# Table of Contents

Preface, *Lindsey Loeper and Auni Gelles*  
1

Introduction to Chapter 1, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 1: From Tobacco Landing to Port City, 1729-1797  
3

Introduction to Chapter 2, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 2: The Golden Age, 1797-1819  
39

Introduction to Chapter 3, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 3: Competing Against the Urban Giants, 1819-1860  
76

Introduction to Chapter 4, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 4: Growth of City Services, 1820-1860  
119

Introduction to Chapter 5, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 5: A Diverse and Volatile City, 1820-1860  
160

Introduction to Chapter 6, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 6: Baltimore’s Civil War, 1861-1867  
186

Introduction to Chapter 7, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 7: Downtown, Neighborhood and Suburb, the Social and Economic Geography of the Baltimore Urban Region, 1865-1920  
202

Introduction to Chapter 8, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 8: Getting Around Town: From Walking City To Motor Vehicle Metropolis, 1844-1920  
226

Introduction to Chapter 9, *Elizabeth M. Nix*  
Chapter 9: The Battle for Baltimore County: Farmers, Suburbanites, and the City, 1865-1920  
268

Bibliography  
Endnotes
Preface

Joseph Larkin Arnold (1937-2004) was a prominent urban historian, a highly regarded professor, and a key leader at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). Dr. Arnold joined the faculty of UMBC—then a very young institution—in 1968 after earning a Ph.D. in social history at the Ohio State University. Dr. Arnold fulfilled a variety of campus leadership roles, including a term as Acting Librarian in 1979-1980. He taught undergraduate and graduate courses on American cities, Baltimore history, historical research methods, and comparative urban history, among other topics. In his field he became known as “the dean of Baltimore historians” for his extensive research on Charm City’s transition from a colonial tobacco port to a modern metropolis. The author of six books and over 60 articles, chapters, and reviews, Dr. Arnold was in the final stages of writing a comprehensive social, political and economic history of Baltimore at the time of his death in January 2004. He had started this research within his first decade at UMBC, compiling his research into chapters starting in the late 1970s and then reworking drafts of each chapter countless times. Dr. Arnold was working on revisions with editor Robert Brugger at the Johns Hopkins University Press, who planned to publish his book. He had composed nine chapters, covering the years of 1729 to 1920.

In May 2004, the Library renamed its collection of research materials on Maryland history in honor of Dr. Arnold. The Joseph L. Arnold Maryland History Collection includes over 3,300 volumes on Maryland history, biography, and literature as well as newspapers, manuscripts and pamphlets. An endowment to develop the collection further was also established with contributions made in his memory. Tom Beck, Chief Curator of Special Collections, worked with the Arnold family to establish the endowment. He noted that “[Arnold’s] dedication and enthusiasm was delightful to watch and infectious to others.”

In 2010, Mary Jane Arnold met with Dr. Kriste Lindenmeyer, then chair of UMBC’s History department, Library Director Dr. Larry Wilt, Chief Curator Tom Beck, and Archivist Lindsey Loeper, to discuss the possibility of making Dr. Arnold’s draft manuscript available to the public. With enthusiasm, those in attendance all agreed to work together to bring the publication to UMBC. Opening both his compiled research files and the unfinished manuscript to the public would not only honor him, but would also benefit future students and scholars of Baltimore’s history – something that he would have found very exciting! This process began with Mary Jane Arnold securing a release from the contract that Dr. Arnold had signed with JHU Press. A project proposal was approved by Dean John Jeffries in June 2013 for the creation of a new Graduate Assistant position to work on the Arnold papers, to be funded in part by the Library, the History department, and the Dean’s Office of the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. The graduate student would work part-time with Dr. Anne Sarah Rubin in the Center for Digital History Education (CDHE) and part-time with Lindsey Loeper in Special Collections.

Prior to the formal partnership with the Library and History departments, Special Collections staff began to work closely with Mary Jane Arnold to transfer Dr. Arnold’s papers and begin the arrangement and description process required to make the papers open to researchers. Graduate Assistant Shae Adams reviewed all of the available draft chapters, in both digital and print form,
to determine the most complete and most current versions. Cited sources in the chapters were also compared and an expanded bibliography was created. Graduate Assistant Auni Gelles completed this work in 2014; she also worked with Mary Jane Arnold to complete archival processing on the first phase of the Joseph L. Arnold papers (Collection 111), prepared the finding aid for the collection, and wrote a biography of Dr. Arnold.

The compiled, unedited chapters were then sent to Dr. Elizabeth M. Nix, Assistant Professor at the University of Baltimore. In addition to her own Baltimore-based scholarship, Dr. Nix’s experience working on the collaborative local history publication, *Baltimore ’68: Riots and Rebirth in an American City* (Temple University Press, 2011), was highly valued for this project. The introductory essays that she wrote for each of Dr. Arnold’s unfinished chapters lead the reader to publications and scholarship produced in the ten years since his passing, and these additional perspectives should both compliment and challenge Dr. Arnold’s work. The development of historical analysis moves quickly, and Dr. Nix’s essays acknowledge the changes that Dr. Arnold could not have anticipated.

Theresa Donnelly completed copyediting the manuscript in 2014. With the exception of a few corrections to names or dates, little relating to the content of Dr. Arnold’s chapters was changed. It is his voice that remains in the manuscript. Lindsey Loeper formatted the manuscript in June 2014.

Many people contributed to the on-going success of this project and they have been listed below. We are particularly thankful for the continued partnership of Mary Jane Arnold – her dedication and spirit have driven this project from the beginning.

Robert J. Brugger, Johns Hopkins University Press  
Dr. Matthew Crenson, Johns Hopkins University  
Dr. Elizabeth M. Nix, University of Baltimore  
Dr. John Jeffries, UMBC  
Dr. Scott Casper, UMBC  
Dr. Larry Wilt, UMBC  
Tom Beck, UMBC  
Dr. Kriste Lindenmeyer, Rutgers University – Camden  
Dr. Marjoleine Kars, UMBC  
Dr. Anne Sarah Rubin, UMBC  
Dr. Daniel Ritschel, UMBC  
Theresa Donnelly, M.A. History at UMBC, 2013  
Shea Adams, M.A. History at UMBC, 2013  
Auni Gelles, M.A. History at UMBC, 2015

*Lindsey Loeper, Archivist  
with assistance from Auni Gelles  
University of Maryland, Baltimore County*
Introduction to Chapter 1
From Tobacco Landing to Port City, 1729-1797
by Elizabeth M. Nix

How did Baltimore grow from a tiny hamlet in 1730 to the third most populous city in the nation in 1800? Joseph Arnold answers this question in the opening chapter of his sweeping account of two hundred years of Baltimore history. Arnold convincingly argues that Baltimore’s success was not due to one charismatic individual who had a compelling vision or to an enthusiastic band of boosters who charted a pragmatic plan for economic growth. Rather, Arnold shows readers that the town’s success as a speculative settlement was birthed almost by the land itself. Arnold paints a picture of the gradual elevations that surrounded the harbor on the Chesapeake Bay, which seemed to provide an efficient route for tobacco rolling roads. When farmers exported their cured leaves to Europe in the 1730s and 1740s, Baltimore jostled for their business with many other tobacco landings along the basin. Arnold demonstrates the advantages of Baltimore’s location in the critical 1750s, when many nearby farmers switched to wheat as a cash crop. The swift streams that flowed into the harbor provided waterpower for grain mills, a crucial piece of the flour supply chain that demanded that farmers process cereal grains before they shipped them. In his comparisons to other fledgling towns in the Mid-Atlantic, Arnold points out that in the Baltimore region farmers could operate most efficiently. They grew their crops in the hinterland, hauled them to Baltimore for milling and then put their sacks of flour on ships that sailed directly to the West Indies and western Europe. The hills, streams and harbor seemed custom made for the profitable flour trade, and by 1776, Baltimore Town had grown into the sixth largest port in the colonies.

To demonstrate the way that Baltimore’s early elite combined traffic in tobacco, flour, and slaves to build the basis for other commercial enterprises, Arnold highlights the career of William Lux, a wealthy exporter, merchant, and farmer, and the eventual owner of some of the thriving ropewalks and tanneries that filled the growing town. He shows that Lux and other successful Baltimoreans supported the cause of independence in the Revolutionary War and reminds readers that the conflict provided a boost to the town’s economy. Despite its anti-British stance, Baltimore came through the war unscathed; the British never occupied the town or attacked it, freeing up its merchants and manufacturers to supply the rest of the colonies. Arnold argues that Baltimore capitalized on its enviable position in the post-Revolutionary period, and new residents poured in. By 1800 Baltimore trailed only New York and Philadelphia in population, and it was the fastest growing city in the new nation. Arnold complicates his portrait of early Baltimore’s successes by detailing the “civic backwardness” of the town leaders as the they
struggled to establish municipal governance, keep the streets passable, promote public health and safety, maintain the harbor, and support of the poor.

Readers who want to continue their research into this period should consult *Freedom's Port: The African American Community of Baltimore, 1790-1860* by Christopher Phillips. Despite the timeframe in its title, the book chronicles the early years of Baltimore and points out that despite its founders' hopes that the town would become a thriving tobacco port, it was not until 1750 that the town exported its first cargo of tobacco by water. Phillips rounds out the story of the transition from tobacco to grain by asserting that Scots-Irish and German settlers brought their traditions of growing cereals through the port of Philadelphia and then into the receptive climate of the Baltimore hinterlands. Seth Rockman continues to chronicle the astronomical rise of the flour trade in *Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery and Survival in Early Baltimore* where he describes the thriving trade with the West Indies, England, and the Iberian Peninsula. To put Baltimore's boomtown experience into the broader context of cities and their hinterlands, look to William Cronon's *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. 
The establishment of Baltimore Town near the mouth of the Patapsco River in 1730 was a minor event, even for those living in the upper region of the Chesapeake Bay. A quarter of a century later it was nothing more than a waterside village, a place like dozens of other little “tobacco landings” sprinkled along the Chesapeake Bay and the navigable ports of its tributary rivers. In the larger commercial world of the American colonies, Baltimore Town remained an inconspicuous actor playing a bit part in a thoroughly provincial theater. That such a place could grow over the next twenty-five years into one of the new nation’s largest and most significant port cities is astonishing. It is testimony to the vast powers of the economic and demographic forces that arose during the second half of the 18th century, and converged on the little town. The eight men most responsible for creating the village back in January 1730 would have been dumbfounded to see the large, wealthy port that had replaced their small village fifty years later.

It may have indeed been the very modest expectations of these eight gentlemen that found only five of them present at its creation on that chilly winter day, even though all but one lived within just a few miles of the town site. The five men who did assemble at a spot on the Northwest Branch of the Patapsco River on the morning of January 12, 1730, came to watch the Baltimore County surveyor, Philip Jones, survey and mark the town’s boundaries. The place was called Cole’s Harbor, but there was no sign of a house, merchant’s store, wharf, or ship. Thomas Cole, long dead by then, took up the original deed to this tract of waterfront property in 1664, attaching his name to a label that had obviously failed to materialize. That was what the assembled party of men hoped to change. Jones drove the first stake made of locust wood into the marshy ground just a few feet from the water’s edge, marking the south-western corner of the town’s
boundaries. As he worked his way back from the water, setting out more stakes, the boundaries of a sixty-acre town gradually appeared. By the time he hammered in the stake marking the spot furthest from the water (near the present intersection of Saratoga and St. Paul streets) the party had moved almost half a mile back from the shore line and up to an elevation of nearly sixty feet. If anyone had taken a moment to scan the horizon, the view was strikingly beautiful. From here they could look down the Northwest Branch to the tip of the Whetstone Peninsula two miles away (where Fort McHenry now stands). Just beyond, the Northwest Branch joined the main stem of the Patapsco River Estuary, a wide body of water flowing another five miles before disappearing, on the far horizon, into the great Chesapeake Bay. The estuary, like the bay itself, was (in 1730) one of the richest and most diverse aquatic environments in the world. As far as the eye could see the waterway was lined with wide marshes, which most of the year were alive with tens of thousands of waterfowl. The estuary itself contained huge oyster beds, many of them so large they protruded above the water at all times except at high tide. Some of the tasty bivalves were as large as a horse’s hoof. Vast swarms of fish swam in the estuary, thriving on the blend of salt and fresh water plus a rich mixture of aquatic plants and microscopic animal life. The bottom was covered with an equally rich layer of these nutrients on which millions of blue crabs eagerly fed.

To the west marshes turned to meadows that provided a gateway to miles of fertile forests. The edge of these woodlands had been named Hunting Ridge, and as the name indicates, they provided a home for deer, elk, and a variety of smaller game. The soil out of which the forest grew was rich and well watered, capable of producing a wide range of crops or grazing livestock. River and bay, forest and meadow, it was (in that nearly pristine age) a juncture of land and water yielding a full menu of nature’s more delicious creatures and the means of raising a cornucopia of agricultural products.

The men assembled on the Northwest Branch that cold morning probably paid little attention to the magnificent scenes that surrounded them. They had more pressing business at hand. The charter granted by the Maryland General Assembly in 1729 designated the site as “Baltemore Town” and appointed seven individuals to act as “Commissioners of Baltemore Town.” The eighth “founding father” was Charles Carroll of Annapolis, the owner of the 550-acre Coles Harbor tract, a small portion of which he had sold to the commissioners. As the largest land owner in Maryland, with thousands of acres spread out in various tracts all across the colony, Carroll probably declined to become an eighth commissioner. The little Baltimore Town project would not have been worth his time and effort to come up to the Patapsco for meetings of the Town Commission. While the seven commissioners all lived in the vicinity of the lower Patapsco and were men of property and leaders in the local community of tobacco planters, none remotely approached Carroll in wealth or status. Five of the seven were on hand to watch Mr. Jones stake out the lines of their new town.
Chapter 1: From Tobacco Landing to Port City, 1729-1797

It takes only a quick search of local records to recognize that the commissioners were members of Baltimore County’s economic and political elite, although the term “elite” needs some qualification. In 1730, the region was still a half-settled frontier. The first pioneers entered the area in the 1650s, but hostile Indians and the hilly terrain discouraged rapid settlement. Only 6,000 people lived in the county in 1730, most residing just a mile or two from the bay. There still existed tracts of land facing the water that remained uninhabited and uncultivated. Further inland in the central and western sections of the county lay forested hills and valleys nearly untouched by any white men save hunters and property surveyors. By 1730 hunters had made a noticeable dent in the elk population while surveyors had marked out several hundred tracts of the best land which had been purchased (at very low prices) by frontier real estate investors. The speculators hoped these lands would soon attract pioneering families moving into the county and they would be willing to pay a higher price for a five to ten acre property on which to build a small cabin and begin planting tobacco, the great staple crop of the region. The land speculators were a small number of the better-off planters living mostly in the southeastern (Patapsco) region of the county. One such individual was Thomas Sheredine, who purchased a 250 acre tract fourteen miles inland (near today’s Hunt Valley Office Park) and named it, in a moment of unusual candor, “The World’s End.” Speculators like Sheredine, who comprised the top tenth of the county’s planters, had enough capital to invest in frontier lands, but could not yet be called wealthy compared to the top tenth in Maryland’s older counties. The wealthiest Baltimore County planters cultivated moderate-sized tracts of land with few indentured servants and/or slaves. In contrast, the county’s more typical planters worked just a few acres with no servants or slaves and lived in cabins with little more than the bare necessities. However, even the wealthiest settlers lived in modest houses that boasted relatively few luxuries. A number drew income from a second occupation as a merchant, physician, tavern keeper, artisan manufacturer or local government official. The General Assembly turned to this class of men as they selected the leaders of Baltimore Town and a brief résumé of the commissioners’ backgrounds fills out the picture.

Thomas Tolly, the first commissioner named in the charter, owned a substantial amount of land, although most of it was held for speculation. He had served in a number of public offices and in 1712 helped lay out Joppa Town, a small tobacco port and the county seat, located near the mouth of the Little Gunpowder River fifteen miles north of Baltimore Town. Richard Gist was Deputy Surveyor of the Western Shore and owned over 2,000 acres of land, much of it in the lush, but still largely unsettled, Greenspring Valley ten miles northwest of Cole’s Harbor. William Buckner also owned several hundred acres but probably owed his selection to the fact that he was the son-in-law of Richard Colgate, one of the most influential political figures in the Patapsco region and a man who had struggled for years to have the county government removed from Joppa Town to some location on the Patapsco. Dr. George Buchanan combined tobacco planting with medicine and by 1729 held twelve different parcels of land in the lower and middle sections of the county totaling 1,600 acres. Another physician, Dr. George Walker, had developed what
seems to have been a good medical practice in Anne Arundel County but, like so many others in that overcrowded district, he moved to Baltimore County in 1715 and before long built “Chatsworth,” a fine 800 acre plantation located just a mile north west of the town site. Finally, William Hammond came to Baltimore County from a large, prominent family in Anne Arundel County and by the 1720s had established himself as a major figure in the Patapsco region. He of course planted tobacco, but was also a land speculator, merchant, partner in a local iron furnace and owner of the main ferry crossing on the Patapsco River, five miles southwest of Baltimore Town. Hammond served as a justice of the peace and vestryman of St. Paul’s, the local Anglican Church. His cousin was John Moale, a tobacco planter and merchant who operated a private tobacco landing at the entrance to the Middle Branch of the Patapsco, two miles south of Cole’s Harbor. The commissioners initially approached Moale to purchase their town site from him, but when these negotiations fell through, they turned to Cole’s Harbor.

By the time Governor Benedict Leonard Calvert signed the Baltimore Town charter in August 1729 the commissioners had nearly completed negotiations with Charles Carroll of Annapolis to purchase a town site at Cole’s Harbor. Carroll’s father, Charles Carroll the Settler, had purchased Cole’s Harbor 1701 as an investment. A stream called Jones Falls ran through the property and in 1711 he sold a small tract along the waterway to a Quaker miller named Jonathan Hanson who built a house and a water-powered gristmill. This was the last piece of Cole’s Harbor that Carroll Sr. sold, either because he wished to retain the rest or, more likely, because he received no other acceptable offers. Even the development of a wagon trail through the tract with the inflated name “Great Eastern Road,” failed to stimulate interest in the property. By the time the Baltimore Town commissioners became interested in Cole’s Harbor, Carroll the Settler was dead and the property had passed to his sons, Charles Carroll (of Annapolis) and Daniel Carroll. Carroll of Annapolis handled all the negotiations for himself and his brother, leaping at the opportunity to become an enthusiastic supporter of the project. He and the commissioners quickly came to an agreement on the sale of that portion of Cole’s Harbor to be laid out as Baltimore Town (the price was £ 120 for sixty acres). They designated January 12, 1730 as the day to lay out its boundaries. After staking out the boundaries, county surveyor Jones turned to the streets and lots. Long Street (now Baltimore Street) ran east-west, roughly parallel to the waterline. Even though it was only two fifths of a mile long (the length of the town) it was four perches (sixty-six feet) wide, a generous width for an eighteenth century street. Long Street was intersected by two north-south streets, Forrest (now Charles) and Calvert. They were forty-nine feet wide. Several narrow (sixteen and one-half foot) lanes were laid out, creating seventeen “blocks” for the sixty town lots. Buyers were required to build one house of at least 400 square feet on each lot within eighteen months. A twenty-by-twenty foot log cabin would suffice. With all the stakes in place, the commissioners assigned each lot a number. They appointed Dr. George Walker to be the town clerk and provided him with a journal for noting the commission’s actions and recording lot sales. Two days later, on January 14 they met again at the town site, this time
Chapter 1: From Tobacco Landing to Port City, 1729-1797

with Charles Carroll. The purchase agreement allowed the Carroll brothers to select one lot for themselves. They chose lot forty-nine, the most centrally located piece of waterfront property. After that business was completed, the commissioners opened sales to the public. Seven people, including three of the commissioners, purchased lots the first day. The next day three more were sold. The recording of these initial lot sales signaled the real birth of Baltimore Town.

Tobacco Port

Why did these men want to create a tobacco port on the Patapsco estuary? Elkridge Landing already existed about six miles up the main stem of the Patapsco and only seven miles southwest of the Middle Branch. No clear answer can be found in the records, but the commissioners and those other local planters who supported the project seem to have been motivated by three factors. First, the perceived need for a port that was closer to the tobacco farms north and northwest of the Middle Branch. Second, and perhaps even more significant, the desire to have a port located in Baltimore County (Elkridge Landing stood on the south side of the Patapsco in Anne Arundel County). Third, the hope that the waterside village might grow into a small port town and the original lot purchasers might profit from increasing land values.

It was essential for a tobacco planter to have a shipping point reasonably close to his farm. Throughout the Chesapeake, planters packed their tobacco in large 500-1,000 pound wooden barrels called hogsheads and rolled them down to the closest shipping point, often called a landing. There local merchants, acting as agents for various British importers in London, inspected the quality of the tobacco, negotiated a purchase agreement, and then stored the hogsheads until the next ship arrived to carry them across the Atlantic. Planters living just north and west of the Middle Branch who took their tobacco to the merchant-traders at Elkridge Landing encountered few difficulties moving their tobacco-filled hogsheads down to this commercial village; however, many of the wealthier planters in the area, including all the town commissioners, owned substantial amounts of property ten or fifteen miles further inland. Today these lands lie in a wide arc roughly following the Baltimore Beltway (I-695) from approximately Liberty Road to Towson. Once cleared of trees, the valleys in this rolling upland proved excellent ground for growing tobacco. The obvious drawback of this area was its greater distance from Elkridge, and the number of ridges to be surmounted. It is difficult today to understand why an extra distance of five or ten miles, or the crossing of 300-500 foot gently sloping ridges, would substantially increase the dangers of moving tobacco down to the water, but such was the case. Beyond the basic quality of the tobacco itself (and of course the market price in London) the major factor determining its value was its condition upon arrival at the landing. Unfortunately, dried tobacco leaves are rather fragile and every extra mile and every hill threatened to damage the golden leaves or even crack the hogshead. This was particularly true in the upland region where the unpaved trails called “rolling roads,” were more uneven and rocky than those on the
flat, sandy Coastal Plain. The distance to a landing was bound to lower the value of Baltimore County’s inland tobacco plantations. A port on the Middle Branch of the Patapsco would be a shorter and safer trip for the inland planters and increase land values.

The other compelling reason for seeking an alternate port to Elkridge Landing was the location of the village in Anne Arundel County. A petition that accompanied the Baltimore Town bill sent to the General Assembly in 1729 stated that “a Town is much wanting on the North side of Patapsco River,” a fairly clear reference to Elkridge. Why the fuss? The most likely reason was the desire of Baltimore County planters to use their own court in Joppa Town for the settlement of disputes with the merchants who handled the export of their tobacco. As it stood, commercial disagreements were settled at the Anne Arundel county court in Annapolis, over twenty miles away and in a court where Baltimore County residents had little influence.

Finally, at least some of the commissioners must have hoped that Baltimore Town might grow into a major landing with several hundred residents where their real estate investments would bring a profit. This last motivation was evidently not entirely compelling. Two of the seven commissioners did not even purchase a lot. The lack of total enthusiasm may be explained by the fact that such ventures in the Chesapeake region seldom led to the growth of even a modest sized commercial community. While dozens of tobacco ports dotted the region in 1730, there were almost as many abandoned sites. Those that survived remained very small. The difficulty of transporting tobacco overland made it impossible for any particular town to develop an extensive commercial hinterland and become a major port. In all of Maryland, only Annapolis approached the size of a real town, and this was due to its role as the colonial capital rather than its activities as a port.

Baltimore Town survived, but the venture could hardly be called an immediate success. Lot sales proceeded haltingly and the construction of houses was even rarer. During the first year fourteen lots were sold. Among the buyers were Capt. Robert North, a prominent local tobacco merchant, and several well-known county planters such as Lloyd Harris, John Gorsuch, Thomas Sheredine, and John Ristau. Almost half of the original buyers failed to build houses on their lots within the specified time and the properties reverted to the commissioners. By 1734 only about a dozen houses stood within the town. Two years later, Carroll of Annapolis purchased twenty-six of the vacant lots, adding them to the one he had selected in 1730. He was apparently exempted from the requirement to build on the lots, for they all remained unimproved. Fourteen years passed before he could sell any of them.

The sluggish pace of growth stemmed in part from the still relatively underdeveloped state of Baltimore County’s agricultural economy, but it may also have been caused by the establishment of nearby Jones Town in 1732. Laid out along the east side of a small river called Jones Falls, the southern edge of the ten-acre town site lay just 350 yards from the eastern edge of Baltimore Town across the falls and its adjacent marshland. Whether founded as a rival settlement or a complementary one is unclear. Among the five Jones Town commissioners who
Chapter 1: From Tobacco Landing to Port City, 1729-1797

purchased the site from Edward Fell were Robert North and Thomas Sheredine, men who had also bought lots in Baltimore Town in 1730, but failed to build on them in the two years since the charter. Perhaps the men decided that the new site, about a third of a mile from the mouth of the falls, just below Hanson’s mill, constituted a better opportunity than the one in which they had originally invested. Better evidence points to a more cooperative venture and a fairly close personal relationship between the two groups of town promoters. Dr. Walker, the Baltimore Town Commissioner and Town Clerk, held the same offices for the Jones Town commissioners. Walker had recently married the widow of Jonathan Hanson who had purchased several Jones Town lots. Shortly thereafter, William Hammond, another Baltimore Town commissioner, married Sheredine’s sister. Lots in Jones Town sold rather well during the first several years, although it is does not appear that many houses were built on them during the first two decades.

An even clearer sign of cooperation occurred in 1740 when the two sets of town commissioners joined to construct a bridge and causeway over Jones Falls and the adjacent marshes, linking the two communities. This project led to a realignment of the Great Eastern Road from the ford above Hanson’s Mill to the new bridge. This route carried wagon traffic, now running at a heavier volume than a decade before, directly into Baltimore Town along Baltimore Street. Five years later the towns merged, but did so under the single name of Baltimore Town. A new town commission emerged with three men from the Jones Town commission, four Baltimore commissioners and two new men, Thomas Harrison and Capt. Darby Lux, both residing in Baltimore Town. The newcomers had been born in England and prospered in the tobacco trade between London and the Chesapeake. Lux sold convicts and indentured servants from Britain and Ireland, plus slaves from the West Indies. In 1742 Harrison purchased two lots on South Lane (now South Street) and Lux bought two on Light Lane (later Light Street). Both became merchant traders and with the substantial capital they possessed quickly became leaders in the little community. The arrival of Harrison and Lux was the first evidence that the town had begun to attract the interest of shrewd, successful businessmen from the world beyond Baltimore County.

Baltimore’s population increased slowly and small annexations in 1747, 1750, and 1753 doubled its territory. Still, it remained a small waterside village. A drawing of the community made in 1752 by the young John Moale, Jr. shows twenty-five buildings, four of them brick structures and the rest made of wood or logs. A wharf is depicted at the foot of Calvert Street and two vessels are shown anchored in the harbor. One is Capt. Lux’s sloop *Baltimore* and the other a brig belonging to Nicholas Rogers, another local tobacco merchant. From a partial list of residents in 1752 it is known that the town contained approximately 200 residents, some of whom were indentured servants and slaves. The free white population included half a dozen merchants, a number of artisans, a wagoner, two tavern keepers, and the Barnetz brothers, who were German brewers.⁶
Grain and Flour Exporter

Young Moale could not have known that his drawing portrayed the village on the eve of a profound transformation. During the late 1740s and 1750s Baltimore’s merchants gradually woke up to the fact that they could market other commodities beside tobacco. The most profitable were wheat and flour. For some years sugar cane planters in the British West Indies had been importing flour from Philadelphia and New York. Baltimore’s merchants were undoubtedly aware of this trade, but it took some time for them to enter it themselves. Baltimore’s immediate hinterland was devoted to tobacco and the market for the golden leaves, while not as profitable as it had once been, remained steady. The gradual shift from tobacco to wheat and flour exporting appears to have been driven not so much by the town’s merchants going out into the countryside to buy wheat, but by an increasing number of farmers carrying it to Baltimore, seeking out the merchants.

The farmers entering Baltimore with sacks of wheat slung over their pack horses came from a new, more distant, and rapidly growing agricultural frontier in what Baltimoreans simply called “the back country.” Between the 1740s and 1770s thousands of English, German, Scotch Irish and American-born farmers took up land in the area now encompassed by Carroll, Harford, Frederick, and Washington counties in Maryland, and across the Mason-Dixon line in York and Cumberland counties, in south-central Pennsylvania. These rich new agricultural lands stretched in a broad arc from Frederick and Hagerstown in Maryland to Gettysburg, Carlisle, Hanover, and York in Pennsylvania. For wheat farmers now entering this region, Baltimore proved to be a closer and more convenient port than Philadelphia. Unlike tobacco, wheat and flour could be carried a long distance. Most tobacco shipped out of Baltimore came from plantations within a fifteen to twenty mile radius, an area of 300-400 square miles. The new wheat-growing hinterland extended fifty to sixty miles into the backcountry, a region in excess of 4,000 square miles.

Baltimore’s merchants entered the West Indian flour trade at just the right moment. This was the era when Indies sugar trade burgeoned in response to Britain’s seemingly insatiable demand for sugar and a growing taste for rum (distilled from molasses). West Indian planters, who had previously raised a variety of crops, including tobacco, concentrated more and more of their land on sugar cane and imported hundreds of thousands of African slaves to raise and process this valuable plant. By 1770 the population of the British West Indies, less than half a dozen small islands with a combined land area half the size of Maryland, had a total population of almost half a million, approximately 45,000 whites and 434,000 enslaved Africans. Maryland at this time was populated by 150,000 whites and 50,000 enslaved people. Eventually, an acre of West Indian sugar cane reached a value five times greater than an acre of wheat, so planters put every available plot of land into cane and imported flour to feed themselves and their enslaved workforce. American ports had a great advantage over those in England in providing these commodities. British ships required at least two months to reach the West Indies and spoilage was
a serious problem. American shippers could deliver a cargo in half the time and Baltimore, closer to the West Indies than Philadelphia or New York, and using fast Chesapeake pilot boats (later called Baltimore clippers) could make the run even faster.

Turning wheat into flour was an easy task for Baltimore’s shippers. Sitting so fortunately on the very edge of the Piedmont Plateau with numerous streams flowing rapidly down from this upland region, the town was surrounded with innumerable mill sites. Jones Falls alone was capable of powering a dozen mills besides the old Hanson mill. As the demand for flour increased, new mills appeared on Jones Falls and along other nearby streams. By 1820, at the height of the water-power era, over a hundred mills surrounded the town. The seventy-three Baltimore County roads which still have the word “mill” in their name are a reminder of this large industry.

Along the Chesapeake Bay, no other port could match the happy combination of geography that existed in the region of the lower Patapsco. Norfolk, about 160 miles south of Baltimore at the mouth of the bay, offered some serious competition because it stood at the gateway to the Atlantic and was obviously a bit closer to the West Indies, but it did not have as many good mill sites nor such a large wheat growing hinterland. In the upper bay, Annapolis lay too far east of the wheat growing region and its relatively flat terrain provided very few mill sites. Joppa and Elkridge, their muddy waters growing ever shallower, were completely out of the running. Across the bay from Baltimore, several small ports on the upper Eastern Shore (where large amounts of wheat were also grown) were competitors for a time, but the flat terrain precluded milling. Increasingly, Eastern Shore farmers sent their wheat across the bay to Baltimore. Further south, Georgetown on the Potomac was equally close to the wheat growing backcountry as Baltimore, and streams in its immediate vicinity were also quite suitable for flour mills. The town’s great drawback was its location over a hundred miles up the Potomac from the Chesapeake Bay. This distance made shipping quite unpredictable when windless days becalmed vessels trying to ascend the river. In contrast, the open waters of the bay were just eleven miles downstream from Baltimore and a breeze was almost always wafting across the wide Patapsco estuary.

The one challenge for ship captains sailing in the Patapsco was its increasing shallowness as they approached the Northwest Branch. Relatively deep natural channels existed, but they periodically shifted position. Those who did not know the current state of the waterway could easily run aground. The waters of the Northwest Branch were even shallower except those adjacent to Fells Point, a small hook-shaped peninsula about a mile east of Baltimore Town. Nevertheless, ship captains who knew the waters well or took on an experienced pilot as they entered them could sail into the Baltimore Town wharves with little danger of running aground. Thus in almost every respect, Baltimore’s location was superior to any other Chesapeake port for gathering in large amounts of wheat, grinding it into flour, and shipping it to the West Indies—or to any of the other ports of the Atlantic World.
The first person to send wheat or flour down the Patapsco from Baltimore Town will never be known. Some of the town’s tobacco merchants undoubtedly shipped small quantities of wheat to the West Indies as early as 1740 and some wheat may have been shipped to England in 1740-1741 when poor harvests led to great scarcity and food riots. The first well documented export of wheat, which came to symbolize the town’s commercial transformation, occurred in 1752 when Dr. John Stevenson, a Baltimore physician turned merchant, sent a full cargo of grain from Baltimore to Northern Ireland. The large profit he earned from this venture sent several other local merchants scurrying to enter the trade, looking not only to Ireland, but other West European nations as well. At almost the same moment that Dr. Stevenson became Baltimore’s first full-time grain exporter, flour shipments to the West Indies began to shift from a small, irregular business into a large, very profitable commercial operation—outshining the European trade for over a decade.

The great boom in Western European demand for both grain and flour arose from a series of poor harvests on the continent during the mid-1760s, but the more long-term factor was massive European population growth during the eighteenth century. During the two centuries between 1500 and 1700 European population had grown from 100 million to 150 million. From 1700 to 1800 it grew twice as fast, reaching 200 million by the end of the century. In countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy, the climate and their still largely medieval agricultural systems could not keep up with the demand for flour, and they came to depend on British imports of grain. Great Britain also experienced a population boom, but aside from the brief crisis of 1740-1741, was seldom required to import any wheat. Its wet climate and more modern agricultural system allowed wheat growers to keep pace with the nation’s demographic expansion, but little was now left for export. Consequently, the ports of the Iberian Peninsula, and to a lesser extent Italy, became the focus of Baltimore’s grain and flour trade.

These vast economic and demographic changes in Europe and the West Indies led steadily towards an enormous increase in Baltimore’s exports and a decisive shift from tobacco to grain and flour. Tobacco continued to be shipped from the town as well as large amounts of corn, and bar iron, but by the 1770s grain and flour far exceeded the combined value of all other products. From exporting just a small amount of grain and flour in the late 1740s, Baltimore merchants were exporting about 90,000 bushels of wheat and 10,000 barrels of flour by 1760. Ten years later exports reached 250,000 bushels of wheat and 70,000 barrels of flour (milled from approximately 320,000 bushels of grain).

Leaders of Baltimore Town recognized the value of exercising some sort of quality control over the flour that the town’s merchants exported, but they were not convinced of the best way to implement a system. For some years they tried to negotiate private agreements among themselves. None proved satisfactory. Finally, in 1768 they asked the General Assembly to establish an official protocol to eliminate entirely the export of bad flour and grade the rest according to its quality: “Super-Fine,” “Fine,” “Middlings,” and “Ship-stuff.” Each barrel leaving the port now carried the
brand of its quality. The commissioners appointed Jonathan Hanson, Jr. as the town’s first Inspector of Flour. Hanson had inherited his father’s mill on Jones Falls and built three others. As the largest most knowledgeable miller in the town, he made certain Baltimore’s “Superfine” equaled the highest quality flour sent out by any port on the Atlantic Coast.

The one brake on the pace of growth was the absence of good transportation links between Baltimore and the backcountry. Frederick was forty-five miles west of Baltimore and Hagerstown sixty-five. In Pennsylvania, York lay almost fifty miles away and Carlisle nearly seventy. The transportation routes from these towns into Baltimore began as pack horse trails in the 1740s then widened during the 1750s to permit the passage of wagons. Packhorses managed to carry thousands of bushels of wheat into Baltimore Town during the middle 1740s; however, once wagons took over the trade the number of bushels climbed into the hundreds of thousands.

Surprisingly, Baltimore’s leaders do not appear to have played much of a role in the development of roads into the backcountry, although they supported such projects within Baltimore County itself. They did, however, attempt to attract farmers into the town in other ways. In 1747 the town commissioners petitioned the General Assembly to allow them to hold a spring and fall fair just outside the town on land owned by Cornelius Howard (on the site of the present Lexington Market). They intended the fairs to act as “an Encouragement to the back Inhabitants and others to bring Commodities there to vend and sell.”8 The fairs become a major local event. Vendors sold food, drink, and all types of goods. There were games of chance, horse racing, cock fighting, dancing, and general gallivanting. As one disapproving group of local residents asserted, the fairs only served to provide “an opportunity for... drunkenness, gaming and the vilest immoralities.”9 Economically useful or not, they were obviously quite enjoyable.

Seeking a permanent place for backcountry farmers to sell meat, vegetables, and other fresh items on a regular basis, a group of merchants began to raise money in 1748 to build a market house, but lack of adequate funding put the project off until 1762. Once opened, the institution thrived and the modest sized market quickly became too small to accommodate all the vendors and shoppers; once again the townspeople made do with the existing arrangement for almost twenty years. A new, larger building was not erected until 1784. Along the waterfront, the town’s response to its growing trade also remained inadequate. Several privately owned wharves now supplemented the lone public wharf at the foot of Calvert Street, but they were not numerous or long enough to keep pace with the rising maritime activity or the decreasing depth of the water (a result of silt washing into the basin from Jones Falls). Behind the wharves, merchants did build new, larger stores and warehouses, although the streets in front of them remained unpaved. Dusty in dry weather and a sea of mud when it rained, these thoroughfares alternated between highly uncomfortable and nearly impassable.

The merchants’ fumbling attempts to create an effective flour inspection system, their lackadaisical approach to upgrading the town’s commercial streets and shipping facilities, and their limited interest in improving the transportation links with the backcountry— all seem
curious in view of their undoubted desire to expand trade. Perhaps they realized Baltimore had no serious rival, and therefore its trade would escalate even without significant expenditures on local improvements. To many, it may have seemed that the town was being lifted by an almost mystical destiny. Clarence Gould, one of the most famous historians of Colonial Maryland, used the word “magical” to describe the effect of the new trade on the former tobacco landing. “What had been an obscure village was becoming the talk of the province, in a decade it had become the most important center of Maryland’s trade, and in two decades it was safely among the leading seaports of America.”

Diversification

News of Baltimore’s commercial success did indeed reach nearly every port city in the Atlantic world. William Eddis, a royal official serving in Maryland during the early 1770s, recalled the rapid spread of the little town’s fame during the previous decade. “The commencement of a trade so lucrative to the first adventurers soon became an object of universal attention. Persons of a commercial and enterprising spirit emigrated from all quarters to this new and promising scene of industry.” Baltimore’s population soared. By 1768 it had become a genuine town with over 350 houses and a population of approximately 2,000. Eight years later, on the eve of the American Revolution Baltimore’s population of 5,900 put it in sixth place among the twenty major port towns of America.

The growth of the grain and flour trade attracted backcountry sellers of other commodities. Baltimore’s merchants began to handle corn, flax (for linen), pork, lumber, barrel staves, and other products of the field and forest. Iron bars, produced at local furnaces, brought very good prices in Britain, Portugal and Spain where they supplied blacksmiths and other manufacturers of finished iron products. With plenty of forests for charcoal, local iron exporters increased their volume of production throughout the colonial era. The expansion of the export trade into new commodities required the services of a labor force with a broad range of skills to process the new items. The same held true for imported goods, which now arrived in great quantities on returning vessels. On to Baltimore’s wharves came manufactured products from Europe, wine from Spain and Portugal, sugar and molasses (for distilling rum) from the West Indies. Those who purchased large amounts of these goods established Baltimore’s wholesale trade, supplying itinerant retail traders and country store merchants throughout Maryland and south-central Pennsylvania.

Increased trade required more ships and this led to the growth of a substantial shipbuilding and repair industry along Middle Branch waterfront. By the 1770s Baltimore merchants owned over sixty ships and hundreds more visited the port each year. The largest cluster of shipyards was centered on Fells Point where the water was deeper and vessels of almost any size could dock easily. The small peninsula and the little village that grew up there, stood on
land originally owned by William Fell whose nephew Edward Fell laid out the town’s streets 1763. The establishment of several shipyards at “the point” augmented its already large shipping business and completed its foundation as a thoroughly maritime community. Shipyards developed into Baltimore’s most large-scale and complex industry. They required the services of a wide variety of artisans: carpenters, joiners, sail makers, riggers, caulkers, painters, cabinetmakers, coppersmiths, and marine blacksmiths. Local iron furnaces and forges supplied the shipyards with everything from nails to thousand-pound anchors.

The town’s growing population of both permanent residents and visitors (from the countryside and from ships in the port) offered many opportunities for retail and service trades. Grocers, tailors, seamstresses, furniture makers, silver smiths, book sellers, house painters, private tutors, and individuals pursuing several dozen other trades could be found in the town. The rich could afford fine goods from Europe, but a number of local tradesmen also produced high quality items. The tailor James Cox made several fine coats for Daniel Carroll and a “sute of velvit” for the merchant and real estate developer Jonathan Plowman. Fine furniture could be purchased from Gerard Hopkins, a Philadelphia furniture maker who moved his business to Baltimore in 1767. The large scale manufacturing of spinning wheels began in 1775 when David Poe, a Scotch-Irishman, arrived from Londonderry and began producing these valuable domestic machines. Visitors to Baltimore could refresh themselves or spend the night at one of approximately thirty taverns, inns or boarding houses. The professions were represented by five clergymen, eight lawyers, eleven physicians, and a fluctuating number of women practicing the oldest profession—a sure sign of a growing port.

Throughout the colonial era Baltimore’s population was principally composed of three groups: Anglo-Americans, Germans, and Scotch-Irishmen. African Americans were present in the town, but probably accounted for less than 5 percent of the residents. Because almost all of them were enslaved, we know comparatively little about their lives. Anglo-Americans, both native and English born, constituted the great majority of Baltimore’s residents, but Germans and Scotch-Irishmen also entered the town in large numbers, the Scotch-Irishmen especially making their presence felt. Most of the Germans and Scotch-Irish came to Baltimore from the colony of Pennsylvania, which encouraged these groups to immigrate and help settle its vast central and western regions. The German immigrants came primarily from the Rhineland. Thousands arrived in North America the 1690-1715 era, fleeing the almost constant warfare between France and the German Rhineland states that ravaged that rich agricultural region. A considerably smaller group than the Rhineland Germans, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of Northern Ireland were not in such a desperate a position; nevertheless, they had some good reasons to doubt their future on that troubled island. Transplanted from Scotland by the English government during the seventeenth century, they were hated by the Roman Catholic Irish as invaders and Protestant heretics. They also found themselves discriminated against by the ruling English Anglicans who disliked both their Presbyterian religion and Scottish ethnicity. Thousands of them immigrated once again to
America. Most arrived in Philadelphia and soon spread out along the Pennsylvania frontier and down into central and western Maryland.

The Germans followed the same path out from Philadelphia, arriving in Maryland’s Monocacy Valley in the 1740s where they established the town of Frederick in 1745. Soon, the stories about the growing port of Baltimore convinced some of them to trade their farms on the Monocacy for houses overlooking the Patapsco. Not long after, Germans from Hanover, York, and adjacent areas of Pennsylvania began arriving in the town, meeting the first groups of immigrants disembarking from Germany itself. Only a few of these immigrants (or in-migrants) ended up as merchant-traders, but those with artisan skills did quite well and others prospered as shopkeepers and tavern owners.

The most prominent German in Baltimore during the colonial era was Dr. Carl Wiesenthal, who arrived from Germany in 1755. A physician from Prussia, he became the leader of the town’s medical profession. His good education and wide cultural interests allowed him to move easily among the community’s elite merchant class. Yet Wiesenthal was something of an exception. Baltimore’s Anglo-Americans welcomed the Germans and respected them for their skills, reliability and work habits, but generally kept them at arm’s length. They were regarded as outsiders with odd customs plus a Lutheran religion that could not be understood because its services were conducted in German. Language was a significant issue since this was the first large foreign-language group to enter the community. A small number of poor French Arcadians had been dumped in the town by the British in 1756, but they seem to have aroused more pity than suspicion or resentment. The Germans were a much larger group, and many saw no reason to shed their Germanic culture. Many of the adults, could not (some said would not) learn the English language, and even those who did (almost all children) continued to use the mother tongue with other Germans and to live as much as possible as they had in the old country, a behavior that appeared to some “Americans” to be an implied insult to their new home. 13

The Scotch-Irish who came to Baltimore do not seem to have been looked upon as foreigners. They spoke English, their Presbyterian religion could be easily understood, and its intellectual rigor, along with its stern theology, was respected even by many who thought it overly grim and harsh. Those Scotch-Irishmen who ended up in Baltimore followed much the same pattern as the Germans, moving from Europe to the American frontier and then “backwards” into Baltimore. Some had experience as shopkeepers and merchants, arriving in town with enough money to buy property and launch themselves into trade or artisan manufacturing. A number of others, emigrating directly from Northern Ireland had gained skills in Belfast, Londonderry, or Donegal. Within a decade or two several dozen emerged as wealthy international traders and the names Smith, Buchannan, Sterett, Spear, Purviance, McHenry, and McKim became well known in the town. With the arrival of these two ethnic groups, Baltimore received an infusion of talent unequalled by any other community in the Chesapeake region or perhaps any of the southern colonies.
Chapter 1: From Tobacco Landing to Port City, 1729-1797

On the eve of the American Revolution Baltimore was unmistakably a major port city. Its wharves were a beehive of activity, the (still) unpaved streets full of carts, carriages, and wagons, its shops and warehouses crammed with European goods. Most striking were the hundreds of new houses ranging from the jerry-built shacks of the poor to comfortable wood and brick dwellings for the middling classes and some elegant new mansions for its great merchants. The international merchant-traders, a group of about seventy or eighty individuals, stood at the center of this maritime community.14 The prosperity of the town ultimately depended on the success of their business activities and they exerted a wide influence in almost all matters. Memories of them survive everywhere on city street signs and other city landmarks. One cannot spend much time in Baltimore even today without seeing the names of individuals such as Daniel McHenry, Nicholas Ruxton Gay, John Ridgely, Richard Lemmon, Jonathan Hudson, James Calhoun, Nicholas Rogers, William Asquith, Jonathan Plowman, James Stirling, George Prestman, Alexander McMechan, and Brian Philpot. The senior members of the merchant community began trading out of Baltimore before 1750 while the majority would enter the business during the next twenty-five years. From the beginning, the town’s wealthiest merchants intermarried with one another and with the larger local planters. As young men achieved wealth and manifested the behavior of gentlemen, they too entered into economic and connubial relations with Baltimore’s “polite society.” How refined or polite these wealthy families actually were in the booming, pioneer town may be questioned. Some of the leading families’ members could be rough, lewd or crude, but on the whole they do not seem to be particularly violent or debased.15

William Lux straddled both the old and new generations of merchants, providing a useful insight into the entire group. It will be recalled that his father, Captain Darby Lux, arrived in Baltimore in the 1740s and made a comfortable living trading tobacco, convicts, and slaves. When the captain died in 1750, William inherited the business and after a few years began to shift it into the overseas flour trade. Lux became a major West Indian merchant, trading primarily in Barbados where his younger brother, Darby, Jr., served as agent. In the 1760s he commenced trading with ports in England and Ireland, but soon turned to Spain, Portugal and the Madeira Islands. Cadiz, Spain became the most frequent destination of his cargoes. Lux’s ships were a familiar sight sailing past the fortress of San Sebastian and into Spain’s ancient harbor, the main shipping point for Spanish sherry.

Lux’s letter books reveal that buying and selling in the capricious Atlantic marketplace carried great risks as well as high profits and required something of a gambler’s compulsion to continue the game. Wars and storms could bring disaster. If a cargo had not been contracted to a buyer at a fixed price, it sold at public auction at the port where it was landed. This could bring even larger profits or losses. The price Lux hoped to receive for his goods at auction necessarily depended on outdated information, so he gave his ship captains considerable discretion as to where to land their cargo. In 1764 Lux instructed one of his captains to head for the Madeira Islands with a cargo of wheat, flour, corn and iron; but added “if you should meet any ship at sea
from Lisbon or Cadiz and learn Markets are high there, it would be more of our Interest to go there.” A year later, reflecting on a wheat shipment to Cadiz that brought half the expected price, he wrote to a friend, “I really believe I must for the future make my own Bargains, & not trust to the fluctuations of distant Markets. But I do not know how to restrain myself as I cannot help wishing to trust something to Chance. Hope, you know is the great Cherisher of Human Happiness.”

Lux also trafficked in slaves and indentured servants. He purchased indentured servants in England and Ireland, selling them on Baltimore’s wharves much like slaves except, of course, their terms of service were for a fixed number of years. In spite of some occasionally heavy losses during the Atlantic crossing, most survived and usually brought Lux a reasonable profit. Slaves were another matter. He purchased small numbers of them in the West Indies, hoping to gain a quick profit by selling them right off the ship when it returned to Baltimore, but more times than not he seems to have lost money in these transactions. Writing back to his brother Darby Jr. in Barbados in 1765, William said, “Our Negro Purchase turned out very bad. We lost one, the others will not sell for prime by £30.” A number of other Baltimore merchants trading in the West Indies also brought small numbers of slaves into the port along with their regular cargoes, and a few operated on a much larger scale. The Purviance brothers announced in March 1768 that they would be selling at the Baltimore waterfront an entire shipload of slaves “just arrived from Africa.” Baltimore’s international slave trade did not match most ports farther south, but it seems clear that more than a few of its local merchants participated in this terrible traffic.

In the end, Lux’s various mercantile ventures brought more profit than loss. As the son of a successful tobacco merchant, Lux began his climb several rungs up the ladder, but he also possessed the foresight to sail on the new economic tide, turning a modest establishment into a vastly more profitable series of enterprises. By 1776 he presided over an extensive trade network linking the backcountry to the West Indies and Europe. He also owned a rope walk, a tannery, and part of a flour mill. His land holdings included 159 acres of prime farmland at Linganore Quarter in Frederick County and the extremely valuable lot in the center of town that his father had purchased (and was now subdivided and leased). Through his marriage to the daughter of Dr. George Walker, one of the original Baltimore Town commissioners, he came into the possession of Chatsworth, the doctor’s 800-acre plantation outside of town, just west of the present intersection of Franklin and Green streets. Lux transformed the property into a showplace suburban estate where he and his family lived with thirty-one slaves, nineteen horses and all the luxuries the Atlantic world could provide. Like most of Baltimore’s merchant-traders, he strongly supported American independence and at the time of his death in 1778, was one of the town’s most ardent war leaders.

Relatively few Baltimoreans of this era achieved a level of wealth equal to Lux, but dozens became quite prosperous and several thousand newcomers improved their economic existence by settling in the thriving port. Increasing trade and rising population resulted in the construction of
new dwellings, taverns, counting houses, shops and warehouses, which gradually filled in almost all the available space in Old Baltimore Town and Jones Town. Building began to spill over on to properties beyond Baltimore’s boundaries. In 1765 Cornelius Howard, a local planter and owner of a large piece of land adjacent to the town (a portion of which provided a site of the town fairs) convinced the commissioners to annex a thirty-five-acre section to the west side of the harbor. Through this tract Howard laid off four east-west streets: Barre, Conway, Camden, and Pratt (named for British political leaders he admired). The town now encompassed an area triple its original size and its population was larger than any town in Maryland except Annapolis.

Three years after the Howard annexation, the community’s leaders launched a well-organized campaign to move the county government from Joppa Town to Baltimore. They sent the General Assembly forty-one petitions (seven in German) supporting the transfer. The petitions were printed by Nicholas Hasselback, a German immigrant and the town’s first printer. They contained 2,271 names, people from William Lux to Benjamin Banneker, a free African American living near the Ellicott’s mill, who later achieved national fame as a skilled mathematician and surveyor. Defenders of Joppa Town collected only 901 names on their petitions. Presented with such a decisive expression of public opinion, the legislature agreed to move the county government to Baltimore. The town’s leaders placed the new county courthouse on the crest of a hill at the northern end of Calvert Street (the site now occupied by the Battle Monument at Calvert and Fayette streets). Unfortunately, the building blocked the northward advance of Calvert Street, so when the hill was cut down to extend the thoroughfare workmen placed four huge stone arches under the structure so traffic could pass beneath it. One bemused resident described the remodeled courthouse as a square brick building “perched upon a great stool.”

Rapid growth also began to weave together the three original settlements of Old Baltimore Town, Jones Town, and Fells Point, yet the residents in each section retained a unique character and continued to regarded themselves as separate local communities—forming the first generation of Baltimore’s neighborhoods. Of the three, Old Baltimore was by far the largest and wealthiest. Here lived most of the chief merchants plus the vast majority of ordinary residents. Every major church, the county court house, and the public market house were located there as were the most well-supplied retail stores, nearly all the best artisan shops, along with the most elegant inns and the taverns. Old Baltimore had something resembling a central business district focused on the docks and the harbor, but even this area still contained many private residences, some of them belonging to the town’s chief merchants. This close mixture of commercial and residential structures did not completely disappear until the mid-nineteenth century, and with the gentrification of the 1980s and 1990s has appeared once again.

Jones Town developed in a different manner. During the late 1760s this area on the east side of Jones Falls expanded from a small cluster of houses and shops into a fair sized settlement focused on the eastern approach to the Gay Street bridge, the 1740 structure that carried the Great...
Eastern Road across the falls. By the 1760s the old trail had become known as the Philadelphia Road, a heavily traveled (though still unpaved) artery linking Baltimore with the Quaker city, and from there north to New York and Boston. As the area west of Jones Falls in Old Baltimore became almost entirely built up, wagoners and livestock drovers coming down the road from Baltimore and Harford counties began to stop at Jones Town where enterprising individuals had built inns with stables and large yards for horses, wagons, and herds of livestock. Naturally, blacksmiths, wheelwrights, harness makers, and wagon repair shops sprung up adjacent to the inns. Exactly when Jones Town came to be called “Old Town,” (the name it still carries) is not known, but by the 1770s the cluster of commercial facilities and dwellings had become a thriving community, its life centered on a major colonial highway with its wagons, horses, teamsters, livestock, drovers, and hostlers— as opposed to Old Baltimore, which focused on wharves, ships, international merchants, mariners, and dockworkers.

Fells Point maintained an even more independent existence. Physically set apart by the wide marsh at the mouth of Jones Falls, and having no legal connection with Old Baltimore or Jones Town, its residents enjoyed their independent status and the good living they made from the bustling maritime activities along their waterfront. The community grew very rapidly during the 1760s and for a time it appeared that “The Point” might develop into a larger maritime center than Old Baltimore. An early chronicler wrote that those wishing to buy commercially valuable waterfront properties “were in fact at great loss to determine in which part to buy, as most likely to improve.” Some chose Fells Point, others picked Old Baltimore and those with sufficient capital purchased property in both places. Most investors lived in Old Baltimore and they wished to see the two waterfront communities joined. Even though a large number of Fells Point residents wished to remain independent, the Baltimoreans carried more influence in the General Assembly. In 1773 the legislature authorized Baltimore’s annexation of Fells Point along with an intervening tract of land named Plowman’s Addition. The act covered 80 acres of land (a 42 percent increase in territory) and assured that the three original settlements would henceforth operate under a single local authority. Most Fells Point residents acquiesced to the decision, but continued to regard themselves as a unique community, linked only by commercial and administrative ties to their sister settlements.

With the annexation of 1773, the boundaries Baltimore Town now encompassed an area of almost half a square mile and held approximately 5,000 residents. Its shops carried almost the entire range of goods produced in the Atlantic World and Daniel Grant’s newly built Fountain Inn was regarded as one of the best in the colonies, a place that became George Washington’s favorite stopping places when passing through on the Philadelphia Road. The town had a theater company that performed in a converted warehouse and a local newspaper, William Goddard’s *Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser*, which began publication in August of 1773. Baltimore could now claim to be something approaching a cosmopolitan community.
With their own newspaper, Baltimoreans could follow closely the growing rift between the colonies and the British government. It is no surprise that they immediately embraced the patriot cause. Beginning with the Stamp Act in 1765, its merchants, along with almost all other voters in the town, voiced increasingly bitter complaints about what they believed were the unjust and selfish policies of the British government. During the Stamp Act Crisis the local stamp distributor, Zachariah Hood, was burned in effigy and threatened with death. William Lux wrote to a friend that Hood “has been obliged to resign his office to save his neck. I should have been glad they Stretched it only that I hope he will live to be the outcast of Fortune for 20 years.” In addition to the town’s Anglo-American merchants whose anger focused on Britain’s commercial regulations and tax policies, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians harbored resentment towards the Crown for treating them as second class citizens in Northern Ireland and collecting taxes from them in America to support the Anglican Church. The town’s Germans had no historic grievances, but felt little loyalty to what must have seemed a foreign government and as Lutherans they too resented the subsidized and privileged position of the Anglicans.

The imperial crisis that arose in 1774-1775 with the Boston Tea Party and Britain’s harsh reaction pushed Maryland’s rural elite to the brink of revolution and sent Baltimore’s leaders right over it. In June, 1774, as soon as they learned of the Bostonians’ call for a boycott of British goods, a committee headed by Charles Ridgely, William Lux, Samuel Purviance, John Moale, Jr. and several other leading figures passed resolutions to support this action. In November a meeting of the town’s freeholders voted to create a permanent Committee of Observation to enforce the boycott and act as an agent of the Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia. Leaders of the movement included the great majority of Baltimore’s merchants, professionals and artisan manufacturers. Chief among them were Lux, Daniel Bowley, John Eager Howard (Cornelius Howard’s son), the Moale brothers, the Purviance brothers, James Calhoun, William Smith, David Poe, Mordecai Gist, Philip Rogers, David McMechan, Dr. Wiesenthal, George Keeports, John Merryman and William Spear. By June of 1776, when Robert Eden, Maryland’s last British Governor, departed for England, essentially leaving the colony free to establish its own government, Baltimore’s revolutionary leaders had been acting for some time as if it was an autonomous city-state. Governor Eden called them “the most rebellious and mischievous” group in Maryland. Any opposition to independence among the town’s residents quickly disappeared. The small band of Baltimore Loyalists, taunted by death threats and roughly handled in the streets by patriot gangs, left town. Even those favoring independence but who were judged to be insufficiently fervent in their views, suffered at the hands of Baltimore’s version of the Sons of Liberty (called the Whig Club). William Goddard, an avowed supporter of the revolution and publisher of the Maryland Journal (the actual printing of the paper was managed by his very capable sister Mary Goddard) was beaten and his shop wrecked for publishing an article deemed to be unpatriotic. This sort of vigilante justice and the general tendency toward independent and sometimes violent action brought stern reproaches from the state’s more conservative
revolutionary leaders (nearly all landed aristocrats) who viewed such behavior as a threat to public order. With the exception of the Goddard incident and a few other cases of physical intimidation, neither political turbulence nor mob violence ever rose to serious levels in the town. Nevertheless, the landed elite harbored an abiding suspicion of Baltimore’s political volatility that tempered their appreciation of the town’s major contributions to victory in the Revolutionary War.

Baltimoreans did indeed play significant role in the war. Many served in the Continental Army or on one of town’s many privateering ships. Several local leaders achieved military prominence. Mordecai Gist, John Eager Howard and Samuel Smith won fame as battlefield commanders and James McHenry served on General Washington’s staff and later as aide-de-camp to General Lafayette. On the sea, Baltimore’s 248 privateers, commanded by a number of outstanding captains such as Jeremiah Yellott and Joshua Barney, took a heavy toll on British shipping and brought in huge sums of prize money and tons of captured goods. In no subsequent war did so many Baltimoreans occupy major military positions.

The town itself emerged from the conflict completely unscathed and more prosperous than it had been in 1776, growing from 6,700 to over 8,000. This enviable situation stemmed in part from the skill and hard work of its leaders, plus a very large element of plain good luck. Baltimore was the only major American port to escape occupation or attack by the British. Those responsible for the town’s defense did build an earthen fort at the tip of the Whetstone Peninsula to protect the harbor, but luckily the small battlement never came under attack since it could never have withstood a naval bombardment. Whether the British thought Baltimore too small to be worth capturing or, more likely, concluded that the shallow waters and shifting channels of the Patapsco were too dangerous for their war ships, no hostile vessel ever entered the river.

The British navy did attack Norfolk in 1776 (it burned to the ground during the battle) and attempted to halt Baltimore’s trade by a naval blockade at the mouth of the bay; however, the town’s fast schooners and sloops found little difficulty slipping past the British vessels. Excluded from the British islands of the West Indies, Baltimore merchants quickly built up an extensive commercial trade with the French and Dutch islands. Under the direction of David Poe, Baltimore’s quartermaster, vessels loaded with government purchased flour visited these islands, returning with much needed military supplies. Altogether, the town’s trade doubled during the war.

The war also stimulated artisan manufacturing in and around the town. With Maryland cut off from British goods, and called upon to help supply American troops, a large market for all types of manufactured items developed. Baltimore artisans turned out everything from leather goods and cookware to uniforms, tents and artillery pieces. Large furnaces and forges in the vicinity produced tons of iron, an essential item for both domestic and military goods. Shipbuilding and repair in Fells Point grew rapidly. Employers hired large numbers of white workers and when this supply ran short, rented or purchased slaves from surrounding planters.
and farmers. During the final campaign of the war at Yorktown, Virginia, Baltimoreans played a leading role in supplying both the American and French forces. In 1783, when news reached Baltimore that a peace treaty had been signed, Goddard’s *Maryland Journal* reported that a great celebration began and continued into the night when the town “was universally illuminated, with great Taste and Elegance.” The prosperous town had much to celebrate.

**Post-Revolution Prosperity**

Baltimore’s success during the war attracted yet another wave of talented, ambitious men who entered the town from all corners—the Southern Maryland, the Eastern Shore, the ruins of Norfolk, the backcountry frontier and New England’s seaport towns. Some still managed to come from Germany and Northern Ireland. A select few of these in-migrants eventually amassed great personal fortunes. The most famous were Robert Gilmor who came up from Dorchester County, William Patterson, a Scotch-Irishman who had settled for a time in Philadelphia before moving to Baltimore, and Robert Oliver who emigrated directly from Northern Ireland. Hundreds of others entering the town during the war years achieved more modest success, but added significantly to its labor force and general prosperity.

The African Americans who entered (or, more accurately, were brought to) the town in large numbers during the war became the vanguard of a significant influx that continued over the next twenty years. Most were local Maryland slaves purchased by Baltimoreans to work as laborers in the Fells Point shipyards, helpers for artisan manufacturers, and household servants. A number arrived as “hired” slaves, sent by owners who had switched from tobacco to wheat and could no longer profit from slaves who were now economically useful only two seasons of the year. Other farmers freed their slaves outright or made agreements allowing them to purchase their freedom. Over time the results were startling. In 1790 African Americans comprised a tenth of Baltimore’s population and four out of five were enslaved. Ten years later they were 20 percent of the population and almost half of these 5,600 individuals were free. The existence of this large population of free African Americans once again set Baltimore apart from every other American city.

The decades following the end of the Revolutionary War proved somewhat turbulent and upsetting for the new United States, and Baltimore, now one of the nation’s leading ports, did not entirely escape these difficulties. The 1780s were punctuated by wide fluctuations in trade, but good years outnumbered lean ones and the port’s reputation as a boomtown continued to draw large numbers of in-migrants. Population increased by over 60 percent, to a total of 13,500. With the commencement of the Wars of the French Revolution in 1793, and the very high demand for American grain in Europe, the city’s trade rose dramatically. Exports skyrocketed from $2 million to almost $10 million by 1800 and imports rose almost as rapidly. Population growth followed the great upswing in trade, doubling the size of the community. Baltimore became the fastest growing
city in America. In 1800 its population (26,500) placed it third in the new nation. Only Philadelphia (41,200) and New York (79,200) held more residents.

Two pictures of post-Revolutionary Baltimore emerge from the records. The civic leader and novelist John Pendleton Kennedy remembered Baltimore at the close of the Revolution as a vibrant, booming, and yet charming place:

It was a treat to see this little Baltimore town...conceited, bustling and debonair, growing up like a saucy, chubby boy... bursting incontinently out of his clothes... [Baltimore Street] “had shot... out... as far as Congress Hall, with its line of low-browed, hip-roofed wooden houses in disorderly array, standing forward and back, after the manner of a regiment of militia with many an interval between the files. Some of these structures were painted blue and white, and some yellow; and here and there sprang up a more magnificent mansion of brick... with occasional court-yards before them and reverential locust trees, under whose shade bevies of school-boys, ragged little negroes and grotesque chimney-sweeps ‘shied coppers’ and disported themselves with marbles.”25

Others saw the town quite differently. They viewed it as a rough, muddy place which one observer said, contained “8,000 inhabitants and 10,000 swearing strangers and seafarers.” Its streets and alleys, were “infested by gangs of burglars, shoplifters, footpads, and petty-larceny scoundrels.”26 For many, Baltimore’s unpaved streets epitomized the town’s civic backwardness Robert Gilmor remembered Washington’s army passing through the town on Baltimore Street in 1781 and watching a drummer boy “nearly swamped in a deep mud hole at the corner of North Street, [who] was with his pony extracted only with difficulty.”27

The need for a stronger local authority to take charge of the growing urban center seemed self-evident, but the General Assembly did not establish a municipal government until 1797. The long wait was due to disagreements among the town’s voters over the type of government under which they wanted live and the concerns of conservatives in the General Assembly about creating an independent local government for a community that many feared was a hotbed of radical political ideas. A number of Baltimore’s wealthy merchants and property holders also worried about the radical ideas circulating in the community, mainly among the artisans and shopkeepers, but also championed by a small, yet outspoken group of wealthy men whose politics was based on democratic egalitarianism. Nevertheless, it appears that the majority of the town’s wealthy and propertied classes remained confident that they could create a municipal government that would be democratic enough to satisfy the radicals, yet assure “the better sort” a paramount role in its operation.

One reform on which all classes of Baltimoreans agreed was the need for fair representation in the General Assembly. Under Maryland’s colonial government, Baltimore had no representation in Annapolis. In fact, the 1747 Annexation Act, extending Baltimore’s boundaries to encompass eighteen additional acres, specifically prohibited the town from sending
any delegates to the General Assembly. By 1776 the town’s population had reached almost 7,000 and was growing faster than any of the counties. It would soon exceed several of them (the census of 1790 showed the town had surpassed six of the counties). When Maryland’s revolutionary leaders wrote a state constitution, Baltimore Town was allowed to send delegates to help draft the document. Most of the representatives in the convention thought it unfair and unwise to exclude Baltimore from any voice in the state government, but they naturally wished to keep its influence well contained, giving the town just two delegates to the General Assembly (when each county received four). Baltimore’s representatives proposed increasing the town’s delegates to four when its population exceeded any of the counties, but this was too much for most of the county people who defeated the proposal thirty-seven to fourteen. The most steadfast supporters of the town in its effort to obtain representation in the General Assembly were the representatives of Baltimore County because once the town began to send its own delegates to Annapolis, its voters would no longer be able to participate in (and influence) the county’s elections.

Of course having two, three, or four delegates in the state legislature did not solve the town’s more immediate problems of unpaved streets, inadequate harbor facilities, and dozens of other shortcomings. By the end of the war both the town and its problems had grown larger, but no movement emerged to establish a municipal government. In the absence of a strong local government, the town’s leaders had to find other ways to solve at least the most pressing needs. One obvious solution would have been to increase the powers of the old Baltimore Town Commission of 1729, but this body selected its own members and was responsible only to itself. The commissioners were all leading figures in the town: men such as Daniel Bowley, John Moale Jr., Thomas Harrison, and Richard Ridgely, but many Baltimoreans, even a number of wealthy merchants, opposed placing more authority and wider tax powers in the hands of such a small, undemocratic institution. The solution was to request the General Assembly to establish several independent local commissions, each to address a particular problem. In 1782 the General Assembly established two commissions, one to oversee harbor improvements and the other to pave and maintain the streets. The governor appointed the first set of commissioners, but beginning in 1786 they would be elected by the town’s property holders. Two years after the street and harbor bodies were created, the original Baltimore Town Commission received authority to establish a night watch and light the streets. The watchmen looked out for fires as well as well as criminal activities. As it had done during the colonial era, the Overseers of the Poor for Baltimore County Court continued to levy the county “poor tax” (in both the county and the town) and cared for the destitute residents of both local areas. During the yellow fever epidemics of 1793-1795 several Baltimore physicians were appointed to enforce quarantine on ships entering the port and take other measures to protect the town’s health. Thereafter, they operated intermittently as a semi-official health commission. Until the establishment of the municipality in 1797, these five local bodies functioned as Baltimore’s de facto local government, addressing, to one degree or another, the basic problems of public security, health, fire protection, street paving,
harbor improvements, and poverty. Problems that fell outside the purview of these bodies were either dealt with by private or church groups (as in the case of education) or simply ignored.

It should be understood that during this era most American cities that did possess municipal governments limped along with services and facilities that a later generation, coming of age during the 1840s and 1850s, would have regarded as quite inadequate. While Baltimore stood out among the nation’s large cities for having no municipal government at all during this era, its curious system of local administration did bring some significant improvements. Protection from public disorder and crime naturally rank as the most important service provided by any local government, and Baltimore’s record in this area seems reasonably adequate by the standards of the day. Like most small communities, Baltimore required very little active policing during its first forty years. Then in the 1770s, when the population surpassed 4,000 and the town began to host larger numbers of mariners and other transients, complaints about crime and disorder begin to appear. One resident believed the source of the problem was “idle vagrants” who hung around the town market and engaging “in acts of a most heinous nature, viz. cursing, swearing, drunkenness and debauchery.” Such behavior, he asserted, led inevitably to “robbery and plunder.”

The Baltimore County Sheriff bore the responsibility for law enforcement in both the 800-square-mile county plus the town, but with no funds to hire peace officers to patrol Baltimore’s streets, he could do almost nothing directly to restrain crime and disorder in the community. Until 1776, the St. Paul’s vestry, acting in its official position as the established church, could itself punish acts of profanity, intoxication and disorderly conduct, the most common minor offenses against public order. Its jurisdiction included the town and a large surrounding territory. The vestrymen were wealthy merchants and local planters who obviously did not patrol the streets but when residents brought complaints the alleged offender was brought to them for a hearing. If the defendant was found guilty, a small fine was imposed. They sent more serious cases to the county court, which could levy a larger fine, expose the guilty party in the stocks, order a public whipping or, in the most serious cases, hang the guilty party or parties. Judging by the number of cases sent to the County Court, serious crime remained fairly low. With the coming of the American Revolution, the vestry lost its legal authority and their services as part-time peace officers ceased.

Crime and disorder appeared to increase during the Revolutionary War, and the town’s residents responded by forming a night watch. Soon, however, the volunteer organization lapsed and subsequent efforts to restore it, even with a small number of paid individuals, met the same end indicating perhaps that while crime may have increased local residents did not regarded it as a very serious problem.

Permanent reform finally came in 1784 when the General Assembly authorized the Town Commission to light the streets and appoint seventeen permanent peace officers, three daytime constables and fourteen night watchmen. During the day the three constables patrolled the streets and when darkness fell, the night watchmen took over, making their rounds from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.
during the winter and 9 p.m. to 4 a.m. in the summer. The commissioners installed oil lamps along the main streets and while they did not quite turn darkness into daylight, pedestrians appreciated any sort of illumination. The little lamps and the watchmen did not eliminate crime and disorder, especially in the rough waterfront blocks, but as the town grew during the next ten years, more lamps were installed and the night watch expanded to a force of over fifty men. These officers kept the streets reasonably safe. When midnight brawls turned into small riots, they could raise a general alarm and count on the men of the neighborhood to get out of bed and help subdue the riotous parties. Only Election Day melees and other large-scale political disturbances confused and sometimes overwhelmed the watchmen. These altercations presented a quandary for local officials because it was difficult in that age of rough street-level politics to draw a line where the exercise of political rights crossed over into assault and rioting. Fortunately, such events, while not exactly rare in Baltimore during this era, never became a regular part of its political life until the 1850s. In terms of more ordinary disorders and street crime, the watchmen seemed able to deal with these problems until the 1840s and 1850s when residents once more began to lodge serious complaints.

The legislation for watching and lighting the town marked a major turning point in Baltimore’s local government. It created the first large group of full-time public employees, men who quickly became the most familiar symbol of the town’s government. In a town with no city hall or any public building besides the small market house, the new street lamps immediately became the most valuable piece of public property. The source of revenue for these improvements brought a fundamental change in the system of local taxation. To pay the annual cost of watching and lighting small amounts of revenue were drawn from fines and a license fee on taverns and retail liquor shops, but the great majority came from a general property tax of one shilling six pence per £100 (approximately twelve cents per $100). This taxing authority, transferred to the new municipal government in 1797, gradually expanded to cover a wide variety of public expenses and remained the backbone of the city’s revenues until the late twentieth century.32

Protection of the town from disease, a far more serious issue of life and death than crime, received only sporadic attention. It would undoubtedly have been dealt with much more vigorously if physicians and civic leaders had understood even the rudiments of modern microbiology, but of course they did not. Their conflicting theories regarding the causes of disease left government officials and the public deeply confused. The largest numbers of residents seem to have held the view that disease arose from the intervention of an angry God or constituted a nearly unfathomable mystery. Only when an epidemic disease such as yellow fever struck the town, usually concentrated in Fells Point which was adjacent to large, mosquito-infested marshes, was the public willing to give serious, even frantic attention to almost any regulation or expenditure that might end the deadly outbreak. None of the local commissions, or the county, had the authority to appoint a board of health or enforce quarantine. Only the governor held this power and the first time he used it was in 1793 during the great yellow fever outbreak of that year,
an epidemic that visited almost all the nation’s port cities. Some thought the disease was caused by “miasmic” or “noxious” vapors arising from decaying organic matter and attempted to remove of garbage and other types of putrid waste from streets, alleys, vacant lots, and (to whatever degree possible) from the marshes along the lower Jones Falls and adjacent to Fells Point. Once the deaths rate subsided, public interest melted away. The quarantine was lifted, street cleaning relapsed into its usual haphazard state, and life returned to normal. The one permanent reform resulting from the 1793 epidemic was the appointment by the town’s commissioners of a local Board of Health composed of seven physicians, a body which functioned intermittently until it was incorporated into the new municipal government in 1797.

Severe yellow fever epidemics gradually subsided during the nineteenth century as the marshes were filled in but other diseases continued to ravage the population. Maladies such as typhoid fever, dysentery, and other gastric-intestinal diseases took a far greater toll over the long run than yellow fever, especially among infants and small children. For adults, “the wasting disease” (tuberculosis) was by far the greatest killer. Most residents seemed unconvinced that careful attention to personal and domestic cleanliness would help ward off disease. They appeared satisfied with any water that did not have an obviously foul smell or taste. While walking in the town, they steeled themselves to the odors arising from street filth, and they regarded the thousands of flies swarming around this refuse as a nuisance instead of a health threat.

Calls for the more thorough removal of street filth made some impression on the Town Commission, for it periodically issued regulations requiring its removal, but it is not always clear whether these arose from health concerns or simply a wish to eliminate the stench. As early as 1750, the commissioners asked residents not to let “stinking fish, dead creatures or carrion to lie on their Lotts or in the Streets near their Doors.” In 1766 concerns about public health clearly motivated the commission in their attempt to compel Thomas Harrison, Alexander Lawson, and Brian Philpot, the owners of Harrison’s marsh (located just west of the mouth of Jones Falls) to fill in the swampy area because it had become a dumping ground for trash, garbage, dead animals, and other unsavory items. The commissioners asserted that “the noxious Vapours and putrid Effluvia arising therefrom [are] very prejudicial to the health of the inhabitants.” Almost twenty years passed before the marsh was filled. When the Continental Congress met in Baltimore during the winter of 1776-1777 one delegate from New York wrote to friend, “This dirty, boggy hole beggars all description.” Those attending the sessions of the congress were often compelled to move along Baltimore Street on horseback to avoid sinking nearly to their boot tops in the reeking mud.

A new day seemed to have dawned in 1782 with the creation of the Street Commission, which was charged with the responsibility of paving, maintaining, and cleaning the town’s thoroughfares and alleys. The paving went well, subsequent maintenance less well, and cleaning seems to have been haphazard from the start. The commission hired a few scavengers who made occasional sorties on the more heavily traveled streets, but the continual stream of complaints
indicates that these pioneer sanitation workers achieved little permanent success. Their main interest was collecting manure, which they could sell to local farmers.

Privies, of which there were several thousand by the 1780s, contributed heavily to the spread of disease. No laws regulated their construction or cleaning. A number emptied directly into the harbor from wharves and into the Jones Falls or other streams from other waterside facilities. Rainwater often ran into poorly sealed privies, eventually seeping into nearby wells. Heavy downpours caused many overflows, sending hundreds of gallons of fecal-laced water into back yards, alleys, and streets.

Public sanitation, personal cleanliness, and the avoidance of directly ingested microorganisms are all greatly enhanced by a convenient supply of uncontaminated water. A few springs provided safe water, but their small number left many residents to rely on neighborhood wells. Unfortunately, the hand pumps used to draw the water often broke, and as the town became more densely populated, a number of wells turned foul. A group of local men obtained a charter for a water company in 1792; however, baffling technical and engineering problems in addition to rising cost estimates put off action until the opening of the new century.

Next to epidemic disease, fire posed the gravest danger to towns and cities. This was underscored during the eighteenth century by devastating conflagrations in Boston, New York, Norfolk, and other communities. Even with these grim examples, Baltimoreans took a fairly casual attitude toward fire protection. A first small step was taken in 1747 when the Town Commissioners required the owners of each dwelling to keep a ladder of sufficient length to reach the top of the roof. Some years later, they required that two leather buckets be available in each home. A fire code for buildings would have been much more helpful, but none was established until 1799. While an increasing number of builders constructed brick houses and shops, many existing structures were wooden. The original one-acre tracts had long since been subdivided into small lots with little or no space between the buildings and newer sections of the town followed the same pattern, so a fire could quickly spread.

A significant private innovation was introduced in 1763 when a group of prominent Baltimoreans, following the precedent of Philadelphia, established the Mechanical Fire Company. In 1769 it purchased the town's first fire engine, a small, hand-pumped hose wagon. Three more companies formed during 1792 and another in 1794, making five altogether. The Mechanical Fire Company became an important political organization during the Revolution, and the others gradually assumed a political role in addition to fire protection. They evolved as private, independent entities, sometimes cooperating while at other times competing for the honor and financial rewards of arriving first at the scene of a fire. The firemen showed remarkable bravery rescuing people and property from burning buildings, but their private financing never allowed them to purchase enough engines and equipment (especially the expensive pump engines) to quickly subdue a large fire. Baltimore escaped any huge conflagrations during this era, owing
more to good luck than to its fire companies and its residents armed with ladders and leather buckets.

As might be expected, the two areas showing the greatest improvement were the streets and the harbor. The two commissions created by the General Assembly in 1782, provided with substantial legal authority and taxing power, accomplished a great deal before they were absorbed into the municipal government in 1797. The street commission spent by far the largest amount of money and brought the greatest single improvement in the daily lives of the town’s residents. To grade, pave, maintain and clean the town’s streets and lanes, the legislation authorized the commission, officially named the Board of Special Commissioners and initially appointed by the General Assembly but elected after 1786. All adult males owning £30 of property voted for electors who chose the commissioners with an eye to equal representation from every section of town. Each commissioner was required to possess £500 of taxable property. While hardly a democratic revolution, the commissioners became Baltimore’s first elected officials. The first election was somewhat disorderly and the charges of fraud and other irregularities growing out of the contest reinforced the views of many wealthy conservatives (both in the town and the counties) that Baltimore was indeed a turbulent center of radical democracy. In spite of the election difficulties, the men chosen proved just as capable as their appointed predecessors. The legislation stipulated Market (Baltimore) Street be paved first, other major commercial streets next, and all remaining streets and lanes thereafter. One third of the paving was financed by abutting property owners who were assessed for each foot at the front of their property. The rest came from various taxes of which the most important was a special paving tax which paid whatever the assessments did not cover plus the cost of all intersections which of course had no abutting owners. Between 1783 and 1796 the commission paved almost every street in the town at a total cost of £51,415 (about $205,600). In contrast, the harbor improvements cost only £11,038 ($44,200).37

Harbor improvements came under the direction of the Port Wardens Commission with its membership drawn from the town’s chief merchants, (wardens needed £1,000 of property to qualify for office). The naturally deep harbor at Fells Point had already been improved by waterfront property owners who built bulkheads and numerous short wharves at which the largest ships could dock. It was therefore logical, though not entirely fair to Fells Point taxpayers, for the wardens to concentrate on the mouth of Jones Falls, the waterline in front of old Baltimore, and the western side of the Basin, which at this time washed up to Charles Street and in some places as far as Hanover Street. In 1782 a few bulkheads had been built along these two sides of the Basin, but in general the waterline had not changed much since 1729. In old Baltimore, a bulkhead ran just in front of Lombard Street so the eastward extension of Pratt Street was blocked by the water at Charles.38 Jutting out from this bulkhead was a group of private wharves, the two longest extending about 200 feet into the harbor. These structures proved useful for small and mid-sized craft, but did not extend far enough for most deep draft ships. To make
matters worse, soil washing into the Basin from Jones Falls had built up a thick layer of silt on the bottom, which threatened to impede even the smaller vessels from tying up at these wharves.

In response, the port wardens decided to make radical changes. They authorized waterfront property owners to set bulkheads 200-400 feet out from the existing water line and build new, much longer wharves. Owners installed over 2,000 feet of bulkheads along the north and west sides of the harbor and dumped tons of fill behind them, creating a substantial amount of valuable new land. In front of the new water line, four private wharves (O’Donnell’s, Smith’s, Speer’s and Bowley’s) were built 600 to 1,000 feet further out into the water. Unfortunately, the structures were built too close together to allow adequate circulation so the water in the slips soon became covered with “a beautiful and substantial scum” exuding a particularly foul odor.39 A few residents complained, but the majority seemed to regard it as the price of progress. To address the silting problem more directly, yet avoid the expense of dredging, the wardens completely reconstructed the mouth of Jones Falls. Two huge jetties, each almost 1,500 feet long, directed the stream’s soil-laden waters out to a deep trough near the center of the Basin where, it was hoped, the silt would no longer wash back into the wharves. The jetties consumed most of the warden’s funds, but only put off for a time the need to begin dredging.

In conjunction with the jetty project, the Baltimore Town commissioners finally purchased and filled in Harrison’s Marsh, the “noxious” waterfront spot, which had eluded improvement for almost twenty years. Atop the fill, they built a large, elegant public market building with plenty of space around it for temporary stalls and wagons. A group of local merchants and residents helped finance the project. It was named the Centre Market. From this strategic spot Thomas McElderry and Cumberland Dugan, two of the town’s wealthy merchants, constructed a pair of wharves over 1,000 feet long on which they erected matching rows of fashionable dwellings and convenient warehouses.40 This waterfront location with its long wharves, attractive market space, and new customs house (one block west at Water and Frederick streets) served for over a century as the focal point of commercial life. When residents at the eastern and western edges of the town complained about the distance they had to walk to reach the Centre Market, the Town Commission built public markets at Fells Point and at the intersection of Hanover and Camden streets. Attractive but small, neither one challenged the supremacy of the Centre Market, a facility which everyone jokingly called the “Marsh Market.” Regardless of it malodorous underpinnings, “Old Marsh” was Baltimore’s first truly splendid public building.

Like every other seaport town in the new nation, Baltimore contained among its residents a significant number of people who were loosely identified as “the poor.” Some had lived in and around the town for many years, but many others were more newly arrived from ships or the more distant countryside. Some were elderly, others teenage mothers with infants. A number were clearly quite ill, disabled, or ruined by alcoholism while others seemed able-bodied, but strangely dazed and lethargic. Each had a story: bad luck in farming, a business partner’s
faithlessness, death or desertion by a husband, some terrible accident, seduction at a young age, parents lost at sea or dead of yellow fever, an encyclopedia of victimization and misery—some of it lies, some of it exaggerated, most of it sadly true. In addition to these, were the temporarily poor. During times when trade and commerce was interrupted by war or crippled by economic crises, the port’s trade slackened or temporarily halted, throwing many regular workers out of employment and into the ranks of the poor. These were often joined by other normally hard working people from other ports or the countryside who had also been victimized by the vast economic and political forces that suddenly swept through the Atlantic world. What to do with such a wide variety of needy individuals and families? Baltimoreans could never agree upon an answer.

The problem of poverty was an issue like no other. The great majority of residents clearly felt the need for physical security, fire protection, paved streets, and several other aforementioned services and facilities. With the exception of public health, they also generally agreed on how best to deal with these issues. When it came to the poverty, individuals held widely differing opinions on whether it was really much of a problem at all, and if it was, how it should be dealt with. Some thought real poverty (which they usually described as complete destitution) afflicted only a tiny number and these few needy persons received adequate care through the county government’s “poor tax” fund. Other observers had a wider and more liberal definition of poverty that encompassed many individuals who had not yet fallen into complete destitution. How lacking in material goods should an individual or family become before they deserved aid? If they are judged to be poor enough to deserve help, how much aid (and of what sort) should be provided? Fair-minded, even compassionate people differed sharply on these questions. One Baltimore civic leader defined the deserving poor as those without any real or personal property and “totally unable to support themselves” in contrast to “the merely poor who in this county cannot suffer for a scarcity of bread or work.”

By the 1760s approximately 200 of Baltimore County’s roughly 17,000 residents were certified by the County Court as legally poor and it appears that a substantial number of them resided in and around the town. Those who could independently care for themselves received a direct allowance. Those unable to care for themselves were placed by the court into the hands of people who received the allowance in return for their pledge to provide good care to these individuals. With little oversight for the program, abuses crept in. A letter appearing in the Maryland Gazette in 1765, thought to have been written by William Lux, condemned the “shameful treatment” many poor individuals received from caregivers seeking to make an inordinate profit on their services. The letter also censured “imposters” who received public aid from the poor tax when their circumstances did not warrant it. Both problems could be resolved, the writer said, by establishing a public “almshouse” where the incapacitated poor would receive uniformly kind treatment and “imposters” kept out. The letter stimulated little immediate discussion and almost a decade passed before action was taken, but in 1773, by which time a
majority of the county’s poor lived in the town, the General Assembly established the Trustees of the Poor of Baltimore County (five from Baltimore Town and two from the county), authorizing them to build and operate an almshouse at a location on the outskirts of the town. The trustees, which included Lux, John Moale, Jr. and William Purviance, were fortunate to be able to purchase, at a generously low price, an excellent piece of elevated land just north of the town owned by William Lux.43 Here they built a large and attractive structure that could accommodate nearly 200 individuals. The quality of care given to the “inmates” (as they were officially designated) is difficult to assess. Occasional newspaper articles charged the trustees with providing inadequate care to the poor and accused the almshouse manager of exercising a “tyrannical authority,” but both allegations seem doubtful.44 Thus in the case of clearly destitute residents, a community consensus emerged that favored caring for this relatively small number of individuals in a manner which, by late eighteenth century standards, was an excellent public institution.

Far more complicated questions arose when periodic downturns in trade threw a large number of Baltimoreans out of employment. Many fell quickly into great need. The almshouse was obviously not created to deal with such situations. To meet such crises, the community relied on a system of ad hoc, private charity whereby families and individuals in each section of town helped their suffering neighbors.45 Informal committees collected funds from the more prosperous (and/or generous) households to purchase food, fuel, clothing, and other necessities, which they distributed among those judged to be needy. The committees varied widely in their standards of judgment, financial resources, and general efficiency. Then as now, “poverty” is much in the eye of the beholder. In the past many Baltimore families lived in conditions that would shock us today, but in the late eighteenth century, they were not considered poor. Some went door to door among the unemployed poor to determine who required aid and in what amount. In other neighborhoods those distributing aid simply made spot judgments as people lined up at distribution points (usually a prominent street intersection). Fortunately, the town’s rich, middling, and poor families were still spread fairly evenly across the town and no large slum districts had developed where a small group of better off residents struggled to provide for a very large number of the needy residents.

In view of this haphazard practice, and the emergence of a clear “boom-bust” cycle in the port’s trade, it may at first seem curious that those Baltimoreans who were concerned about the issue of temporary poverty did not seek to have the Trustees of the Poor build up a fund from the tax they levied that could be used for a more well centralized, uniform, and community-wide aid program when the next unemployment crisis arose. However, upon reflection, it is not surprising that such a plan failed to materialize.

First, it is doubtful that many taxpayers were willing to contribute to a public relief program for able-bodied residents who might otherwise be able to scrape through the hard times with temporary jobs and the half-hearted aid of the neighborhood charity committees. There
seemed nothing to fear from these people even if they tottered on the brink of destitution. Thomas Griffith, a well known and charitably-minded leader in the town, warned his fellow Baltimoreans during the 1790s that a failure to provide adequate aid to the poor when they were in great need bred class hatred and perhaps even a threat to social and political stability (he had witnessed some of the most turbulent days of the French Revolution in Paris), but his warning was, quite correctly, dismissed by the town’s residents. Even during the extremely cold winter of 1793-1794, when suffering in Baltimore was very widespread, the unemployed poor staged no bread riots or any other type of disturbance. Baltimore was not Paris.

Moreover, those individuals who may have wished to relieve the town’s economic suffering in a larger and more centralized manner held widely different opinions on the proper method of accomplishing this task. Some feared that a public body authorized to levy a tax and give the proceeds to a group other than the unemployable destitute might come into the hands of unscrupulous politicians who could use their power to build a political following among those they aided. Other charitable individuals feared that too much aid might be given, encouraging those not yet in so desperate a position to look for charity rather than employment or a more prudent level of personal expenditure. By leaving all these matters in the hands of ad hoc, local committees to which a resident could contribute generously, modestly, or not at all, there was no need to resolve disagreements about the nature of poverty and the best methods of dealing with it. Unfortunately, these differing perspectives on poverty and its relief persist today.

Even though Baltimoreans showed surprising ingenuity in dealing with those problems that caused them serious concern or discomfort, they still wanted a full-fledged municipal government like all the rest of the nation’s major seaport cities. They waited patiently through the Revolutionary War years, but the ink was hardly dry on the peace treaty when a group of the town’s leaders, led by the respected merchant and war leader James Calhoun, began campaigning for a municipal charter. They drafted a charter that placed the town’s merchants, professionals and larger property holders in control of the new government; but also, they believed, allowed enough representation for the town’s artisans and shopkeepers who, in that age of democratic revolutions, wanted a significant voice in municipal affairs. The charter provided for a bicameral city council with a lower chamber elected by all those qualified to vote in state elections (those possessing £30 in real or personal property) and an upper chamber chosen by electors. Both chambers would elect the mayor. All municipal office holders needed to possess at least £500 in taxable property, the same amount required to sit in the Maryland House of Delegates. At a series of public meetings voters wrangled over the question of a unicameral or bicameral city council, the role of the mayor, the length of terms, and the particularly contentious issues of indirect elections and property qualifications for office holders. Not surprisingly, wealthier residents favored indirect elections and relatively high property qualifications for office holding while the artisans, shopkeepers, and a few democratically-minded merchants wanted direct elections and no property qualifications. Issues regarding taxation, business regulations, and moral controls
(over taverns, theaters, and dancing halls) further divided the electorate. After a series of long--
sometimes turbulent--debates, Calhoun and his associates abandoned the effort.

The incorporation proposal submitted to the General Assembly two years later in 1786
was tied to a plan by John Eager Howard and a group of his associates to convince the General
Assembly to move the state government to Baltimore. In 1783 Howard had a large piece of his
suburban property annexed to the town and divided into blocks containing 350 building lots. The
acreage lay on the west side of the town with today’s Howard Street running through the center.
Howard also reserved a large space for relocating the state’s government buildings. Many
members of the Assembly seemed willing to consider the idea since Baltimore offered a far higher
level of convenience than Annapolis, but they were naturally wary of moving the capital to a place
they regarded as a turbulent center of democratic radicalism. In an effort to quiet these fears,
Howard and his associates drafted a charter, which provided for little democracy or municipal
autonomy. It gave the General Assembly a predominant voice in the city government (much like
the federal government later assumed in the District of Columbia). Suspecting that the charter
would arouse local opposition, the group submitted it secretly to the legislature. When news of
this action leaked out, a storm of protest erupted. One Baltimore voter expressed his “horror at so
barefaced an attempt to violate... the privileges of its freemen; to enslave, as it were, ten thousand
peaceful, industrious inhabitants to the will, the humors, perhaps to the interests of a few men.”

Faced with such a large, vociferous protest, the General Assembly rejected the charter and decided
to keep the state government in the quiet little town on the Severn River.

In the wake of the 1786 disaster, seven years passed before any group came forward with
another incorporation plan. The charter proposal of 1793 bore a strong resemblance to the
original 1784 plan. Several local groups immediately objected. The artisan-shopkeeper group,
along with several very democratically-minded merchants, labeled the proposal aristocratic. Fells
Point residents groused that it was unfair to their section because it allowed their tax monies to be
spent on further improving harbor facilities in the Basin. Several strict, evangelical Protestant
groups attacked it as morally lax for failing to provide sufficient authority to regulate taverns,
theaters, and other centers of frivolity and vice. These groups formed a coalition called the United
Committees and eventually drafted their own charter, a strange combination of radical
democracy for voters and strict moral controls over urban amusements. Such a wide gap between
the two proposals left little basis for compromise. The General Assembly rejected both proposals.

Two more years passed before anyone worked up the courage to submit another charter. This fifth attempt called for the establishment of government composed of a unicameral city
council and a mayor. Councilmen were to be elected directly, but needed to possess at least £500
of property. The mayor needed £1,000 and would be chosen by electors. James Winchester, a
wealthy merchant-miller and one of the town’s delegates to the General Assembly, submitted the
charter in December 1796. The House of Delegates said it was too democratic, criticizing in
particular what it regarded as the dangerously low property qualifications for city councilmen.
Winchester asked for instructions from the town’s voters, but received little useful help. A public meeting presided over by James Calhoun simply instructed him to resubmit the charter he had been given. With opposition still running strong in the House of Delegates, Winchester took it upon himself to rewrite the document. His draft provided for a two chamber city council, the upper house (called the Second Branch) to be elected indirectly and its members to possess £1,000 of property, members of the lower house (the First Branch) would be popularly elected and needed £500 of property. This satisfied the House of Delegates, but when the bill went to the State Senate, its members increased the property qualification of First Branch councilmen to £1,000 and those of the Second Branch to £2,000. The property qualification for mayor was also raised to £2,000. (These were steep figures. State delegates needed only £500 and state senators needed only £1,000). Now assured that these changes would control Baltimore’s allegedly radical tendencies, the Senate passed the bill on December 31, 1796 and Gov. John H. Stone, wishing to end the long-standing charter controversy, signed it immediately. He quickly began to form a six-man commission to conduct the first municipal election.

The more democratically-minded Baltimoreans, a number of whom were members of the United Committees, were keenly disappointed by the turn of events and talked of boycotting the election, but were convinced that such an action would fail and leave them with no representation at all in the new municipality. Governor Stone convinced two key leaders of the United Committees to join the election commission and this assured the safe launching of the new government. On January 16, 1797 voters assembled in an orderly manner, electing two First Branch councilmen from each of eight wards and on February 20 gathered again to vote for the eight electors who would select the members of the Second Branch and the mayor. The twenty-five officials ultimately elected to office were all well-known and (obviously) prosperous residents, men such as James Carey, Zebulon Hollingsworth, David McMechan, Nicholas Rogers, John Merryman, and Robert Gilmor. For mayor the electors chose James Calhoun, the loyal supporter of incorporation for over fifteen years. While most were fairly conservative, nearly one-third had been affiliated with the United Committees. Richard Moale, a member of the now well-known Baltimore family, was appointed city register and secretary. Overall, Baltimore City’s first set of officials constituted a remarkable collection of talent, experience, and wealth. A number of the city’s leading business and professional men continued to serve in city offices during the next half century, but never again did the municipality possess such a distinguished group as assembled on February 27, 1797 to launch the new government. After years of acrimony and waiting, Baltimore Town finally became Baltimore City.
Baltimore may have been big and bustling after it established its charter on New Year’s Eve in 1796, but in Chapter 2 Arnold argues that the city was slow to develop cultural institutions and was late to fully embrace new forms of production. During the Market Revolution, other American cities developed industries that made goods, while Baltimore honed its expertise in moving goods, many of which arrived from far-flung ports. The city remained an international mercantile center with continued attention to the Atlantic, but after the National Road opened up new markets among the settlers of the nation’s interior, successful merchants turned their eyes to the domestic west. Arnold asserts that instead of establishing universities and museums, Baltimore’s elites gave the city a solid banking system and turnpikes to support their lucrative ventures. In his excellent synopsis of Baltimore during the War of 1812, Arnold gives ample evidence that Baltimore’s rising fortunes made it a rich target for the British after they had ignored it during the Revolution. Readers might want to continue their investigation of Baltimore during 1814 in Steve Vogel’s 2013 work, Through the Perilous Fight: Six Weeks That Saved the Nation. The most startling revelation of Arnold’s second chapter is that Baltimore has never recovered from the Panic of 1819. Arnold credits the critical financial crisis with ending Baltimore’s boomtown status.

The trading activity in the town led to an atmosphere of exotic goods and ethnic and religious diversity. Arnold highlights the arrival of Scots-Irish and German immigrants with their Presbyterian and Lutheran churches and explains how migrants from southern Maryland bolstered the Catholic population, leading the greater Catholic Church to select Baltimore as the site of the first Catholic cathedral in the United States. All of these established religious communities were threatened by the new enthusiastic Methodists who took Baltimore by storm. In this chapter, Arnold helpfully links early Baltimore leaders to their respective denominations, a useful resource for researchers tracing networks in the early republic.

Here, as always, Arnold exhibits an acute attention to class. It is striking that in a chapter he entitles ”The Golden Years,” Arnold devotes a great deal of space to the plight of the self-sustaining poor. Seth Rockman continues this discussion in Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery and Survival in Early Baltimore where he highlights the work experience of women, especially seamstresses. Arnold outlines the large increase in the free African American population in this period, and emphasizes the deep racial divide in an otherwise tolerant city. In Freedom’s Port: The African American Community of Baltimore, 1780-1860 Christopher Phillips describes this period as somewhat of a Golden Age of race relations in the young city. When the expanding economy offered jobs for everyone, free blacks flocked to the city and found that, in Phillips’ words,
"obsessed with economic expansion, white residents of Baltimore appear[ed] to have grown marginally color-blind." African Americans lived on the same blocks as whites, were included in the city directories, and, although a number of skilled jobs in the city were reserved for whites, blacks found work in semi-skilled trades as well as manual labor. Like Arnold, Phillips credits the Panic of 1819 for bringing about major social change. In this case the hard economic times ended what Phillips describes as surprisingly liberal attitudes Baltimoreans held about race in the early republic. Phillips draws parallels between the heightening of racism and rising black unemployment after the Panic.

In the case of another minority group in the city, Arnold mentions the two Jewish families who settled in Baltimore during this period. In his work in progress, On Middle Ground: A History of the Jews of Baltimore, co-written with Deborah Weiner, Eric Goldstein indicates that Baltimore’s Jewish community was not as tiny as historians once thought. As Arnold notes, these two families formed the hub, but Goldstein has recently found that other Jewish families and individuals moved through the city, living in Baltimore only temporarily and leaving few traces in traditional historical documents.
Chapter 2
The Golden Age, 1797-1819

By the time Baltimore became a full-fledged municipality in 1797 its growth rate exceeded every other city in the nation and for the next two decades it surged forward, passing Charleston, then Boston and setting its sights on overtaking Philadelphia. In wealth, warfare, and politics, the Chesapeake metropolis moved close to the center stage of American history. City residents purchased costly engraved copies of John Moale's 1752 drawing of the rustic old village to hang on the walls of their opulent town homes as testimony to the belief that "no city ever advanced to a similar height of prosperity and respectability in an equal period of time." 48

To a degree, the prosperity of the Golden Age arose from the continued expansion of the city's rich agricultural hinterland that it had begun to tap in the 1750s and 1760s, but the great acceleration began in 1791 when the wars of the French Revolution forced almost every West European nation to turned to America for foodstuffs and other supplies. The West Indian Islands, their trade with Europe profoundly disrupted by the wars, looked even more to Baltimore than it had done in the past. Since the Chesapeake metropolis was able to tap a larger and richer agricultural hinterland than any other coastal city, and possessed an almost unlimited number of sites for water-driven flour mills, it became the chief supplier of flour and tobacco to the Atlantic world. The growth of its flour trade is truly astonishing, from approximately 70,000 barrels in 1783 to a peak of 553,000 barrels in 1812. Philadelphia exported only half as much and New York City remained a distant third. For several decades the Baltimore region remained the largest milling center in the nation, and the city's merchants handled more flour than any port in the world. By 1812 the city's domestic trade extended throughout the entire Chesapeake region, westward to the Ohio Valley, north into Central Pennsylvania and all along the Atlantic seaboard from Massachusetts to Georgia. It did not seem foolish to think that Baltimore might eventually overtake Philadelphia and become the nation's second city behind New York. This dream, along with the Golden Age itself, ended with the Panic of 1819. While all of America's seaports suffered
from this economic collapse, Baltimore was dealt a blow from which it never fully recovered. Even so, for a few glorious years it seemed to be a city of destiny.

Baltimore's prosperity and growth rested on its great international merchants; this group of approximately 150 men became very rich, forming a new economic elite within the state of Maryland. Several were among the wealthiest men in America. Only a handful of the largest tidewater planters equaled their wealth and none matched their economic influence. It was a profound revolution in the balance of economic power. Some merchants specialized in grain and flour exports while others concentrated on tobacco, flaxseed, lumber, or iron; but when it came to imports, they were nearly all general tradesmen, selling whatever happened to come into their hands. Naturally, those who traded more to England brought back manufactured goods while those shipping wheat and flour to the Iberian Peninsula brought back more wine, but many of Baltimore's ships touched at several different ports and thus returned with a variety of items. For example, the firm of Harrison and Sterrett traded heavily in Spain, Portugal and the Madeira islands, but stopped at enough other ports to gather a broader range of items to sell in their Baltimore wholesale store. In 1817 they offered for sale some 97,000 gallons of Madeira, sherry, claret, and sauterne, but they also had 1,260 gallons of brandy, 3,780 gallons of Dutch gin, ten cases of soap, fifty casks of olive oil, 200 bags of coffee plus a large quantity of copper sheathing and tin plate. Other stores and warehouses along the city's waterfront bulged with products from every nation: Swedish iron bars, English hardware and textiles, Russian sheet iron, Belgian mirrors, Scottish fishing line, Irish linen, Italian writing paper, German glassware and tobacco pipes, Spanish wool, Greek olive oil, and Turkish opium.49

Even though trade was king, artisan manufacturing continued to grow rapidly. In 1814 approximately four out of ten people appearing in the city directory listed themselves as artisans or mechanics. The city's most skilled craftsmen turned out high quality silverware, furniture, clocks, and other items that can still be seen at the Maryland Historical Society and the Baltimore Museum of Art; but on the whole European goods remained superior in quality and often very competitive in price. During the period of the Confederation in the 1780s the city's artisans and mechanics sought to limit European competition by petitioning the Maryland General Assembly to place duties on foreign goods. The rural-dominated legislature refused and so Baltimore's artisans lined up behind the local merchant-traders to support the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 with its plan for a central government capable of placing protective tariffs on foreign goods. When Maryland ratified the Constitution in April of 1788, the city's artisans, mechanics and merchants staged a huge parade that ended on a large hill overlooking the Inner Harbor. Here they feasted, drank, and celebrated the new federal government. The place has ever since been called Federal Hill. The next year they petitioned the new Congress for a tariff and while the new federal government complied, the legislation did not reduce the influx of foreign goods as much as the hard-pressed artisans had hoped. Most remained small-scale producers, getting by with just a few workers and earning profits that made them comfortably well off rather than rich.
The city’s only large, factory-style manufacturing experiments came during the brief period of the Jeffersonian Embargo of 1807-1808 and again during the War of 1812 when the supply of English textiles was cut off. A group of Baltimore investors established the Union Manufacturing Company and built a very big textile mill, perhaps the largest in the nation, on the Patapsco River. Four other suburban textile mills opened between 1808 and 1816. While successful by the standards of the day, they did not spawn many imitators. The Industrial Revolution, which had begun to transform New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, remained a neglected stepchild in Maryland.

Even though the city failed to embrace the new manufacturing sector, its commercial prosperity provided a wide variety of lucrative careers for the more talented and well connected, while giving the rest employment that allowed them to live in modest comfort. Not surprisingly, wealth holding in Baltimore resembled a steep pyramid with a few rich families at the top and much larger numbers in the middling and lower ranks. In 1813, when the city had about 50,000 free residents living in approximately 8,400 households, a group of about 360 of these households (the top four per cent) composed the economic elite. This small number of wealthy merchants, bankers, lawyers, and a few manufacturers possessed an average of $4,533 in taxable wealth and together owned just over half (52 percent) the city’s total real estate and personal property.

**The Social Structure**

Baltimore’s elite lived splendidly. They occupied large, tastefully decorated town homes, and surrounded themselves with household servants and slaves. They moved through the cobbled streets in fine carriages or sedan chairs and could be seen dancing at the Assembly Rooms (built in 1798), or attending plays at the theater on Holliday Street. During the winter they dined in private banqueting rooms at the Indian Queen Tavern. In good weather they ate and drank outdoors while watching circus acts or fireworks at Gray’s Gardens, an amusement park on the grounds of what had formerly been William Lux’s private garden at Chatsworth. During the hot and often unhealthy months (July through early September) the rich retired to their country estates in the suburbs, or traveled to resorts in the Northern states.

Below the elite was a larger group of about 700 households headed by men (and a few women) who pursued prosperous careers as merchants, retailers, artisan manufacturers, ship captains, builders, tavern and innkeepers, boarding house proprietors, teachers, clergymen and chief clerks. This group also lived quite well, aided by several servants or slaves. They too escaped to the country during the summer, occupying small cottages rather than estates. Further down, but still clearly within the ranks of the property owning classes, were a group of approximately 1,100 households whose average taxable wealth amounted to only a small fraction of what the elite possessed, but their relatively small amount of property did not mean they lived uncomfortably by the standards of the day. Over a third of these families owned at least one slave. Most enslaved
people in Baltimore were owned by artisans and served primarily in their businesses, but others were hired out for the income.

At the lowest level of the propertied classes were another 1,350 households whose combined taxable wealth constituted a mere 6 percent of the total. Individually, their assessments ranged from $300 down to $53. While certainly modest in wealth, they still constituted a portion of the city’s propertied class and thus counted themselves among the upper half of the city’s residents. A surprising 22 percent of these households (about 300) also owned at least one slave. Once again, small craftsmen who did not even own their own houses, might hold a slave or two to help in their trade. Also, widows appear often among the slave-holding group—women like Ann Crow whose total assessed wealth consisted of two slaves with a combined value of $146 and $12 worth of furniture. What she received from hiring out her two slaves may have provided her only income.50

What of the approximately 3,400 households that owned no taxable property whatsoever? Even though they lacked the economic security that the ownership of real estate or enslaved people brought, and lived in cramped little houses, the great majority did not view themselves as poor. They ate reasonably well, wore decent clothing, and owned a small number of personal possessions. Many artisans owned a stock of tools that under the law were not assessed for taxes. Those who did not possess either tools or skills supported themselves as day laborers, helpers, servants, or temporary agricultural workers in the surrounding countryside. Today, these households would fall well below the poverty line and qualify them for low-income subsidies, but two centuries ago they were regarded as people of modest means or sometimes called the thrifty or self-supporting poor. In fact, many in this group could not remain self-supporting when the city’s trade slackened and the laboring jobs on which they depended melted away. During such times they needed, and received, public aid but even then were not stigmatized as “the regular poor.”

The more regular poor, “paupers” or “vagrants” as nearly everyone called them, were quite a separate group in the city, easily identified by their ragged condition. Throughout the Golden Age about one out of twenty Baltimoreans lived in real poverty, thus in 1790 they comprised a group of about 700 people and by 1819 exceeded 3,000. These households or individuals almost never held permanent jobs and consequently lived just on the edge of actual destitution. They had barely enough food to prevent serious malnutrition, wore ragged clothes, and owned almost nothing beyond a cook pot, some bowls, and a few other nearly worthless personal items. Old boxes and barrels passed for furniture and piles of rags or straw were used for sleeping. They usually inhabited a single room, a back building or a shanty that was poorly ventilated in the summer and heated in the winter only when wood could be obtained by charity, scavenging, or theft. Those who fell below this minimum level of existence were truly destitute and either lived on daily charity or perished. Almost no one actually starved to death in Baltimore, but many, especially the children of the poor, died from their low resistance to disease, a condition that itself
arose from periodic malnutrition, exposure to the elements, and a general lack of elementary sanitation.

The regular poor encompassed a very wide spectrum of individuals and households. Women with dependent children led the list and these grim households comprised a majority of all those living in poverty. Most of the mothers were widowed or abandoned, but a number had husbands who were in some way incapacitated--by sickness, injury, mental disorders or alcoholism. A second group, composed largely of individuals, slipped into poverty through old age, a severe injury or disability, or a variety of mental and emotional disorders. Many of the regular poor showed signs of severe alcoholism, but whether this was a root cause of their downtrodden condition, or a reaction to it, is impossible to know. Those who believed drinking to be sinful tended to see it as the root cause of nearly all poverty, crime, and violence while others viewed it as one cause among many. There is no doubt, however, that a sizable percentage of the more able-bodied vagrants who drifted in and out of the city and hung around the docks or on street corners were severe alcoholics whose drinking problem made it impossible for them to support themselves in any regular way. Many of these sad individuals had no fixed residence and survived by a combination of odd jobs, begging, scavenging, and petty theft. Some women had no choice but to turn to prostitution along the docks to make an income.

The city's major charitable efforts were divided between the thrifty, self-supporting poor and the much smaller group that composed the regular poor. The propertied classes understood the justice and necessity of aiding the city's respectable laborers and poorer artisans when trade was cut off and jobs became scarce. Each time economic distress became apparent among the working poor, usually in late December or January, the city launched a major relief effort. While technically a private enterprise, the mayor and the city's leading merchants always directed the campaign. Relief committees elected at public meetings in each ward collected money and goods from the more affluent householders while other local volunteers went door-to-door in the ward's narrow streets and alleys to determine the requirements of the needy households. The relief committees assembled supplies of food, fuel, and other necessities at some prominent point in the ward and on certain announced days, distributed them to those who had been identified as requiring aid. This system, while often called a charity, operated more like an unemployment insurance system. During the unusually hard winter of 1816-1817 relief committees distributed over $10,000 worth of goods to needy families. However, like almost all ad hoc, voluntary efforts, the system never functioned efficiently. Even Mayor George Stiles, one of the city's most able and public-spirited leaders, admitted that while the basic idea was sound, its actual operation left much to be desired. Speaking of the 1816-1817 effort, he said that while many residents received aid who might "otherwise have perished by the severity of the weather," the giving of aid "on the spur and pressure of the occasion," inevitably led to a portion of the goods going to "frauds and impositioners."
Attempting to find a more permanent solution to the problem, a group of the city’s leading businessmen met in 1818 and established the Savings Bank of Baltimore, an institution designed to aid "the thrifty poor." The charitable, moral and even religious character of the bank was made clear at the outset by one of its directors who recorded his view that the commencement of the savings institution now opened two very different paths for the city’s working people. Those disciplined enough to save a small amount each week, he said, "secure for themselves and their families a resource in sickness and old age" while those “who spend a like portion of their earnings in grog shops,” do so "to the utter ruin of themselves and the misery of their families; besides forfeiting all claim to the mercy of an offended Deity."52 The board of directors, who served without pay, invested the depositors’ savings and paid interest on the accounts. This poor man’s bank certainly helped some individuals and families, but the modest size of the average account meant that it could not serve as an economic cushion for old age or even see a family through an extended period of unemployment.

The regular poor, though much smaller in total numbers, presented a far more serious challenge to charitably-minded city leaders. They, too, shared in the largess of the ward-based charity distributions during the winter months, but when general prosperity returned they always seemed unable (or unwilling some thought) to take up some type of employment. During the summer and fall months such persons could get by with odd jobs, street begging and scavenging, but when winter came many entered the Baltimore Poor House.

The Alms House provided generously for those who were admitted, but conditions were crowded and the poor health of many "inmates" spread diseases that sometimes ravaged the entire institution, especially the children who usually comprised about a quarter of the institution’s population. Discipline was rigorous. A number of the inmates required very close supervision. The chief problem was overcrowding. Even though the directors of the Alms House expanded the facility several times during the Golden Age, the numbers committed to its care by city and county officials almost always exceeded the available space. Along with the mothers and their dependent children, the elderly and the sick poor, local officials also sent troublesome alcoholics and mentally disturbed people, many of whom were homeless beggars and petty thieves. Thus an institution designed to care primarily for the "deserving" poor served also as a dumping ground for the region’s problem people.

In addition to the annual ward-based distribution of aid and the Alms House, a whole network of smaller charities operated in the city. Churches, ethnic societies and more informal local groups collected money and goods which they distributed to those deemed worthy of relief. There also existed a substantial amount of individual charity, some in response to begging and probably even more of an unsolicited nature. In this manner kindly Baltimoreans aided many truly needy families and individuals, but also enabled quite a few "frauds and impositioners," as Mayor Stiles called them, to remain unemployed and/or drunk.
By the end of the era a few enlightened individuals began to deal with the regular poor in a more thoughtful manner. The Fells Point Humane Society founded in 1819, provided food, fuel, and other necessities to destitute families in that waterfront community. Unlike the other charities, the Fells Point organization attempted to keep in regular contact with those to whom it gave aid, visiting their homes once a week to check up on them, offer advice and extend encouragement. Moral concerns were paramount. The Society assured the public that in giving aid, it employed "every means... to ascertain from their neighbors and others, how far such persons are deserving the aid offered by the society," and those whose claims of poverty proved false or who were found guilty of "gross immorality" were "immediately struck from the list." \(^\text{53}\)

Sadly, but perhaps understandably, most Baltimoreans were just not willing to spend much time visiting the poor at all, much less making the effort to offer them more regular encouragement and advice. The propertied classes proved willing to contribute small sums to charity, especially the annual ward-based collections, and they paid the city/county poor tax without much grumbling, but only a tiny minority spent any significant amount of their time or money trying to aid, encourage, and chastise the regular poor. Consequently, the numbers of chronically poor continued to multiply, kept in check more by death and out-migration than by any of the efforts to help and/or discipline them. However, even as the ranks of the poor were thinned, others took their places--unskilled and confused in-migrants from the countryside, disoriented foreign immigrants, and those who through some family tragedy or personal disintegration slipped down from the regular working classes or even the middle ranks. By 1819 the roughly 3,000 men, women and children living on the edge of destitution, revolving in and out of the Alms House, and seen daily as they begged on the street corners, were now something more than a series of personal tragedies. They had become a social problem.

Baltimore’s residents during the Golden Age continued to be a diverse group. The intermingling of many "foreign" individuals into the Anglo American majority tended to produce a new sort of people who, while basically "American" in their speech and behavior, formed an amalgam of four or five ethnic groups. At the same time many new "ethnics," entered the city and augmented its distinct German, French, Irish or African American sub-cultures. In 1817 the British traveler John Palmer visited Baltimore and characterized its residents as "a mixed race of French, Irish, Scotch, English, Germans and their descendants, plus a separate society composed of "many blacks... free and slave." \(^\text{54}\)

Exactly how many of Baltimore's residents had really "mixed," remained questionable as those of Anglo American background continued to be the city's core ethnic group. To call these people Anglo Americans is something of a misnomer since for some time these British-descended people had referred to themselves simply as Americans. Of course anyone born in the United States, or who took out citizenship papers, could also call themselves American, but if they were of some other ethnic background, Anglo Americans perceived them, to one degree or another, as a slightly different sort of fellow citizen. This sense of difference did not necessarily carry a
negative connotation. The Scots, Scotch-Irish, Germans, and French were generally welcomed as
descendants of modern, thriving societies and respected for the contributions they made to
Baltimore’s progress. The city’s Irish Catholics, especially those of the laboring and servant class,
still suffered under the lingering suspicion that befell all Roman Catholics in the largely Protestant
nation, despite a strong Catholic presence in Maryland since its colonial beginnings. Those who
achieved wealth or even middle class status did, however, find a greater degree of acceptance in
Baltimore than almost any other city in the nation.

The great exception to this multicultural society was the racial divide. African Americans
(all those exhibiting any trace of African background) were dismissed as a completely separate
and inferior caste. Even free people of color who acquired skills and lived prosperous, upright
lives found themselves restricted by laws and social customs that placed an iron barrier between
themselves and all white people. At the same time the wrenching nature of their ancestors’ forced
immigration to America cut them off from nearly all of their own African cultural background.
Thus they were left by default as people whose adopted language, culture, and religion flowed
from a society that utterly rejected them as equals. Even here, of course, amalgamation of the
most basic sort still transpired. Sexual relations, nearly all between white men and African
American women, produced an ever-larger group of biracial individuals who were neither
completely black nor completely white but who under Maryland law and white custom were all
set on the dark side of the racial wall.

Religion

As a crossroads city between North and South, Baltimore exhibited an unusually wide
religious diversity. By 1819 the city numbered among its many churches the only Roman Catholic
Cathedral in the United States, the founding church of American Methodists, and the only
Unitarian church south of the Mason-Dixon Line.

The major event in the religious history of Baltimore during this era is the spectacular rise
of the American Wesleyans, or Methodists. In fact, the origin of American Methodism is closely
tied to Baltimore. Francis Asbury, the first great Wesleyan circuit rider, passed through Baltimore
regularly during the 1770s preaching a more enthusiastic form of Anglicanism and winning
converts. By 1783 there were two Wesleyan meetinghouses in the city, one located on Strawberry
Alley (now Dallas Street) in Fells Point and a larger one on Lovely Lane (now Redwood Street) in
Old Baltimore Town. It was at a meeting of Wesleyan clergymen in the Lovely Lane chapel at
Christmas time in 1784 that the American Methodists finally separated from the Anglican Church
and formally established an independent denomination. The conference ordained Asbury as the
church’s leader, organized an administrative structure, and agreed upon the ways in which its
preachers were to spread to their intense message of damnation and redemption.
By 1819 the small sect had become the largest denomination in both Baltimore and the nation. Its greatest growth occurred along the Western frontier, but urban residents also responded to the call. Nearly 10,000 Baltimorians joined the new church and worshiped in one of the city's eight meetinghouses. The Methodists achieved particular success in winning converts among the city's African Americans. While other denominations did allow African Americans members, their status was clearly that of second-class Christians. The Methodist outreach, fired by a depth of conviction that bordered on spiritual egalitarianism, soon brought a clear majority of Baltimore's African Americans into their fold.

While predominantly a church of the common folk, a number of wealthy merchants and lawyers (or their wives) also became Methodists and provided large sums of money to the denomination. Enthusiastic, evangelical, and highly organized, the Methodists dedicated themselves to spreading a highly emotional brand of Christianity through revival services at the city churches, street preaching, and most successful of all, at "camp meetings" held in suburban groves or other nearby retreats. The camp meeting could be an awesome event. In 1806 the Baltimorean Henry Smith described a suburban revival held in a grove near Belair Road where "hundreds were prostrate on the earth before the Lord" while others "came running from every Direction to stand weeping and shouting for Joy…"55

In the early 1770s, Asbury had often described Baltimore's residents, especially those in Fells Point, as "much devoted to pride, spiritual idolatry, and almost every species of sin." Others he found to be "cold and unaffected...destitute of spiritual feelings." Even in 1784, when Methodism had gained a firm place in the city, he still was "grieved at the barrenness of the people; they appear to be swallowed up with the cares of the world." However, upon his return in 1789 he found "a wonder working time... people were daily praying from house to house; some crying for mercy, others rejoicing in God, and not a few, day after day, joining in society for the benefit of spiritual fellowship."56 While the emotional outbursts of the camp meetings and city revivals have become the hallmark of the early Methodism, its long-term success in the city rested more on the creation of a large number of well-organized city congregations. Rejecting the more grand architectural ambitions of the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Lutherans, the Methodists built plain, relatively inexpensive meetinghouses that could be put up quickly whenever a new neighborhood required one. By 1819 every neighborhood had a meetinghouse where hundreds were provided with a strong religious base for their lives and, unfortunately, a deep distrust of the more liturgical churches, especially the Episcopalians and Roman Catholics.

Baltimore's Episcopalians remained the oldest and most prestigious denomination in the city, but the continued rise of other church congregations into the upper ranks of wealth and polite society reduced their influence. Nevertheless, St. Paul's continued to be the parish of the city's old Anglican merchants and the church of choice for Baltimore County's landed elite when they resided in town during the winter months. It also attracted a number of newly enriched merchants from a variety of religious backgrounds who joined out of religious conviction, social
considerations, or (most often) because of their marriage to female parishioners. Among the new members were an increasing number of the city's German American merchants who rose to wealth during the Golden Age. George Keeports, Engelhard Yeiser, Mark Pringle, George Hoffinan and John Munnickhuysen, wealthy gentleman and active civic leaders, all played prominent roles in St. Paul's affairs. It is also possible that some Baltimoreans were attracted to St. Paul's by the fine music and the high quality of the sermons.

Individual churches have always been deeply influenced by their respective clergymen and St. Paul's was fortunate in its leadership during these years. Joseph Bend (1779-1812) was a dedicated cleric, a thoughtful preacher, and a cultured gentleman. He also pursued an active civic life, helping to establish the Baltimore Library Company and the Maryland Anti-Slavery society. As a deeply religious "high" churchman, Bend became troubled by what he perceived to be a widening religious gap among the city's residents. He thought many Baltimoreans, particularly males, lived lives of an increasing secular and irreligious character, while at the other end of the spectrum the new Methodist preachers and their followers gave themselves over to "ranting, noise, and other follies" that disgraced Christianity, standing contrary to the "rational and dignified way in which the clergy of almost all other churches proceed." Bend's successor, James Kemp, who came to St. Paul's in 1812 proved to be an even more dynamic leader. Between 1814 and 1817 Kemp oversaw the construction of a fine new church for St. Paul's that substantially increased its seating capacity—a sure sign of success.

The enlargement of St. Paul's was part of a broader growth spurt for the Episcopal denomination throughout the city. Even as its proportion of adherents in the general population declined, the extremely rapid rate of total population growth brought thousands of Episcopalians from the tidewater counties into the city. A number were pulled into the ranks of the Methodists, but by 1819 enough remained to establish several new Episcopal parishes. While losing their status as the dominant church in the city, the wealth and position of their elite members and their continuing expansion into new districts of the city, allowed Episcopalians to remain a major religious force in the city.

The city's Scotch-Irish Presbyterians remained a distinct ethnic and religious group, suspicious of the more conservative Episcopalians and Roman Catholics, while at the same time bemused and disgusted by what they saw as the mindless ranting of the Methodists and Baptists. While numerically small, (they remained a steady 15 percent of the city's Protestants during these years) their wealth and commitment to public life made them a major force in the community. A church whose members included such men as Sam Smith, William Buchanan, Samuel Sterrett, William Spear, Robert Gilmor, William Patterson, George Brown, James McHenry, James Mosher, John Stricker, and James Calhoun was bound to be of great influence. It is difficult to imagine how the city would have developed as it did during these years without this extraordinary group of men. The wealth and widespread influence of Baltimore's Presbyterians, in addition to their self-assured attitude (some called it self-righteousness) was almost bound to engender mixed
feelings among their fellow citizens. They were at once admired, envied, distrusted, and disliked. Not until the rise of the German and Polish-Russian Jews in the 1880-1930 era did Baltimore again have such a distinctive and influential ethnic/religious minority in its midst.

Baltimore's Roman Catholic community experienced an increase that almost paralleled the Methodists. Although Maryland had been founded as a Catholic colony in 1634 most of the religion's adherents had settled in Southern Maryland. In Baltimore Catholics remained relatively obscure even into the 1780s but by 1819 Catholicism had become one of the largest and most prominent denominations in the city. It was certainly the most cosmopolitan. Attending mass at St. Peter's church one found Anglo Americans, Irishmen, Englishmen, Scots, Frenchmen, Germans, Belgians, Spaniards, Cubans, and African Americans.

Anglo Americans formed the single largest component within the city's Roman Catholic community, but the intermarriage of this group with Irish Catholics, both in Southern Maryland and subsequently in Baltimore, makes it very difficult to disentangle the two groups. The majority of these families had migrated to Baltimore from the state's old Catholic settlements, but many Irish Catholics had been brought directly to the Baltimore area as indentured or convict servants. Those who had been born and raised in Southern Maryland had probably migrated to Baltimore in the years after 1783. Many had been small planters or artisans for several generations, and thus the vast majority found employment as artisans, clerks, and mechanics in Baltimore. The descendants of the more recently arrived indentured and convict servants, not yet having made their way very far up the occupational ladder, remained in the laboring classes.

Baltimore's French Catholic residents were a distinctive and unusual group. Aside from a relatively few French West Indian merchants such as Henry Didier and John D'Arcy who decided to immigrate to Baltimore at the start of the American Revolution, almost all of Baltimore's 2,000-3,000 French immigrants came as refugees from Santo Domingo, fleeing the great slave revolt that erupted on the island in 1791. For a time the city was overrun with French hairdressers, musicians, dancing instructors, dressmakers, and private tutors. Some remained and turned their attention to making Baltimore's women the most musically-talented, best dressed, and stunningly-coifed females in the nation. After a few years most of the émigrés moved on, but a number stayed and gradually merged into the larger Anglo/Irish Roman Catholic group. Much smaller contingents of Germans, Englishmen, Scots, Flemings, and Spaniards lived in the city and aside from the Germans, none reached the size where they formed a separate sub-community worthy of a separate ethnic parish. Baltimore's African American Catholics, both enslaved and free, came primarily from Southern Maryland or Santo Domingo.

A world apart from all these middling and poor Catholic families stood the city's Catholic elite, several hundred wealthy Anglo-Irish families, a handful of prosperous French merchants and shipbuilders, and a few German merchants and artisan manufacturers. Once again, the Anglo/Irish Americans formed the overwhelming majority of this elite group. Most were from Southern Maryland, but unlike the majority of Catholic in-migrants from this area, they
descended from families possessing substantial wealth and experience in business. In a fast growing city such as Baltimore, where a Catholic background proved little hindrance to advancement, these already well-established Southern Marylanders prospered and about 150-200 counted themselves rich. This was not a large group, but aside from New Orleans, which was still an overwhelmingly French city, Baltimore's Catholic elite was larger, wealthier and more sophisticated than those in any other American city. When the famous British writer Frances Trollope visited Baltimore in 1827 and attended High Mass, she was "perfectly astonished by the beauty and splendid appearance of the ladies" who entered the sanctuary. "Excepting on a very brilliant Sunday at the Tuileries, I never saw so showy a display of morning costume, and I think I never say anywhere so many beautiful women at one glance."58

Within Baltimore's Catholic elite, Charles Carroll of Carrollton and the Carroll family occupied a special place above all others and it was through Bishop John Carroll (Charles Carroll's cousin), that the Pope placed the first American bishopric in Baltimore in 1789. While no longer the wealthiest man in Maryland, Carroll of Carrollton still held vast stretches of agricultural land as well as numerous valuable urban properties. In addition, he was increasingly venerated as one of America's greatest living statesmen. As an American patriot and also a staunch Roman Catholic, Carroll supported almost every great civic activity undertaken by the city or the state of Maryland while underwriting the Catholic bishopric in nearly all its endeavors. If anyone ever thought less of Carroll for his devotion to the Catholic Church, they never said so in public.

The comfortable and secure position enjoyed by Roman Catholics in Baltimore during the Golden Age certainly owed something to the esteem people felt for Charles Carroll, but it also owed something to John Carroll, whose appointment as the city's first Catholic bishop turned out to be an inspired appointment. Well educated, like his cousin Charles, at the Jesuit college of St. Omar in Flanders, Bishop Carroll was an urbane, outgoing, public-spirited individual who, from his arrival in Baltimore in 1786 until his death there almost three decades later, won the deep admiration of Catholics and Protestants alike. An inveterate joiner, Carroll helped found and direct nearly a dozen local institutions for charitable, educational or other civic purposes. His favorite was the Library Company of Baltimore, an organization whose officers included Reverend Allison of the First Presbyterian Church, William Bend of St. Paul's, and the merchant Robert Gilmor. Carroll wrote the Company's constitution served as its president until his death.

Even though Bishop Carroll devoted the majority of his time to administering the far-flung network of American parish churches, he spent considerable time developing Catholic institutions in Baltimore and Maryland. His cathedral church was St. Peter's, the church opened by the town's Catholics in 1784; however, as the years passed, this single church proved too small and perhaps a bit too cosmopolitan for the city's various Catholic constituencies. In 1792 Irish Catholics in Fells Point expressed a desire for a church of their own and as a result St. Patrick's parish was established there in 1792. A few years later the city's German Catholics were provided with their own parish and a German priest. When St Mary's chapel was opened by the French-
speaking Sulpician fathers in 1808, Baltimore's French Catholics and many African American Catholics flocked to this charming edifice for mass. Thus, even before Baltimore's first prelate was advanced to archbishop in 1808, his city flock had taken on the character it would maintain for nearly the next two centuries—a central cathedral church whose parishioners became increasingly affluent and sophisticated, and a series of more local parish churches catering to various ethnic and racial groups.

Early in the nineteenth century Charles Carroll had come to believe that his denomination needed a more impressive sanctuary in the city. By 1803 St. Peter's had become so crowded that it was difficult to maintain decorum during masses and its very plain design fell far short of even the poorest European cathedrals. Consequently, Carroll and the city's leading Catholics determined to build a large, European-style edifice. John Eager Howard, ever desirous of improving his west Baltimore properties, offered (at a very reasonable price of $20,000) an entire city block just three streets north of St. Peter's, facing onto the Falls Turnpike Road (now Cathedral Street). At the time, the lot stood on the very northwest edge of the city, but the area around it already showed great promise and within a few years residential builders were touting it as "a seat of fashion." The property, bounded by Franklin, Cathedral, Mulberry, and Charles Streets, was purchased and in 1806 Carroll laid the cornerstone of the new cathedral. The structure was designed Benjamin H. Latrobe, America's first great architect and at the time a resident in the city. Unfortunately, the size, complexity and cost of the structure slowed construction. By the time it was dedicated in 1821 both Carroll and Latrobe were dead, but the Basilica of the Assumption, as the cathedral was named, remains the city's greatest architectural treasure and one of the most important church buildings in America.

Next to the Archbishop and his cathedral church, the most important Catholic institution in Baltimore during this era was St. Mary's Seminary and College. It originated somewhat by accident in 1791 with the arrival in Baltimore of four French Sulpician priests accompanied by five young seminarians. Residing originally in Paris, they fled to America when the French revolutionary government suppressed their order and imprisoned its leaders. They set up their seminary in a former tavern just outside the city on the Reisterstown turnpike (now Pennsylvania Avenue at Paca Street). In this rather unlikely setting they opened the first institution in the United States for the training of Catholic priests. After a shaky start in the 1790s, St. Mary's began to establish itself on a firmer financial base, a development that allowed the fathers to transform the old tavern into a handsome complex of buildings surrounding a botanical garden.

The key to success was the decision to open a non-denominational private secondary school called St. Mary's College that might attract Protestants as well as Catholics. The Sulpicians were a famed teaching order in Europe and affluent Catholics from Maryland, Louisiana, and the West Indies began to send their children to Baltimore for an education. Soon dozens of the city's leading Protestant families, finding that St. Mary's did indeed avoid religious proselytizing, also began sending their children to the school. It is somewhat startling to look the list of St. Mary's
graduates during these years and see the names Sterrett, Dorsey, Ridgely, Patterson, McHenry, Hollingsworth, Purviance, Ellicott, Howard, Spear, Smith, and Mosher—the children of some of the city's leading Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Quaker families. Only the Methodists and Lutherans appear to have shunned the opportunity to gain a superior education and a fluency in French. The institution flourished as Baltimore's premiere high school for some years until the municipality opened a public high school.

The religious tolerance exemplified by St. Mary's College reflected a degree of general religious toleration in Baltimore that exceeded almost any other major American city, but its success undoubtedly owed something to the fact that students were drawn from the "polite" upper classes where both Protestants and Catholics generally regarded overt displays of religious bigotry as uncouth manifestation of lower class behavior. However, among the city's more roughhewn residents in places like Fells Point, religious sensitivity and toleration hardly existed. The waterfront neighborhood contained a volatile combination of intense Methodist revivalism, blasphemous maritime secularism, and deep Irish Catholic piety. When the parishioners at St. Patrick's held a public procession in Fell's Point on Corpus Christi day in 1811, Archbishop Carroll was appalled, complaining that it was a rash act, lacking in "respect for our fellow citizens" and "might have been the occasion of a riot."\(^{60}\)

Woven into Baltimore's ethnic and religious tapestry, but also standing a bit outside of it, were the Germans. Next to the Anglo Americans themselves, Germans formed the city's largest ethnic group. The majority embraced the Lutheran or Reformed churches, but a small percentage from the South German states remained Catholic and a number drifted off into one of the other Protestant denominations. Germans had begun entering Baltimore in the 1750s and by 1819 approximately one in eight city residents had either been born in Germany or, more often, was descended from German immigrants and therefore more accurately called a German American. While not as uniformly successful as the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, men of German background attained wealth and influence out of proportion to their numbers. Approximately one-fifth of the city's wealthiest merchants were Germans and as the city moved into the new world of banking and insurance, German names appeared often on their boards of directors. They stood out even more prominently among the artisans and mechanics. The German states had long been home to many of Europe's greatest craftsmen and those who came to Baltimore pursued the full range of skilled trades and achieved great success in nearly all of them.

In politics Baltimore's Germans provided candidates for both the Federalist and Jeffersonian parties. A majority united behind Samuel Smith and the Republicans, but a number of others remained staunch Federalists. In local politics Germans were quite successful. The first Baltimore city council, elected in 1797, included four men of German background and throughout the era one fourth of the councilmen came from this ethnic group. The city council elected in 1805 was only two seats shy of a German majority. Since people of German background
were scattered almost evenly throughout the city’s eight wards, it appears that their popularity extended to a large number of non-German voters.

In spite of their relatively large numbers, there were no permanent citywide German institutions until the end of the era. Attempts had been made in the 1780s to establish a German Society and to publish a German language newspaper, but both efforts failed. While all this points to a general slackening of ties to the fatherland and its culture, some of the city’s most "mainstream" Germans did seem willing to contribute towards the establishment of formal German institutions. For example, General John Stricker, a second generation German American who arrived in Baltimore from Frederick, Maryland after the Revolution, became a wealthy merchant, bank president, commander of the city militia, a congressman, and an elder in the First Presbyterian Church; he also played an important role in the German Society of Maryland when it was revived in 1817. The re-establishment of the German Society opened a new chapter in the development of Baltimore’s German American community. The real catalyst was an upsurge in German immigration following the close of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. Spurred by the arrival of this new wave of immigrants, the society became Baltimore’s first permanent, citywide, Germanic institution. The city’s four German churches, each strong by itself, did little to promote citywide cooperation, whereas the founders of the German Society included men from every religious background, including Solomon Etting and Jacob Cohen, the two leading members of Baltimore’s tiny German Jewish community. In the years that followed, a number of other secular institutions were established that drew their membership from all parts of the city’s German population and gave the community as a whole a new visibility. While most Baltimoreans remained proud to have such a solid and successful ethnic group as the Germans in their midst, others worried that their increasing numbers might make the city too Germanic. In 1819, however, this seemed a remote possibility.

Abolition

If Baltimore’s dominant Anglo Americans worried about basic population shifts within their community, the focus should have been on African Americans rather than Germans. Of all the demographic changes in Baltimore during the Golden Age, the most radical was the large increase in its African American population and the shift in its status from overwhelmingly slave to predominantly free. Prior to 1776 relatively few enslaved or free black people lived in Baltimore. During the Revolutionary War, however, an increased demand for labor in Baltimore, a halt in the flow of white indentured servants from Europe, and the disruption of the tobacco trade, which greatly altered the workload of enslaved Marylanders, induced many planters to hire out or sell their slaves to city employers. In Fells Point, the only section of the town where slave-holding records survive from the war years, the number of enslaved residents grew from sixty-five to 276, with over a third of them owned by the Point’s shipbuilders. The census of 1790 showed
that of the town’s 13,503 residents, 12 percent were African Americans and eight out of ten were enslaved.

Over the next thirty years the percentage of African Americans grew to 23 percent and over two-thirds were free. By 1819 black residents comprised the largest single group in the city after Anglo-Americans. How did this happen? First and foremost, an increasing number of Maryland slave owners freed their slaves because, under the changing economic conditions, owners were finding it increasingly difficult to profit from enslaved labor. This was especially true in the counties of central Maryland and the upper eastern shore where the cultivation of tobacco, which relied heavily on the labor of enslaved workers, went into a long decline after the American Revolution. Some Marylanders freed their slaves because they believed slavery violated the republican principals for which the American Revolution had been fought, while Quakers and many Methodists came to see slavery as a sin. Still others granted freedom to their slaves because they began to run away too often. The proximity to Pennsylvania (which abolished slavery in 1780) made it relatively easy for slaves in Baltimore to escape across the Mason-Dixon line. Rather than deal with this problem, owners freed their slaves outright, or promised them freedom after a fixed period of years. Others agreed to let their slaves earned extra money and purchase their own freedom.

In spite of the seemingly high incidence of escape and the growing criticism of slavery as an institution, a number of white Baltimoreans continued to purchase slaves and by 1810 the total number of slaves in Baltimore reached 4,672. At the same time the number of free blacks grew even faster. Thus, while the absolute number of slaves in the city reached its peak in 1810, enslaved people had become a minority of the black population. From that time on, however, the number of slaves began to decline absolutely and by 1860 reached 2,212 or a scant 10 percent of the black population. For a time, Baltimore’s slaves worked in almost every occupation. Several hundred worked for skilled artisans as cabinetmakers, silversmiths, jewelers, gunsmiths, brass founders, blacksmiths, watchmakers, and tinsmiths. Christopher Raborg, a German copper and tin smith in Fells Point, owned an enslaved man named Frank whom the city assessed at £45 (about $200), a considerable sum in 1798. John Welsh, who operated a small boot and shoe factory, owned five enslaved people, one of whom was listed as a "tradesman" and assessed at £65.51

Ultimately, the use of slaves in the city’s skilled, better-paying occupations engendered growing opposition from white artisans and apprentices who naturally objected to competition from enslaved labor. While white artisans could not obtain any legislative restrictions on the use of slave labor, and such laws would almost certainly have been struck down in the courts, they made their views known quite forcefully, and many employers felt obliged to restrict themselves to free white workers. Also, those who did purchase slaves to work in manufacturing found that while such a practice assured them of a steady workforce in prosperous times, slaves could not easily be employed elsewhere during slack periods and then they became an expense. Thus while
slavery fell away as the majority condition of Baltimore’s black residents by 1810, that reduction occurred in a backhanded way that had little to do with equality or freedom as most whites understood those terms.

It is in fact a misnomer to call Baltimore’s “free” African Americans a truly free people since their legal status remained clearly inferior to that of whites. While a small movement arose to eliminate slavery altogether and a few even suggested that general emancipation should be followed by the elevation of African Americans to full and equal citizenship, nothing came of either proposal. The movement centered in Baltimore and revolved around the Maryland Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, founded in 1789. It was led by men such as Samuel Sterrett, James Winchester, Alexander McKim, Zebulon and Jesse Hollingsworth, Joseph Townsend, Jesse Tyson, Francis Johonnett, Adam Fonerdon, James Eichelman, Elias Ellicott, James Carey, and Gerard T. Hopkins—a group heavily tipped towards Quakers, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Germans.

The views of these enlightened Baltimoreans found some support in northern and western Maryland, but the tidewater counties remained convinced that abolition spelled economic disaster and that its social consequences would be even worse. The planters could not envision turning their slaves into disenfranchised peasants, much less fellow citizens. In 1791 when the Baltimore abolitionists introduced a resolution in the House of Delegates favoring some form of general emancipation in Maryland, the tidewater slaveholders voted it down thirty-nine to fifteen. However, when conservatives attempted to restrict individual manumissions or compel free blacks to leave the state, these proposals were also rejected. Essentially, Maryland chose to leave the question of emancipation to each individual slave owner, and this became the state’s (and Baltimore’s) back door to abolition.62

The state legislature proved more united in its definition of the status of Maryland’s free blacks. Faced with an increasing population of such persons, the largest of any state in the union, the General Assembly sought to control them by prohibiting all political activity and sharply circumscribing their individual liberties. Following the 1831 Nat Turner Slave Rebellion in Virginia, the legislature would pass further restrictions. The net legislative result was that while free blacks maintained the right to reside within the state of Maryland, move about as they wished, become legally married, own property, and enter into private contracts, they could not vote, hold public office, sit on juries, or testify against whites in criminal court cases. Public assemblies, religious services, and even private meetings could not be held without the approval of a white official. The possession of hunting dogs or firearms was forbidden and ammunition could be purchased only with a permit signed by a white person. Free blacks who were judged to be vagrants could be bound out and thus for a time virtually re-enslaved.

Exactly what sort of community Baltimore’s African Americans created under the state’s so-called “Black Code” is not yet well understood, but there is no doubt that by 1819 its religious, social and civic life revolved around two churches: Sharp Street Methodist, founded in the late
1790s, and Bethel African Methodist Episcopal, established in 1816. While black people attended almost all of the city’s churches (usually in separate sections of seating) Sharp Street was the first all-black congregation. While the congregation was exclusively African American, it remained under the control of white Methodist leaders. Dissatisfaction with this arrangement finally led some members of the congregation to split off in 1816 and form their own religious institution that they called Bethel Church. Affiliating with a similar all-black congregation in Philadelphia, they became the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church, thus establishing one of the two centers from which this large denomination arose.

Bethel’s first minister was an ex-slave named Daniel Coker and through this position he emerged as Baltimore’s first significant black leader. The congregation grew rapidly under Coker’s leadership and in 1817, with over 600 members, moved into a large edifice near the Gay Street bridge that crossed Jones Falls. As the only institution operated exclusively for and by African Americans, it represented a key foundation stone for the city’s emerging black community. Unfortunately, Reverend Coker, a man of ability and determination, did not long enjoy the fruits of his religious labors. Bethel’s members either could not (or would not) provide him with a sufficient salary, and the private school he operated for African American children also failed to generate sufficient income. In 1818 Coker applied to the local court for insolvency and two years later immigrated to Liberia under the sponsorship of the American Colonization Society. He died in Sierra Leone in about 1846.

The degree to which Coker’s financial problems were his own, or were more traceable to the parsimony of those he sought to lead, cannot be known, but there is no doubt that his congregation, like the city’s free black community as a whole, was very poor. In fact, as the city grew and prospered occupational opportunities for free black residents declined and poverty increased. You can see this trend in the increase in the proportion of blacks who worked low-paying jobs. In 1810 only one third of Baltimore’s free black workers were employed as unskilled laborers and laundresses, two of the lowest rungs on the occupational ladder. The rest found better paying jobs in a wide variety of fields. Over the next seven years a dramatic change occurred, and by 1817 almost two-thirds worked at laboring and laundering jobs. White workers, increasingly angered by competition from the growing number of free blacks, gradually pressured employers to ban them from virtually all the better employment opportunities. Even many of the more dirty, difficult, and low paying jobs went to blacks only if the white workers could not be found to take them. Under such circumstances only a tiny minority of the city’s free blacks earned enough to gain any taxable property and by 1819 Baltimore’s black community had fallen far below the level of home ownership maintained by free blacks in Philadelphia, New York, or Charleston. As job opportunities dwindled, the pace of black in-migration slackened and ultimately the proportion of African Americans living in the city began to decline. Thus by 1819 white Baltimoreans who had been alarmed at the growing number of African Americans in their midst, were relieved to note that the influx of whites surpassed the in-migration of blacks each
year. Baltimore seemed destined to remain a white man's city in the midst of a large black rural population.

Building Boom

While it is obvious that the prosperity of the Golden Age did not reach all segments of Baltimore's community, the city's overall economic success fueled a major population increase and sustained a thirty-year building boom that transformed the city from a raw port town into something like an elegant metropolis. Visitors invariably commented on the breakneck pace of growth. In 1783, the German surgeon Johann Schoepf spoke of "building in all quarters of town," while in 1795 the Frenchman Moreau de Saint-Méry wrote that the city "increases each day amazingly... future streets have already been staked out and even named." The Englishman John Palmer, writing in 1817 said, "Improvements are rapidly going on, public and private buildings are rising in every street... I should think Baltimore is still one of the most thriving places in the United States."64

The actual built-up area of the city expanded from about 500 acres in the late 1790s to nearly two square miles in 1819, and the filling in of vacant lots and back gardens in older sections gave the whole urban landscape a more dense and settled look. For those who remembered the little waterside town of the late eighteenth century, Baltimore in 1819 must have seemed a very big city; but from our current perspective it was still a very small place. Few buildings stood west of Paca Street or north of Franklin. In Fells Point, Baltimore Street and Happy Alley (now Durham Street) formed the northern and eastern edges of town. From the wharves at Pratt and Light Streets, one could walk out into fairly open country in about twenty minutes.

All along the waterfront the city corporation and private builders made dramatic changes. Around the Basin the municipality filled in the last remaining marshlands and extended streets across them to form the outline of an Inner Harbor that remained until the 1960s. The filling in of the old wharves along the northern side of the harbor finally allowed the extension of Pratt eastward across the Jones Falls where it was joined to Queen Street (now called East Pratt Street) in Fells Point. The wide, shallow marsh at the west end of the harbor was filled, allowing Charles and Light Streets to be extended across into South Baltimore. The largest marsh occupied almost two hundred acres at the mouth of Jones Falls and still acted as a major barrier between Old Baltimore Town and Fells Point. To fill this extensive, mosquito-infested wetland required thousands of cartloads of dirt and stone, but by 1819 the job was nearly completed and what came to be called the City Dock began to take shape at the foot of Canal Street (now Central Avenue).

Behind the new waterfront, especially in Old Baltimore Town, the pre-revolutionary houses and shops disappeared as larger, more modern commercial structures took their place. Few of the old landmarks survived. Almost all the old homes of the early settlers were torn down or converted to some commercial purpose. Kaminsky's tavern at Grant and Mercer streets,
depicted in Moale’s 1752 somehow survived, but it now looked small and a bit shabby next to the large new stores and warehouses around it. For years Kaminsky’s continued to serve its loyal devotees, but it had long since been eclipsed by places such as the Indian Queen and Fountain Inn. The Indian Queen tavern at Baltimore and Hanover streets could accommodate over 150 lodgers and served hundreds in its dining rooms. Not quite as large, but more elegant and well provisioned, was the Fountain Inn on Light Street, which gained fame as one of George Washington’s favorite stopping places during his many trips through the city. Both of these modern hostelries were staffed twenty-four hours a day to receive stagecoaches, horsemen, and passengers off the boats. They served vast numbers of people in their public dining rooms and provided special rooms for elegant private parties. Guests could refresh themselves with hot or cold baths and, at least at the Fountain Inn, enjoy a wide selection of the best European wines in addition to the local beer and whiskey. In the reading rooms one could browse through all the current American and European newspapers.

At the west end of town where the Washington, Frederick, and Reisterstown turnpikes converged stood a number of additional taverns and inns serving those who used these thoroughfares. At Baltimore and Paca Streets, John Eager Howard built the General Wayne Inn. Located just a few hundred yards from the first tollgate on the Frederick turnpike, it hosted hundreds of farmers, teamsters, drovers, and coachmen entering the city from that great western highway. Nearby were the Golden Horse, the White Swan, the Black Bear, the May Pole and the Three Tuns.

Near the north end of town the old county court house that for some years had stood on large stone pillars in the middle of Calvert Street was finally torn down in 1805. The removal of this landmark was the first step in an ambitious plan to turn the site at Calvert and Lexington streets into a plaza to be called Washington Square. In the center, where the courthouse had stood, a tall monument to George Washington was to be erected. The county government moved into a commodious building on the northwest corner of the square; this left plenty of room on the other three sides for the construction of large townhouses to accommodate merchants and other prosperous residents moving north out of an increasingly congested area below Baltimore Street. All went well until the new homeowners became concerned that the tall shaft of the proposed monument might come crashing down on their dwellings. As a result, it was decided to honor the late president at some less dangerous spot. Eventually John Eager Howard offered a fine open site on his own property and in 1815 construction began on the famous monument that still stands today at the intersection of Charles and Monument streets. The question of what to put in place of the old court house resolved itself when, following Baltimore’s the victory over the British in 1814, the idea was put forward to honor the city’s defenders with a monument in Washington Square that would be of less dangerous height than the one contemplated for the first president. Thus the 178-foot-high Washington Monument ended up half a mile north on the grounds of Howard’s Belvedere estate, and Washington Square (soon renamed Monument Square) received a
Chapter 2: The Golden Age, 1797-1819

The thirty-nine foot high "Battle Monument" designed by Maximilian Godefroy, a French architect then living in the city.

The Washington Monument, completed finally in 1829, ultimately became more famous and ended up in a spacious boulevard-style garden called Mount Vernon Square, while the Battle Monument, like the courthouse before it, stands today perched somewhat precariously in the middle of Calvert Street. Nevertheless, Godefroy’s striking pedestal and statue is in some ways the more important object. It is the city's first monument and celebrates Baltimore's own brave citizens rather than a national figure who, while unquestionably a great American, was never more than overnight guest in the city. It is a blend of Egyptian, Roman, Renaissance, and nineteenth century French motifs that today looks whimsical or even bizarre, but in the second decade of the nineteenth century it seemed very stylish. By 1819 Monument Square had become the premiere uptown residential location, reminiscent of London's fashionable West End. Just to the east stood the Holliday Street Theater with its fine private boxes, and the Assembly Rooms, an elegant private ballroom and banqueting facility where the city’s elite entertained themselves and important public meetings were held.

Architects and builders at work in other sections of the city erected hundreds of townhouses that in size and beauty compared favorably with those of Philadelphia, New York and Boston. Most of these residences, plus most of the city’s commercial structures, were put up by nearly anonymous carpenter-builders, but Baltimore also enjoyed the services of eight or ten well-known architects who created dozens of residential, religious, commercial, and civic buildings that gave Baltimore the look of an opulent and sophisticated metropolis. Of these men, three were among the nation’s most talented. Robert Cary Long, Maximilian Godefroy, and Benjamin H. Latrobe each designed important buildings in the city and while enough of these structures have survived to give some impression of their great talent, most can only be seen only in prints or old photographs.

While Baltimore became a rich city and supported a variety of religious, civic, and commercial institutions, educational and cultural institutions tended to founder. The city’s attempt to create a university got off to a reasonable start with the founding of the "College of Medicine of Maryland" in 1807. Robert Cary Long designed a splendid Pantheon-style building to house the new school, and when it opened in 1812 many regarded it as the finest medical school building in the nation. Encouraged by their initial success, the institution’s directors expanded it into a regular university by adding faculties of arts and sciences, divinity, and law. Unfortunately, Baltimoreans and Marylanders seemed less eager to support these innovations. In a city of such diverse religious views, the divinity school had little chance of success and the arts and sciences faculty drew few students and even fewer contributions. The law school struggled on for a time, but finally closed in 1833.

In similar fashion, the ambitious effort by the Philadelphian Rembrandt Peale to develop a museum and art gallery in Baltimore similar to the one his father operated in the Quaker City,
never received the support it required to flourish. Peale opened his museum in the fall of 1814 in a commodious building specially designed for the purpose by Robert Cary Long. It was the first such structure in the nation. Advertisements in the papers invited the public what Peale called a "Museum of Natural and Artificial Curiosities," plus a "Gallery of Paintings." The "curiosities" consisted of stuffed birds and animals, mastodon bones, Indian costumes and headdresses, ancient coins, Chinese manuscripts, and iron pyrites along with a few shells and rockets the British had fired at Ft. McHenry the previous September. It was in this building that the bright young artist, scientist, and inventor first demonstrated his gas lighting device, an event that led in 1816 to the establishment of the Gas Light Company of Baltimore, the nation's first gas lighting corporation. Peale hoped his museum might become a rendezvous for Baltimore's educated and cultured classes, but it is not clear how he hoped to accomplish this. In any event, nothing of the sort occurred and the museum never received enough income to overcome its costs. Discouraged by the response he received in Baltimore the young inventor left town, turning the museum over to his brother Rubens. It survived as a theater and music hall until the municipal government bought it to use as a city hall.

The failure of the university and Peale's museum can both be explained by particular circumstances, yet they also reflect the broader conclusion that the city's merchant elite, while men of reasonable learning and taste, were not deeply interested in culture. When not attending to business, they spent their leisure time riding, hunting, or pursuing private entertainments having little to do with higher learning or the fine arts. Whether this reflected the more generally unsophisticated urban culture of southern cities, or Baltimore's relative youth, is impossible to determine, but there is no doubt that by 1819 Philadelphia, New York, and Boston all had a number of well-developed educational and cultural institutions while Baltimore, a wealthy city larger than Boston and more than half the size of Philadelphia, possessed almost none.

The "youthful city" theory appears to have some merit, for even a quick examination of its economic elite reveals that in 1819 most of the city's wealthiest merchants were either in-migrants or first generation rich men. The old eighteenth century merchants such as Smith, Buchanan, Bowley, Spear, Strerret, Keener, Eichelberger, Stricker, Brune, Hollingsworth, McEldry, Tieman, Hillen, Didier, and Calhoun were all intensely loyal to their adopted city and served it in a variety of civic capacities, but those among them that gave endowments tended to focus almost entirely on religious or charitable causes. This is also true of Baltimore's "big four": Robert Oliver, Alex Brown, Robert Gilmor, and James Patterson, the great quartet of merchants who by 1819 stood above all the rest in wealth, prestige, and influence. All were born elsewhere, made huge fortunes in the city, and gave generously to a variety of civic and charitable institutions, but showed little interest in the creation of cultural institutions or higher education. Robert Gilmor's son, Robert Gilmor, Jr., accumulated one of the best private art collections in the nation, but he stands alone in this role and remained a purely private promoter of the fine arts. Instead of establishing a museum to preserve his collection and make it available to the public, as the Walters brothers did,
it stayed in the family and was eventually disbursed. James Patterson gave the city a fine piece of land north of Fells Point for a public park, but showed no interest in cultural or educational affairs.

Banks and Highways

The chief contributions of the Golden Age merchants to the city were almost entirely of an economic nature. Among the business and economic institutions they bequeathed to the city the two most significant were a commercial banking system and a network of turnpikes. The banks came first and in the long run were of greater importance. Baltimore's pre-Revolutionary merchants financed their trade by borrowing and lending to each other and relying heavily on their corresponding London merchants for lines of credit, but by the 1790s the scale and complexity of trade required more formal institutions for financial transactions. In the Italian cities, Amsterdam, and London banks had proved very successful in dealing with these problems, so when a group of Philadelphia merchants established the Bank of North America in Philadelphia in 1781, merchants in other major American seaports moved to create their own banks. James McHenry, whose father and brother were among the city's most prominent merchants, led the first attempt to establish a bank in Baltimore in the early 1780s, but a suspicious state legislature refused to grant the charter. Tidewater legislators, along with some of the farmers in western Maryland, feared that a bank in Baltimore would monopolize credit and draw money away from the rural areas.

Finally in 1790 the General Assemblymen changed their minds and granted a charter to the Bank of Maryland. The legislators realized that the new banks in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston had not ruined agricultural interests in those states and could actually be helpful. Also, they began to fear that if Baltimore fell behind in the banking revolution, all sectors of Maryland's economy would suffer. The Bank of Maryland was chartered with a capital of $300,000, almost all of it provided by Baltimore's merchants. Two years later the federally chartered Bank of the United States opened a branch in Baltimore and in 1795 the Bank of Baltimore opened with a capital of $1.2 million. By 1813 the ten banks operating in Baltimore controlled eighty per cent of the state's banking resources and provided links to small town banks across the wide trading area dominated by Baltimore's merchants. City merchants and rural store owners could conduct commerce through the big Baltimore banks that did business regularly with the banks in Alexandria, Georgetown, Easton, Chestertown, Frederick, Lancaster, York, Carlisle, Chambersburg, Gettysburg, Bedford, Hagerstown, Uniontown, Pittsburgh, and Wheeling. While hardly the pillars of financial stability they pretended to be, Baltimore's banks as a whole served the business community well during the Golden Age, and without them the city merchants would have operated at a serious disadvantage against their competitors in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.
Next to the banks, the most important corporations created during this era were the turnpike companies. The two institutions remained closely tied since the city’s banks invested heavily in turnpike construction and handled the financial affairs of almost all of the turnpike companies. It was essential that Baltimore maintain good transportation links between the city and its growing hinterland as the agricultural commodities that the city exported and the manufactured goods it sent to the rural areas all traveled over the state’s roads. Unfortunately, the dirt roads running out in all directions from Baltimore were hardly better in the 1790s than they had been when first cut through the woods half a century before. Road maintenance remained a responsibility of the county governments and was everywhere mired in corruption and inefficiency. Even during dry weather drovers could not count on making good time along the state’s roads because ruts, holes, and unrepaired washouts marked almost every mile, and the failure to build or repair bridges required the fording of numerous streams and rivers. When the weather turned wet or icy, Maryland’s roads could quickly become impassable. Businessmen and travelers tolerated such conditions because high quality, all-weather roads were expensive to build and equally costly to maintain. They needed to be placed on high ground, have a thick bed of crushed stone under them, and be carried across almost every stream on a steady, permanent bridge.

The city’s merchants had first turned to Baltimore County to create such improved "highways," and in 1787 the General Assembly authorized the county to construct three turnpike roads: the first running out towards Frederick, another towards Westminster and Hanover, Pennsylvania, and a third towards York, Pennsylvania. Surveyors laid out three highways that were much straighter and more carefully situated than the old wagon roads. As shown on Warner and Hann’s map of 1801, the new Frederick Turnpike began at what is today Baltimore and Paca streets and ran southwest past James McHenry’s suburban estate to the Patapsco River at Ellicott’s Mills. Once across the Patapsco, it headed straight west toward Frederick as far as the county line. The Reisterstown Turnpike, the city portion of which came to be called Pennsylvania Avenue, began at Franklin Street near the old Lux estate and with just a few minor turns, ran northwesterly to Reisterstown (originally called Hookstown) where it branched off toward Westminster and Hanover. The York Turnpike began on the east side of Jones Falls below Monument Street and ran north past Robert Oliver’s estate "Greenmount" (whence comes the name for the lower portion of what is still today called York Road). It continued through Baltimore County north to the Pennsylvania line. Unfortunately, construction of the roads proceeded very slowly and was not of a very high quality. The county government seemed unable to handle such a large project.

Frustrated at the slow pace and uneven results of the public effort, Baltimore’s leaders opted for the creation of turnpike corporations that could build private toll roads. Such highways, they believed, could be constructed more quickly and at lower cost. Tolls could be set that were reasonable but could still pay for repairs and even generate a little profit for shareholders. In 1805
the Maryland legislature authorized the creation of three private turnpike corporations: the Frederick, Reisterstown, and York turnpike companies. The corporations purchased the three unfinished county highways and completely rebuilt them, creating three high-quality roads.

The largest and most important of the new transit corporations was the Frederick Turnpike Company capitalized at $220,000. This corporation completed the old county turnpike and extended it through Frederick County to Boonsboro, Maryland sixty-two miles west of Baltimore. Its board of directors included Sam Smith, John Ellicott, John Donnell, Solomon Etting, and John Eager Howard (who still owned the land surrounding the eastern terminus of the turnpike at Baltimore and Green streets). Others connected with the company were merchants James Carey, Luke Tieman, George Warfield, and Francis Hollingsworth. It was obviously a blue ribbon group that launched this large and important transportation project. The other two turnpike companies were also major undertakings. The Reisterstown Turnpike Company, capitalized at $160,000 and the York Turnpike capitalized at $100,000 also enlisted a distinguished group of directors from the city and country elite. The turnpike stock sold quickly and construction moved ahead steadily. Laying a crushed stone highway sixty-six feet wide and carrying it over rivers on permanent stone bridges proved to be even more expensive than anticipated. The bridge across the Monocacy River cost the Frederick Turnpike Company $56,000. However, as each stretch of road opened to traffic, tolls began to be collected and company revenues rose rapidly. The initial success of the first three turnpikes led to the building of four more: the Falls Turnpike, the Washington Turnpike, The Baltimore and Havre-de-Grace Turnpike, and the Harford Turnpike. By 1816 these seven highways, costing almost $2,000,000, had either been completed or were under construction. Baltimore now resembled the hub of a giant wheel with turnpike spokes jutting out in every direction.

National attention became focused on the Frederick Turnpike when the federal government decided in 1806 to construct a "National Road" across the Appalachian Mountains that would link the East Coast with the Ohio Valley. In 1808 a commission selected Cumberland, Maryland as the starting point of the road and Wheeling, Virginia on the Ohio River as its initial western terminus. Once the federal commissioners announced their decision, the Frederick Turnpike Company rushed to extend its highway the seventy miles from Boonsboro to Cumberland in order to link up with the new federal highway. The state of Pennsylvania compelled the government to move the route north so it would pass through Unintosh and Washington, Pennsylvania before turning southwest again to reach Wheeling, but this did not do serious injury to Baltimore’s prospects. Even if Philadelphians built their own turnpike to link up with the National Road at Unintosh, Baltimore was still a hundred miles closer to Wheeling.

The National Road was a huge stroke of luck for Baltimore. This 125-mile stretch of road crossed mountain ridges over 2,000 feet high and required several of the largest and most expensive bridges ever built in America. The $1,600,000 cost of the federal turnpike was far beyond anything that Baltimore or Maryland could have financed after building their turnpikes.
When the National Road opened in 1818, travel time for freight wagons between Baltimore and Wheeling was cut from seven weeks to about sixteen days. Fast stagecoaches carrying the U.S. mail made the trip in forty-eight hours! Soon hundreds of teamsters used the new road system, their huge Conestoga freight wagons carrying 2,000-3,000 pounds of goods between Baltimore and the Ohio Valley. The state of Ohio had almost 500,000 residents and plans were already underway to extend the road into the new states of Indiana and Illinois. Baltimoreans saw a grand vision of their city as the major emporium for the almost undreamed of wealth that lay across the Appalachian Mountains. Of all the factors that bolstered the boomer spirit in Baltimore, the Frederick Turnpike and its National Road link to the interior was the most potent.

The War of 1812

Just as the city was moving into high gear on its turnpike construction projects and preparing for the opening of the National Road, it fell under the unexpected threat of foreign invasion. While the capture of Baltimore and the possible destruction of its waterfront warehouses and other buildings would not have reversed its rise to wealth and influence, it would have dealt the city a severe blow that could have taken years to overcome. Fortunately, Baltimoreans proved themselves to be as brave (and perhaps as lucky) on the battlefield as they were successful in trade and commerce, so the attempted British raid of 1814 came to nothing. Even so, it was a close scrape with real disaster.

To a large degree, the British attack on Baltimore resulted from the city's success as a commercial port and the prominent role it played in the war against Britain's shipping. When the United States declared war in 1812, Baltimore was ready to leap into action. With extensive financial resources, a large pool of skilled sea captains and experienced seamen, and a fleet of fast schooners, it was a formidable maritime power. As soon as the U.S. government began to issue letters of marque (official licenses) to private ship owners, allowing them to arm their vessels and attack enemy shipping, Baltimoreans snapped them up and put to sea. From Labrador to the West Indies, British vessels fell into the hands of Baltimore's privateers.

Using this system of essentially entrepreneurial naval warfare, Baltimore outdistanced all other American ports in the number of privately armed ships it put to sea and the impact these vessels had on British shipping. Baltimore sent out 122 privately armed vessels during the War of 1812. Of the approximately 1,750 British craft that were captured as prizes, nearly one third (556) were taken by Baltimoreans--far more than any other port. Baltimoreans who invested in or served on these armed vessels reportedly earned over $16,000,000 from the prize sales. Aside from the city's Quakers, who refused to join in the business of entrepreneurial warfare, almost all of the city's major merchants and investors helped finance the fleet of privateers. A full one-fifth of all the adult males in the city participated in the enterprise as investors, builders, contractors, provisioners, or crew members.
The major reason for the scale of Baltimore's maritime effort and its high rate of success was the fact that most of the city's existing commercial vessels were the sleek, highly maneuverable schooners and sloops that had come to be called "Baltimore clippers." Developed as fast carriers for the West Indian flour trade, they proved to be perfect for privateering. Most were 70-110 feet in length and displaced around 200-350 tons, not nearly the size of the big square rigged ships which were the workhorses of the Atlantic trade; but even when heavily armed and sailing with large crews, (50-150) they could still sail faster and out maneuver any craft afloat.

Several privateers and their captains became legendary. One of the most audacious was Thomas Boyle, a New England sea captain who had come to Baltimore during the Golden Age and found there both wealth and military glory. Boyle commanded what was probably the city's finest privateer, the 356-ton Chasseur, dubbed "the Pride of Baltimore." A masterpiece of a schooner from the shipyards of Thomas Kemp in Fells Point, the Chasseur had several successful cruises under other commanders before Boyle and his crew of 150 took over in July 1814. Sailing past Newfoundland, he quickly captured or sent to the bottom four sizable vessels including the fourteen-gun brig Eclipse. Moving across the Atlantic, he picked off a variety of merchantmen coming out of English and Irish ports while easily out-sailing the numerous British naval vessels sent out to destroy him. Adding insult to injury, Boyle had a "proclamation" conveyed to Lloyds of London in which he declared "all the ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands and the sea coast of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in a state of strict and rigorous blockade." It was of course impossible for Boyle and the other American privateers to maintain anything like a real blockade or engage directly any of Britain's regular ships of the line, (1,700 ton vessels carrying seventy-four guns and a crew of over 400), but the fast little schooners played havoc with British shipping.

By September of 1814 the commanders of the British forces in the Chesapeake felt almost compelled to chastise the "nest of pirates" in Baltimore, while gathering in for themselves some of the rich bounty of goods, ships, and naval supplies stored in the port. The manner in which they had overcame the American forces outside Washington, D.C. on August 24 and captured the city of Washington itself the following day, led them to think that a quick raid on Baltimore would be equally easy. By any reasonable calculation, the British had more than adequate military resources to carry out this task. The combined land and naval force which entered the Patapsco River on September 11, 1814 included nearly fifty vessels commanded by Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane, and an army of over 4,000 men under the direction of General Robert Ross, a very bright and well respected officer who had already earned fame with the Duke of Wellington in the war against Napoleon. The naval force was awesome: ten huge seventy-four gunships-of-the-line, twenty heavily armed frigates, brigs and sloops, plus a number of shallow draft bomb ships mounted with mortars that could throw a 190-pound explosive shell and special launchers that fired large, incendiary rockets.
The British attack plan was simple and largely dictated by the nature of Baltimore's water approaches. General Ross's army would land at North Point where the deep draft seventy-fours could protect them. The troops would then march inland along the North Point Road towards the eastern edge of Baltimore where, Ross quickly learned, the city's defenders were preparing to make a stand. At the same time Admiral Cochrane's more shallow draft warships would proceed up the Patapsco, quickly reduce Fort McHenry, and sail into the Northwest Branch. From this vantage point they could rake the city's defenses with naval gunfire and rockets, forcing the Baltimoreans out of their entrenchments and allowing General Ross's troops to send them running back through the streets of the city. The British would then simply walk into Baltimore, just as they had done in Washington, D.C. after routing the Americans at Bladensburg the month before. In fact, Ross and Cochrane thought the task in Baltimore would prove even easier this time since they had sent the Americans running at Bladensburg with just a fraction of the artillery they could bring to bear once their ships were safely past Fort McHenry.

The British commanders first miscalculated by equating the hastily gathered and poorly led military force they had encountered outside Washington with the one they were about to meet in Baltimore. The overall commander of the American forces in Baltimore was General Sam Smith, still recognized as the city's most skilled military leader. Even though he was Baltimore's leading Republican politician, Federalists such as John Eager Howard himself urged that Smith be given control of Baltimore's defenses. The general had the support of a number of other experienced and able officers including General John Stricker, commander of the Baltimore militia, and Major George Armistead, the regular army officer in charge of Fort McHenry. Local militia units had been training hard for weeks before the British arrived at North Point. They were well armed and paid regular salaries from a $600,000 defense fund that the municipal government was able to borrow from Baltimore's banks. In the last days and even hours before the British landed, other militia units with wagons full of supplies and ammunition rushed to the city, many of them making record time on the turnpike roads.

Smith guessed correctly that the British would land at North Point and attack from the east so that Cochrane's ships, if they could get past Fort McHenry, would be able to provide artillery support. To halt the British land force, and provide some protection from artillery fire, Smith constructed a series of trenches and redoubts stretching in a long arc from the Fells Point waterfront around to Belair Road. The center of this line sat atop Hampstead Hill (a spot now covered by the grounds of Patterson Park) and was defended by 11,000 men and over a hundred pieces of artillery. Even so, if Cochrane's warships could come within range of the trenches, there was no telling how long the defenders would be able to maintain them under a rain of shells and rockets.

The main responsibility for keeping Cochrane's fleet at a safe distance fell to the defenders of Fort McHenry. If the British ships managed to get past the fort, they would be held up at least temporarily by a boom consisting of masts fastened together by chains that had been placed
across the narrow entrance to the Northwest Branch. Behind it, several vessels had been sunk and
behind them a number other small unarmed boats (including Baltimore’s first steamboat, the
Chesapeake) were anchored. It would have taken the British some time to clear these obstacles
and sail directly into the Basin, but if the fort were silenced, he could sail right up to the boom,
rake the American lines for almost a mile inland and bombard Fells Point. Conversely, if Fort
McHenry could be held, Cochrane’s ships would have to remain almost two miles farther down
river and even his longest guns would be useless.

The very existence of Fort McHenry was to some degree another example of the city’s
amazing good luck. Since 1776 some type of fortification had existed at the tip of the Whetstone
peninsula, guarding the narrow entrance to the Northwest Branch, but the massive structure that
faced the British fleet in 1814 bore little resemblance to its predecessors. The old fort, while
superior to the hastily built structure that protected the town during the Revolutionary War, was
still simple earthen breastworks and by the 1790s was of little value against more modern naval
gunnery. Secretary of War Knox proposed a modest expenditure of $4,255 to expand the
earthworks and make it possible to mount a few more guns, but he contemplated no major
upgrade of the structure itself. In 1796, before this work was completed, Knox resigned and
President Washington replaced him with James McHenry, his old aide-de-camp from
Revolutionary War days. The appointment of the Baltimorean led to an immediate re-evaluation
of Knox’s plan and, perhaps to no one’s surprise, the new secretary found it much too modest. By
1800, when McHenry left office, construction was well under way on a huge masonry fortress
designed by Jean Foncin, a skilled French military engineer. By 1805 the federal government had
spent over $110,000 on Ft. McHenry, over 10 percent of the amount expended on all U.S. coastal
fortifications.

Whether one calls it good fortune or shrewd political influence, by the time Cochrane’s
fleet dropped anchor off North Point, this splendid fortress, along with a series of waterside
batteries surrounding it, constituted one of the nation’s most formidable marine defenses. Its sixty
artillery pieces, thirty-six of which were heavy guns removed from a French warship, made any
attempt to run by it extremely hazardous.

The commander of the fort, Maj. George Armistead, was a regular army officer who, at
Smith’s urging, had been assigned to that important post in 1813. He had under his command a
unit of regular U.S. artillerymen and a much larger group of Baltimore militiamen that included
some skilled gunners from Baltimore’s privateering vessels. Altogether, about 600 men were
crammed into the fort. As everyone knows, the British failed to reduce the fort, or even do much
damage. Only four defenders were killed and twenty-eight wounded during the twenty-five hour
attack. Admiral Cochrane greatly underestimated the strength of the fort, not to mention the skill
and bravery of its defenders. First, Cochrane decided that it was unnecessary, or perhaps too
risky, to bring any of his seventy-four big gunships upriver to participate in the attack. This
proved to be a wise decision because even the sixteen more shallow draft vessels he did take up the
Patapsco found it difficult to navigate the narrow and confusing channels. Several ran aground. Not wishing to enter even shallower water, Cochrane spent the first two and a half hours of his attack shelling Fort McHenry from a distance of about two miles—out of range of the Baltimoreans guns and, as it turned out, too far away for the British to do much damage. After a time, the ships moved in closer and fired a combined broadside that shook the foundations of houses in the city. The firing had almost no effect on the fort, but the British fleet now came within range of the American artillerymen who inflicted enough damage to force Cochrane's ships back down the river.

Around 3:00 in the afternoon, after sending hundreds more rounds into the fort, the British moved in even closer and attempted to fire directly into the fort's gun enclosures. Once again, however, the American gunners replied with a steady, accurate fire that seriously damaged three of the British ships. The rocket ship Erebus had to be towed out of range. The rest of the fleet also withdrew. They reformed their line back down the river again began their long range, highly ineffective bombardment.

While the reduction of Fort McHenry composed an important element in the British military plan, General Ross does not appear to have thought it essential to a successful assault on Smith's entrenchments. Ross landed his troops at North Point early on the morning of September 12th and quickly began the ten-mile march toward the city. When some captured American pickets told him there were 20,000 militiamen but no regular troops defending the city, the general expressed relief, saying he did not care "if it rains militia." In fact, Smith had only 11,000 men, although he was expecting several thousand more within the next twelve hours.

Unwilling to wait for the British troops to arrive at his entrenchments unmolested, Smith sent General Stricker with 3,000 of his best militiamen men out to meet Ross at some spot along the North Point Road in order to slow him down, feel out his strength and perhaps give him a different impression of American fighting ability than he had gained at Bladensburg.

As Stricker's militiamen approached the British, Ross rode out to get a better view of them. Some American riflemen hiding in a small grove trees spotted the general and fired at him. An accurate marksmen or a lucky shot struck Ross and he died within a few minutes. There being no other general attached to Ross' staff, the command fell to Lt. Col. Arthur Brooke. The death of General Ross was a serious blow since he was one of the British army's most successful commanders and imbued his troops with a remarkable level of confidence. Colonel Brooke, while a very experienced officer, did not possess these qualities. Regardless of Brooke's abilities, the men he now led were seasoned veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, so when they met Stricker's militiamen in battle about an hour after Ross's death, they steadily pushed the Americans back and finally forced them into a full retreat. While Stricker was forced to withdraw, he did so in an organized manner, his riflemen inflicting substantial damage on the British, killing, wounding, or capturing almost three hundred while losing about half that number himself. It must have been
unsettling for Brooke and the other British officers to encounter militiamen who performed in a disciplined manner and fought bravely, taking a heavy toll of their adversaries before retiring.

Thus the next day, when Brooke and his 3,700 troops broke camp just beyond the battlefield of the previous afternoon and began their march towards the main American position, they must have been pleased to hear the distant thunder of the British guns as they opened their attack on Fort McHenry. When they came within view of the harbor and Smith's line, however, they were undoubtedly disheartened to see Cochrane's attack fleet still standing far down the Patapsco lobbing shells into a fortress that showed almost no damage.

Brooke saw it would be foolish to attempt a daylight assault on the American entrenchments and that a night attack would be the most effective way to dislodge them. Late in the day he sent a messenger to Cochrane asking if the admiral could at least get close enough to train his guns on the southernmost section of the American line where it ran down to the waterline. The admiral eventually replied that he had not been able to silence the fort and suggested that the army consider withdrawing. Baltimore was a valuable prize, but not worth the risk of heavy casualties. To make matters worse, a steady rain began to fall that turned the landscape in front of the American lines into a slippery, muddy terrain. Around midnight, Brooke consulted with his other officers and they agreed that the profits were not worth the possible cost. At 1:00 am on the 14th the British troops built up their campfires so the Americans would not suspect anything and, in the midst of a series of heavy thunderstorms, began moving back down the North Point road. Some expressed disappointment, believing that a night attack would have been successful against "a parcel of tailors and shoemakers," while others seemed glad to head back to the ships. One of them later wrote, "I was not sorry. These Americans were not to be trifled with."

Neither Smith's troops, who had been standing in their water-filled trenches, nor the hundreds of Baltimoreans sitting on their rooftops through the rainy night, had any way of knowing whether the attack was ending or whether its last act was about to begin. A short, furious cannonade erupted from McHenry at 1:30 am, and more brief flashes of light came from the direction of Cochrane's ships, but the rain and fog prevented anyone from seeing exactly where the British fleet was located or whether the fort remained in American hands. Smith's exhausted and drenched militiamen assumed that Brooke's army was still in front of them, possibly massing for an assault in the last hours of darkness.

Shortly before dawn the rain stopped and the clouds broke up. As the eastern horizon brightened and the landscape returned to view, Baltimoreans and their fellows-in-arms beheld an amazing sight. The British army had disappeared and the American flag still flew over the fort. Out in the distance, Admiral Cochrane's attack fleet sat silent in the water. Presently, sails were unfurled and one by one they glided back down the Patapsco. Midshipman Robert Barrett aboard the HMS Hebrus recalled, "In truth it was a galling spectacle for the British seamen to behold... as the last vessel spread her canvas to the wind, the Americans hoisted a most suburb and splendid
ensign on their battery, and fired at the same time a gun of defiance... we retired down the Patapsco River with far different sensations from those we experienced on entering it... What Barrett saw, of course, was raising of the large 30 by 42 foot American flag made especially for the fort by the Baltimore flag and pennant maker Mary Pickersgill. Armistead had ordered it soon after his arrival in Baltimore in 1813 and when it became clear the British were withdrawing, ordered it run up in place of the smaller storm flag that had flown during the bombardment.

While a minor embarrassment for overconfident British, the morning of victory was for the Baltimoreans and their fellow defenders a moment of joy and exhilaration such as few people ever have the opportunity to enjoy. Even the Georgetown attorney Francis Scott Key, who as a Federalist had no particular warm feeling for Republican Baltimore, was overwhelmed by the scene at dawn. Standing on the deck of a truce vessel anchored eight miles down river near the main British fleet, where he was seeking the release of a friend captured by the British in August, he too saw Fort McHenry's flag waving in the breeze and in that moment of joy and pride, jotted down the verses that he revised a few days later (at the Indian Queen hotel) and set to the tune of a popular English melody. As Walter Lord said in The Dawn's Early Light, “The song caught Baltimore's fancy right away. Key's words somehow conveyed perfectly the strange combination of fear, defiance, suspense, relief and sheer ecstasy that went into that desperate night.” It was published almost immediately as a broadside, and ten days later appeared in the Baltimore Patriot and Evening Advertiser whose editor stated that the song was "destined long to outlast the occasion and outlive the impulse, which produced it." Even so, “the occasion” itself had major consequences.

The repulse at Baltimore, along with a similarly embarrassing defeat at Plattsburg, New York at almost the same time, helped convince the British government to give up the costly war. Historians still debate the exact effects of the Baltimore campaign on British policy and the final peace settlement, but there is little doubt that it had some impact and there is no question that for those two days in September 1814, Baltimore occupied the center stage of both American and world history. The city played its leading role with skill and bravery. For the next hundred years Baltimoreans celebrated "Defenders Day,” as their chief civic festival, a time of parades, banquets, musical programs, and speeches. The addresses invariably reminded local citizens of their historic triumph and suggested that no matter what dangers the city might face in the future, they could be overcome.

Panic

Baltimoreans did not anticipate how soon they would need to be reminded of their greatness and daring, for only five years separated their military victory of 1814 from their economic debacle in the Panic of 1819.
The specific cause of the financial collapse in 1819 was the overextension of credit to farmers and rural storekeepers by the seaport merchants of American coastal cities, but the deeper cause was the oversupply of agricultural commodities on the world market that drove down the amount that American farmers (and merchants) received for their commodities. At the same time, the price of European manufactured goods, while declining somewhat, did not drop nearly as much. Consequently, farmers experienced increasing difficulty paying for imported goods and asked the seaport merchants for longer credit terms. Baltimore merchants, who usually gave nine months credit to country buyers, extended it to sixteen or even twenty-four months, assuring themselves that agricultural commodity prices were bound to turn up. However, European exporters became alarmed and demanded payment for the goods they had sold to the American merchants. When they could not pay up or get their credit extended, merchants turned to Baltimore's banks for emergency loans, only to discover that most of the large banks, including the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, held few actual assets. The bank's directors had grossly mismanaged the institution's investments, putting large amounts in very speculative ventures in which the directors themselves often had a personal interest. Baltimore's banks lost more than $800,000 of their depositors' money and became hard-pressed to save themselves, much less help the panic-stricken merchants.

By July 1819 trade had fallen to a trickle and over a hundred of the city's merchant houses had failed. To make matters even worse, yellow fever, common to Fells Point since the 1790s, broke out with renewed vigor in August and killed over 350 people during the next eight weeks. Almost half of the Point's residents fled to higher ground and were accommodated in a tent city set up near the present day Johns Hopkins Hospital. Between the financial collapse and the fever, Baltimore's commerce ground to a halt. Unemployment rose and the "Baltimore Economical and Soup Society" provided aid to the destitute.72

The list of bankrupted merchants included many famous and respected men. John Hollins, James Calhoun, Henry Didier, Christopher Deshon, Capt. Hugh Boyle, and John Levering were only a few of the dozens of names that appeared in the bankruptcy notices. The most spectacular failure was the firm of Smith and Buchanan with Sam Smith becoming its chief victim. Buchanan and several other insiders, knowing the weakness of the city's banks and realizing that they would be unable to save the merchant houses, quietly withdrew a portion of their bank deposits and otherwise insulated by themselves financially. While their fortunes declined, all escaped the humiliation of insolvency. General Smith, who relied almost completely on his partner to run the business, was apparently not told how precarious its position was nor how over-extended the banks had become and as a result did not insulate his investments.

For a time after the business failed the general seemed completely paralyzed and almost insane. Some feared he would take his life. In an attempt to satisfy his creditors, he sold almost all of his tangible assets: the large townhouse in Baltimore, his beautiful suburban country home, Montebello and even his wine cellar, china, and silver. He turned down an opportunity to travel
to England on a diplomatic mission for fear that he would be arrested by his English creditors. Living very modestly and managing carefully his family’s few remaining assets, the general satisfied the last of his creditors in 1826, but he was never again even a moderately wealthy man. In spite of his financial collapse, Smith remained popular with the electorate and continued to be elected to Congress for the next two decades. In 1833 Baltimore’s voters elected him mayor at the age of 81. The old gentleman enjoyed public service and remained an important figure in the city, but it is likely that he continued to seek office in part because he needed the money.

Smith was the most famous of the ruined merchants of 1819, but it was really the city’s business community as a whole that suffered the severe blow. John Quincy Adams, a long-time political adversary of Smith and Baltimore’s Democratic political machine, expressed no surprise at the depth and breadth of the city’s collective default. In the midst of the panic he confided gravely to his journal that the failure of Smith and the other high-rolling Baltimore merchants was a case of just rewards since: "there is not a city in the Union which has had so much apparent prosperity, or within which there has been such complication of profligacy." The Philadelphia Gazette, said, "Oh Baltimore, how art thou fallen!"

Baltimore’s fall from economic grace did not deal the city so devastating a blow as some Philadelphians or Bostonians thought (or perhaps hoped). The more prudent and conservative merchant-financiers such as Alex Brown and Sons, William Patterson, and Robert Gilmor survived the panic in reasonably good condition. Many failed merchant houses reorganized, the banks changed directors, and new laws were passed to try to improve their operation. The perceptive Scotsman John Duncan, visiting the city in the midst of the depression noted that "the quays are now half deserted and the store-houses comparatively empty," but quickly added that as the city’s businessmen "recover from their present mercantile difficulties, and as the back country becomes more thickly settled, the increasing demand for foreign produce and manufacturers must by degrees bring back the good old times, when Fell’s Point was crowded with merchantmen and the storekeepers of Baltimore exalted in the dimensions of their ledgers."

Indeed, trade did gradually return to the Point and the city had begun to recover by the spring of 1820. The panic, like the yellow fever that accompanied it, gradually faded from memory. These horrendous events, sobering and chastising to be sure, were not perceived by Baltimoreans as crippling blows or a sign that Baltimore’s long run of good fortune had finally come to an end. The great Conestoga wagons rumbling down Baltimore Street in the spring of 1820, loaded with produce, were proof enough that the Patapsco metropolis was still very much in business. In addition, two years before in 1817 the legislature had finally expanded the municipal boundaries far out into the countryside. From the approximate center of the original Baltimore Town (Baltimore and Calvert streets) the municipal boundaries were extended one and one-half miles north, two miles east, and just over two miles west. The municipality, which had encompassed approximately less than two square miles, now covered almost fifteen. The municipal government thus gained control over thousands of acres of open land that would
eventually provide large new tax revenues. Optimists predicted that agricultural prices would eventually rebound, the new National Road and the other turnpikes would soon disgorge vast amounts of inland wealth on the city’s docks, and the Golden Age would return brighter than ever. Baltimore would grow once again and residents could spread then themselves out in an orderly manner over the old suburbs to create a larger and even greater city.
Introduction to Chapter 3
Competing Against the Urban Giants, 1819-1860
by Elizabeth M. Nix

The antebellum period was so momentous for Baltimore that Arnold divides his treatment of it into three chapters. Chapter 3 addresses the economic progress the city made in the wake of the Panic of 1819. Baltimoreans came to realize their town would never achieve the status of New York, Philadelphia or even Brooklyn, and although their economy tripled in these years, other northeastern cities far outpaced them. These forty years saw Baltimore settle into a comfortable position as the “southern city without equal.”

According to Arnold, this period was most affected by the introduction of steam power. Most readers will be familiar with the story of the steam engine and Baltimore’s role as the anchor of the B&O, the first railroad linking the Atlantic coast to the Ohio River. Arnold dismisses the interpretation of the B&O founders as visionaries and states instead that when they proposed the rail line they were taking “a shot in the dark.” Their venture faced numerous financial difficulties and took over thirty years to complete. That line, however, and numerous smaller railroads, enlarged markets for the city’s growing wholesale and retail sector serving the interior. Arnold details a shift in the role of Baltimore’s tradesmen from importers receiving goods directly from Europe to that of forwarding merchants passing items from New York ports into the expanding hinterlands. David Schley has investigated the somewhat surprising decision to place the railways on the major thoroughfares of the city in his article “Tracks in the Streets: Railroads, Infrastructure and Urban Space in Baltimore, 1828-1840.”

Readers may not be as familiar with the impact the steamboat had on the city’s fortunes. Arnold reminds them that entrepreneurs embraced the new technology and established a number of steamboat lines around the Chesapeake Bay, up and down the eastern seaboard and even across the Atlantic to Europe. Steamships took tobacco to Breman and returned with German immigrants who made Baltimore the American city with the highest percentage of Germans in its population. Trade around the Chesapeake increased the amount of grain coming into the city from Eastern Shore farmers and created quicker routes to rural customers eager to buy Baltimore’s goods.

Finally, manufacturers increasingly used steam engines to power their production plants. Arnold notes that the most extensive “manufacturing” in Baltimore -- oyster packing and hand-sewing hats and men’s clothing -- was still powered by humans, but increasingly business owners generated steam power to do their work. The activity of railroads and steamboats in the city gave rise to a supporting cluster of iron works, metal works, and mechanic shops to build and service them. Arnold shows that while the merchant class of the city had promoted the railroads and steamboats to move their goods, they also created a thriving manufacturing sector in the process.
More recently historians have investigated the social aspects of these economic developments. Garrett Power looks at the neighborhoods in which these workers lived in his chapter, "Deconstructing the Slums of Baltimore" in From Mobtown to Charm City: New Perspectives on Baltimore’s Past. In Freedom’s Port: The African American Community of Baltimore, 1780-1860 Christopher Phillips shows how Maryland slaveholders employed the practice of "hiring out," renting their slaves to urban businesses and creating a workforce of enslaved and free people, both white and black. Seth Rockman shows in Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery and Survival in Early Baltimore that despite the booming economy, it was difficult for working men and women to feel any level of economic security.
Chapter 3
Competing Against the Urban Giants, 1819-1860

During the four decades prior to the Civil War the United States underwent a commercial and industrial revolution that recast the economy and created an urban network that has survived into our own generation. In the course of this momentous change, Baltimore achieved, or more accurately speaking, was assigned, its long-term place in the nation’s urban hierarchy and acquired the basic physical form that it would keep for the next hundred years. Much of what remains from the antebellum era is still regarded as “classic Baltimore.” Such places as Mount Vernon Place, Druid Hill Park, the City Dock, the B&O’s Camden Station and the Mount Clare Shops, numerous grand churches, and several thousand brick row houses are all striking reminders of the remarkable urban environment Baltimoreans constructed between 1819 and 1860.

Baltimore was officially the fourth largest city in America in 1860 (after New York, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn), but it actually ranked fifth. Boston was larger, but its city boundaries did not yet encompass enough of its suburban residents to surpass those living within Baltimore’s much more extensive municipal territory. As can be seen in table 1, Baltimore’s overall growth rate was quite low during the antebellum era, lower than all the major Atlantic ports except Charleston. The grand dreams of becoming the nation’s second largest city faded as it became apparent that the great northeastern port cities were forging ahead in both trade and manufacturing while Baltimore still struggled to recover from the devastating collapse of 1819. Mrs. Basil Hall, an Englishwoman touring the U.S. with her husband, Capt. Basil Hall, visited the city in 1828 and noted the
effect that the economic slowdown had on its residents. Arriving after several days in the booming city of Philadelphia, Mrs. Hall found the much slower pace of life in Baltimore a welcome relief.

No one here has spouted to us of their Institutions and their buildings and their liberty and fifty other things of which the Philadelphians boasted morning, noon, and night. We were also spared the repetition of the “wonderful improvement” of Baltimore, in fact, fortunately for us, Baltimore is either standing still or retrograding in the march of improvement! You may think this a very unchristian like remark, but had you been exposed... as we have been to the never ending history of the rapid advancement, “wonderful improvement,” “extraordinary increase of population,” “marvelous extension of towns,” you would congratulate yourself as we do that for once you have come to a place where this cackle-cackling is not sounding in your ears.76

Table 1: Population of Major Atlantic and Gulf Coast Ports (in thousands)77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1810</th>
<th>1820</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1840</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1860</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baltimoreans may have had less to boast about, but they hardly lived in a declining city. While its overall growth rate did not measure up to Philadelphia, New York, or Boston, Baltimore remained a very large place, and as a southern city it had no equal. Within Maryland it accounted for almost a third of the state’s population and nearly 40 percent of its taxable wealth. It built the world’s first long-distance, commercial railway and enjoyed a coastal trade that made it a key center in the emerging interregional economy of the antebellum era. In 1860 it was the nation’s fifth largest
manufacturing center. Straddling the borderland between the North and South, Baltimore was sought after by the major political parties as a neutral and convenient location for their presidential conventions, hosting more of them than any other city.

Baltimoreans should actually have been pleased with their progress during the antebellum era. Given the economic obstacles that the city faced, its ability to prosper and grow was something of a triumph. The great unpleasant fact was that the currents of international trade and the direction of America’s domestic economy, which had both so favored Baltimore and the Chesapeake region up to 1819, now turned in other directions. The slowing pace of economic progress during the 1820s was apparent not only to Mrs. Hall, but to a wide variety of observers. Her husband, Capt. Basil Hall, was more interested in economic matters and offered a remarkably full explanation of Baltimore’s plight. During the Napoleonic Wars, he said, the city flourished, but then a series of changes occurred that made New York and New Orleans America’s leading ports and condemned the rest to a distant secondary rank.

The harbor of New York... is at all times accessible for merchant ships, while the climate is nearly always healthy. It is also connected, during the greater part of the year, with the interior States... by numerous rivers and canals, which as yet have no rival on that continent. In the South, again, steam navigation of the Mississippi, the Ohio, the Missouri, and fifty other gigantic streams, has rendered the communication with New Orleans a matter so expeditious and economical, that, in spite of the noxious climate, the produce of the interior will probably always find it a place of deposit in the highest degree advantageous... If the mouth of the Mississippi could be damned up, or New York harbor be demolished, there might be some chance for the resuscitation of the intermediate seaports; but in the meantime I suspect both Philadelphia and Baltimore must be contented to enjoy their local, but comparatively limited advantages, without attempting to rival those great emporiums.78

Captain Hall visited Baltimore in 1828 in the midst of the first excitement over the proposed B&O Railroad, the city’s grand project for recapturing the western trade, but he dismissed the plan, saying that the cost of building and maintaining such a road would far exceed any profit it might bring to the city.

On the subject of international trade, Hall turned out to be a good prophet. By 1860, New York and New Orleans accounted for the great majority of America’s international trade and Baltimore never recovered its former position in this arena.
Where he faltered, of course, was his prediction that the city’s railroads would come to nothing. Baltimore’s three railroads along with its bay and coastal steamboats, reoriented and extended the city’s commercial outreach and allowed it to develop as a major manufacturing center. But even in the brave new world of iron rails and paddle wheels, Baltimoreans never found profits on the scale that the previous generation had enjoyed. The competition for the new trans-Appalachian trade was very tough. Baltimore’s natural advantage, its more westward location, had been significant in the days of horse-powered transport on the Frederick Turnpike and the National Road, but canals, and especially the steam railroad, diminished that asset. By the 1850s Philadelphia, New York, and even Boston had created good rail connections, developed efficient forwarding services, and employed fast, powerful locomotives that took away much of the western trade that Baltimoreans expected to come to their city.

Speaking in the broadest terms, the 1819-1860 era witnessed the rise of a commercial and industrial heartland that centered on New York City, stretched northward through lower New England, and extended southward through New Jersey and Pennsylvania. New York was the undisputed center of trade and banking while Philadelphia led the nation in manufacturing. Baltimore clung to the extreme southern fringe of this economically vibrant region, and while it shared in the commercial and industrial wealth generated there, its participation was weaker and the economic payoff proved less rewarding. These developments can be better understood by looking more carefully at Baltimore’s trade and manufacturing during the four decades between the Panic of 1819 and the great secession crisis of 1860-1861.

The city’s international trade continued to expand in absolute terms, tripling between 1821 and 1860, but it was vastly outdistanced by New York and New Orleans and failed to gain on either Boston or Philadelphia. New Orleans, the world’s leading exporter of raw cotton and the recipient of a river trade that reached over a thousand miles into the interior, was a special case, but the failure to keep up with the three North Atlantic ports indicated a basic shift in the pattern of America’s international trade. By 1860 Baltimore’s annual volume of international trade accounted for only five per cent of the U. S. total, and was the lowest of all the major port cities; however, its trade within the Chesapeake Bay along the East Coast increased enormously. Over the four decades, Baltimore’s total waterborne commerce quadrupled. This absolute increase supported a significantly larger number of people and accounts for much of the city’s population growth (it roughly tripled during the 1820-1860 era).
The major problem Baltimore’s shipping merchants faced after 1819 was finding new markets for the city’s flour, its leading export commodity. Flour inspections at Baltimore, which reached nearly 600,000 barrels during the last years of the Golden Age, rose to 1,307,000 barrels by 1852. The trick was to find buyers. The increasing volume of flour coming into Baltimore from ever more distant regions in the West, plus a huge volume of grain landed in the port by Chesapeake Bay vessels, had to be sold in a national and international market that was often surfeited with the abundant production of an agricultural region that stretched from the Ohio Valley to Poland and Russia.

The largest market lay in Western Europe, especially Great Britain, but even after the British opened the United Kingdom and Ireland to imported grain and flour in 1846, Baltimoreans found it impossible to maintain a permanent place in this highly competitive arena. In 1852 the city’s merchants, led by Robert Garrett and Sons, were able to sell 235,000 barrels of flour in the United Kingdom, almost a third of that year’s total exports of this commodity, but it was a rare windfall. The great majority of American flour shipped to the United Kingdom now passed through New York City. By the mid-1830s Rochester, New York had become the nation’s milling center and New York City generally shipped three or four times the volume of flour that Baltimore handled. In addition to its western connections via the Erie Canal and its two inter-regional railroads, New York was closer to Liverpool, London, and the other ports of Northern Europe.

Tobacco was the one commodity that Baltimore did market continually and profitably in Europe. The largest buyers were merchants in the north German states, and the port of Bremen became the major center of this trade. The tobacco connection encouraged an increasingly broad range of commercial transactions and brought a large stream of German immigrants to the Chesapeake metropolis. By 1860 Baltimore had the highest percentage of German-born residents of any city on the east coast.

By the 1850s some of these immigrants had become major figures in Baltimore’s business community and leaders in its civic life. Heineken & Schumacher, Oelrich & Lurman, Schaer & Kusler and Decker & Gordes joined the older German firms such as F. W. Brune & Son as major traders with the German states and the whole Baltic region. Albert Schumacher, the son of a prosperous Bremen merchant, came to Baltimore in 1826 as the junior member of a firm trading between the two ports. By the 1850s he was the Consul General for Bremen and Hamburg, a director in two of the city’s largest banks, a board member of the B&O Railroad, and a co-founder of the Adams Express Company. Gustav Lurman, another immigrant from Bremen, was a partner in the firm of Oelrich
and Lurman, flour and tobacco exporters to the German states and the Baltic region of Russian. The firm also served as Baltimore representatives of the Baring Brothers in London, the largest provider of investment capital to the U.S. during the antebellum era. To their great misfortune, Baltimoreans had little success in the cotton market. By the 1850s cotton was by far the largest and most valuable American export, but while Baltimore shippers did some business in this area, New Orleans, New York, and Mobile monopolized most of the cotton trade to Liverpool. In the domestic trade the New England ports, primarily Boston, brought cotton in for their local manufacturers. Had Baltimoreans been able to enter the international cotton trade in a larger way, or developed more of a local cotton textile industry, their economic position would have been greatly enhanced, but they were not able to do either. During the peak years of the 1850s, local textile manufacturers brought 30,000-40,000 bales of cotton into Baltimore, which they turned into cloth and canvas. The suburban mills employed 2,000-3,000 workers and were thus an important component of the local economy; by comparison, Boston imported ten times more cotton, and the textile mills in its extensive suburban region employed over 35,000. The inability of Baltimore to enter into the large-scale cotton trade meant that almost three quarters of its exports continued to be the old staples of flour and tobacco, commodities that continued to be profitable, but never profitable enough to allow its merchants to accrue the sort of wealth that New Yorkers and Bostonians expected as a matter of course.

This was doubly disadvantageous. Without a large volume of really valuable exports, the city could not become a major importer. For example, the $10 million worth of goods that were imported into Baltimore in 1857 (the port’s single best year of the whole antebellum era) was a substantial volume of goods, but it ranked dead last among the nation’s five major ports. Boston’s imports were $47 million and New York imported an amazing $360 million in goods—fifteen times more than the Patapsco metropolis and 66% of the U.S. total. By this time most Baltimore merchants and wholesalers obtained far more of their imported goods from New York commercial houses than from Baltimore’s own importers.

The bright spot in the city’s international commerce was its growing trade with South America. Here Baltimore had the advantage over New York, both in sailing time and in the unique qualities of its flour. Over the years Baltimore area millers had developed a type of flour made from Maryland and Virginia winter wheat that could withstand the heat and humidity of the tropics, and this product found a good market in
South America, especially Brazil. By the 1840s Baltimore was shipping more flour to South America than to the West Indies. The ships that carried flour to Brazil returned with coffee and Baltimore became the leading importer of this valuable commodity. The Levering family, Thomas Whitridge, Kirkland, Chase & Co., and Lambert Gittings made fortunes in “Brazilian gold.” Unloaded from fast clipper-style sailing vessels built for the long haul to Rio, the coffee beans were repackaged at the large waterside warehouses on Brown’s wharf and Belt’s wharf. They were then loaded into large Conestoga wagons (later onto railroad cars) and sold throughout Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania and the Ohio Valley. Large amounts of sugar and molasses from Cuba and Puerto Rico, British Guiana, Brazil, and Louisiana flowed into Baltimore where it, too, was processed and sold in the hinterland.

A less attractive, but quite valuable commodity that began to enter from South America in the 1830s was Peruvian guano. In 1860 over 71,000 tons of this nitrogen-rich bird manure was imported by fertilizer dealers who in turn sold it to tobacco planters in tidewater Maryland and Virginia to rejuvenate their exhausted soil. Guano’s major disadvantage was its high cost, so by the 1840s an enterprising Scotch-Irish immigrant named William Davison began producing a chemically created fertilizer made from ground bone and other raw materials and then treated with sulfuric acid. His factory near Federal Hill became the basis of a growing and increasingly diversified chemical industry in Baltimore. While a boon to tidewater farmers, the odoriferous fertilizer factories and the guano storage facilities were less popular with those living in South Baltimore.

The other major raw material imported from the West Indies and South America was copper ore. Cuban and Chilean ore became the basis for the establishment of the Baltimore Copper Smelting Company at Canton and the Baltimore and Cuba Smelting and Mining Company at Locust Point. During their peak years of prosperity in the early 1850s these plants employed 200-300 men and turned out 4,000-5,000 tons of copper. Most was rolled into sheets for shipbuilding and repair or used in the construction of steam engines and locomotives. Copper ingots were also exported to Bremen, serving as profitable ballast in the tobacco ships. Thus in a number of ways West Indian and South American raw materials came to figure prominently in Baltimore’s foreign trade, accounting for over half of Baltimore’s imports and supporting several large waterside industries.

As an offshoot of the long distance trade that developed with South America (and with California during the 1850s), Baltimore shipbuilders constructed a number of large,
clipper-style ships that were among the leading vessels in the world in terms of speed and beauty. The Ann McKim, built at Fells Point in 1833 and the Mary Whitridge, launched in 1855, established speed records for long-distance voyages that were seldom equaled by any other sailing craft. Unfortunately, they were profitable only when they could carry extremely valuable cargoes or passengers willing to pay a handsome price for a quicker voyage to Rio or around Cape Horn to California. By the 1850s ocean-going steam vessels of 2,000 tons or more, having much larger carrying capacities, made most of these magnificent sailing ships economically obsolete and they became Baltimore’s last major contribution to marine architecture. During this decade Baltimore’s shipyards still turned out three or four very large sailing ships of over 1,000 tons, and one or two approached 2,000; but the great majority were smaller, seventy to 200-ton barques, brigs, schooners, and even smaller sailing craft designed for the coastal and bay trade. On the eve of the Civil War, the most notable (and certainly the most expensive) Baltimore-built vessels were probably its bay steamboats.

The trend towards larger, deeper draft ships for the ocean trade hurt Baltimore in another way. The Patapsco was simply not deep enough. Unfortunately, dredging and maintaining a channel deep enough for the new generation of Atlantic cargo carriers proved far more expensive than the city could reasonably afford. During the 1830s the federal government contributed a small amount of money to dredging the harbor, but disagreements in Congress over distribution of the funds halted further expenditures. The only federal money spent in the harbor went for the construction of Fort Carroll, built between 1847 and 1852. Fort McHenry was now of little value in protecting the city from the much longer range naval guns that had been developed, so the new fort was placed on the Sollers Flats, about four and a half miles downriver from Fort McHenry. Built largely by Col. Robert E. Lee of the Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Carroll was a fine structure, but what the city really needed was a deeper shipping channel. Finally, in 1852 Congress passed a comprehensive rivers and harbors bill and Capt. Henry Brewerton of the Army Corps of Engineers arrived to begin digging a new, deeper channel in the Patapsco. Working with the latest steam-powered dredges, Brewerton gradually created a fifteen-mile channel from Fort McHenry to a spot four miles beyond North Point. The city itself purchased a new steam dredge to widen and deepen its channels from the basin out to Fort McHenry. By 1859 the first leg of the Brewerton Channel (as it is still called today) had been dredged to a point just beyond Fort Carroll. It was 150 feet wide and about twenty feet deep. The second leg, running out beyond North Point, varied from nineteen
to sixteen feet. This was not deep enough for the largest merchant ships then sailing the Atlantic, but was far superior to the channels that had existed seven years before.

Given the difficulties with its Atlantic trade, the steady expansion of Baltimore's bay and coastal trade became a vital element in its waterborne commerce. The value of foreign cargoes was significant, and immigration brought quite a large business; however, domestic passenger traffic, especially on the Chesapeake Bay, was growing. By the 1840s over two-thirds of the vessels trading at Baltimore carried goods to and from other American ports. By the 1850s the entire bay and coastal transportation business (goods, livestock, and passengers) involved more vessels, capital, and employees than the overseas trade. In addition, dozens of small, unregistered bay craft, each carrying a few tons of cargo, moved through the Patapsco each day. Thousands of barrels of flour, and hundreds of thousands of bushels of wheat and corn were shipped to New England, and Baltimore became the major distributor of northern and imported manufactured goods to those living around the Chesapeake Bay and down along the South Atlantic coast. The key to this new trade was the steamboat. While sailing craft still far outnumbered the steamboats in Baltimore's harbor in 1860, (the city's oyster packing business alone was served by over 250 small bay-sailing craft) the paddle-wheeler extended trade enormously. Steamboats could operate in almost any weather and, more important, were able to travel swiftly up the rivers that sailing vessels had navigated only with the greatest difficulty. The new technology revolutionized water transportation in the Chesapeake basin.

The coming of the steamboat to Baltimore allowed local investors (along with some Philadelphia and New York entrepreneurs operating out of Baltimore) to develop a series of steam packet companies running on regular schedules between the Patapsco and the hundreds of cities, towns, and landings that lay along the Chester, Choptank, Patuxent, Potomac, Rappahannock, York, and James Rivers. Goods could now be shipped quickly and cheaply from Baltimore to such places as Chestertown, Cambridge, Easton, and Salisbury in Maryland and Alexandria, Richmond, Petersburg, Fredericksburg and Norfolk in Virginia. By the 1830s and 1840s steam packet boats linked Baltimore with most of the major ports from Boston to New Orleans.

The most heavily traveled steamboat routes crisscrossed the Chesapeake Bay and extended up its tributary rivers. Thousands of passengers, tons of freight, and herds of horses, cattle, sheep and hogs all traveled the bay region in the big paddle-wheelers. As the Christmas holidays approached, the Pratt Street and Light Street wharves were
crowded with bay area shoppers coming to the city to make purchases or Baltimoreans heading “back home” to southern Maryland, the Eastern Shore, or tidewater Virginia. During the hot summers steamboats carried excursionists out of Baltimore to cool waterside picnic groves and resorts along the Western Shore. In 1830 an advertisement in The American announced that the steamer Columbia left the Patterson Street wharf at two thirty each afternoon and returned by dark. “This Boat affords a spacious promenade upon her top deck, which is screened from the sun by a large awning, and rendered at all times extremely pleasant, from the free circulation of air, occasioned by the SPEED of the Boat... Capt. Roundtree’s celebrated Band will accompany the Boat.”

All this activity called for greater carrying capacity. Steamboats evolved into very large vessels so steam navigation, like the railroads, became centralized in cities that could build, maintain, and repair huge, complex pieces of machinery. For the Chesapeake region, that place was Baltimore. The first steamboats were small and underpowered. The Chesapeake, built in Fells Point in 1813 and George Stiles’ Surprise (1816) were around 130 tons and approximately 100 feet long. With their small engines puffing smoke and hissing steam, their odd looking paddle wheels throwing up little plumes of water, they often provoked more mirth than admiration as they splashed and bounced across the harbor. By the 1850s much larger and more powerful steamboats, a number of them over 200 feet long and also much wider, carried up to a thousand passengers and hundreds of tons of freight. Everyone agreed that these were impressive, even awesome, vessels. The overnight steamers had elegant private cabins and dining rooms where sumptuous meals were served on fine china. The Louisiana, built in 1854 for the Old Bay Line at a cost of over $100,000, was 266 feet long and its huge steam engine, built by Baltimore’s Charles Reeder, propelled it easily between Baltimore and Norfolk in eleven hours. Its owners described it modestly as “doubtless one of the most substantial, commodious, and elegant boats of the day.” In spite of their increasing size and carrying capacity, the bay steamboats had a very shallow draft. This allowed them not only to service the river towns many miles inland, but with a little dredging they could dock right at the Pratt or Light Street wharves in the Inner Harbor.

Each of the steamboat companies operated out a particular wharf and competition was keen for the best locations. The Weems boats operated out of Dugan’s wharf, the Merchants Line for Charleston left from Smith’s wharf, the Cromwell boats bound for New York used Spear’s wharf, the Merchant and Miner’s boats to Boston leased space along the large Union Dock while a variety of other bay and coastal steamers used the
new Light Street docks which, in up-to-date fashion, had numbers rather than names. The Inner Harbor was small, but its central location made it a very convenient transfer point.

By the 1850s the thirty-seven wharves that lined the Patapsco from Fells Point around to Federal Hill were in constant use. The Inner Harbor was the most crowded, lined with dozens of steamboats and innumerable sailing craft loading and unloading goods in front of commercial piers, oyster sheds, repair docks, chemical factories, sugar refineries, and iron foundries. This harbor area gradually became an oily, trash-filled body of water, which neither fish nor any other marine life could tolerate. It frequently gave off a very distinctive odor. Nevertheless, it pulsed with life twenty-four hours a day. The queens of this dark water domain were the huge stern- and side-wheelers that churned through the soupy mess, belching smoke and shooting sparks high into the air. Baltimoreans watched the scene at first with a mixture of awe and foreboding, but eventually they became used to the hissing steam, the pounding engines, the shrill whistles, and the stench of fouled waters. When Dr. Thomas Buckler suggested in 1858 that the stinking harbor be filled with dirt from Federal Hill (the doctor did not think either place was very attractive or useful), the local press and the city council gave it serious consideration, but the city’s business leaders and waterfront property owners took a dim view of the project and it was shelved. Thus the smoky, dirty spectacle of the inner harbor steamboat wharves continued to thrill the eye and assault the nose until the 1940s.

**Steam Railways**

As important as the magnificent steamboats were to the city, their impact was overshadowed by the steam railways. In 1860, while steam-powered vessels still struggled to replace sail on the high seas and were by no means able to drive sailboats from the Chesapeake Bay, the steam locomotive had reduced the horse and wagon to a local carrier. For long distance and heavy hauling, steam was everywhere triumphant. The reason is readily apparent. In the 1820s it cost approximately forty to fifty dollars and took three to four weeks for a Conestoga freight wagon traveling the Frederick Turnpike and National Road to carry a ton of freight along the 378-mile route between Baltimore and Wheeling, Virginia. In 1853 when the B&O finally extended to Wheeling, the cost dropped to eleven dollars per ton (eight dollars for bulk goods), and a typical train, hauling over 150 tons of freight (as much as sixty horse-drawn wagons would normally carry), made the trip in nineteen hours. In the late 1820s approximately 40,000-50,000
tons of freight was hauled eastward along the National Road-Frederick Turnpike route each year while thirty years later the B&O carried over 700,000 tons a year! The old freight wagons were not eliminated from Baltimore’s streets, but their role was dramatically altered. Hundreds still came into the city over the turnpikes and during the harvest season were lined up for blocks behind the wharves or clustered around the public markets. The difference was that almost all had come from a radius of about twenty or thirty miles and their combined tonnage probably amounted to less than ten percent of the amount entering by rail. Further west, freight wagons were now simply used to carry loads to and from the nearest railroad, canal or steamboat landing.

In the creation of America’s railway system, the city of Baltimore, and the railroad that bore its name, occupies a special place. The Baltimore and Ohio is justly famous as the first commercial railroad in America and a line whose long-term reputation for quality service placed it in an elite circle that included the Pennsylvania Railroad, the New York Central, and a handful of Western lines. Of all the innovations that came to Baltimore from the age of steam, the B&O had the largest impact on the city and became its single most famous institution. It was a high stakes, bold adventure and over the long run it paid off handsomely for hundreds of individual stockholders, thousands of employees, and the city as a whole.

The B&O was not, of course, the only railroad in Baltimore during this era. The Northern Central and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore railroads also played important roles in the city’s economic development. However, far more local capital was tied up in the B&O than either of the other railroads and the commercial future of the whole city seemed more closely tied to its expansion. Also, the sheer size of the B&O made it a gigantic presence in the city. By 1855 its total assets were equal to the combined holdings of all the banks in the entire state of Maryland. In almost every respect, the B&O was the line that maintained Baltimore as a major commercial center and allowed it to stay in the race against the urban giants of the northeast.

Over the years the B&O took on an almost mythic quality, something akin to a “home team” status that made Baltimoreans both proud and sometimes angry. In fact, during the first five decades of its existence, the B&O was partly owned by the City of Baltimore. By 1858 the city government (and the state legislature) had invested over six million dollars in the line and at one point held almost a quarter of the seats on its board of directors. After the Civil War, as Baltimore began to fade from national attention, the B&O alone continued to identify it as a great city. In 1963, when the B&O was purchased
by the Chessie System, the event was regarded locally as a tragedy and the corporation’s
demise was genuinely mourned. Today, Baltimore’s B&O Railroad Museum, located at
the old Mount Clare repair shops on Pratt Street, is a reverent memorial to the old
pioneer and the city that created it. The reverence is justified. The construction of the
B&O Railroad over 378 miles of mountainous terrain to Wheeling, Virginia was perhaps
the greatest engineering feat of the antebellum era.

The question naturally arises as to why Baltimoreans, who in 1827 were certainly
not in the forefront of American engineering or steam technology, took such a huge
gamble on a project and a technology that was still so little understood? The official
answer is that the group of local leaders who launched the B&O were men of vision and
boldness who believed that steam power could overcome the Appalachian Mountains. A
more realistic answer is that the city had no other practical alternative and was thus
virtually compelled to take what amounted to a shot in the dark. There is probably some
truth in both views.

The sequence of events that led to the establishment of the B&O is well known.
The opening of the Erie Canal in 1825, linking New York City and Lake Erie, gave the
Hudson River metropolis a decisive advantage in the fast growing trade with the West
and forced merchants in Philadelphia, Baltimore and (somewhat surprisingly) in
Georgetown, Maryland, to consider cheaper ways of carrying goods to and from the Ohio
Valley-Great Lakes region. Moving goods by canal cost a fraction of the amount required
to haul them over even the best turnpikes, so in 1826 Philadelphia’s merchants
committed themselves to a system of canals to link their city with Pittsburgh and the
Ohio River. Merchants in Georgetown resurrected an old plan to build a canal along the
Maryland side of Potomac River and extend it to the headwaters of the Monongahela,
creating an all-water route from the Chesapeake Bay to the Ohio River.

Obviously, Baltimore’s merchants also had to find some type of improved
transportation to the West. Little more could be done to reduce the cost of moving goods
on the Frederick Turnpike-National Road system; a canal seemed to be the only
alternative. At a large meeting in the Merchant’s Exchange in 1823 Robert Goodloe
Harper, Charles Carroll’s son-in-law and one of the city’s leading attorneys, argued that
Baltimore should build its own canal to the Potomac, linking up with the proposed C&O
Canal project at Georgetown. George Winchester, a member of a family that had been
involved in the city’s trade and politics for many years, argued that a canal up the
Susquehanna River with a link to the Pennsylvania canal system, was the better bet. Some
merchants were skeptical of both projects, but when the Maryland legislature chartered the C&O Canal Company in 1826, the city decided to hitch its future to this route and secured a provision for the construction of a Baltimore-to-Georgetown branch canal.

As the moment of decision on the branch canal drew closer, the number of skeptics increased. There seemed little reason to expect that a thirty-seven mile canal from Baltimore to Georgetown would take much business away from the Potomac port, especially since it was now part of the District of Columbia and steamboats made shipping on the Potomac far more cost-effective than it had been in the age of sail. Philip E. Thomas, a Baltimore merchant and banker who served as the city’s representative on the C&O Canal Commission, finally decided that a branch canal would not work and a new road to the West, perhaps using some type of steam powered vehicle, might offer a better solution.

Philip’s brother Evan Thomas had witnessed the experimental hauling of wagons by steam powered vehicles in England, and others had seen America’s two small “railroads,” one at a coal mine in Pennsylvania and the other at a stone quarry near Boston. These demonstrations convinced the Thomas brothers, and ultimately a number of their business associates in Baltimore, that a steam-powered machine, operating on a “railroad” rather than a conventional paved highway, could transport goods and even passengers across hundreds of miles, even over the Appalachian Mountains. In February of 1827 Philip Thomas and Alex Brown assembled a group of about two dozen of the city’s leading merchants, bankers, and men of influence and laid the plan before them. The group included Robert Oliver, William Patterson and his son Joseph, Benjamin Howard (John Eager Howard’s son), Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Alex Brown’s son George, Solomon Etting, William Lorman, Luke Tiernan, Isaac McKim, Jr., George Warner, Charles Ridgely of Hampton, and Thomas Ellicott. With the support of this all-star cast of city leaders, the great experiment was launched. Two months later the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was chartered by the state legislature to build a railroad from Baltimore harbor to the Ohio River. The new directors elected Philip Thomas president and George Brown as treasurer. The corporation quickly sold $1,500,000 in stock to private investors (most of whom were Baltimoreans), the state government bought $1,000,000 worth and Baltimore City came in for $500,000.

While collecting this huge amount of capital, the B&O’s directors quietly began consulting with engineers and anyone else who could figure out how to build a long-distance, steam-powered railroad. At the time, of course, no one had a clear idea of how
rails should be designed, secured to the ground or how far apart they should be. Even less was known about the sort of steam-powered device that might be employed to pull a train of wagons and coaches. Quite literally, the B&O’s directors had no clear idea where their road was to go. While they agreed on the route to be taken from Baltimore to Harpers Ferry and Cumberland, no consensus was reached on where to strike the Ohio River.

The B&O was fortunate in finding men of great talent to design and build the road and its equipment. A group of skilled military officers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers surveyed the line to Harpers Ferry. The rest of the road, along with almost all its large bridges and embankments, was designed by Benjamin Latrobe, Jr., son of the famous architect. Jonathan Knight, a Pennsylvanian who had supervised construction of the National Road, managed the hundreds of German, Irish, and native-born workers who actually built the road and laid the tracks. One of the B&O’s luckiest finds was Ross Winans, a New Jersey mechanic and inventor, who came to Baltimore in 1828 to demonstrate to the B&O’s officials a new type of rail wagon he had invented. Winans turned out to be a mechanical genius. He stayed in Baltimore, developing what became the standard type of railroad car for American railroads and also built a large portion of the B&O’s early steam locomotives.

The building of the B&O railroad across the mountains to the Ohio River is a story that has been told often and well, and need not be repeated in any detail. The momentous project got under way on July 4, 1828 with a gigantic procession and ceremony in which ninety-one year-old Charles Carroll of Carrollton turned the first spadeful of earth in a field just beyond the western edge of the city. Bands played, militia units paraded, toasts were drunk and speeches made extolling the greatness of the city and wonderful new era that the railroad would open for its residents. The parade from the Merchants Exchange out to the site of the ceremony took over four hours and almost everyone in the city turned out to watch the historic event.

Once the great ceremony was over, of course, the directors turned to the task of fulfilling the expectations that everyone had for the new transportation company. Their first major task was deciding exactly where to place the B&O’s terminal. They finally agreed to put it on Pratt Street, about a mile west of the basin on a plot of land given to the railroad by James Carroll, a relative of Charles Carroll of Carrollton (James Maccubbin, the nephew of the childless Charles Carroll the Barrister, inherited the estate at his uncle’s death by taking Carroll as his last name). James Carroll had been trying to develop portions of Mount Clare, his thousand-acre estate on the southwestern edge of
the city, for residential, commercial or industrial use. He initially offered the B&O directors a right-of-way through his property and a large parcel of land if they would terminate their line at his private wharf at Carroll’s Point on the Middle Branch of the Patapsco. This would have placed the B&O over a mile south of the basin and well beyond the southern edge of the city, so the directors refused. Carroll then offered a right of way and ten acres anywhere except Carroll’s Point, apparently thinking that if another spot on his Mount Clare property was selected, the B&O might eventually build a branch line down to his wharf in consideration for the gift. In the meantime the city council, fearing that the B&O would strike a deal with Carroll and divert development away from the basin and Fells Point, offered two square blocks of prime waterfront land at the newly built City Dock in Fells Point. To reach this choice piece of property, the railroad would have to extend its line eastward along Pratt Street, across Jones Falls and down the east side of the falls to the dock. The offer was a generous one and the B&O officials took it, locating their terminal on West Pratt Street at the extreme northern edge of the Mount Clare estate.83

At first the B&O line ended at its West Pratt street terminal, but within a few years tracks were laid eastward along Pratt Street all the way to the City Dock. By this time the B&O had begun using steam engines, but the city would not allow them on its streets so each car had to be pulled along the Pratt street tracks by horses. It was a slow and costly arrangement. As the B&O grew, the little station and car shed on Pratt Street expanded into a substantial railyard with a variety of construction and repair facilities. Nearby, Ross Winans’ car shops, Bartlett and Hayward’s iron foundry, the Suffolk Iron and Steam Works, and several other industrial enterprises were established. By the 1840s, the Mount Clare Shops, as the B&O facility came to be called, anchored a large industrial district on the southwestern edge of the city.

As soon as the first few miles of track were opened, the railroad began to earn money. In 1830, when the line reached Ellicott’s Mills on the Patapsco, flour could be transported back to Baltimore and the merchants in the village received their hardware and dry goods by rail. Hundreds of passengers, curious to see the deep cuts the railroad made through the ridges that lay between Baltimore and Ellicott’s Mills, and eager to travel on Ross Winans’ “rail carriages,” made the thirteen-mile trip out to the Patapsco mill town. The trains of carriages were still pulled by teams of horses, but the novelty of traveling on rails proved immensely popular. The B&O reached Frederick in 1831 and the next year Phineas Davis, a transplanted New Englander, placed the first steam engines
into regular service. Flour from the Monocacy Valley, which for almost a century had been hauled by horses, now arrived in rail cars pulled by steam engines.

In 1834 construction crews had laid track all the way to the Potomac River across from Harper’s Ferry. Here, however, the B&O encountered the C&O Canal Company and a long legal fight began over the right-of-way through the narrow Potomac gorge. In addition, the B&O had underestimated its construction costs and had to raise more capital. The Panic of 1837 made fund raising very difficult and construction halted for several years. Finally, in 1842 the B&O entered Cumberland, Maryland, 178 miles west of Baltimore. The construction costs now exceeded $8 million, a far larger sum than anyone had predicted. Once again, painfully short of capital, the directors prevailed on Louis McLane, the Delaware-born lawyer, statesman, and diplomat, to take the B&O presidency. McLane had been a cabinet member and the U.S. ambassador to Britain under President Jackson and was very well connected with politicians in Maryland and financiers in London. These were important assets since he spent most of his time during these difficult years raising money for the financially strapped corporation. The railroad was now shipping over a quarter of a million barrels of flour and other goods eastward and thousands of people traveling to and from the Ohio Valley on the National Road now used the B&O between Cumberland and Baltimore. Yet even with all this traffic, the road was still not the great commercial savior that many had hoped for and construction expenses rose steadily as tracks were laid over the higher mountain ridges west of Harpers Ferry.

One bright spot during these difficult times were the profits earned from the so-called “Washington Railroad,” really a B&O branch line connecting Baltimore with the nation’s capital. Unlike the so-called “Main Stem” out to Cumberland, the Washington Branch ran over nearly flat terrain and the only major expense was a 700-foot long bridge over the Patapsco gorge just south of the Baltimore. The huge stone viaduct, designed by Benjamin Latrobe, Jr., was the largest bridge in America at the time and remains one of the oldest railroad bridges still in service. It cut travel time between the two cities from six hours (eight or ten hours in bad weather) to an assured two hours. The state of Maryland took twenty percent of the gross receipts as their price for granting the B&O the exclusive right to operate a railroad between the two cities, but passenger traffic on the line rose rapidly since it formed the final link in a rail network that united the nation’s capital with Philadelphia, New York and Boston. During the 1850s a line connecting Baltimore with Annapolis was built off the Washington Branch, a step that generated even more revenue.
Chapter 3: Competing Against the Urban Giants, 1819-1860

Samuel Morse strung his first telegraph wires along the Washington Branch, thanks to a Congressional appropriation secured by Baltimore’s John Pendleton Kennedy, the well-known author, attorney, and politician. In May 1844 the telegraph line stretched between the Capitol building in Washington and the B&O’s small station and warehouse at Light and Pratt Streets. Morse sent his historic message “What hath God wrought?” to this prosaic little structure. The B&O’s directors, while pleased with the experiment, saw no use for it in the operation of their railroad. Many years passed before they adopted it to control rail traffic. Even with the good performance of the Washington Branch, the B&O remained financially troubled through the 1840s. The city’s political leaders and private investors, who had clamored to buy stock in 1827, lost much of their original zeal. Alex Brown, William Patterson, Charles Carroll, and Robert Oliver, all of whom had been so firm in their support of the road, were now dead. When the B&O came back to the city in the late 1840s (and again in the 1850s) for more funds, the politicians were frankly skeptical whether the road would ever reach the Ohio River. With Philadelphians and New Yorkers pushing ahead on their own rail projects, however, there seemed no alternative but to vote to give the B & O more money. As the city and state governments bought more stock and gained more seats on the B&O board, they sought more active control over the corporation’s affairs. They were primarily interested in seeing the road extended to the Ohio River to facilitate the city’s trade, while board members representing stockholders hoped that a portion of the profits could be used to finally pay some dividends. A fundamental tension developed between the two groups. Private stockholders, who still comprised a majority on the B&O board, complained of political interference in the railroad’s business decisions and the newspapers seemed shocked when they lobbied in the city council and state legislature to influence the selection of the government representatives on the board. B&O President McLane, more lawyer and statesman rather than rough-and-tumble politician, encountered serious difficulties trying to head a railroad that was halfway between a private corporation and a public utility. He finally gave up the presidency in 1848 and returned to what he hoped would be the more placid world of diplomatic service.

In spite of his distaste for the job, McLane was an effective money raiser and by the time he left the B&O’s financial status was much improved. Also, the B&O board had resolved the important question of where the road was to connect with the Ohio River. For a time it appeared that the B&O might obtain the right to build north across Pennsylvania and terminate in Pittsburgh. Philadelphia had built railroads out in several
directions, but its line to the west extended only as far as Harrisburg. Business leaders in Pittsburgh and Western Pennsylvania were unhappy with this state of affairs and welcomed the chance to connect with Baltimore’s railroad. Unfortunately, in 1846 a group of Philadelphia merchants and industrialists finally awoke to the threat and organized the Central Railroad Company, which promised to begin building a line west from Harrisburg, connecting Philadelphia with Pittsburgh. Promoters of the new corporation (which soon changed its name to the Pennsylvania Railroad) got the Pennsylvania legislature to block the B&O’s application to enter Pennsylvania. B&O officials had no choice but to turn to the Virginia legislature for a right-of-way.

In negotiating with the Virginians, the B&O was fortunate in having among its chief officials Thomas Swann, a Virginia-born lawyer who possessed considerable skill as a political lobbyist and negotiator. Swann became convinced that Parkersburg, Virginia, just down river from Marietta, Ohio, was the best terminus. Swann had a wide understanding of the national network of railways that were beginning to link the Atlantic seaboard not just with the Ohio River or Lake Erie, but with the entire Middle West. Swann thought that the B&O from Parkersburg could connect with a railroad being built between Marietta and Cincinnati, the largest city on the Ohio River. A line was also projected from Wheeling west to Columbus, Ohio, but this project appeared much shakier and Columbus was a small town compared to Cincinnati.

At this point, the City of Wheeling asserted itself. Even though the river town had only about 8,000 residents, it was already a major industrial and commercial center with influential friends in the Virginia legislature. The National Road crossed the Ohio at Wheeling and its iron industry was growing rapidly, so Virginians were anxious to see it become a rail center as well. In spite of Swann’s best lobbying efforts, the Virginia politicians required the B&O to build its line to Wheeling. John W. Garrett who with his brother Henry, had become one of the largest stockholders in the B&O, was disgusted that the road was going to Wheeling rather than Pittsburgh or Parkersburg. He wrote to his brother saying, “Our R.R. is a hopeless concern.”

While failure to get into either Pittsburgh or Parkersburg was disappointing, it was not a serious setback. Any terminal on the Ohio would connect with the extensive steamboat traffic along the river and there was no reason that the B&O could not try again later to build a line towards either of the other two towns. In fact, in 1851, as the B&O’s tracks neared Wheeling, the smooth talking Swann got the Virginians to agree to let the B&O build a line to Parkersburg once Wheeling had been reached. Only a man of
Swann’s tactical skill and persuasive ability could have achieved such a concession and it was undoubtedly these political skills that led to his election as President of the B&O in October 1848.

Thomas Swann was a remarkable individual. Born in northern Virginia to a moderately wealthy and socially prominent family, he came to Baltimore as a young man and married into the Gilmor family, thus instantly elevating himself into Baltimore’s business and social elite. His business and political skills soon placed him in a key position within the B&O’s management and during McLane’s last years he ran most of the corporation’s daily activities. Swann spent five crucial years as B&O president and for the next twenty he played a major role, not only with in the B&O, but in the political life of his adopted city and state. Like his two chief allies on the B&O board, Johns Hopkins and John Work Garrett, Swann had a keen grasp of the economic revolution that was recasting Maryland and the whole nation. He continually threw his weight behind those movements that sought to modernize the old tidewater-dominated state and make it a modern commercial and industrial society.

As the B&O’s new, dynamic president, Swann’s enthusiasm and broad vision of the road’s future rekindled public confidence and he was able to get the corporation moving rapidly again on a variety of fronts. First, he oversaw the final 200-mile thrust over the highest mountain ridges and down to the Ohio River at Wheeling. Swann later recalled (after the line had been completed) that this was his most courageous decision. When he first went out to look at the route of the proposed road west of Cumberland, he was overcome by a deep foreboding. “We had been charged in the city of Baltimore with attempting impossibilities, and I was almost brought to the conviction that our assailants were not without some ground of complaint.” In spite of his private misgivings, Swann placed his faith in the engineering skills of Benjamin Latrobe, Jr. and gave the order to begin construction. A work crew that sometimes numbered 5,000 men cut a roadway along steep mountainsides, filled deep crevasses, dug tunnels, and constructed 113 bridges. Fifty-three of the bridges were built on location and sixty others, fabricated at the Mount Clare Shops by the B&O’s great bridge engineer Wendell Bollman, were shipped out in pieces and reassembled on the site. The 615-foot bridge across the Monongahela River at Fairmont, Virginia, designed by Latrobe and constructed by Bollman, was the largest iron bridge ever built up to that time. The tunnels were equally spectacular. The 4,100-foot Kingwood tunnel under Summit Ridge was the longest in the nation.
By the time the last spike was driven on Christmas Eve 1852, the Baltimore-Wheeling line had required just over $17 million dollars (others said $20 million). Both figures are more than four times the original estimate, but because the volume of traffic on the line was now also much larger than anyone had dreamed in 1828, and jumped again when the road reached Wheeling, the cost overruns were largely forgotten. In January 1853 Swann and over 500 other B&O officials, stockholders, and government leaders from Maryland and Virginia boarded special trains in Baltimore to make the 378-mile trip out to the Ohio River. B&O stock, which had sold for as low as $28 a share in the last years of McLane’s presidency, now sold for as much as $99. After an eighteen-hour ride, they arrived at Wheeling where the local citizens entertained them with a lavish banquet consisting of oysters, ham, turkey, beef, buffalo tongues, and lobster—a cornucopia of foods brought from all parts of the nation. Such a feast would have been impossible before the railway age.

The completion of the line from the Patapsco waterfront to the Ohio River was a moment of supreme triumph for the B&O and all those Baltimoreans who, twenty-five years before, had supported the seemingly impossible task of linking these two waterways by something called a railroad. The fact that the Pennsylvania Railroad had opened service of a sort between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh (with a connection across Ohio to Cincinnati) just a few weeks before took nothing away from the B&O’s celebration. Just west of Altoona, the Pennsylvania Railroad’s cars had to be pulled over the Appalachian’s highest ridge by an inclined plane. Thus the B&O became the first railroad to link the Atlantic coast with the Ohio River by an unbroken line of rails.

The completion of the road to Wheeling was certainly the B&O’s crowning achievement in the antebellum era, but Thomas Swann also pushed ahead with a series of other major improvements in the B&O’s tracks, equipment and terminal facilities, especially in Baltimore. Heavier rails were laid on older sections of the line, new stations and sidings constructed, faster and more powerful locomotives ordered and hundreds of larger freight cars constructed. All this work gave Baltimore’s iron foundries and machine shops a huge boost and accounted for much of the city’s industrial prosperity during the mid-1850s. For example, in January 1853 the Mount Clare shops had over a thousand men at work assembling seventeen locomotives and 284 freight cars while nextdoor Ross Winans was filling an order for sixty locomotives. Denmead’s Monumental Iron Works was building five locomotives and 200 freight cars, Murray and Hazlehurst’s Vulcan
Works at Federal Hill were building 400 freight cars, Poole and Hunt were building 100 more while E. S. Benson and the Suffolk Works were building fifty each.\(^87\)

Swann oversaw the completion of new terminal facilities at Locust Point near Fort McHenry and on Camden Street near the Inner Harbor. The decision to build an entirely new deepwater port facility at Locust Point was made just before Swann became president, but he oversaw its construction. Crowded conditions at the City Dock and the restriction on the use of steam engines along the city streets led the B&O to seek a waterside location where locomotives could move trains right out onto the piers. The still largely unoccupied Whetstone peninsula provided an admirable site. In 1848-1849 the B&O laid a new branch line across the southern end of the old Mount Clare estate to Locust Point. There it constructed wharves and piers along a half-mile long stretch of waterfront and ran tracks right out to the water’s edge. Bulk commodities, mostly coal and wheat, could now be loaded directly into waiting ships. The new rail line out to Locust Point attracted factories and by 1860 the previously unoccupied lands between the city and Fort McHenry were dotted with industrial plants and small houses.

The other terminal project was the construction of a central passenger and freight station. The little station at Mount Clare, built in 1829, had become woefully inadequate. The railroad needed a large passenger and general freight station adjacent to the harbor, the downtown hotels, and the wholesale warehouses. Because no large pieces of open land remained in the central area, the B&O bought four square blocks of houses and shops just a few blocks west of Light Street for $500,000 and replaced them with a large, handsome rail station facing onto Camden Street. Swann had wanted a massive, Norman-style palace for the station, but settled for a less expensive Italianate structure designed by John Niernsee and James Nielson, the local architectural team that had designed the Northern Central Railroad’s Calvert Street station four years earlier (also in the Italianate style). The B&O’s Camden Station was an elegant structure and considerably larger than the Northern Central’s station. In fact, for a brief time it was the largest railroad station in the country.

A third terminal project, pursued by Swann after he had left the B&O presidency and become mayor of Baltimore, never materialized. This was a branch line from the B&O’s main stem that was to have run across Baltimore’s northern suburbs from Elysville (later called Alberton) and down to Canton to a waterside terminal similar to the Locust Point facility. Since Locust Point could handle the B&O’s needs at the time, and influential landowners in the northern suburbs opposed it, the railroad’s directors did not
pursue the project. After the Civil War the B&O deeply regretted their failure to build such a line, or at least to obtain a right-of-way into the Canton waterfront.88

Swann’s final contribution, also made after he left the presidency, was the completion of B&O line to Parkersburg, Virginia. Under the agreement with the Virginia legislature construction could not begin until the B&O’s main stem opened to Wheeling, but almost as soon as that task was completed, work on the Northwestern Virginia Railroad or Parkersburg branch began. Swann served as president of the line and Johns Hopkins, George Brown, and several other Baltimoreans dominated the board of directors and worked closely with John Work Garrett, the B&O’s largest stockholder and the man who was gradually assuming the dominant role in the corporation. When the branch line finally opened in 1857 Swann, Garrett, and Hopkins regarded the event as equal in importance to the completion of the Main Stem four years earlier.

This triumvirate of railroad men, plus a small circle of like-minded stockholders and officials, had come to realize that the B&O’s great achievement in reaching the Ohio River, a feat that seemed like a fantastic dream back in 1828, was now only the first step in the development of a much larger rail system linking the eastern seaboard with the entire Middle West. The phenomenal growth of these western states, from just over a million people in 1828 to almost eight million by the mid-1850s, created a profound economic and geographic revolution. While the B&O won the race to the Ohio River, railroad leaders in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, armed with far more capital than Baltimore possessed, moved ahead by building railroads of their own (i.e., the Pennsylvania, the New York Central, and the Erie) that began to link up to numerous lines under construction in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions. Many of the middle-western railroads were financed by money from northeastern cities and therefore became more closely connected to the three northern trunk lines. This is why Swann, Garrett, and Hopkins gave close attention to the Parkersburg branch. It provided the B&O’s link to the Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad, which would join Baltimore and the great river town on the Ohio. Another railroad was being constructed between Cincinnati and St. Louis, and the B&O sought to join the three lines into a single route linking Baltimore and the Mississippi River.

The three railroads were completed by 1857 and another huge celebration, reminiscent of the 1853 event, was staged by the B&O’s directors. Led by now Mayor Swann and a host of B&O officials, a large party went out to Cincinnati and St. Louis to inaugurate what the B&O called the “American Central Route.” Once again there were
special trains, huge banquets, many toasts, and brave speeches. Had the three lines really been well connected the route would have been excellent, but there were several serious breaks in it. No bridge spanned the Ohio at Parkersburg and freight had to go by steamboat up to Marietta. There was no direct connection in Cincinnati and the line to St. Louis ended in East St. Louis, on the Illinois side of the river. It is not a surprise that the 920-mile American Central Route proved disappointing to Baltimore shippers. Cincinnati was far better served by other Ohio lines that connected it to the Pennsylvania Railroad.

At the same time the B&O cobbled together their American Central Route, Garrett and Hopkins tried to establish rail connections with Columbus, Ohio, and Pittsburgh. Both of these projects were really attempts to break into the Great Lakes region where the Pennsylvania and New York Central were hard at work building a system of lines across northern Ohio, Michigan, northern Indiana, and into the rapidly growing city of Chicago. A mere frontier town in 1830, Chicago now appeared to be the premier city of the Middle West. Unfortunately, the B&O simply could not raise enough private capital to buy or build lines that would connect Wheeling with the Great Lakes cities or perfect its route to St. Louis. Garrett, Hopkins, and Swann attempted to convince Baltimoreans that unless some means could be found to pay for further expansion, the bulk of the Middle Western trade would gradually shift to Philadelphia and New York. Even so, the B&O’s city and state directors, who must have shared at least some of these concerns, shrank at the idea of funding large new capital expenditures.

The Panic of 1857, while not nearly so devastating to Baltimoreans as the Panic of 1819, was still a serious downturn and banished all thoughts of trans-Ohio expansion. It caused a severe drop in railroad revenues throughout the nation and threatened some lines with bankruptcy. Not wishing the B&O to suffer such a fate, the board of directors turned increasingly to Garrett as the most knowledgeable and solid financial manager within the corporation and perhaps in the city. By 1858 all the private members of the B&O’s board had become convinced that Garrett was the only man who could put things right and four of the publicly appointed directors agreed, so by a vote of sixteen to fourteen, the merchant-turned financier was elected president. For the next twenty-six years John Work Garrett ran the B&O almost as his own private company while his private banking firm of Robert Garrett and Sons, became the city’s major private banking firm. Until his death in 1873, Johns Hopkins also played a central role as Garrett’s most
trusted friend and advisor, but Garrett was the major leader and the chief voice of the corporation. No Baltimorean before or since has carried more influence.

As a business manager, Garrett had no equal and his responsibilities were vast. He presided over a railroad that had more than 500 miles of track, 236 locomotives, 3,668 freight cars, 124 passenger cars and approximately 4,500 employees. It was already the largest institution that 19th century Baltimore would ever produce. The economic depression following the 1857 panic reduced the B&O’s gross receipts by $200,000, but Garrett was able to cut costs by $800,000, producing a net profit of $600,000, more than it earned in some of its good years. Sure of his own judgment, the new president reorganized almost every aspect of the railroad’s operations. By 1860 the railroad had become far more efficient and showed better profits than at any time in its history. A grateful board reelected Garrett by a vote of 26-0 and Baltimore’s greatest economic institution finally seemed poised to fulfill its destiny.

The B&O, of course, was not the only railroad in the city. Construction of a line called the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad began in 1829, less than a year after work started on the B&O. A second line, the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad, was chartered in 1832. Neither of these two roads came close to matching the size of the mighty B&O, but together they played a significant role in opening different avenues of trade and contributing to the city’s commercial and industrial growth.

The Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad grew out of the attempts by Baltimoreans to improve their transportation links to the counties of central Pennsylvania. While the York turnpike continued to bring a great deal of the Pennsylvania trade into the city, a number of merchants became convinced that a canal would increase trade even more. For a time it was thought that a canal along the Susquehanna might be able to connect with Philadelphia’s Main Line canal system and open trade all the way to Pittsburgh. However, when efforts to raise the money to build a Susquehanna canal stalled, a group of merchant-investors from Baltimore and several from central Pennsylvania sent petitions to Annapolis and Harrisburg for a charter to build a railroad from Baltimore through York, Pennsylvania, and north to York Haven on the Susquehanna River. The petitioners were led by George Winchester, the man who had previously led the fight to build a Susquehanna Canal. In fact, the railroad’s main rail yard and shops were placed at Bolton, Winchester’s suburban estate just north of the city (today it is the site of the Mount Royal Station). The railroad’s founders also included Charles Carnan Ridgely, Robert Purviance, Sheppard Leakin, and William Patterson’s son
Chapter 3: Competing Against the Urban Giants, 1819-1860

Joseph. Construction began on August 8, 1829 with a parade and an elaborate ceremony similar to the celebration held the previous July when the B&O commenced building its railroad. The speaker of the day at the Baltimore and Susquehanna ceremony, Ebenezer L. Finley, seemed more conversant with sailing craft than railroads and told the crowd “We have embarked on a great voyage. Prosperous gales are wafting us in our course... and enlightened enterprise is at the helm. Let the crew be faithful to their duty, and no storms can impede-- no difficulties can arrest our course.” As orators had just a year before at the B&O celebration, Finley expressed his certainty that the railroad was going to redeem the city’s promise of greatness. “Baltimore is destined at no distant day to become one of the most prominent if not the first, amongst the cities of the Union.”

Philadelphians were not amused by such boasting from their southern competitor and were able to delay approval of the railroad’s charter in the Pennsylvania legislature for three years, but local leaders in the Susquehanna Valley finally overcame this opposition. Construction on the line that had halted at the Pennsylvania border resumed, only to be halted again by financial problems. Fortunately, George Winchester obtained a loan from Baltimore City and construction moved forward once again. The line opened to York in 1838 and by 1846 it was hauling over 100,000 tons of freight had generated gross receipts of approximately $150,000. While this was small compared to the B&O’s volume of business (its gross receipts for 1846 were over a million dollars), it appeared to be a line with a great future. In 1855 the Baltimore and Susquehanna was consolidated with several smaller lines and reincorporated as the Northern Central Railroad. The first president of the new corporation was John Pendleton Kennedy, the same well-known Baltimore lawyer, novelist, and political leader who had been involved with the development of the B&O during the 1830s and 1840s. Kennedy was a bright and able man who moved in the upper circles of the nation’s cultural and political elite; he took the job, as he told his friend Washington Irving, “to show the carping world how foolishly they talk when they say that a man of letters... is a mere blockhead in all matters of practical work.” The novelist turned railroad executive proved to be an able administrator, lobbyist, and money-raiser for the growing enterprise, but after two years of “running up and down, to and fro, amongst city councils, and Legislators, domestic and foreign, and Boards of Directors,” he grew weary of the job and resigned, complaining to Millard Fillmore, “These men of business are all tainted by that vice of refusing the pleasant appointments of life.”
Kennedy’s departure may also have been prompted by the fact that the road, while continuing to grow both in size and revenues, remained starved for funds and sent its president on an endless round of appointments to raise money. As with the B&O, it simply did not have sufficient capital to expand rapidly and Baltimore’s political leaders began to lose faith in the project. The Northern Central was hit hard by the Panic of 1857 and in 1860 was unable to keep up its debt payments to the city. Luckily, the Baltimore merchant, banker and real estate magnate John S. Gittings loaned the corporation $120,000 of his own money and took over as president. Gittings had great faith in the future of the road. In 1858 it opened service to Sunbury in the heart of the Pennsylvania coal country and became a major supplier of Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal to Baltimore. Of even greater importance, it intersected at Harrisburg with the Pennsylvania Railroad and began to carry goods to Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago. By 1860 Chicago hotels could serve fresh Chesapeake Bay oysters, shipped out in casks of ice via the Northern Central-Pennsylvania route. With only forty-one locomotives, thirty-one passenger cars and 1,756 freight cars, the Northern Central was not yet comparable to the B&O, but its long-term future seemed bright. The Bolton shops and yards employed over 400 men, and its tracks, which ran down Howard Street to the Inner Harbor and by a more circuitous route over to Fells Point, were busy day and night with freight traffic. In 1850 it opened a beautiful passenger station at Calvert and Franklin streets, selling through tickets to Harrisburg, Pittsburgh and as far west as Chicago.

In spite of its financial problems, the Northern Central’s railroad’s potential as a carrier to the Great Lakes region attracted wide attention, and among those interested were John and Henry Garrett. During the 1850s the Garrett brothers purchased a substantial bloc of Northern Central stock, and it appeared that at some point their banking house might acquire a controlling interest in the line and merge it into the B&O system. Unfortunately, when the economy turned down in 1860-1861 following the election of Lincoln and the secession of the southern states, the Garretts came under sudden financial pressure and decided to sell their Northern Central stock. The shares were bought up by J. Edgar Thompson and Simon Cameron of the Pennsylvania Railroad. At the March 1861 meeting of the Northern Central’s stockholders, the Thompson-Cameron group (which included the Baltimoreans John Gittings and William Walters) gained majority control. The take-over gave the Pennsylvania Railroad just the sort of access to Baltimore that the B&O had sought in Pittsburgh over a decade before. Had Baltimoreans not been in such a complete uproar over the secession crisis and the
movement of Northern troops through the city in April, 1861, the Pennsylvania Railroad’s quieter invasion of the city might have led to mass meetings and strong protests, but with such momentous political events consuming local attention, the takeover went almost unnoticed.

The third rail line in the city, the Baltimore and Port Deposit (later the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore) was a later starter, but eventually came to play a crucial role in the city, especially during the secession crisis of 1860-1861. The Baltimore and Port Deposit (B&PD) was chartered in 1832 to carry goods between Baltimore and the mouth of the Susquehanna River. With a capital stock of a million dollars, it constructed a line from Fells Point northeastward on a line roughly parallel to the Old Boston Post Road. Benjamin Latrobe, Jr. surveyed the line in 1834 and construction began the next year. In 1838 the B&PD merged with the three other small rail lines to form the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad (PW&B). Trains could move directly between central Philadelphia and Baltimore, crossing the Susquehanna on a steam ferry fitted with rails. At Philadelphia, it connected with rail lines to New York and Boston. Traffic and receipts on the PW&B grew steadily during the 1840s, reaching $627,000 by 1849, most of it from passenger traffic, which by this time approached 300,000 per year.

The PW&B’s major impact on the city was in Fells Point and East Baltimore. The line came into Baltimore from the northeast, skirted the Canton shoreline along Boston Street, and then headed directly west through Fells Point along Canton Avenue (now Fleet Street). It ended at President and Fleet streets where a large passenger station was built in 1850-1852. The President Street Station, as it was called, was just two blocks above the City Dock where both the B&O and Northern Central tracks came in. Through an agreement with the B&O, the PW&B connected its tracks to the B&O’s Pratt Street line and its cars were hauled by horses over to Camden Station where they were attached to a B&O steam engine and sent on to Washington. Since the Northern Central’s tracks already linked up with the PW&B at Exeter and Fleet streets, and with the B&O at Howard and Pratt, Baltimore’s three railroads formed a loop around the center of the city. This provided an efficient urban rail network, except that all the hauling had to be done one car at a time at whatever speed the horses could pull them. Slow as it was, the system allowed a remarkable volume of passengers and freight to move through the city. With over thirty regularly scheduled passenger trains in and out of Baltimore each day, and many more freight trains, hundreds of rail cars passed through the city’s streets during
each twenty-four hour period. The central city was saved from smoke and cinders, but locomotives entering and leaving Locust Point, the Mount Clare and Bolton Shops, Camden Station, Calvert Station, and the President Street Station did enough puffing and whistling to prove that Baltimore had become a major center of the nation’s steam railways.

Specialized Merchants and Traders

The chief beneficiaries of Baltimore’s transportation revolution were the merchants and traders, and they continued to occupy the center stage within Baltimore’s business community. There was widespread agreement that trade was the backbone of the local urban economy and in terms of the number of businesses and employees that was clearly correct. In 1851 the city issued 4,319 traders licenses. At the top of this vast throng of merchants, traders, shopkeepers, and street vendors were the 400-500 men who carried on the city’s large-scale commodity and wholesale trade (approximately 250 of whom actually called themselves “commission merchants”). As in the eighteenth century, they remained the city’s economic aristocrats, standing a step above the elite professionals and perhaps two steps beyond the manufacturers. Even the Baltimore Sun, which constantly beat the drum on behalf of manufacturing during these years, did not perceive the factory to be the leading edge, or even the equal of the mercantile sector. In 1852, in an editorial discussing the economic implications of the completion of the B&O to Wheeling, it stated that

...one of the most potent and enduring auxiliaries of commerce, in the development of domestic exchange, consists in the manufacturing interests with which it can familiarly ally itself. And in view of the relation we are about to enter upon with the great West, and the interests we must endeavor to cement with the South, manufactures will constitute an imposing adjunct of trade.91

Likewise, The American, still the city’s leading commercial newspaper, always provided the public with a lengthy and detailed annual review of the city’s trade but offered only occasional glimpses into the affairs of the city’s manufacturers.

While the large commission merchants and wholesalers (often called jobbers) continued to dominate and were undoubtedly the wealthiest single group in the city, they were by the 1850s quite a different agglomeration of traders than they had been in 1819. Aside from the obvious fact that they were more numerous and did a much larger volume of business, they were a much less cohesive group. Quite a few merchants continued to
buy and sell a wide variety of items during the 1820s and 1830s, but over the next twenty years this eclectic style of trade declined steadily. Specialization became the order of the day and most merchants focused on only one or two areas of trade. A city directory of 1850 lists seventeen different types of wholesale merchants.

As specialization eroded the old community of general traders, the more formal institutions that they developed during the Golden Age tended to wither also. The Baltimore Exchange Company, that business group that paid for Latrobe’s magnificent Exchange Building in 1818-1819 and formed the Baltimore Chamber of Commerce in 1820, disbanded the organization in 1831 and sold the exchange building to a consortium of private real estate investors. A general board of trade was organized in 1836, but disbanded in 1848. Another board of trade was incorporated in 1852 by a combination of old families from the Golden Age, men such as John C. Brune, William McKim, Jr., George Hoffman, and Edward Dallam, but new men who had gained their wealth in the 1830s and 1840s formed a majority of its charter members: Hugh Jenkins, Enoch Pratt, Gustav Lurman, Chauncy Brooks, and the Levering brothers. It achieved enough support to build its own headquarters building in 1859, but this structure, while attractive and well appointed, was quite modest next to the old Exchange Building. The board’s chief activity during the 1850s was lobbying congress to deepen the harbor channels.

As might be expected, it was the various sub-groups of merchants and traders who developed close organizational relationships. While each merchant competed vigorously with the rest, they also had common interests and so affiliated in more or less formal associations. A few took the step of incorporating. The largest and most influential was the Corn and Flour Exchange, which was incorporated in 1854. It looked after the interests of the ninety to one hundred men who carried on the city’s coastal and international trade in flour, grain, and corn. The city’s tobacco merchants, wine importers, and coffee merchants were smaller groups and probably needed no formal association, but when issues arose affecting their general interest, they could act together quite harmoniously.

Of equal stature to the international commodity merchants were those who sold goods to the now truly vast inland population in the South Atlantic states and the West. During the Golden Age the exporters of flour and grain also served as the chief importers and sellers of European manufactured goods; but that was no longer the case by 1850s. New York became the port of entry for the great majority of European manufactured goods and almost seventy per cent of all American made products were manufactured in
the northeastern cities. As a result, Baltimore merchants obtained most of the dry goods, hardware, and other manufactured items from New York importers or from manufacturers in Philadelphia, New York, and New England. These goods were resold to individuals and storekeepers out in the Baltimore hinterland-- a region that was by the 1850s four or five times larger than it had been in 1819. The steamboat and railroad gave rise to a whole new generation of large-scale forwarding merchants in Baltimore who sold dry goods, hardware, agricultural implements, and provisions to the thousands of shopkeepers located in Virginia, the Carolinas, the Gulf Coast, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois. The southern trade was very large, and firms like Daniel Miller & Co. or Strauss Brothers made this region their specialty; however, the western commerce was always much larger. It was in the western trade that men like the Garretts, Johns Hopkins, James Hodges, John Hurst, or Thomas Armstrong earned their first substantial fortunes when their goods were carried in wagons over the National Road. Later they became major shippers on the B&O and the Northern Central railroads and it was through this connection that they became interested in railroad management. Also, as large-scale dealers in credit, they naturally moved into banking. A good example of this was Enoch Pratt, a young man from Massachusetts who came to Baltimore in 1831 to sell New England hardware. When Baltimore iron manufacturers began to make these products, Pratt sold them also and as the iron makers moved from charcoal to coal (after the B&O Railroad reached the Cumberland coal fields in 1842) Pratt entered the wholesale coal business. By the 1850s his extensive credit arrangements drew him into banking and his continued importation of hardware from New England involved him in the management of the PW&B. This is the same path that his two associates, John Work Garrett and Johns Hopkins traveled during these same years.

**Banks**

The increasing amount of attention that merchants such as Pratt, Garrett, and Hopkins gave to finance and banking was a natural progression, but it may also have stemmed in part from the growing realization that Baltimore’s financial institutions were not keeping up with the growth of banks and investment firms in other American cities. Since the whole mercantile community, as well as many large manufacturers, was heavily dependent on credit and other financial services, Baltimore’s success as a trade center rested to some degree on the size and efficiency of its local banks and investment houses. Baltimore had been an important financial center during the Golden Age, and after it
recovered from the Panic of 1819 its banks and investment houses grew into major institutions. However, their collective growth was a good deal slower than New York, Philadelphia, Boston, or New Orleans.

Between 1819 and 1860 the number of commercial banks in Baltimore grew from ten to fourteen and their combined resources increased substantially. Baltimore’s private investment houses, which had hardly existed in 1819, also grew into large-scale providers of investment capital and financial services. The six most important were Alex Brown and Sons, Robert Gilmor and Son, Robert Garrett and Sons, Peabody and Riggs, McKim & Co., and the German-American firm of Oelrich and Lurman. Each of these private banking houses had connections with London or Liverpool investment houses that provided them with investment capital, letters of credit and international exchange services.

Among the incorporated commercial banks in Baltimore, the largest in the city by the 1850s was the Merchants Bank (chartered in 1834) with John Hopkins as its president and men such as John G. Brune, President of the Corn and Flour Exchange, on its board. Indeed, looking at the bank presidents and boards of directors, the largest bloc are commission merchants, individuals such as Hugh Jenkins, William Hoffman, Thomas Levering, George Appold, Thomas Kelso, Albert Schumacher, Thomas Whitridge, Robert Garrett, Chauncy Brooks, Joseph Cushing, Enoch Pratt, Samuel Wyman, and William McKim. Lawyers such as Robert Purviance, Jr. and the transplanted New Englander Archibald Stirling also appear regularly on the boards of directors as do manufacturers as George Bartlett, Charles Wethered, William Hooper, C. A. Gambrill, and H. R. Hazelhurst.

By 1860 Baltimore’s financial institutions were for the most part stable and well run, weathering the Panic of 1857 and the financial crisis of 1860-1861 much better than they had done during the Panic of 1819 and the numerous financial difficulties of the 1830s. Nevertheless, the four decades between 1819 and the coming of the Civil War were generally troubled times for the city’s commercial and private banks. A number of Baltimore banks failed during the era, the most spectacular failure coming in 1834 when the Bank of Maryland collapsed. When it became known that the bank had misappropriated over $2 million of its depositors’ money, an angry crowd attacked the houses of its chief officers. Reverdy Johnson’s home on Monument Square was gutted and his possessions burned in the square. When Mayor Jesse Hunt attempted to protect the bank officers’ houses, the mob stormed his dwelling and burned his furniture in the
street. Hunt resigned as mayor and frightened property holders finally called on eighty-three-year-old Sam Smith to lead a military force and restore order.

Nothing so dramatic or violent occurred in connection with the city’s private banks, but two of the most valuable ones, Alex Brown and Sons and Peabody and Riggs, actually left the city. Alex Brown and Sons, the city’s first private banking house, opened an office in New York in 1825, the year the Erie Canal opened. Operated by two of the four sons, this office gradually became the center of the family business operating under the name Brown Brothers. It worked closely with the Liverpool office, which had been opened by the third son and became known as Brown and Shipley. The fourth son, George, remained in Baltimore and after Alex Brown’s death in 1834 he took over the Baltimore office. When George Brown sold out his share of the business to his brothers in 1839 (for well over a million dollars), the Baltimore office had really become a small branch of the New York-Liverpool firm.

The loss of George Peabody was not a severe blow to the city because he had not achieved the stature in the financial world that he later achieved, but if he had stayed, the city’s financial community might have been substantially strengthened. Peabody was born in Massachusetts, but spent his early mercantile years in Baltimore. Like the Browns however, he realized during the 1820s that the city was not destined to be a major financial center and moved on to London where he founded a banking firm in partnership with Junius S. Morgan. It eventually became the London office of J. P. Morgan & Co.

After two decades of financial turbulence and losses, the city’s banking system gradually recovered. The private banks that remained in the city, while never matching the huge success that Brown Brothers or Peabody & Morgan achieved, grew steadily and, as can be seen in the activities of Robert Garrett and Sons, played a leading role in helping corporations like the B&O railroad achieve success in the 1850s. After the debacle with the Bank of Maryland in 1834, a group of Baltimore merchants established the Merchants Bank and vowed to set a higher standard of honesty and efficiency in its operations. A revision of the Maryland state banking laws in 1844, and undoubtedly a better-qualified and more honest generation of bank directors, allowed the city to come through the Panic of 1857 without a single bank failure. To some degree the new stability stemmed from more cautious investment policies on the part of the new directors. Some thought they were much too conservative. They made few speculative loans and dealt largely with a select circle of well-known and well-established borrowers. It is difficult to determine
whether this acted as a drag on the local economy, but with their relatively modest financial resources, it seems doubtful that more liberal lending policies would have increased the city’s growth very much. Compared to Philadelphia, Boston and especially New York, Baltimore banks just did not loom very large on the financial horizon. In 1858 the combined deposits in Baltimore’s fourteen banks totaled $9.1 million while New York City’s fifty-four banks held $108.9 million. There has been speculation that Baltimore actually possessed more wealth than its banking resources indicated. Some have alleged that its wealthy citizens, rather than putting their money in the local banks or buying stock in local enterprises such as the Northern Central Railroad, invested in ground rents, agricultural land, suburban estates, race horses, and the like. The charge may be true in some cases, but given the wide disparity between Baltimore’s whole commercial and manufacturing economy and those of Philadelphia, New York and Boston, the very modest stature of its banking resources was most likely due to the fact that the city’s merchants and manufacturers were simply not numerous or wealthy enough to create a large pool of investment capital on the scale of the big northern cities.

**Wholesale and Retail**

While banking and finance was undoubtedly a weak spot in Baltimore’s antebellum economy, one should not leap to the conclusion that the city was down-and-out by the 1850s. Like so much else, the size and importance of Baltimore’s economic activities, and its overall prosperity during the antebellum era are matters of perspective. Compared to mighty New York, the Baltimore of 1860 is a relatively small commercial center, but compared to the Baltimore of 1819, it had become a wealthy giant. The entire commercial sector, both foreign and domestic, grew to proportions that dwarfed the volume of commerce during the Golden Age. Its foreign trade rose from around 140,000 tons in the early 1820s to approximately 350,000 tons in the late 1850s. The city’s domestic trade loomed even larger. In 1853, for example, the city’s merchants handled 3,412,000 bushels of wheat, 3,996,000 bushels of corn, 780,000 bushels of oats and 160,000 bushels of rye, almost all landed by Chesapeake Bay sailing vessels. Sailboats also landed 83,000,000 board feet of lumber. The 29,000 hogsheads of Maryland tobacco that came to the city arrived mostly on bay steamboats while 19,000 more hogsheads were delivered from Ohio and Kentucky by the B&O. Coastal vessels brought over 35,000 bales of cotton from Charleston, Savannah, Mobile and New Orleans. Railroads carried almost all 1,181,000 barrels of flour that came into the city along with 90,000 barrels of whiskey,
over 500,000 tons of coal and at least a dozen other commodities from farms, forests, mines and quarries. Livestock, which in the 1820s had been driven into town along the turnpikes, was now carried on the B&O and Northern Central. Nearly 36,000 head of cattle and 82,000 hogs were brought in during 1853. A small number were shipped elsewhere and nearly all the rest slaughtered by local butchers whose abattoirs and packinghouses could be found in almost every section of the city. Most of the slaughtering and processing facilities were small, but William Krebs’ huge three story packinghouse at Fayette and Caroline Streets (just south of today’s Johns Hopkins Hospital) operated on the scale of the great Cincinnati packing plants.92

The incoming commodities were disposed of in a variety of ways. The city’s flour merchants sold almost all of it abroad in South America, the West Indies and Europe. Over two thirds of the wheat, corn, oats, and rye never left the wharf area. About a third of the grain was transferred to larger craft and sold up and down the Atlantic coast, mostly in New England. A small amount went to Europe and the rest was sold to city millers, a number of whom operated steam-powered mills right on the wharves. The corn was more widely distributed. Almost 60 percent was shipped coastwise, much of it again to New England. Approximately 15 percent went to Baltimore distilleries, and the rest sold locally for feed or ground into cornmeal. The 48,000 hogsheads of tobacco were almost all shipped overseas to the German states, Holland, and France. About 10 percent was purchased by Baltimore tobacco manufacturers who rolled it into cigars or packaged it for chewing.

The volume of goods that Baltimore’s merchants sent out into the southern and western hinterlands was just as amazing as the foreign and coastal trade. During the 1820s local merchants had sent wagonloads of goods west that weighed between two or three tons and had a value of up to $3,000. Three decades later, they often sent consignments of 20-30 tons, loaded into several railroad boxcars that were worth $24,000 or more. The annual inland trade of Baltimore’s merchants in the mid-1850s was estimated at $70-$80 million. By comparison, the city’s foreign trade in the 1850s averaged between $16 and $20 million. The old warehouses of the Golden Age, often just converted residences, were by the 1850s replaced by four and five story buildings with handsome iron fronts capable of holding hundreds of tons of goods. John Wright’s warehouse adjacent to the Calvert Station, completed in 1853, could hold 60,000 barrels of merchandise or provisions. Whole blocks along Pratt, Baltimore, Hanover, German,
Howard, Eutaw, and Charles, especially those adjacent to the wharves and railroad stations, became solid phalanxes of tall warehouses.93

The steamboat and railroad not only facilitated the movement of goods out to the countryside, it allowed the country people to come into Baltimore to shop. The result was a tremendous growth in retail sales. Next to the warehouses, some of the largest and most attractive business buildings in the city of 1860 were the retail stores. Retailing itself became a big business by the 1850s and the major store owners were looked upon as gentlemen. An increasing number of the new retail stores presented themselves as grand emporiums of consumerism. Hamilton Easter’s five-story dry goods store on Baltimore Street between Light and Charles had a fifty-four foot frontage and offered customers over 54,000 square feet of floor space, eight or ten times the size of the typical retail shop of the 1820s. The American described Easter’s establishment in most poetic terms, crooning that “it rears its noble proportions and attracts the attention by its stately magnificence, the admiration of each passerby.” The building was topped by “a spacious and well-lighted dome, which adds greatly to its palatial grandeur, and sheds a flood of light throughout the entire store.”94

Not to be outdone, the clothing merchant Noah Webster’s new store, which he opened in 1859 on Baltimore Street one block east of Easter’s emporium, was also five stories high and had a gigantic statue of George Washington perched on the sill of the third story, a curious mixture of patriotism and advertising.

On the eve of the Civil War there were approximately 2,500 regular retail establishments selling goods or providing some service, especially food and drink. The city directory of 1858-1859 lists:95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grocers</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail dry goods dealers (56 wholesalers)</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco shops</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apothecaries</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal dealers</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewelry shops</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor and wine shops</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail provision dealers</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh produce sellers</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millinery and straw goods shops</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddle and harness shops</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sellers of paints and oils</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Candy and fruit shops | 51
Book sellers | 36
China and glass dealers | 23
Furniture dealers | 25
Daguerreotypists | 20

Not listed in the directory were the city’s 1,292 taverns, saloons and public houses, at least two or three of which could be found on almost every block in the central area. While Baltimore’s elite, and the country gentry, still did most of their shopping for clothes and other high quality items in New York, the middling classes and their rural counterparts found Baltimore’s retail stores quite satisfactory. For urban working classes and less prosperous rural folk, dozens of small shops and street vendors offered goods of varying quality at cut-rate prices. During the spring and the fall, and especially at Christmas, shoppers from the city and countryside crowded the downtown streets. They also thronged the eight public markets, buying at the stalls or from the farm wagons that lined the streets for blocks around.

Manufacturing

While the wholesale and retail trade continued to dominate the local economy, manufacturing grew increasingly important. This sector grew slowly between 1819 and 1840, but during the next twenty years it increased steadily and on the eve of the Civil War Baltimore ranked fifth among the nation’s manufacturing centers. The census of 1860 showed 1,320 manufacturing establishments in Baltimore City and surrounding Baltimore County employing 21,842 male and female workers and turning out just under $30 million worth of goods. The numbers would undoubtedly have been even higher if a census had been made in the mid-1850s since the effects of the panic of 1857 were still lingering in 1860. As a southern city, Baltimore had no peer in this area. No city below the Mason-Dixon Line even approached the variety or scale of Baltimore’s factories and shops.

On the other hand, there is reason to question the depth and breadth of Baltimore’s antebellum industrial revolution or, to put it another way, to wonder why a city of the size and wealth of Baltimore did not enter more fully into the industrial revolution. Part of the problem lies with our understanding of what the industrial revolution really was. If it was a change to be measured primarily by the numbers of people engaged in any type of manufacturing, then Baltimore stands quite clearly in the
top rank. The percentage of its population engaged in this sector compares quite well with all of the nation’s largest manufacturing cities. But if one conceives of the industrial revolution as a capital-intensive, machine-based transformation, Baltimore’s position is somewhat weaker than the cities of the Northeast. For example, 1,218 Marylanders, almost all of them Baltimoreans, were listed as machinists or mechanics in the 1860 census, while in Connecticut, a state with approximately the same total population as Maryland, 5,310 pursued these occupations. Further, with the exception of railroads, steamboats and its small textile industry, Baltimore’s major areas of manufacturing tended to be those requiring little in the way of expensive machinery and were based primarily on the use of cheap, low-skilled laborers using hand tools. The largest single manufacturing enterprise in Baltimore by the 1850s was the production of clothing and millinery goods. In 1860 it employed 36 percent of the city’s manufacturing labor force. The second largest employers were the oyster- and fruit-packing houses with 11 percent of the workers. Together, these two businesses accounted for almost half of the city’s manufacturing employees.

Oyster packing, while listed as a “manufacturing” business, was really on the fringe of this broad category. Among the twenty-five firms engaged in oyster and fruit packing by the 1850s, the five largest accounted for over three quarters of the production. They were led by the industry’s pioneer, Thomas Kensett, an English immigrant who had begun canning oysters in Baltimore in 1826. Canned oysters could be sent anywhere. Fresh oysters, packed in ice, became a large business in the 1850s when the railroads were able to rush them far into the interior. The Sun reported in 1858 that during the peak season, which ran from September to April, Baltimore packing houses shucked over 10,000 bushels of oysters a day, two thirds of which were then sent out by the B&O and Northern Central. The B&O carried them to Western Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and St. Louis while the Northern Central, via the Pennsylvania and its western connectors, delivered them to a vast region “from Pittsburgh to the Nebraska Territory.”

However extensive this trade, oyster packing was obviously not a very “industrial” enterprise. A few skilled workers tended the steaming machinery for the relatively few oysters that were to be canned, about a hundred handcraft tinsmiths made the cans and about twenty carpenters put together crates for the iced shipments. The other 90 percent of the employees shucked oysters by hand at long tables in the waterside packing sheds. While Kensett and the other large packers employed 700-800 shuckers during the peak season, the business remained a very labor-intensive, hand-tool trade.
Unlike the oyster packing business, the “ready-made clothing industry” as it was then called, came to rely much more on machines, much of the work was still done by hand even in 1860. Within this industry, men’s clothing was primary, employing 96 percent of the 2,169 males and 3,826 females who cut and sewed for their living. Of the roughly 120 clothing manufacturers in the city in the late 1850s, fifteen firms all located just west of the city center and each having several hundred workers, accounted for the vast majority of clothing produced in the city. The two largest employed 800 and 1,250 people respectively, making them the city’s largest manufacturing centers after the B&O’s Mount Clare Shops. A significant number of the owners were German-Jewish tailors and former clothing merchants whose businesses were becoming nationally famous. In 1860 the names Wiesenfeld, Hamburger, Stein, Greif, Rosenfeld, and Sonneborn were already well known and Baltimore-made clothing was sold throughout the South and West. Some of the large firms had direct retail outlets in Washington, Alexandria, Norfolk, Richmond, Petersburg, Winchester, Frederick, Hagerstown, York, and Harrisburg.

Sewing machines were important to the ready-made clothing industry, but they remained simple devices that unskilled women or girls could quickly learn to use. Like the oyster-shucking trade, it was a place where low-wage women and girls were welcomed by employers and at least grudgingly tolerated by the male workforce. As a result, these two businesses employed 90 percent of all female manufacturing jobs in the city.

The only other place where women and girls found large-scale manufacturing employment was in the suburban cotton mills. This industry, begun in the Baltimore area in 1808 during the Jeffersonian embargo, had gone through many difficult times with bankruptcies and fires taking a heavy toll of the mills. By the 1850s, however, over a dozen cotton mills, employing approximately 3,000 people, had found their niche in a market dominated by British and New England manufacturers. In the Jones Falls the Gambrill and Hooper families were turning out cotton duck for sails, tents, and other canvas goods. Along the Patapsco, other mills turned out a variety of specialty cloth. By the latter part of the decade the ex-New Englander James S. Gary and his son had taken over several mills and were building them into a major business. The hard times after 1857 temporarily reduced the mill workforce to 1,919 (over half of whom were women and girls), but the war restored their profitability and they remained a major factor in Baltimore’s industrial profile until the 1920s. While these mills were an integral part of Baltimore’s economy, their disbursed and somewhat remote locations along the Jones
Falls and deep in the Patapsco Valley, well beyond the edge of the city, gave them more of a village character.

Only when one turns to iron making, metalworking, and machinery does Baltimore’s industrial revolution become more readily apparent. By the 1840s and 1850s the distinctive sulfur-laden odor of the smoke rising up from dozens of chimneys, the whirring of over a hundred stationary steam engines, and the clanging of huge forge-hammers announced to all that the harbor area was surrounded by a phalanx of coal-fueled industrial enterprises. The fabrication of metal was not a new industry in Baltimore. The region had been a major iron producer since the mid-18th century, but as the supply of wood for charcoal faltered, the furnaces moved to Western Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

The business picked up again in the 1840s and 1850s as the iron industry began to switch from charcoal to coal (or coke) and the B&O, along with the Northern Central, started to deliver tons of coal and iron ore to the city. In 1853 twelve of Maryland’s thirty-one iron furnaces were again located in the Baltimore area and the 32,000 tons of iron they produced amounted to 45 percent of the state’s total production. With this basic capacity for producing iron plus the importation of pig iron from Pennsylvania and Great Britain, the city became host to a large number of forges, rolling mills foundries, boiler works, and machine shops. The other factors in the rise of this industry were the railroads and steamboat lines. The B&O and Northern Central were huge consumers of iron rails, bridge girders, locomotives, passenger and freight cars, railroad spikes, and countless other items. The thousand-man workforce of the Mount Clare Shops, plus the several hundred men building engines and cars for Ross Winans, made southwestern Baltimore an industrial scene par excellence, while down on the harbor steamboats and marine steam engines provided work for several hundred more foundry men and machinists. In 1848 a Sun reporter, visiting the Reeder Machine Shops and the Vulcan Works of Murray and Hazlehurst, both located at the foot of Federal Hill, surveyed “a scene of liveliness and activity rarely witnessed in any other part of the city. Crowds of workmen are everywhere seen busily engaged in the various departments of the mechanical arts.”

Over in Canton, just east of Fells Point, the Abbott Rolling Mills, adjacent to the Stickney Iron Furnace, turned out more iron plating. Horace Abbott, a New Englander like a number of the city’s other manufacturers, purchased the plant from Peter Cooper and by the 1850s had turned it into one of the largest rolling mills in the nation. Nearby stood a
large copper smelting plant, Wendell Bollman’s bridge works, and several other metals establishments.

A number of shops built steam engines or made component parts for them. Throughout the city and its suburbs, dozens of Baltimore’s factories, shops, and mills, even those whose primary source of power was still waterwheels, employed one or more steam engines in their work and hundreds more were sold to saw and grist mills in the South and West. Production by steam power appeared to carry with it a kind of prestige that made the producer seem modern and up-to-date and the product vaguely superior. Numerous local manufacturers used the word “steam” in their names—places such as the Baltimore Steam Cedar Ware and Moulding Manufactory on Pratt Street, Hugh Sisson’s Steam Marble Works on North Street and even Woods Steam Printing House on Baltimore Street.

During the peak years of the 1850s somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 men were engaged in some sort of trade involving the fabricating of iron or the making of machinery. Even in 1860, when the local iron and machinery sector was depressed, the census of manufacturing counted 3,347 in these trades. Even though this group included 126 blacksmiths who continued to ply their nearly medieval trade, it also listed 1,593 men making steam engines, locomotives and machinery. In addition, hundreds of other small factories and shops that used metal parts required complex machinery in their production process. The list included carriages, wagons, candles, illuminating oil, gas lamps, flutes, pianos, beer, whiskey, cigars, paints, brushes, jewelry, soap, washing machines, baby carriages, coffins, and gravestones. Nevertheless, broad as the city’s manufacturing base was, its overall size and variety needs to be kept in national perspective. Philadelphia, New York, and the cities and towns of New England produced an even wider range of items and a greater volume of them than the Chesapeake metropolis. In a number of manufacturing sectors they were well in advance of Baltimore. But considering the city’s relatively peripheral and even somewhat isolated position in a very rural and to some degree even backward state, it was a surprisingly strong competitor next to the industrial giants of the Northeast.98
Introduction to Chapter 4
Growth of City Services, 1820-1860
by Elizabeth M. Nix

Arnold argues convincingly in Chapter 4 that between 1820 and 1840 Baltimore’s municipal leaders were a frugal bunch: they allowed feral dogs and roaming hogs to sweep the streets for organic waste, had older students teach the younger ones in the fledgling city schools and even turned off the streetlights during every full moon. But Arnold shows that as the population of Baltimore doubled between 1830 and 1860, the civic leaders realized that they were going to have to pay for more centralized systems. Arnold traces the efforts of the city to save money by allowing for-profit businesses to deliver water and fight fires, but he shows that time and time again the government was forced to take over after private companies failed to deliver. Baltimore’s greatest accomplishments in municipal reform took place in the 1850s under Whig and American Party mayors. In 1850 a private firm had managed to get water piped in to only one quarter of Baltimore’s residences. After the city took over the water works, they connected more houses in the next seven years than the private firm had serviced in the previous fifty.

In this chapter readers also learn the origins of the term “Mobtown.” When private companies set up competitive fire companies all over the city, the firemen and their fanatical entourages would battle each other to determine who would fight a particular fire. In election season these same bands would convert to partisan mobs that violently prevented their political opponents from casting their ballots. Arnold shows that constant street violence abated only when the city replaced the independent fire companies with a single municipal fire department and started patrolling the streets with an authorized police force.

This period also ushered in the city’s first professional social workers, a more organized almshouse and orphan home, and the beginnings of a public school system. Arnold points out that although free African American citizens paid taxes, their children could not attend any of the Baltimore City public schools. In his book Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and the Limits of Liberalism, Howell Baum describes an interracial effort to change this injustice. After black petitioners failed in 1839 and 1844, black and white citizens in 1850 advocated to either create schools for non-white children or waive the tax for free blacks. Their petitions were rejected. Black churches started their own schools for their community’s children, and The Colored Sabbath School Union in Baltimore was established in 1859, uniting fifteen member schools.

Readers interested in the first steps that Baltimore took to become a ”Monumental City” during this period should consult Mary Ryan’s article ”Democracy Rising: The Monuments of Baltimore: 1809-1842,” where she focuses on the role the Battle Monument played in the
formation of a political identity for Baltimoreans. Amy S. Greenberg has done in-depth work on antebellum firefighters, including “Volunteer Fire Companies and Community Formation in Baltimore 1780-1859” in From Mobtown to Charm City: New Perspectives on Baltimore’s Past. Seth Rockman delves into the lives of the Baltimoreans who were digging the ditches for the waterworks, fighting over firehouse turf or entering the almshouse in Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery and Survival in Early Baltimore.
Chapter 4: Growth of City Services, 1820-1860

Between 1820 and 1860 Baltimore’s civic leaders modernized and dramatically expanded the urban services offered to its residents. A few services such as aid to the poor remained in private hands but were radically reformed, and by the mid-1850s operated much like city departments. Education, water supply, and fire protection were taken over by the city and the old police force was completely reformed. As a consequence, Baltimore’s local government was transformed from a small, poorly financed and relatively powerless body into one of the city’s largest, wealthiest, and most influential institutions. Most of this expansion occurred during the 1840s and 1850s. Prior to these decades, Baltimoreans allowed their municipality to sit on the sidelines while they relied on private individuals and small, private institutions to provide most urban services. This spotty and amateurish approach to the city’s services occasionally caused some grumbling, though never enough to provoke major reform. Gradually, however, public attitudes began to change. As the city grew, older sections became more densely populated even as fringe areas expanded across the old suburbs. A more diverse and turbulent population, including German and Irish immigrants, began to surge through the streets. Middle- and upper-income residents became frustrated and alarmed with these changes and responded by vesting their municipal government with the legal authority and tax revenues to address the problems arising from this new, larger, and more disorderly city. By 1860 the municipal government stood as a giant among the city’s institutions, collecting almost two million dollars in revenues and employing a small army of workers. Only the B&O Railroad had a larger payroll.

It is easy to understand why city leaders remained content with their Lilliputian local government during the 1820s and 1830s. Population growth had slowed from the breakneck rate of the Golden Age and foreign immigration remained quite low. Aside from a few essential responsibilities that could be managed by a handful of municipal officials, private institutions seemed adequate to meet the city’s needs. The municipality’s major accomplishments in the 1820s
were the creation of the Poppleton Street Plan, construction of the City Dock, and a dredging program for the ever-more-shallow Inner Harbor. During the 1830s the only significant innovation was the establishment of a small and much-criticized public school system that limped along with minuscule funding and few students. The city’s largest job in 1820, the prosaic task of repairing, cleaning, and lighting the city streets, still led the expenditure list in 1840. In spite of the comparatively large sums expended in this area, residents complained that many streets remained rutted, filthy and dark. The initial paving of streets was paid for by the abutting property owners with the municipality acting only in a supervisory capacity, but Baltimore’s hilly terrain (plus poor grading and a lack of storm sewers) caused the cobblestone pavements to wash out almost as soon as they were laid. The municipality bore the expense of street repairs and from the volume of complaints brought before the city council it appears that this service was usually tardy and inadequate. The proper grading of streets also caused endless debates, especially as new streets, opened on higher ground, sent rainwater rushing down into the older thoroughfares below them. Some streets and intersections became such raging torrents that the city was reduced to placing tall stepping stones on them so pedestrians (especially women in long skirts) would not have to wade across them.

Street cleaning was essential to keeping the city’s thoroughfares clear for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and it was also regarded as an important matter of public health, yet efficiency in this service remained elusive. Once again, the problem was money. Private scavengers competed eagerly for the lucrative privilege of removing manure from the streets since it could be sold to local farmers, but although they were also required to remove other types of refuse, it often sat for days, especially in the alleys and enclosed courts. The problem would have been worse except for the hundreds of hogs and dogs that roamed the streets, consuming tons of organic refuse. Unfortunately, this rather environmentally sensitive system for the removal of garbage and other types of waste had its own problems. The hogs, many of the weighing 200-300 pounds, could become angry and dangerous while the dogs chased after the horses, causing them to bolt. Efforts to get rid of the hogs brought cries that the city was oppressing their owners, usually poor people who relied on them for food or extra income. When the number of loose dogs reached the crisis stage, or an outbreak of rabies occurred, the city hired dog killers to dispatch the hapless creatures. Since the dog killers were paid for each dead dog they dragged in, a certain number of household pets were always stolen out of yards— a practice that naturally led to vigorous complaints. Accumulations of waste was severe in the older areas surrounding the harbor where the market men, hotel proprietors, innkeepers, and shopkeepers left piles of offal and refuse each day; but outer sections of the city areas also suffered. Slaughterhouses and manufacturing establishments dotted the suburban fringe and generated piles of waste while the city’s own private scavengers often dumped their unsalable refuse on vacant lots rather than carry it out to the more distant dump sites provided by the municipality. Every section suffered from overflowing privy vaults that could send streams of watery excrement flowing into back alleys and

120
eventually into the streets. Walking in the city during these decades required constant surveillance of the ground and a strong stomach. These problems continued to plague the city even in 1860, but by that time the construction, repaving, and cleaning of the city’s much larger system of streets and alleys was much more closely monitored by the municipal government, and their condition, while still quite poor by twentieth-century standards, had been greatly improved, especially in the downtown area and along the main thoroughfares and more prosperous residential streets. Needless to say, this effort required a much larger force of construction and repair crews, plus a small army of street cleaners.

Lighting the streets after dark presented its own problems during the 1820 and 1830s. Even though the city had pioneered the development of gaslights, its adoption of this new technology was cautious and slow. Under a contract with the Gas Light Company of Baltimore a number of the downtown streets were brightly illuminated, but the high cost of the lamps and the gas they consumed led the municipality to limit their use to these streets alone. By 1860 street lighting had turned from a luxury into a necessity for the downtown businessmen and a substantial portion of the residents. The entire downtown district and most of the main streets were finally lighted with gas. Many side streets, especially in newer sections of town where the gas company had not yet laid gas mains, still relied on oil lamps, but they were now relatively plentiful and well maintained by the city’s lamplighters. Only the poorest sections of town, and almost all the alleys, still lacked lighting. The only throwback to earlier, more frugal times was the city’s habit of turning the streetlights off when a bright full moon shown.

Most other urban services, whether delivered by the city or private institutions, were also quite modest in the 1820-1840 era. There were no daytime policemen and only a feeble force of night watchmen after dark. Fire protection rested with a group of private fire companies that varied considerably in their efficiency and whose rivalries often led to violent clashes. Most residents relied on wells or springs for their water supply while a small private water company delivered piped water to downtown businesses and a few residences. Education was conducted by a number of small private schools. The vast majority of children received no organized instruction. Aside from its support of the Alms House, the municipality spent nothing to aid the poor. It relied primarily an informal system of ward-based charity to keep the needy from starving or freezing during the winter. In those wards where the more prosperous residents supported a large and efficient charity operation, the ward’s poor families got by fairly well. In other wards where most of the prosperous families had removed to newer, more comfortable sections of the city, the poor spent much of the winter living in misery.

By 1860 the education of the city’s young people, water supply, support for the poor, fire protection, and policing all operated far more efficiently and on a scale undreamed of by those who had grown up in the city of the 1820s. Clearly, Baltimoreans underwent a fundamental change in their attitudes towards government and local taxation. This new attitude arose from a variety of sources, but two seem most important. First, there occurred a slow, steady “revolution
of rising expectations” as the city’s middle and upper classes became increasingly aware of the superior urban services provided by Boston, New York and many European cities. Baltimoreans returning from London, or Paris spoke of the wide boulevards, clean, well-lighted streets, handsome public buildings, beautiful parks, and above all city police forces that kept good order. A Sun editorial in 1859 said that “many of our readers are aware that any of our citizens who make the tour of Europe come back with the highest praise of the system of municipal government they observe in operation there... its complete sufficiency for the duties required of it.”

The second factor contributing to reform was the influx of immigrants and migrants from the countryside who flooded into Baltimore during the 1840s and 1850s. Compared to the increase of 40,000 during the 1820-1840 period, the addition of 110,000 residents during the next twenty years overwhelmed the ability of city departments and private institutions to keep the city safe, orderly, or efficient. Reluctantly, the propertied classes and their leaders were forced to admit that their small-scale system of urban services needed substantial expansion and reform if they were to deal successfully with the city’s new, needier, and more turbulent residents.

While the scale of services provided by the municipality changed dramatically during the antebellum era, its basic political structure, and its control by the propertied classes, underwent no significant alteration. The municipality continued to operate with a mayor and a two-branch city council. First Branch councilmen were elected annually while the mayor and Second Branch members served two-year terms. Three major changes were made in this structure: the institution of direct elections for the mayor and the Second Branch councilmen, the elimination of property qualifications for office holding, and an increase in the number of wards, a reform that required readjusting the number of the councilmen’s districts seats. Universal white male suffrage had been mandated in all state and local elections since 1808 and thus “popular” politics was well established in the city by the 1820s. This trend was augmented during the next decade by the institution of direct elections mayor and Second Branch councilmen. Nevertheless, local party caucuses, composed primarily of the propertied classes, significantly tempered the influence of the artisans, clerks, and laborers who formed an actual majority in all three of the city’s antebellum political parties. In spite of the obvious domination of the local political parties by the propertied classes, the rhetoric of all political leaders emphasized universal, white male suffrage and the common brotherhood of all party members. This lip service paid to Jacksonian egalitarianism received strong reinforcement by the seeming camaraderie of the ward-level political clubs that provided social events in which the prosperous local leaders mixed easily with artisans and mechanics. These picnics, excursions, and various entertainments, paid for largely by the parties’ leaders, brought as much political solidarity as political meetings and election rallies.

For Baltimoreans who enjoyed this small-scale, neighborhood-based political life of the 1820s, the growing size of the city and its electorate brought sadness and some degree of alarm. In 1820 each of the city’s twelve wards held approximately 1,000 voters and each elected three city
councilmen, two for the First Branch and one for the second. As the city grew it attempted to keep the size of the ward electorates relatively small by adding new wards. Two new wards were created in 1842 and six more in 1846. A forty-member First Branch was felt to be too large, so the number of councilmen was reduced to one from each ward. The Second Branch was cut to ten members, one from each of two contiguous wards. No new wards were created after 1846, but the number of adult white males continued to grow, so by 1860 each member of the First Branch represented approximately 2,300 voters and Second Branch members represented about 4,600, over four times the number they had represented in 1820. Looking back from the twenty-first century, this does not appear to be mass politics, but neither did it have the village-like atmosphere of 1820s or 1830s when a councilman could probably call by name almost every voter in his ward. Population growth and the steadily increasing rate of voter participation made citywide elections for mayor large-scale events. When the Jacksonian Democrat Jesse Hunt was elected mayor in 1834 (the first time Baltimore voters were able to cast a direct ballot for this office) 9,833 votes were cast. In 1860 three times that number voted when George William Brown, running as the Democratic-Reform candidate, defeated Samuel Hindes, the American Party’s choice. Between these two elections Baltimore’s total population had doubled while the active electorate nearly tripled. Whether electing a ward councilman, the mayor, or a delegate to the state legislature, money and organized support became essential and this fixed the grip of national political parties on municipal elections. Only they could provide the resources needed for electoral victory.

No national party, of course, developed an agenda for cities. They all formed around regional or national issues and expressed no views on street cleaning, urban schools, water supply, or police departments. In a place like Baltimore, this meant that Whigs, Democrats, and American Party members usually entered or left office for reasons having little to do with local affairs. Even though the Whig party, and certainly the American party (which included many ex-Whigs), favored more vigorous use of government authority at the municipal level, while the Democrats tended to remain suspicious of such a policy, all three parties moved towards greater empowerment of the municipality. It is self-evident that Baltimore’s greatest era of municipal reform came under the leadership of the Whig and American Party during the 1850s, but it is also clear that several Democratic mayors in the 1840s called for many of the same reforms and the lone Democratic mayor of the 1850s, John Hollins, was a strong advocate of police reform and presided over the city’s purchase of the private Baltimore Water Company. During the 1850s some Democrats grumbled about the American party’s large expenditures and the growing municipal debt. When they returned to power in 1860 no serious consideration was given to rescinding any of the great municipal reforms enacted during the previous decade.

Part of the reason for the parallel movement of the city’s political parties towards municipal reform is that while all of them drew from a broad spectrum of economic classes, each was firmly in the hands of the propertied classes, a group comprising roughly one-third of the electorate who owned almost 80 percent of the taxable property in the city. They comprised the
chief support for urban reform. They wanted their property protected from fire, theft and vandalism, reaped the greatest benefits from the public school system, had the leisure to enjoy public parks, and, most important, believed that the municipality was the best institution to provide these services and facilities. Even Baltimore’s Know-Nothing-style American Party, which rose to power during the mid-1850s on a wave of anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant feelings, did almost nothing in these areas, focusing instead on the water supply system, parks, police reform, and a number of other municipal reforms having nothing to do, at least directly, with religion or immigrants.

Part of the reason the propertied classes were willing to broaden the powers of the municipality and pay the local taxes necessary to support it, was the expectation that they would largely control that government. They were not disappointed. Those who served on the city council were almost all men of property and a number were gentlemen of wealth. Almost all the candidates for mayor were well-known merchants with a sprinkling of prosperous manufacturers, several lawyers, a builder, and a newspaper proprietor. Only three of the seventeen mayors who served during the 1820-1860 era could claim even a humble background, and all achieved some degree of wealth by the time they entered the city's highest office. Jacob Small, who served three terms during the 1820s, posed as an artisan, even though he had become a prosperous builder by the time he ran for office. Elijah Stansbury always claimed to be a bricklayer, but pursued this trade only in his youth. He was actually a supplier of building materials. Samuel Hinks, the first American Party mayor, came from a rural background of real poverty, yet by the time of his election he had become wealthy as a flour miller and grain merchant. The last two mayors of the era, Thomas Swann and George William Brown, were by far the richest men to hold office during the antebellum period and among the dozen or so wealthiest residents of the city.

Within the city council, especially the First Branch, the middling propertied class predominated. Most had arisen from modest backgrounds and some had grown up on the edge of poverty, but few were still artisans or workingmen by the time they gained electoral office. A great variety of occupations are to be found among these men. Roughly 400 individuals served on the city council between 1820 and 1860. Council members included merchants, retailers, innkeepers, builders, printers, physicians, lawyers, coal dealers, foundry owners, glass makers, shipyard proprietors, horse traders, clothing manufacturers, liquor dealers, and at least one theater manager (John T. Ford, who owned a large theater in Baltimore and opened the famous Ford’s Theater in Washington, D.C.). Through never a large contingent, a surprising number of councilmen were gentlemen of substantial wealth and distinguished backgrounds. The surprise is a double one. First, that in an age of supposed Jacksonian egalitarianism, voters would still elect such gentlemen to local office. Second that these men took the time and effort to serve in a time-consuming and thankless job. Nevertheless, such names as Moale, Purviance, Carroll, Shipley, Ridgely, Ellicott, Gittings, Howard, and Pinkney continue to appear on the lists of council members. It is obvious that between the gentleman, the small businessmen, and the professionals,
the city council remained a bastion of the propertied classes, and as this class gradually embraced urban reform, their representatives on the city council were always there to respond almost regardless which particular party they represented. In this regard, Baltimore remained in sync with all of the nation’s large cities, even though its more generally conservative nature usually placed it a step or two behind its northern rivals.

Before Baltimoreans could seriously consider expanding the role of their municipal government, they needed to get the Maryland General Assembly to equip it with more legal authority and allow it to obtain more revenue. During the 1820s and 1830s the ever-suspicious Maryland legislature continued to exert considerable authority over the city’s activities, requiring state approval for nearly all major innovations as well as many minor ones. Some influential Baltimoreans found this quite useful since it was sometimes easier to slip a special bill for the city through the state legislature than to risk more careful scrutiny from the mayor and city council. For example, the opening or closing of any street that deviated from the Poppleton Street Map required an act of the General Assembly. Intended to prevent a weak-willed city council from undoing the 1822 street plan, this requirement sometimes allowed influential land developers to side-step the mayor and city council by going to the legislature with a street alteration bill that the council had (usually for sound reasons) opposed. Eventually the legislature grew tired of this game and transferred most of this authority to the municipality, but it continued to retain a great deal of legal authority over the city, a power that it used very decisively in 1860 to strip Mayor Swann of his control of the city police force.

The more serious municipal problem during the early years of the era was its lack of revenue, and the root of this difficulty was the failure of the legislature to provide for regular reassessments of city property or adequate machinery for collecting city taxes. Without an adequate source of revenue, only the most modest level of public services could be delivered or even contemplated. The city’s taxable property, both real and personal, had almost always been under assessed, and then from 1822 until 1835 it was never reassessed at all. In addition, a third or more of the taxes levied in many years were not paid. Sometimes three or four years elapsed before property owners settled up with the city--often for a sum well below what they actually owed. The municipality found it almost impossible to deliver even the few services it was authorized to provide. In 1824 Mayor Edward Johnson lamented the “inability on the part of our citizens to meet the demands of our treasury upon them” that forced the city to practice “a system of rigid economy” in its delivery of services. Even projects vital to the basic commercial health of the city, such as keeping the wharves and harbor dredged, were sometimes curtailed by the lack of revenue. The city council had no choice but to raise the tax rate. Between 1818 and 1835 the rate climbed from $1.50 per hundred dollars of assessed value to $4.77. The state legislature finally resolved the problem in 1833 by providing for a new property assessment in Baltimore and a few years later passed another act allowing the municipality to compel property owners to pay their tax bills promptly. The city reassessed all its property in 1835 and in 1841, after several years of
sharp debate in the city council, empowering the City Collector to make property owners pay their taxes by the end of the year in which they were levied.

The property reassessment increased the city’s taxable base from $3.4 million to $42.9 million! This allowed the council reduce the tax rate to 66 cents in 1836 and still collect $155,000 compared to the $101,000 it had collected in 1835 at the $4.77 rate. From 1835 onward, the city regularly reassessed its property, and while the tax rate did creep back up to $1.00 by 1860, this amount was levied on a tax base of $138.5 million and produced a revenue of $2.8 million. A clearer way to look at the financial change that occurred in the city is to look at per capita revenues. In 1835 the city collected $5.55 in taxes for each resident, while in 1860 it collected $13.54. Never again did the city’s per capita revenue increase so rapidly.

The 1841 ordinance compelling taxpayers to settle up each year also improved the flow of revenues into the city treasury despite predictions that it would be almost impossible to enforce and would create a great hardship for poorer property owners (a cry that many of the not-so-poor eagerly took up). The 1841 ordinance was the work of Mayor Samuel Brady, a firm Jacksonian Democrat who might have been expected to side with the anti-tax forces. Fortunately for the municipality, Brady was a tough-minded merchant who had previously served as City Collector and was very familiar with the city’s revenue problems and the real scandal surrounding tax payments. As one of the first mayors to sense that the municipality would be required to play a much larger role in the city, Brady’s response to the critics of his allegedly heartless tax payment ordinance has a very modern ring.

“Some may suppose that it would be exceeding difficult to enforce such a law; that it would be very severe upon the poorer classes of taxpayers. I do not think so. I think it would be much better for them than the present mode. The taxes, all know, must be paid, and when once in the habit of paying every year, it will be much easier for them, than when they permit some two or three years to run together. Its tendency will be to prevent the taxes from increasing, as it will at once do away with the necessity of borrowing to pay interest on borrowed money. It will also prevent great injustice to those who are in the habit of paying their taxes promptly.”

Public Schools

Unfortunately, the city’s first venture into a major new service, a public school system, came in 1829, six years before the tax reform, and this undoubtedly contributed to the controversy over its establishment and the problems it experienced during its early years. Nevertheless, the creation of a small public school system became the seed of what grew by 1860 into the city’s largest and most expensive municipal department. Prior to 1829 the education of Baltimore’s young people rested with a wide variety of private educational institutions, plus a small army of private tutors. Children of the well-to-do received a reasonably good education in a
small number of expensive private academies, dame schools, and church schools. A number were taught by private tutors. Middle class families could also obtain a fairly good education for their sons and daughters if they were willing to pay the steep fees charged by the city’s reputable private schools, but if they sent them to less expensive schools, the quality of instruction became far more erratic. The majority of the city’s families could pay little or nothing for education and consequently their children could attend one of the free Sunday schools where religious proselytizing was often more in evidence than academic instruction, or (if they were willing to bear the stigma) they could attend one of the city’s non-denominational charity schools. The majority of children attended neither of these types of schools and learned what they could from relatives or friends.103

The first attempt to use tax monies for public schools came in 1813 when the state legislature began distributing small sums of money to counties willing to establish public schools, but Baltimore City (considered by the legislature to be a county for most administrative purposes) refused to participate. A number of city councilmen were nervous about undertaking a task that might soon entail additional support from the municipality, while others feared a conflict among the city’s religious denominations over the type of moral and religious training that almost everyone agreed should form part of the instruction. Others argued that the charity schools were more than adequate to meet the needs of those who could not pay for a private education. Many private schools and tutors, fearing competition from a public system, raised all sorts of objections. If there was a group that thought public, tax-supported schools should be introduced into the city, they remained silent. In 1825 the silence was broken. A citywide movement appeared, advocating the establishment of a tax-supported public school system.

It is not clear why this movement appeared in 1825, but it may have been part of the growing realization that Baltimore had fallen behind cities like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, not only in economic development, but also in education. Boston’s public school system, the oldest and best in the nation, had put all other cities to shame for some years, but during the early 1820s, Philadelphia and New York had also begun to upgrade their schools. Philadelphia’s public school system, launched in 1818, had by 1825 become a large institution enjoying wide public support. New York City’s leaders had established a group of privately financed charity schools for poor children in 1805, but began in 1824 to convert them into a publicly supported system for the children of all classes. While there is no direct evidence that New York’s shift from charity schools to a regular public system sparked the reform movement in Baltimore, the timing is remarkably coincidental.

New York’s action may have inspired the Baltimoreans, but it was Boston’s system that provided the most often discussed model. The focus on Boston may be attributable to the role that Baltimore’s New England-born merchants played in launching the school reform movement. In January of 1825 school reformers organized a series of local meetings to drum up public support. Among the movement’s most ardent leaders were the ex-New Englanders Edward
Hinkley, Henry Payson, Charles Appleton, William Penniman, and George Peabody. Baltimore’s school movement was not, of course, purely a New England affair. In fact, the majority of advocates were lifelong Marylanders or European immigrants who had come to the city in their youth. It was an impressive list and included such men as John Pendelton Kennedy, Robert Purviance, Archibald Stirling, Francis Davidge, Philamon Towson, Hugh McElderry, Charles F. Mayer, Jacob I. Cohen, Solomon Etting, Christopher Rayborg, John Hoffman, Alexander McKim, Isaac Tyson, and W. G. D. Worthington. A number of these men had involved themselves in a variety of city reform movements and so it is no surprise to see them campaigning for a public school system.104

The school movement also had the support of Sam Smith’s political machine. James H. McCulloh, Hugh McElderry and Philemon Towson, all of whom were closely associated with the Smith faction of the city’s Democratic Party, were undoubtedly devoted to the school movement as individuals, but they could not have missed the political aspect of the issue. The Smith machine, just then on the brink of joining the new Jacksonian Democratic Party, undoubtedly won popular support by advocating the right of a free education for all children in a public school system. They added that it would have the further advantage of bringing young people from a variety of economic and social backgrounds into close association, teaching them to respect one another and to learn to live under the same rules. This equalizing was tempered by the realization that some parents would object “to sending their children to schools where they may be injured by associating with the children of dissolute parents.” The difficulty could be resolved, they said, by charging a modest tuition or book fee that would bar “the children of the street mendicant and common pauper” who would be educated separately in the city’s charity schools.105

Ward meetings, sponsored by the school movement, stirred popular enthusiasm while a committee was formed to draft a school bill for the Maryland General Assembly. Unfortunately, the committee seems not to have kept in close touch with all their supporters, for the document they presented contained two unpopular provisions. First, it provided for the establishment of a completely separate and independent board of school commissioners, elected directly by the voters, over which the mayor and city council would have no control. Second, it authorized the school commissioners to raise revenue for the schools through a 1 percent income tax on all city residents having an annual income of $50 or more.

The first provision led to a public debate, but the tone remained polite. The only vehement objects seemed to come from the mayor and a number of the city councilmen. The provision was based on the Boston public school system, which operated with an independent board of commissioners, but the mayor and councilmen in Baltimore took it as an affront and even some of the councilmen who supported the school movement objected.

As can be imagined, the income tax provision stirred the greatest debate. This was a truly unique and, for the time, quite radical proposal. When the bill was placed before a general convention of school reformers in late January, a number of delegates vehemently attacked the tax
provision, arguing that the already established property tax system was quite sufficient and the necessity of determining everyone’s income, rather than their taxable property, would be politically unpopular and difficult to administer. In the end, the draft bill, including the income tax, received endorsement from the convention, but it was far from unanimous.

When the local newspapers published the bill, a storm of criticism arose against the tax provision. The American, a strong supporter of free public schools, did not actually withdraw its endorsement, but published a number of letters and articles hostile to the income tax. One resident recalled that the use of an income tax in England during the Napoleonic Wars constituted “one of the most odious and unpopular taxes ever raised” and added that while he was willing to pay a property tax, “Lord defend us from tax inquisitors in the first place who are to find out what each man’s income is every year, and from collectors who will call to receive it.” Another writer claimed darkly that the tax “would ruin three-fifths of our population in less than seven years,” and wondered whether some other motive was at work. “Can the friends of the proposed scheme have it in contemplation to equalize estates?” A few days later an article appeared purporting to be an interview with a gentleman who “has long been, and still is, an advocate for the establishment of schools at public expense,” but who stated that the income tax “is of a nature repugnant to the feelings of freemen” and would “be subject to much evasion and fraud, and must necessarily operate with inequity and injustice; and in many instances with oppression.”

In spite of the widespread public criticism, the school movement’s leaders submitted the bill to the General Assembly where it was quickly rejected. Supporters of the two controversial provisions were forced admit defeat. The school bill that went to the next session of the General Assembly, and which passed in January 1826, simply authorized the city council to create and manage a public school system, supporting it through the property tax. To ensure that the city council would go ahead and establish a school system, the bill stipulated that if, after five years, the city had taken no action, the state government would institute a school system in the city. The city council, obviously angry at being railroaded by the reformers, did not pass an enabling ordinance until 1828. It created a board of six school commissioners, a carefully selected group that included the prominent Catholic layman Fielding Lucas, several different brands of Protestants and former mayor Jacob Small (who was an Episcopalian). No municipal funds were authorized for the commissioners, so they were compelled to open their schools in the fall of 1829 with the $1,431 they received from the state school fund. Three rooms were rented (two for male students and one for females) three teachers hired and public announcements made that the Baltimore Public Schools were ready to receive young scholars. After three months 269 pupils (235 boys and 34 girls) had enrolled. With the schools in actual operation, the city council finally authorized a school tax of 12 ½ cents per $100. Baltimore was finally launched on the road to mass public education.
Enrollments in the public schools made only modest headway during its first eight years, and then declined alarmingly in 1837 and 1838. Beginning in 1839 they bounced back and for the first time exceeded 1,000 students. A decade later (in 1849) total enrollment stood at 6,763, a growth rate of 600 percent. While the number of students continued to grow for the next 130 years, no decade matched the expansion of the 1839-1849. What happened?

The relatively low enrollments during the first eight years were due in part to the small number of schools available to prospective students. Rather than establish small schools in each ward, the commissioners established four large and substantial school buildings that could hold several hundred students each. Looking a bit like miniature Greek temples with fine Doric porticos, the buildings were grand monuments to the commissioners' vision of a classical education, but many parents refused to let their children walk the long distances necessary to reach them.

The more serious problem, and the one that caused the 1837-1838 enrollment drop, was the controversy over the so-called monitor or Lancastrian system of instruction adopted by the commissioners. This system promised mass education at a very low cost through the use of older, more able students acting as monitors to help the younger pupils. In this way, argued Joseph Lancaster, the system’s chief promoter, a single paid teacher could instruct a vast number of students. It was for this reason that the first school buildings constructed by the commissioners were such relatively large structures. Objections to the system arose almost immediately, but it took the commissioners eight years to admit its failure. Parents of the student-monitors complained that their children spent too much time teaching and keeping order among the younger students rather than advancing their own studies. One principal reported that “I have had much difficulty with parents; many will not suffer their children to be monitors.”108 Forced to press into service whomever they could convince to be monitors, the teachers themselves complained most of all. The system worked fairly well for a few years when the total number of students was small, but as enrollments rose, so did the complaints. Eventually, the local papers attacked the quality of instruction in the schools, increasing numbers of parents withdrew their children in order to send them to the private schools, and enrollment fell off sharply. Faced with what amounted to a parental revolt, the commissioners announced in the summer of 1839 that beginning in September the student monitors would be replaced by paid teachers who would each have their own separate class. The next fall enrollment doubled.

The hiring of more full-time teachers and paid assistants proved costly; per-pupil expenditure increased by almost 50 percent. Even though the municipality now collected far larger tax revenues, the renewed popularity of the schools brought more students each year and required additional teachers. To add to the difficulties, the parents’ demand to have schools closer to their homes required the commissioners to establish more schools—eventually several in each ward. One result of rising education costs was the decision to hire female teachers in the male primary schools and grammar schools, which had previously been staffed by men. Since
extremely well-qualified women could be employed at salaries far below what it took to hire even marginally qualified men, the commissioners could congratulate themselves that they were cutting costs while improving the quality of instruction. Once agreed upon, the gender transformation became inexorable. In 1847 when women began to be hired to teach in the male primary and grammar schools, they composed 47 percent of the teaching staff. By 1860 the number reached eighty-two percent.

As more schools opened in the city’s various neighborhoods, they filled rapidly. This was especially true for the primary schools and all the female schools. Parents who had been reluctant to send their young children, especially their girls, to schools located in some other neighborhood were happy to enroll them if a school opened in their own ward. In 1832 only one out of five students was female, but by 1851 they became a majority in the school population. In 1860 the commissioners had established 41 male and 45 female schools that were spread through every section of the city. They enrolled 8,068 boys and 10,239 girls.

As the system expanded, the commissioners introduced several more types of schools. Several night schools opened in the 1840s and a “floating school” (on an old vessel in the harbor) opened in 1857 to train boys in marine trades. The most significant innovation was the creation of three high schools. Following the older examples of Boston and Philadelphia, the commissioners established the Baltimore Male High School in 1839. In 1844 they opened two female high schools, the first such public institutions in the nation. The two female high schools, one in the eastern section of town and another in the west, once again deferred to parents’ wishes that their daughters not be required to travel too far from their homes to obtain an education. The three schools quickly became very popular, but rigorous entrance examinations screened out all but the most capable students. In 1860 the 737 high school students (173 boys and 564 girls) amounted to just 5.3 percent of the total public school population. Children fortunate enough to be admitted to these schools obtained an education equal to many of the most expensive private schools.

The academic curriculum in the three schools was almost identical and remarkably comprehensive. Subjects studied included arithmetic, algebra, geometry, natural philosophy, physiology, botany, chemistry, astronomy, grammar, etymology, rhetoric, geography, ancient history, modern history, and Greco-Roman antiquities. Even though the school commissioners eventually abandoned classical architecture in their school buildings, the curriculum still harkened back to Greece and Rome. With an average of just 19 students in each class and a staff of well-qualified, highly paid male teachers, the boys’ high school offered an enviable educational opportunity for those lucky enough to get accepted. The two female high schools, which by the 1850s had three times the number of students, were not quite so fortunate, since their classes averaged thirty-seven students. While this number was far superior to the average of nearly fifty students per class in the primary and grammar schools, it seemed a clear case of a double standard compared to the male high school. This bias may be correct, but it is also possible that the smaller
classes in the male high school may have been maintained because the boys were more difficult to control. The unruliness of the high school boys, as well as those in the lower schools, was a serious problem in this era. Fights between teachers and disruptive students were not uncommon and one student of the 1840s (who later became the city’s chief of police) recalled that teachers were sometimes seriously cut and bruised when students threw books, slate boards, and ink wells at them. For example, corporal punishment, which had been a feature of the discipline at the male high school (and in all the male grammar and primary schools) was abolished in the high school 1848, and then quickly reinstituted the next year because as The Sun put it, “the boys have been used to it [and] find it a difficult matter to get along orderly without it.” The girls presented no serious discipline and therefore could be taught in much larger classes.

Aside from the larger size of the classes, the female high schools appeared to be serious academic institutions and produced young women who even at age eighteen or nineteen, were very well read and quite competent in math and science. A number were very accomplished writers. The one striking difference in atmosphere between the male and female high schools was the bold, confident attitudes of the young men in contrast to the more introspective, somber, even melancholy attitude exhibited by many of the female high school students. For example, the final academic exercises as the Western Female High School in 1850 featured the reading of a number of essays written by the senior students. The topics of the compositions were often rather dark and even grim, with titles such as: “The Convict’s Daughter,” “The Intemperate Family,” “Orphan’s Lament,” “Sadness,” “Visit to Greenmount Cemetery,” “Death,” “Disappointment,” “The Evening Star” and “A Voice From Herculaneum.” The reading of these dark or sepulchral subjects was relieved by brighter pieces such as: “An Omnibus Ride,” “Adventures of a Rose,” and Olivia Rodenmayer’s essay entitled “Cheerfulness.” The more uplifting essays were, perhaps on purpose, bunched at the end of the exercises. The somber attitude expressed in the girls’ essays undoubtedly manifested the more general gothic romanticism of the mid-nineteenth century; however there was probably some element of real sadness in the very ceremony for which the essays were composed. For most it marked the end of what was probably the most stimulating intellectual experience they would ever have, and the beginning of lives as wives, mothers or (for those who did not marry) careers as school teachers. In contrast, the male high school graduates, full of confidence and with the entire world before them, nearly all wrote essays on such topics as patriotism, great military leaders, decisive battles, chivalry, the progress of science, or the rewards of hard work. One would like to think that the hundreds of well-educated young women who graduated the city’s pioneering female high schools during these years were able to maintain their intellectual interests and be appreciated as educated individuals, but that is perhaps a lot to hope for.

While there is no doubt that the city’s three high schools were outstanding educational institutions and had begun to attract even some children from well-to-do families, the quality of the primary and grammar schools is harder to judge. With eighty-six schools, 302 teachers, 13,819
pupils and an annual budget of $165,000, there seems little doubt that the city’s public school system had a significant and positive impact on the city’s young people. From the 1840s onwards, every mayor, regardless of whether they were a Whig, Democrat or American Party Know Nothing, praised the schools in the most lavish manner. Once the school commissioners allowed Roman Catholic students to hear the school’s daily religious readings from the Catholic version of the Bible rather than the Protestants’ King James Bible, every important sector of the city’s population spoke positively about the school system and its good effect on the community.

Granting that the public schools did have a good general effect on the community at large, it is important to keep their success in perspective. While Baltimore’s per-pupil expenditure for public education exceeded that in every other southern city, it lagged behind almost every northern city. Also, its efforts, when measured against the truly mass education of the twentieth century, appear quite modest. Even in 1860 the vast majority of school-age children, (ages six to fourteen) still lacked even a primary school education. The city’s 5,000 school-age African Americans (even the children of those who owned property and paid the school tax) were barred from the public schools. Among the city’s white children, approximately 6,000 were by 1860 enrolled in private and church schools; yet even when they are added to nearly 14,000 public school students, the total still falls short of a majority. In 1860 approximately half of all white children either never enrolled in the public schools at all, or attended only sporadically for two or three years before dropping out permanently. On the other hand, about 45 percent of white children persisted far enough to gain a reasonably complete basic education. While this seems strikingly inadequate, it is essential to keep in mind that thirty-one years before, no public school system existed in the city and the percentage of children who obtained a basic education was probably close to one in ten. Thus in three decades, the city public schools had quadrupled the number of formally educated youngsters. In addition, several hundred of the most capable students (many of them from the middle classes or the skilled artisan class) were given a high school education of the quality that had previously been available only to the children of the elite. This stands as a significant municipal achievement and, from a social and economic perspective, it ranks as one of the city’s most revolutionary innovations.112

The Poor

In contrast to the major strides made in education, efforts to solve the problem of urban poverty while very inventive, forward-looking, and progressive, failed to gain the breadth of support received by the public schools. Those who took a serious interest in the poverty question were always few in numbers, but they had long been convinced that “the poor” could be divided into two groups. First, and by far the most numerous, were the working poor, families whose breadwinners ceased to earn an income through temporary unemployment, sickness, or injury. In 1858 the Baltimore Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor estimated that 5,000
families, consisting of about 19,000 individuals, fell into this category and required aid at some
time during the year. Normally hardworking and frugal, these families could never save enough
from their small earnings to deal with a cessation of income for more than a few weeks. After a
month or six weeks, most such families had fallen into deep poverty or actual destitution. The
great majority of charitable Baltimoreans believed that such families clearly deserved to be aided
by the local community in their own homes and not suffer the indignity, health dangers, (and
perhaps the greater expense), of being committed to the Baltimore Alms House. The Baltimore
City and County Alms House was never designed to take in the relatively large numbers of
temporarily poor working class families. It was a last resort for those who were absolutely
destitute and often homeless. As the city grew, especially in the 1840s and 1850s, the number of
unmistakably destitute individuals and families were admitted– often for weeks or months at a
time. The city took its financial and administrative responsibilities for the Alms House quite
seriously. The city council regularly increased the Alms House capital budget in order to upgrade
and enlarge the building, and the operating budget rose as additional staff were added to care for
(and supervise) the inmates. The gentlemen selected to oversee the operation of the Alms House
took were genuinely interested in the plight of the city’s poor. The large number of destitute
people wandering the city’s streets did so not because they had been denied admission to the
Alms House, but rather because they refused to go there.

Most residing at the Alms House came from the chronically poor who could not (or
would not) earn enough money to provide the most basic necessities for themselves or their
dependents even when employment was relatively plentiful. Quite a number were individual men
and women, but a substantial proportion consisted of widowed or abandoned women with
dependent children. They lived by begging, petty theft, and prostitution. When these avenues of
support failed, or an unusually cold spell hit the city (most often in January or February) they
applied for residence in the Alms House. While a much smaller group than the working poor,
probably not more than 4,000-5,000, they presented a far more complex and visible problem to
both the average citizen and city leaders. Almost all of them were, in modern parlance, multi-
problem individuals who suffered from a variety of physical and mental ailments and a sizable
portion were alcoholics. They wandered about the city, particularly the downtown area, where
they begged, talked to themselves, slept, or otherwise made those around them uncomfortable.
Even though the working poor and the more chronically poor together comprised only about 10
percent of the city’s population by the 1850s, a number of civic-minded residents thought they
deserved careful attention. A failure to provide for the temporarily impoverished working poor
sullied the city’s reputation as charitable community, and a failure to somehow dispose of the
chronically poor reflected on the city’s ability to deal with a group of people largely regarded as a
public nuisance.

The most progressive step taken to deal with the city’s two groups of poor people came in
1849 when a group of prominent city Protestants established the Baltimore Association for
Improving the Condition of the Poor (BAICP). A few Roman Catholics also joined, but the local church leaders advised against it, fearing that it might dispense more proselytizing than charity. It was unfortunate that the Catholic Church did not associate itself with the BAICP. The Baltimore institution was patterned closely after the New York City AICP, an organization formed in 1843, which remained strictly non-denominational in its approach to the poor. The BAICP sought to end the ancient, haphazard, and now (by 1849) discredited system of informal, ward-based charities, replacing them with a centralized, citywide organization. Its leaders did not seek any type of regular municipal support and if they had, it is likely the city council would have refused to spend tax monies in this manner. Aside from the charity offered through the Alms House, aid to the poor continued to be viewed as private or religious matter, best handled by private or religious institutions. The BAICP was organized by a number of prominent Protestant laymen in conjunction with a number of more secular, but still charitably minded individuals. The city’s Roman Catholics, who had developed their own charity organizations, did not join the BAICP and would certainly have demanded public funds if the Protestant-led organization received them.

In a few respects, the BAICP operated somewhat like the old ward-based charities. One group went door-to-door among the city’s more prosperous residents to collect funds while another group visited the homes of the working classes to determine if they were in need and exactly what sort of aid they should receive. The major innovations were its permanent, year-round existence, its centralized organization and its citywide scope. It could raise money all year long and carry funds over from one year to the next, allowing it to purchase wood, coal, other supplies for the poor during the summer when prices were lower. Its central office kept records for all the wards together, making it possible to shift funds and volunteers from one ward to another. The latter innovation was particularly important. The old ward-based charity system operated autonomously in each ward, going about their task under the assumption that each ward contained a significant number of prosperous contributors as well as a sizable number of poor families deserving aid. By 1849, this residential pattern had changed significantly. Even though one could find both rich and poor families in every one of the city’s twenty wards, some held very large numbers of middle and upper income families and had relatively few really poor households while other wards, usually the older ones near the harbor, housed a high percentage of the poor, but almost no affluent households remained to aid them. As a centralized, citywide organization, the BAICP could shift funds from the wealthier wards into the more needy ones. Also, its centralized record keeping made it easier to identify both the deserving poor who happened to move from one ward to another, or unscrupulous persons who, under the old system where every ward operated its own charity system, obtained double or triple portions of aid by applying in two or three different wards.

The most obvious flaw in the new system was its use of volunteers to visit the poor. The BAICP had little difficulty attracting individuals to solicit funds from middle and upper income
households, so it raised substantial amounts of money each year and were able to carry funds over from one year to another. By contrast, relatively few volunteers were willing to visit the poor to inquire into their exact needs and assess their worthiness to receive aid. There also seems to have been some confusion over how the visits were to be conducted and the criteria for making judgments about the amount of aid to be authorized. After three years the BAICP gave up trying to recruit and train a sufficient number volunteers to visit the poor, stating that the system of voluntary visitations, while “beautiful in theory,” was actually “defective in practice because of the great numbers, frequent changes, and want of uniformity, and its tendency to periodical and impulsive action.”

Under the new system, the BAICP divided the city into four districts and hired an agent, at an annual salary of $400 a year, to oversee the poor in each district. These four men (a shipwright, a carpenter, and two tailors) thus became Baltimore’s first professional social workers. Not only did they oversee the distribution of large-scale aid to the working poor during the winter months, a task that must have required at least some volunteer effort, the four men worked throughout the year with the chronically poor.

Since almost all these people lived on the edge of destitution through every season, they quickly came to rely on the BAICP for constant aid. By visiting such families on a regular schedule all year long, the agents attempted to instruct and strengthen them, allowing them escape destitution and move off the distribution roll of the association. Those who seemed unable to pull themselves up were often recommended for admission to the Alms House. It is not known what techniques the agents used to instruct and strengthen these families and individuals, but it is doubtful whether these efforts, spread among hundreds of highly mobile individuals and families, achieved a very high level of success; however, it proved to be so much more satisfactory than the old volunteer system that the BAICP made it a permanent part of their program. More significantly, the concept of using full-time paid agents to monitor, instruct, and encourage multi-problem households represented a major step forward in dealing with the chronically poor. While city missionaries to the poor and volunteers from various religious societies had been exhorting the chronically impoverished for many years, and undoubtedly achieved some practical success among those whose lives were dramatically changed through religious conversions, the BAICP agents, providing what appears to have been a non-sectarian series of practical instructions and moral encouragements to families on a regular basis, came close to operating like modern social workers.

The chief problem faced by the agents was the large number of people under their care. Even if they dealt with just half of the chronically poor in their respective districts, each would still have over 500 individuals or families under their management—far more than they could have monitored on a regular schedule. Also, since the agents represented a private charitable agency, they had no legal authority to intervene directly on behalf of wives, children, and other easily victimized poor people. They did bring cases to the attention of court officials, but these officers
were, for a variety of reasons, often reluctant to take action. The Alms House provided remarkably good care for the approximately 2,000 adult and child inmates, who were usually crowded into the semi-regularly repaired old building. There was often a large waiting list of those who had been given permission to enter, but for whom there was no space. Not until the late 1850s did mayor Swann and the American party begin construction of new, much larger Alms House. The rules of the Alms House required the separation of children from their mothers and fathers as well as the separation of husbands and wives. If there was a history of child and/or wife abuse in the family, this proved helpful, but in most cases it became yet another calamity for already over-stressed families. Due to the relatively large number of people brought into the Alms House with serious health problems, the death rate, especially among small children and the elderly, was always fairly high. Considering these drawbacks, it seems surprising that so many sought entrance to the institution, but it is probably some measure of how desperate their conditions were out on the streets or in unheated garrets and back sheds. Some new opportunities arose for abandoned or abused children when the Baltimore House of Refuge opened. This fine institution, established by Alex Brown, Jr. and several other wealthy Protestant philanthropists, opened in 1849, the same year the BAICP was founded. Unfortunately, it could not handle large numbers of children and became very selective in its admittances. For example, it only took girls under age eleven since the directors judged that females over this age proved too difficult to keep in the house and did not do very well after their release. Roman Catholics operated a similar institution, but it was even smaller. A variety of other private and religious institutions that took in poor widows, orphans, the sick, the incapacitated elderly, or inebriates (as alcoholics were then called), grew up during the antebellum era but they, too, were very small. Consequently, while the BAICP’s agents constituted a giant step forward, their small number, and the limited number of charitable institutions to which they could send their most impoverished and dysfunctional cases, reduced their effectiveness considerably. Not until the 1930s did the concept of paid social workers blossom into a full-scale municipal Department of Social Welfare, but its roots go back to the BAICP’s pioneering agents.

Water Works

Water supply was a very different issue from education or poverty. Almost everyone in the city recognized the importance of a clean and plentiful supply of water. Yet this vital service remained inadequate until the very last years of the era. The problem was twofold. First, the city decided to allow a private corporation, the Baltimore Water Company, to provide this service. The company always made a profit, but did so by laying pipes that served only the business center and a few other areas that could pay its relatively high water fees. When the municipality finally came to the conclusion that it would have to buy out the water company and build its own large-scale water system, the company’s directors wanted what many regarded as too high a price.
Negotiations with the company dragged on for years. Second, civil engineers and other individuals who claimed to be water supply experts did not agree what sort of expanded municipal system should be constructed and further delay came from mayors and city councilmen who quite honestly could not decide which water experts to believe. Their caution was understandable. The municipal water supply system turned out to be the single most expensive public works project that the city undertook during the antebellum era.

It should be stated that the city did have municipally owned wells (each surmounted by a hand pump) scattered throughout the city, their construction and maintenance supported by a “pump tax.” In 1820 the city had sunk approximately 290 wells and by the late 1840s the number had risen to nearly 400-- approximately one for every seventy households. There were also several municipally owned springs, of which the most copious and refreshing was the famous “City Spring” on North Calvert Street. The springs remained an important source of water, supplying over 200,000 gallons a day. The public wells were less satisfactory. Usually a quarter of them were out of service due to a broken pump or lack of water. In addition, the city had to close an increasing number of wells due to groundwater pollution.

City leaders had long recognized the inadequacy of the wells and springs, especially for fighting fires. In fact, the first proposal for a centralized system of piped water appeared in 1787, almost a decade before the establishment of the municipal government itself. Finally, in 1805 the city agreed to the establishment of the Baltimore Water Company, a private corporation capitalized at $250,000. The municipality authorized the company to lay pipes under the streets and charge subscribers for the use of its water. In return the city was allowed to insert fireplugs into the pipes for the use of the city’s private fire companies. The water company embarked on what appeared to be an extensive water supply system. It purchased a large tract of land along the Jones Falls two and a half miles north of the inner harbor in an area that was (in 1805) well beyond the northern edge of the city. Water from the falls was conducted to a small reservoir at Calvert and Center streets and then distributed to subscribers through wooden or cast iron pipes. During its early years, commercial or manufacturing establishments provided the majority of fees collected by the company, but a few home owners also began to have water piped directly into their dwellings.

The company expanded its service area, but progress remained very slow. By 1829 it had laid just thirteen miles of pipes, most of which were still wood, and it supplied water to only 2,164 customers (both commercial and domestic). The city at this time had nearly a hundred miles of streets, approximately 14,000 households and hundreds of businesses. Part of the problem could be traced to the company’s distribution reservoir, which held barely a two-day supply of water and had to be refilled so often that mud and other types of particles never settled out. Those who received water complained that it often could not be used for any domestic purpose. The City Water Commissioners, who oversaw the pumps and springs as well as the city’s relations with the
water company, became convinced that the company could not be counted upon to supply the city’s needs. In a stinging report to the city council in 1830, the Water Commission said:

Seeing then that the supply of water furnished by this company is so exceedingly deficient in quantity and in quality, can we be justified in chaining down our fellow citizens to a prolonged subsistence on this muddy substitute for the pure element, more especially when the great inadequacy of their works has been manifest to this company for upwards of twenty years, during all which time not one effort has been made by them to increase their power to supply more water? Is not this proof enough that supplying water was the pretext; but that profit was the real object of the association?¹¹⁴

The commissioners recommended that the city build its own separate water works, drawing its supply from Gwynn’s Falls rather than Jones Falls. The city council, however, did not want to undertake a whole new water works and entered negotiations to buy the Baltimore Water Company and its water rights on Jones Falls. This effort broke down when the company’s president, Columbus O’Donnell, set too high a price. In 1838 the company finally undertook an expansion of their water system, building a new distribution reservoir holding twelve million gallons (a nine-day supply) and extending pipes into several additional neighborhoods. In 1845-1846 it built a fifteen million gallon reservoir on the east side of Jones Falls to furnish the eastern portion of the city. Even with these efforts, the company still failed to keep up with urban growth. More pipes were laid, but not nearly enough. By 1850 only a quarter of the city’s dwellings enjoyed water service. A municipal effort to have the company increase the water pressure, enabling the fire companies to make better use of their hoses on the city’s taller buildings, was rejected by the company because it said many of its pipes (especially the wooden ones) would burst.

Everyone agreed that the Baltimore Water Company had repeatedly failed to meet its responsibilities to the public and should be purchased by the city, but arguments quickly arose over which water source should be used if the whole city was to be adequately supplied and enough additional capacity left over to supply future needs. Some thought that water should be drawn from the Patapsco River or the Gunpowder Falls. Others said these two more distant water sources would cost far too much, and believed the Baltimore Water Company’s sources on the Jones Falls, if augmented by dams and intakes further upstream, would be more feasible from an engineering perspective and considerably less expensive. As various groups of citizens and supposed water experts argued about the best way to build a fully adequate system, the municipal government made several further offers to purchase the Baltimore Company. Once again, no agreement could be reached on the price.

In 1852 mayor John Hollins appointed a commission, headed by Ross Winans and Joshua Vansant (an inventor/manufacturer and a long-time city politician) to resolve the water question.
The commission recommended that the city purchase the water company for approximately $1.3 million and undertake a major expansion of its works along the Jones Falls sufficient to supply all the needs of the existing city while providing enough extra capacity to allow for future urban growth. In October, the recommendation was placed before the electorate who approved it by a lopsided vote of 9,727 to 304. The next year the Maryland General Assembly authorized the city to issue $1,350,000 in bonds to purchase the Baltimore Water Company. The sale was finalized in October 1854, the company selling its waterworks on the Jones Falls, its two reservoirs and the fifty miles of pipes which supplied water to its roughly 8,000 subscribers. After more investigations and arguing, the new American Party’s recently elected mayor, Samuel Hinks, recommended that the city stay with Jones Falls as the supply source. There were a sufficient number of American party men in the council to gain approval. Between 1855 and 1862 the city spent an additional $3.5 million expanding the system. It dammed the Jones Falls seven miles north of the city, creating the Lake Roland Reservoir, the high service reservoir in Hampden, and the low service reservoir at Mount Royal plus many new miles of conduits and pipes. Seven years after the municipal takeover it had connected almost 11,000 additional businesses and/or dwellings to the water system, more than the old water company had accomplished in almost half a century. The city now supplied just over half of its buildings with water and was moving rapidly towards connecting nearly all the rest. Unfortunately, it became apparent that the Jones Falls could not be counted upon to meet future water needs, and after the Civil War the city turned to the more distant Gunpowder Falls for a larger supply. Even so, by 1865 the Municipal Water Department with its expanded supply sources on the Jones Falls was able to provide almost every dwelling and nearly every commercial or manufacturing structure in the city with piped water. It also allowed the city to place fire hydrants in every section of town. This great expansion, completed in just a single decade, was a singular achievement by the city’s Water Department.

Closely linked to water supply were the fire and police services. By the 1850s city leaders perceived all three as essential bulwarks protecting the city’s health and safety. However, the fire and police services were fundamentally different from the water supply. Controversies over water supply never involved the men who worked in the City Water Department. They focused instead on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of different engineering systems. In contrast, arguments over the fire and police services focused almost entirely on the men themselves and the differing perceptions of what constituted a good fireman or policeman. Partisan politics played almost no role in the water supply controversy, but the fire and police services were deeply entangled in city politics. Nevertheless, after a tortuous path of development, and several false starts, fire and police protection ended up in 1860 as efficient, disciplined, and (of course) expensive municipal services.
Fire Services

Next to cholera or yellow fever, nothing struck more terror in the minds of city dwellers than fire. In a city like Baltimore, composed of closely packed structures containing a great deal of wood, where heating, cooking, and manufacturing required the burning of wood or coal, fires were quite common. Once started, a small blaze could easily spread into a large conflagration, making dozens of families homeless and destroying property worth thousands of dollars. Baltimoreans established their first volunteer fire company in the 1760s, and by 1800 five such organizations were scattered across the still rather small city. Twenty years later, with a city containing more than twice the number of people and buildings, distributed across a much larger territory, the number of independent fire companies had grown to fourteen with a total of 300 to 400 active volunteer firemen. Loosely confederated since 1796, they affiliated somewhat more closely in 1834 under the name “Baltimore United Fire Department.” In 1858, when the municipal government finally replaced the companies with a paid department under the direct control of the mayor and city council, there were seventeen of them having a combined membership of 2,400 (a third of whom were active firemen). Aside from a few honorary members, the great majority of “inactives,” as they were called, were ex-firemen. The saga of these volunteer fire companies is a tangled tale of selfless heroism, political intrigue, and an astonishing level of violent, riotous behavior.

It is difficult for modern city residents, accustomed to the highly disciplined and efficient fire departments of the twentieth century, to understand the perplexing and multi-faceted nature of the old fire companies. The companies were first of all independent, private organizations over which the municipal government exerted almost no control. Each of the companies owned a fire hall and their equipment. They alone selected their members and, until 1849, were free to fight fires (and often other fire companies) in any part of the city. The disciplining or expulsion of individual firemen was entirely up to each company. The Standing Committee of the Baltimore United Fire Department, elected from the membership of the individual companies, occasionally conducted hearings into serious offenses committed by groups of firemen, (usually it was brawling with another company), but it was never able to exert any real control over the behavior of its member companies. Even though the city council city began to provide small sums of money for firefighting equipment, it never used this financial subsidy to influence the company’s policies or behavior of their members.

The companies’ apparent immunity to control rested on the fact that almost all of them were highly politicized and many members, particularly the older, retired firemen, were important leaders in the local Whig, Democratic, or American parties. Dozens of city council members can be found on the rolls of the fire companies and at least two mayors, Jesse Hunt and Elijah Sainsbury, were life-long fire company members.
What made the fire companies truly unique was the aggressive, masculine mystique that surrounded them and drew to them not only young men of a rough-and-ready athletic character who served as active firemen, but also a large coterie of intense, almost insanely loyal supporters—something akin to today’s sports fans. Most of these supporters were teenagers or men in their twenties and thirties from the local neighborhood who enjoyed hanging around the fire houses (many of which also served as large, well-appointed club houses containing athletic facilities and extensive libraries). They went on company-sponsored picnics and above all, they enjoyed running with the firemen as they pulled their pumping engines and other apparatus through the streets. Before professional sports teams began to produce strong, masculine heroes and win the intense adulation of “fans” (short for “fanatics”) the volunteer fire companies played this role. Celebrated in stories, poems, songs, and on the stages of theaters across the nation, the brave, brawny fireman assumed heroic stature. Whether risking his life to save a child from a burning building, or satisfying his sense of justice by thrashing some evil or dishonorable opponents, he was the nineteenth century’s version of John Wayne. In 1910, old men who had grown up in Baltimore during the 1840s and 1850s could easily name each one of the fire companies and no doubt remembered the names of their most heroic fire fighters and fearsome brawlers.

Unfortunately, the fireman’s pugilistic activities gradually began to outweigh their contributions to firefighting. Inter-company rivalry often turned into bitter hatred, and when two or more companies arrived at a fire, brawls became common. For some years, the newspapers and others blamed the young boys and men who ran with the companies as the ones who started fights with those who ran with rival companies, fights that often erupted into riots involving the firemen as well. As the healthy rivalry that naturally grew up between the various companies became increasingly violent, it became increasingly clear that it was the firemen themselves who were to blame. The socio-economic status of the city’s firemen did not change very much between 1820 and 1858. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of the volunteers held white-collar positions and the majority were artisans and other types of skilled laborers, but their relatively middle class status seemed not to have influenced their love of a good fight. By the 1830s many of them carried clubs, knives, and guns along with their firefighting equipment. A pitched battle between the Union and New Market fire companies in 1838 resulted in several dozen serious injuries and two deaths. Even with clear and repeated evidence of fighting and rioting among the firemen, public officials remained reluctant to take decisive action since both the Democrats and Whigs were each tied closely to a number of them. In 1844 Mayor James O. Law bravely tried to rein in the companies. He submitted an ordinance that banned minors from membership in fire companies or running with them to fires; withheld city funds from companies that did not give their president the authority to expel members for “acting in a manner unbecoming a fireman;” and held the companies liable for damages caused “in any altercation between two or more companies.” The suggested reforms were accompanied by soothing assurances of the mayor’s “friendly feelings” towards the firemen and the knowledge that “the great mass...are peaceably
disposed” and have been brought into disrepute “because of the actions of a few misguided and unruly individuals.” Another ordinance in 1849 divided the city into five fire districts and prohibited the companies from fighting fires outside their home district without the permission of the mayor.

Such palliatives did little to reduce the violence. More effective control came in 1849 when the city’s newly enlarged police force began to intervene in fire company riots and to arrest the most blatant rioters. However, as the police force itself became more politicized in the 1850s, it ceased trying to keep order among the fire companies. Violence and deaths once again reigned among the companies and the local press, embarrassed by the continual hoots of “mob town” from the newspapers in other cities, demanded that they be brought under direct municipal control.

It is evident that some of the fire companies such as the Mechanical and the Pioneer, were effective firefighting institutions, well organized, disciplined, thoroughly trained, and well equipped. The Mechanical Company’s meticulous records of fires and fire losses provided both the municipality and fire insurers with valuable data. Charles T. Holloway, chief of the Pioneer Hook and Ladder Company, became the Chief Engineer of the new City Fire Department in 1858 and achieved a national reputation in the firefighting profession. Sadly, a majority of the companies were more like the New Market or the Patapsco, both of which were filled with brave young men willing to risk their lives each time the alarm bell sounded, but not nearly so well trained or equipped. Their ability to beat up on other fire companies seemed to outdistance their firefighting capacities. Naturally, the more violent, disorderly companies claimed more public attention, but by the mid-1850s a majority of all the companies had become more or less regularly involved in fire riots. Local newspaper editors, reflecting public frustration with the firemen’s violence, called for the wholesale replacement of the companies with a paid city fire department such as many northern cities had already established.

The editors were joined by the city’s fire underwriters who had become concerned about the increasingly large fire losses their policyholders were sustaining. From the 1820s until the mid-1840s fires cost the insurance companies anywhere from a few hundred dollars up to $20,000 or $30,000 for a large commercial building and its contents. Thereafter, fire losses climbed steadily and by the 1850s reached $100,000-$300,000 for large commercial buildings, and many residences sustained losses of $2,000 to $4,000— a large increase over the residential losses of the 1820s or 1830s. The fire companies appeared to be losing their ability to protect the city. The major reason for the heavier fire losses was undoubtedly the increasing size and value of commercial buildings. It is doubtful that the companies had lost any of their bravery or zeal in fighting fires, but the inter-company rivalry undoubtedly made cooperation difficult, especially when fires in the new, larger commercial buildings required a number of fire companies to act in unison to bring the fire under control.
Even more significant, few of the companies kept up with improved technology of firefighting equipment. In the past the companies always tried to buy the latest models of hand-pumped water engines (several companies working together could run hoses almost a mile to fight fires on the outskirts of the city), but they were almost all strongly opposed to the introduction of steam pumps. The relatively light hand pumps could be pulled through the streets by the firemen themselves and required little more than strength and stamina to operate, whereas the huge steam pumps (weighing three or four tons) had to be drawn by horses, were complicated to operate, and required the level of maintenance that only a full-time, paid individual could provide. The costs exceeded what most companies could raise, would have necessitated a much larger municipal subsidy and required a number of full-time, paid employees. Many of the old volunteers saw full-time paid firemen and heavier public subsidies as the first major steps towards a full municipal takeover. Only a few of the largest and most well-organized companies purchased steam pumper, while the rest clung to their old hand-operated devices. The companies’ conservative stand on steam technology might not have been their undoing, but when combined with public disgust at their now legendary rioting, it finally tipped the scales towards a municipal takeover.

Following his reelection in the fall of 1858, Mayor Swann asked the city council to pass an ordinance disbanding the old volunteer companies, replacing them with a municipal fire department composed entirely of paid employees. The fire companies called a mass meeting to protest the action, but the public failed to respond. Even many Democrats, who hated Swann and the American Party for their violent tactics during the fall municipal election, and who realized that the new firemen would almost all be American Party supporters, were compelled to agree that most of the old companies were out of control and their general refusal to buy modern equipment meant that even reasonably disciplined companies could no longer be depended upon to protect the city from mounting fire losses.

After some initial waffling, the city council passed Swann’s ordinance replacing the volunteer fire companies with a single Municipal Fire Department having a staff of full-time, paid employees. Swann said he was willing to place any of the old volunteers on the rolls of the new department, so long as they followed the strict set of rules established by the new Board of Fire Commissioners. Few of the proud volunteers took advantage of the offer, but the sharp economic recession that threw hundreds of young men out of employment during the 1858-1861 era provided a large pool of very able men from which the Fire Commissioners could select. The total number of firemen was increased from the approximately 800 that the volunteer companies had been able to muster, to just over 1,000 men, many of whom possessed a wide variety of mechanical skills. There is no doubt that hundreds of American Party men received appointments to the new Fire Department, but under Charles Holloway, the former chief of the Pioneer Hook and Ladder company, the department distanced itself from direct political activity important, the brawling and rioting virtually disappeared. By the nature of their occupation, firemen were
young, athletic, brave, and quick to take offense, but altercations between the various firehouses were quickly suppressed and firemen showing too violent a temperament were dismissed. Some of the larger old firehouses, and quite a bit of their equipment, was purchased from the old companies, but the commissioners also built a number of new houses purchased substantial amount of new equipment, including, of course, a number of the latest model steam pumpers.

Obviously, the reform of 1858 became the great turning point in the history of Baltimore firefighting. It had taken some real political courage to stand up to the old fire companies, but Swann was no shrinking violet. It also took some fortitude to finance the reform. The city’s annual expenditures for the old companies had edged up towards $30,000 by the mid-1850s. In 1859, the first full year after municipalization, the cost jumped to $87,000. By 1862 its annual cost reached $121,400, but it had become widely known as one of the best fire departments in America. By 1862 both the fire department and the police force added telegraph systems so that fires could be reported almost immediately and a properly sized firefighting force could be sent out.

Swann acted graciously in his victory over the volunteers. In his 1859 annual message, delivered just as the new department was getting started, he never spoke directly about the fire companies’ long history of violence, alluding instead to the “moral reform” that the new Municipal Fire Department was destined to bring. In fact, he ended his address by paying tribute to the old volunteers, calling them “the gallant men who have since the foundation of our city ... at all hours of the day and night... given their time and risked their lives in protecting the property of our citizens.” There was, however, no question that the new Fire Department achieved remarkable progress in just a few years’ time. In 1862 the British Consul in Baltimore reported back to the Foreign Office in London that the new city firefighting force was extremely efficient and the fire telegraph system, along with the expansion of the city’s water system, allowed almost instant and successful responses to fires. As a result, he stated that the fire insurance companies had reduced their rates by 25 percent! Thus the city Fire Department, expensive as it was compared to the old private fire companies, saved the city’s businessmen and homeowners many times over by lowering their fire insurance rates. This was the sort of progress that almost all Baltimoreans appreciated and for which they were quite willing to pay higher municipal taxes.

Police Force

The reform of Baltimore’s two police forces proved even more difficult than the fire reform. By the late 1840s most Baltimoreans agreed that public violence and crime (usually theft) were serious threats, but reforming the police system became even more deeply enmeshed in politics than the elimination of fire companies. By the late 1840s, Baltimore was hardly unique in having a large number of thefts or high level of violence and public disorder. Of the two, violence and disorder were by far the most aggravating to city residents, and damaging to the city’s
reputation. There are no reliable statistics on thefts for the antebellum era, but most evidence points to its existence as a relatively small problem in the 1820s and 1830s that became more widespread and troublesome during the next two decades. The great majority of thefts appear to have involved relatively small items of low or moderate value stolen out of homes and back yards by servants and other relatively poor individuals. More serious thefts, often carried out by professional thieves, were shoplifting, pocket-picking, and occasional burglaries. Judging from newspaper accounts, robberies on the streets were rare. By the late 1840s and 1850s, with the influx of thousands of poor foreign immigrants and in-migrants from the countryside, theft gained considerably more attention in the press and probably did increase. The number of professional gangs burglarizing houses was said to have grown, more pickpockets were thought to be on the streets, and several new types of thefts appeared. For example, in 1858 the group of boys who hung around the city’s railroad stations offering to carry passengers’ luggage and then ran off with it, had become so large that the police banned all young men from the stations unless they were accompanied by a parent or other adult. Most unsettling was the growth of assault-style robberies on the streets. Since these crimes always found their way into the newspapers, (and after 1849 in the annual reports of the Police and Night Watchmen), the number climbed from just a handful each year during the 1840s to sixty-five in 1859.

The history of riots and dangerous public disorders is much clearer. These types of crimes included disturbing the peace, assault, rioting, attempted murder and murder, being much more newsworthy than theft, were reported much more often in the newspapers and can therefore be more easily traced. During the 1820s and 1830s they rose and fell a number of times, but beginning in the mid-1840s they move steadily upwards. During the 1850s they occurred even more often, involved larger numbers of people, and resulted in a greater number of serious injuries and deaths. Many of Baltimore’s riots of the 1850s involved 100 to 300 individuals with 1,000 or more spectators cheering from the sidelines. These events were the city’s major league contests. At the more amateur level were hundreds of smaller altercations with just two, four or a dozen men going after each other or violently resisting arrest by the day police or night watchmen. By the mid-1850s these events were unquestionably a daily part of the city’s street life.

Baltimore was not alone in this contagion of violence. Every large American city was, like Baltimore, beset with election-day battles, firemen’s brawls, ethnic and religious confrontations and all manner of disturbances that could easily have turned into major riots. In response, almost every large city in the nation established something like the London-style police force to suppress these riots and disturbances. In Baltimore’s case, the level of rioting, especially those connected with political rallies and elections, rose to a level that exceeded most other cities, while the movement towards a genuine reform of its police system remained hobbled by the unusually bitter and violent conflict between the Know Nothings’ American Party and the city’s regular Democrats.
From the origin of its municipal government in 1796 until 1857 Baltimore relied on various combinations of constables, policemen, night watchmen, bailiffs and reserve officers for its safety. Every few years the city council rearranged these groups of law enforcement offices, but none brought real improvement. The basic difficulty stemmed from the unwillingness of the municipal authorities to employ a sufficient number of officers, or pay them enough to maintain an efficient force. The other serious problem was the lack of coordination between the day and night forces. Throughout the era two policing units carried the burden of law enforcement, but there was no formal connection between them. During the day the City High Constable was the chief officer of the law, responsible for patrolling the whole city and enforcing all the criminal, health and sanitation laws. As the city grew, he was provided with a group of bailiffs (one in each ward) and each of these officers could, if necessary, call upon the aid of two assistants who were later upgraded to full bailiffs. In 1836 these bailiffs were formally organized into what was called a “city police,” under the authority of the City High Constable (the only full-time, fully paid employee). The bailiff’s title was changed to policeman.

After dark the city became the responsibility of the Baltimore Night Watch, a semi-volunteer organization that had existed in European cities since the Middle Ages. In Baltimore the night watchmen served not only as law officers, but also kept the street lamps lighted and called out the hours, a practice that some said just alerted evil-doers to their approach. True or not, the watchman’s call was fondly recalled long after they passed from the scene. Charles Crane remembered waking up in the night to hear a “brass lunged” watchman call out “Th-r-ee o’clock and a bright stary mor-r-ning!” While several hundred names appeared on the night watch rolls, the meager fee paid to them (a dollar per night) meant that relatively few men, often the elderly or those who could not find (or hold) a better job, patrolled the streets and keep the lamps glowing.

From the mid-1830s onward, a succession of grand juries and mayors, supported by almost all the local newspapers, called for the merger of the night watch and day police, more strict supervision of both groups, and adequate pay to attract better officers. They also attempted to bestir the city council to build a new city jail. This institution, constructed in 1805, was by the late 1830s, crammed with three times the number of inmates it was designed to hold. For the most part these calls for police reform and a larger jail fell on deaf ears. Not until the mayoralty of Thomas Swann were the police modernized and a large new jail built. Before his era, the citizenry did not think any additional expenditures were necessary. In 1840, a relatively small number of citizens declared that crime and disorder had increased substantially since “the old days,” but the Sun’s editor called such accusations “at least doubtful.” Anyone looking back at the local news sections of the Baltimore press, where the daily (and nightly) arrests were listed, might tend to agree. The vast majority of arrests fell into the “drunk and disorderly” category and the number of those taken in for really serious crimes was quite small. Likewise, aside from the growing incidence of fireman’s riots, the number of large-scale public disturbances also seemed to be
limited. The jail problem could only be solved by an expensive addition or an entirely new building, so it elicited no interest whatsoever. The city council agreed to hire a few more law officers and night watchmen and to pay them slightly more for their arduous duties, but no fundamental reform occurred.

By the early 1850s the city council increased the day police to sixty-seven full-time (paid) officers, and then it also substantially augmented the ranks of the night watchmen, but each group had its own supporters among the councilmen and remained separate forces. Despite the still relatively low wages they received, both forces contained a number of energetic and brave individuals. Nevertheless, neither force seems to have been very well organized, disciplined, or adequately led. When dealing with small groups of drunken, rowdy men and women, they seemed capable enough, but when large disturbances occurred, whether among the fire companies or between the city’s numerous political clubs, social organizations and youth gangs, the lack of a more military-style discipline became painfully evident.

**Political Violence**

The increasing number of policemen and watchmen was clearly dictated by the perceived rise in the number of crimes—especially those of a violent nature. It is of course nearly impossible to judge the effectiveness of these enlarged forces. Between 1849 and 1858 the total number of arrests for disturbing the peace, violent behavior, and theft increased from just over 1,000 to 7,394. Unfortunately the number of thefts and especially the public disorders and riots also grew, reaching a crescendo between 1856 and 1860. While the election day riots were certainly the largest and most deadly, spreading Baltimore’s reputation as “Mob Town,” throughout America and Europe, countless other types of violent clashes occurred. Riots between the old fire companies continued right up to their demise in 1858. Barroom brawls that regularly spilled out into the streets, occurred most often in places like Fells Point and other waterfront districts, but were recorded in almost every part of the city and its suburbs. One of the most universal plagues were the stone fights, often involving fifty or a hundred teenagers, which erupted in every ward and occasionally threw even Mount Vernon Place into an uproar. Dozens of dances and balls, attended by people who were generally quite similar in their backgrounds, often ended in wild melees where a dozen men and women, or sometimes as many as fifty, were arrested by a small army of policemen or watchmen. Many disturbances arose from the drunken and violent behavior of the city’s ruffians. In one celebrated case, called the Post Office Riot, a group of young thugs took over one of the city omnibuses, and drove it wildly through the downtown streets, finally stopping at the Central Post Office where they assaulted an elderly man who happened to be sitting on the post office steps.

Many of the larger riots involved the city’s social and/or political clubs whose status and behavior ranged between a regular social club and a large street gang. Some clubs were little more
than informal street-corner gangs, but larger, highly organized clubs had formal membership rolls, attractive clubhouses, and (usually) strong political connections. The organized clubs were usually led by men in their late twenties or thirties who were local political leaders, but many club members were younger.

The street corner and neighborhood clubs were composed almost entirely of teenagers or young men in their early twenties, but they could still be quite terrifying and sometimes deadly. The “Bloats” and “Sheepboys” of South Baltimore battled more or less constantly, mostly with stones and bricks, but occasionally one of the members got hold of a pistol and did more damage. In 1853 a fifteen-year-old “Bloat” by the name of Thomas Miller was shot and killed by a “Sheepboy” during one of their violent encounters. A short while later two East Baltimore teenage gangs, who ran with the Lafayette and Columbia Fire Companies, clashed and a thirteen-year-old Columbia “runner” was killed by a gunshot fired by one of the Lafayette runners. Mostly, however, the teenage clubs such as the “Cock Robins” and “Sandy Bottoms” of Spring Gardens or the “Richmondites” and “Hunters” who hung out near the Catholic Cathedral, were content to pummel each other with stones, bricks, bottles, and iron bolts.

The larger more formal clubs, with their older members’ political connections and formidable reputations for serious violence, were much more famous (or infamous). Those connected to the American Party during the 1850s were the Blood Tubs, Rough Skins (officially known as the Jackson American Club), the Regulators, Rip Raps, Wampanoags, Pug Uglies, Tigers, and Babes of Liberty. The largest of these clubs sponsored picnics, steamboat excursions, lecture series and other types of activities. The annual Rip Raps Ball was a major social event among the city’s skilled artisans and mechanics. Among their members were a number of individuals who became notable as street fighters, men like John Suter and J. R. Codet of the Rough Skins and John English of the Regulators. The clubs were often directly associated with the regular ward-level Democratic clubs, but in some neighborhoods they took on the added responsibilities of body guards. In the heavily Irish Eighth Ward in northeast Baltimore, the Empire Club and the Bloody Eights were important social clubs on their own, but they also provided physical protection for the Democratic Club’s political rallies, and its Democratic voters. When the local Know Nothing clubs became too intimidating on election days, the Empire Club and the Bloody Eights found the best policy to be full-scale attacks on the enemy’s headquarters. On the whole, the American Party clubs and Know Nothing organizations proved to be superior street fighters, but there were also famous brawlers among the Democrats, men like George Konig and George “Ready” Craig. Craig became a local hero after he was shot and almost died in an attack on the headquarters of the Rip Raps.

While violence of all types contributed to Baltimore’s reputation as a turbulent and riotous city, it was the Election Day riots of the 1854-1859 era that brought major national attention underscored its reputation as America’s “Mob Town.” Unfortunately, the municipal police, both the older, bifurcated force as well as Mayor Swann’s united and modernized force,
contributed to the Election Day violence during the latter half of the 1850s. Some degree of public disorder had always accompanied Baltimore’s election, stemming largely from the practice of having only one voting place in each ward where voters presented their respective party ballots—ballots that clearly indicated which party they supported. The crowds milling around the polling places, composed of both Whigs and Democrats, sometimes tried to intimidate voters carrying ballots for the opposition, causing the voter’s political comrades to come to his aid. Small fights broke out quite often, but were soon broken up by the police and very seldom turned into riots.

However, the collapse of the Whig Party and the dramatic rise of the Know Nothings’ American party in 1854 led to far more bitter electoral contests than the old Whig-Democratic rivalries. Both the American and Democratic parties turned to well-organized campaigns of violence, voter intimidation, and electoral fraud to defeat their hated opponent. The American party grew out of the anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic Know Nothing clubs that arose in Baltimore during the early 1850s. At almost the last minute the newly founded American Party put together a full ballot for the October 1854 municipal election. Its candidate for mayor, Samuel Hinks, defeated his Democratic opponent by a vote of 13,845 to 11,104. The Americans also won a majority in both branches of the city council. The surprising victory owed something to the physical prowess of the Know Nothing Clubs and their espousal of anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic views, but much of the American Party’s voting strength came from the large number of ex-Whigs. The ex-Whigs showed only a slight interest in the Know Nothing crusade for a Protestant, native-born America, but could not bring themselves to unite with their old enemies in the Democratic Party. The surprised Democrats vowed to win the city back from the bigoted and upstart American Party at the next municipal election in October 1856. A few weeks prior to the election the Americans convinced ex-B&O president Thomas Swann to run for mayor and put up a strong group of candidates for the city council. They also made certain that pro-American clubs, and the Know Nothing societies would be in the streets on Election Day, supposedly to protect American Party voters, but also to make sure that as few Democrats as possible would be able to reach the city’s twenty polling places to cast their party’s distinctively colored ballots. The Democrats also selected an ex-railroad president, Robert C. Wright of the Northern Central, to run for mayor and they mobilized their political clubs and gangs to challenge the Americans for control of the polling places. The result was an election stained by almost continuous fighting and rioting. Clubs, knives, pistols, and muskets were freely used and by the end of the day four men lay dead and over fifty had been seriously wounded. The police made half-hearted attempts to preserve order, but most stood on the sidelines or intervened on the side of the Americans. The official count gave Swann the victory by a vote of 13,892 to 12,338, but the widespread fraud and voter intimidation makes it impossible to know who would have won if a fair contest had been held.

It appears that the American Party’s clubs and gangs gained physical control of most polling places, but it is not known if this was the crucial factor. Nor is it certain that the partisan
activities of the police gave the Americans their majority. Certainly the comparative popularity of
the two candidates and the issues over which the two parties fought cannot be ignored. Swann
was still the heroic leader who had finally linked Baltimore with the Ohio River, and he promised
to bring the same active, progressive leadership to the municipality that had energized the B&O.
Robert Clinton Wright had been an able president of the Northern Central, but could not match
Swann’s success or the national publicity that accompanied the completion of the B&O to
Wheeling. Nor was Wright as outspoken or vigorous in his explanations of how he would
improve the city. On the broader issue of immigrants and Roman Catholics, many voters agreed
that much of the city’s violence, crime, and poverty could be traced to the thousands of Irishmen
and Germans who had flooded into Baltimore during the 1840s and 1850s and expected the
American Party to take some decisive actions to limit their entrance into the city and perhaps
restrict the activities of those already in residence. Swann and a number of the American Party
leaders proved disappointing in these areas. Swann believed that massive foreign immigration had
changed the city, but once in office he did almost nothing to support immigrant restrictions.

The alleged “Roman Catholic Menace” seems not to have interested Swann very much,
and most of Baltimore’s American Party leaders, who like Swann had been Whigs, believed that
the so-called ant-Catholicism was not much of an issue. The whole Catholic question did not
ignite as much fire in Baltimore as it did in other cities. Baltimoreans were long accustomed to
having Catholics among them and so it was hard to visualize them as a danger to republican
principles. Indeed, many Baltimoreans saw the city’s sizable middle- and upper-income Catholics,
many of whom had lived in the city for half a century or more, as respected civic leaders whose
generous contributions of time and money to civic, educational, and charitable projects as a real
asset, and certainly not a menace. It is true that Baltimore state delegate Thomas Kearney, aroused
some deep suspicions among the city’s more evangelical Protestants by seeking some degree of
state funding for religious schools, but the widespread opposition this bill stirred up did not
translate into any laws restricting or regulating the state’s Catholic churches.

Because it was impossible to sort out all the factors that might have given Swann and the
Americans their victory in 1856, the Democrats found it most useful to claim that fraud, voter
intimidation, and a politically prejudiced police force were responsible. Unfortunately, the
American Party leaders may also have concluded that violence and fraud were their best assets,
for there is little doubt that their victory in Baltimore in the presidential election the next month
stemmed in large measure from their vigorous use of these tactics. It is also clear that the police
actively aided the Americans on Election Day. As Election Day approached Governor Thomas
Ligon, a Democrat, attempted to raise several companies of the state militia to protect voters of
both parties, but the newly elected Swann assured him that they were not needed. After an
exchange of very terse letters, the state’s two chief executives reached a compromise. Ligon agreed
not to send the militia (something he probably could not have accomplished on such short notice)
and Swann agreed to appoint 200 temporary policemen, drawn equally from members of the two
parties, for Election Day duty. At the polls, the pro-Know Nothing police refused to cooperate with the temporary policemen and sided quite openly with the American Party. By the end of the day ten people lay dead, over 250 had been wounded, and Millard Fillmore, the American Party candidate, received 62 percent of the city vote--enough to carry the state of Maryland. The election proved beyond a doubt that city elections had to be strictly controlled and the police must be divorced from politics. Not only did the police fail to keep any order at the presidential election, but it also failed to break up non-political riots and disorders that seemed to escalate in 1857-1858. Bands of ruffians roamed the streets destroying property, seizing omnibuses, and attacking innocent residents.

Citizen complaints rose rapidly and Swann decided to initiate a sweeping reform of the whole police system. In January 1857 he drew up an ordinance merging the Day Police and Night Watch under the direction of a single Marshall of Police. The new force was composed of forty-two officers, five detectives, and 350 patrolmen. One third patrolled during the day (from 6:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M.) and two-thirds at night (from 8:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M.). During events such as political rallies and elections, almost the entire force could be deployed. The police were all armed with a large wooden “battoon” and could also carry pistols. The new Marshall of Police, W. B. Herring, was a man of real ability, having served as High Constable under the Whig mayor John H. T. Jerome and the Democratic mayor John Collins.

At first the new force made slow progress against the city’s gangs and ruffians. According to Herring, the chief difficulty was not the failure of the police to arrest violent offenders, but the unwillingness of local courts to convict them. Most of those arrested for violent crimes (usually rioting and brawling) were taken before the local magistrates who, as elected officials, proved very reluctant to hand down convictions against men who supported the party that had elected them, and lawyers proved adept in placing their clients before politically sympathetic magistrates. “We often arrested forty or fifty in one night, said Herring, “everyone of whom were released the next morning by the magistrates.” At the top of the city’s criminal court system sat Judge Henry Stump, a Democrat whom both The Sun and The American excoriated as a drunken embarrassment whose often bazaar behavior on the bench could not even be fully reported in the city’s two leading family newspapers. Worst of all, Stump seemed to almost admire the exploits of the city’s most notorious brawlers, Democrats and Know Nothings alike, letting them off with light sentences or simply freeing them. It is little wonder that Herring’s police grew tired of risking their lives arresting such individuals. One of the few ways to ensure that the most serious offenders would be convicted was to have the trial removed to some other court, usually the Baltimore County Court in Towsontown. This was done in the famous Benton-Rigdon case where three young Baltimoreans, having no clear political affiliations, murdered two city policemen in 1857. Officer Benton was killed trying to break up a public disturbance, and Officer Rigdon was shot through a window in his own home to prevent him from testifying at the trial of the murderers. Fortunately, the city’s prosecutor got the trial removed to Towsontown where the
three killers were found guilty. They were hanged in 1859. In the Post Office Riot case, the assault had been committed on Federal property so it went to the Federal District Court in Baltimore, which sent the offenders to prison for two years.

As the mayoral election of 1858 approached, the Democrats refused to run a slate of Democratic candidates, preferring to support an Independent ticket that might draw disenchanted American Party voters who had become disgusted with the party’s strong-arm tactics or its collapse as a national organization (Maryland was the only state in which Fillmore won a majority in 1856). The Independent candidate for mayor was Augustus Shutt, a well-known resident who had been High Constable for several years during the 1840s. It was also decided that if the American Party and the police began to employ their now standard tactics on Election Day, the Independents would immediately withdraw from the election. As predicted, the Americans and their Know Nothing clubs quickly out-muscled the Independents as well as the Democratic clubs seeking to protect them. Around noon, Shutt and the other Independent candidates withdrew from the contest, giving Swann 24,008 votes compared to 4,859 for Shutt. This travesty of a democratic election heaped abuse on Baltimore from almost all the nation’s major newspapers and convinced the city’s chief business and professional men that the whole political fiasco must be brought to an end. A group called the City Reform Association was established under the leadership of George William Brown, Jr., Severn Teackle Wallace, Frederick Brune, Jr., and a number of the city’s other leading citizens. Most had never played a direct role in local politics, but had become concerned that city’s violent reputation and disgraceful political system had begun to hurt its commercial businesses and drive local residents out of the city. It was said that business people from other cities and towns were afraid to enter Baltimore to do business. A Baltimore County resident living in suburban Catonsville said that “if the powers that should be are not more vigilant... the municipal leaders will find that all the city’s residents will have escaped to the suburbs.”

Since it had become clear to all that Swann’s unified and modernized police force still acted on behalf of the American Party and its Know Nothing allies, Swann decided to try more directly to get them out of local politics and take more vigorous action against all types of public disorders. The mayor went around to the station houses, personally urging the police to enforce the election laws fairly and to suppress all outbreaks of violence on the city streets. At the same time he defended himself and his police force in a long, somewhat rambling “Address to the People of Baltimore” in which he blamed the local press for doing “more injury to this city than ten times the catalogue of rowdyism which it professes to detail.” In the next sentence he blamed the papers for inciting the riots and bloodshed that had “brought discredit upon our good name.” As a result of Swann’s more direct, personal involvement in law enforcement, the police actually began to protect Reform Party rallies as well as those of the Americans. When voters went to the polls in October and November of 1859, the police made sure that public order prevailed.
Some violence still occurred and a few people were wounded, but overall the police did a creditable job of keeping the peace.

It would be uplifting to think that Swann’s crackdown on election violence came from a realization that his previous policy had disgraced the city and encouraged an atmosphere where public violence and disorder had seeped into almost every aspect of community life. One indication of the general alarm was the fact that large numbers of peaceful, respectable citizens began carrying pistols when they ventured out on the streets. The non-political violence and rioting had long angered Swann and he went to some lengths to suppress it. The mayor had the authority of a magistrate and began trying cases of public violence himself, handing out much stiffer sentences (regardless of political affiliation) than the neighborhood magistrates were in the habit of doing. When police officer Rigdon was killed, in the fall of 1857, Swann strapped on a large pistol and joined the police in their search for the murderer. Yet he still seemed to think that political violence was a somewhat different matter, growing naturally out of the American political system and the excitement it produced during elections. This type of violence and disorder was more difficult to control, and perhaps less proper to suppress. On the other hand, it is possible that when the Reform Party arose, he realized, in practical terms, that he had no choice but to protect it. Its leaders were too well known and distinguished to be roughed up by the Know Nothing clubs and he must have sensed that if he could not run fair elections, the Democrats would soon recapture a majority in the legislature and bring order to Baltimore themselves.

Regardless of his motivations, his decision to suppress violence and fraud in city elections brought an end to the American Party in both Baltimore and Maryland. In the October city council election the Reform Party won six council seats and in the statewide election the next month, the Democrats regained control of the General Assembly. The newly elected Democrats made it plain that they intended to hold hearings on the election process in Baltimore, end voting fraud, and replace Swann’s partisan police department with a state-controlled force.

In what turned out to be his last Mayor’s Message, Swann went over the long list of solid accomplishments that he and the American Party had achieved during its eight years in office. Among them were the establishment of the City’s Water Works, the new municipal Fire Department, a new City Jail (opened in January 1860) a vast expansion of the public schools, the modernization of the city’s tax and finance departments, significant improvements in the construction, repair and lighting of the streets, and (in cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers) a large harbor dredging program that not only deepened and lengthened the shipping channels, but allowed the filling and bulk-heading of extensive wetlands around the harbor, turning it from “swampland” into valuable commercial or industrial property. Swan then went over the plans for a marine hospital, a new and larger Alms House, a huge municipal park at Druid Hill, just north of the city line, (financed by a innovative tax on the new horsecar companies), a fourteen-mile boulevard, something on the order of Baltimore’s twentieth-century beltway, running around perimeter of the city. The final project was the construction of
magnificent new city hall where the mayor’s office, the council chambers, and all the city
departments, now scattered among several smaller buildings, could be placed under one large
roof. Not only would the building bring more efficiency to the municipal government, the mayor
said it would provide an impressive symbol of the government’s authority, unity, and dignity.
Even Swann’s opponents admitted the great importance of many of these projects.

Eventually, however, Swann was forced to discuss the city police and the related subject of
rioting and violence. Here his tone became defensive, finding fault with everyone except himself.
He was no doubt justified in pointing to the miserable failure of the city’s criminal courts, the lack
of a state law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, and the long tradition of electoral
violence and fraud that had operated in the city long before the American Party rose to power. He
also described the major police reforms he had made, uniting the day and night units, placing all
policemen under a single Marshall, and improving their efficiency through better training, higher
pay, and the installation of a fire and police telegraph systems. However, he made no apology for
the partisan behavior of his “reformed” police in the elections of 1856, 1857, and 1858, choosing
instead to mention their exemplary behavior in 1859. For those who blamed him for the pre-1859
election violence, he retorted that such critics simply failed to see that with Baltimore’s “mixed
and overgrown population,” no one could expect to have peaceful streets “especially on occasions
of excited municipal and state elections.”

Even as Swann was preparing the first drafts of his annual mayor’s message, the new
General Assembly moved quickly to rewrite the city’s election laws and take control of its police
department. An election reform bill, tightening electoral procedures, passed in early February and
a few days later a police bill passed that placed control of the police department in the hands four
commissioners named by the General Assembly. The American Party challenged the laws in
court, but failed to win its case. As a final slap at the city, the General Assembly removed Judge
Stump from the City Criminal Court, replacing him with Hugh Lennox Bond, an honest, tough-
minded young attorney just beginning his long and illustrious judicial career in the local and
federal courts (most of it as a Republican). The fact that Stump was a Democrat with a loyal
following of criminal lawyers and die-hard party members did not save him from the outraged
Democrats in Annapolis. In April 1860 when the Maryland Court of Appeals confirmed the
validity of the election and police laws, the four state-appointed police commissioners (all of
whom were Democrats) began recruiting what turned out to be an almost entirely new force
consisting of fifty officers and 350 patrolmen. The commissioners prevailed on Colonel George P.
Kane to replace Marshall Herring. Kane was a well-known Democrat, but his military experience
and reputation as a man willing to stand up to the city’s ruffians regardless of their political
affiliation made him a popular choice. All the other officers were also replaced, and among the
350 patrolmen, only eighteen held a position on the old force.

The commissioners drew up a new set of rules and regulations for the new policemen that
spelled out carefully their duties and behavior. In the arena of politics, no policeman could attend
a political rally, join a political club, or make contributions to any party or political organization. They could not even enter into conversations on politics “which may lead to recrimination and the use of harsh and intemperate language.” On May 7, 1860 the new police force, dressed in their military-style blue coats and grey pants, took formal control from Chief Herring and the force of now ex-policemen. As the new police headed for the station houses the old force marched behind Herring to the mayor’s office. When Swann came out they cheered him. The mayor told the men how deeply he regretted the action of the General Assembly that led to their dismissal and assured them that it was “their misfortune and not their fault.” Marshall Herring also spoke, thanking the men for their loyalty and devotion to duty. He counseled them to obey the laws and put this dark moment behind them.

Colonel Kane’s new force appears to have moved into their responsibilities without any missteps. Arrests increased and after just a few weeks the newspapers reported that the city seemed noticeably quieter. The accuracy of these reports is difficult to gauge, but there was a large and well-publicized effort to rid the city of known ruffians and troublemakers. The police drew up lists of these individuals and used the city’s loosely worded vagrancy law to arrest them. They were then given the choice of several weeks in jail or removing themselves from the city and its suburbs. Whether this policy really worked cannot be known, but by the time the first of the four presidential nominating conventions assembled in Baltimore on May 9 the city was remarkably quiet and orderly. Three more party conventions met in Baltimore over the next six weeks, and even though political feelings ran very high, public altercations were all quickly smothered by the now twice-reformed Baltimore police.

As the election for mayor and city councilmen approached in September 1860, the American Party sought frantically for a prominent individual to run against George William Brown, one of the city’s most distinguished leaders. Mayor Swann, clearly sensing that his party, already defunct as a national organization, would go down to defeat in Baltimore, declined the nomination for a third term. A number of other well-known party members did likewise. Eventually, the choice fell on Samuel Hindes, a deeply religious Presbyterian known chiefly as a leading figure in the movement to suppress Sabbath breaking.

While disappointing to the head of their ticket, the American Party campaign did not turn on the question of Sabbath breaking. The party leaders focused almost entirely on the national issues of slavery and secession. Although a number of Baltimore’s American Party members may have felt passionately about Sabbath breaking, many others did not. They were much more united on the great issue of the day– preserving the federal union. This had been the American’s major focus in their 1856 presidential platform and so the Baltimore Americans decided to keep the title “Union Party” on their municipal ballots.

The Reform Party eagerly nominated George William Brown for mayor and focused their campaign exclusively on municipal issues, a sharp critique of the American Party’s actions during its six years in office. Slavery, secession, and the future of the federal union were carefully ignored.
Chapter 4: Growth of City Services, 1820-1860

It was difficult to attack the American Party’s accomplishments in the areas of school expansion, water supply, the new fire department or the new jail, so Reformers hammered away at the mayor’s alleged blunders. The Democrats attacked the Americans (and Swann in particular) for creating the horsecar “park tax” and his supposed complicity in the sale of the city’s private horsecar company to “foreign capitalists” from Philadelphia. They claimed that Druid Hill Park was too expensive and too far away from the central city and that the plan for the new city hall was much too extravagant. Much criticism was leveled at Swann’s police for their partisan behavior, but their fine showing at the national party conventions and the 1859 elections, plus the fact that they were now under state control, weakened the impact of these criticisms. Much more effective were the arguments that the entire American Party program had placed an unprecedented tax burden on the city’s businesses and residents, especially in view of the depressed economic conditions resulting from the Panic of 1857 and the impending threat of national disunion. The Reformers promised residents “ample protection to persons and property, and the electoral franchise,” while remaining “rigid in the administration of the municipal government and the retrenchment of its expenditures to the lowest point consistent with honor, the plighted faith and prosperity of the city.”

On Election Day, October 10, 1860, Marshall Kane deployed nearly all his officers around the voting booths and no major disturbances broke out. The election was a landslide victory for the Reform Party. Brown defeated Hindes by a vote of 17,779 to 9,675, carrying all twenty wards by wide margins. Every council seat went to the Reformers. The dramatic saga of the American Party in Baltimore came to an end, but not before it had created a series of municipal institutions that ranked among the best in the nation. Thomas Swann emerged as Baltimore’s first modern mayor and one of the two or three best in its entire history. Unfortunately for Swann’s historical reputation, the Democrats have ruled the city for the great majority of decades since the 1850s, so this brilliant and resolute mayor has been remembered chiefly for his two great flaws: his almost inexplicable toleration of electoral fraud and violence at the polls and his party’s anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic prejudices. Also, although Swann himself seemed little interested in the supposed foreign immigrant menace or the even more dubious Catholic threat, he led a party with an unsavory reputation in both these cases. While these two sins need to be kept in the final balance, they have tended to dominate the scales of justice, ignoring the great reforms that Swann and his somewhat paranoid party brought to all Baltimoreans. The other two major periods of municipal reform in the city, the Progressive Era from 1895 to 1917, and William Donald Schaefer’s urban renaissance of the 1970s and 1980s, may equal those of the 1854-1860 era, but neither surpassed it. The vast changes forged by Swann and the American Party provided most of the foundation on which both of the later reform eras were built. Beyond this they established the tradition of “reform administrations” that revitalized the city twice in the twentieth century and possibly again in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Introduction to Chapter 5
A Diverse and Volatile City, 1820-1860
by Elizabeth M. Nix

The city that Arnold describes in Chapter 5 will look recognizable to modern Baltimoreans. Here he charts the movement of the elite out of the center city to the wealthy enclaves of the north and northwest. In moving to Mount Vernon and Franklin Square, those with means tried to place some distance between themselves and the new immigrants who flocked to Baltimore after The Panic. Population growth spurred new residential development and improvements in transportation, including a controversial decision to run a horsecar from the West Side to Canton, a conflict that sounds strikingly similar to discussions over the Red Line today.

Baltimore's two largest immigrant groups of the antebellum period were the Irish and the Germans. While other east coast cities saw violent anti-Catholic activities during these years, Baltimore was relatively calm in comparison. Arnold attributes the acceptance of non-Protestant immigrants to the long history of Catholic political leadership in the state and to the fact that the city's parallel Catholic and Protestant schools functioned smoothly for decades.

In the violence that did occur in the 1840s and 1850s,Arnold asserts that ethnic rivalries trumped class solidarity. He outlines the conflict between white immigrant workers and enslaved and free blacks that Frederick Douglass describes so well in his passages about working as a caulker in Fells Point. Arnold charts the social geography of all of these immigrant groups as they lived and worked among native white and black Baltimoreans. Wealthier city residents rented or bought three-story row houses around the corner from the more modest alley houses of their ethnic neighbors. Arnold's discussion of the continued popularity of the row house can be enriched by an examination of the fine work of Mary Ellen Hayward in this area: *The Baltimore Row House* (with Charles Belfoure), *The Architecture of Baltimore: An Illustrated History* (with Frank Shivers), and *Baltimore's Alley Houses: Homes for Working People Since the 1780s*.

Arnold admits to the difficulty he had in researching Irish Catholic immigrants who were generally poor and came to America because of the famine in their homeland. The Irish formed few ethnic institutions outside their churches and left no publications of their own. Historians must rely on the biased descriptions in which Anglo newspapers decry Irish alcoholism and overall rowdiness. In contrast, German immigrants were more economically successful before they arrived and worked in skilled jobs. They enthusiastically formed institutions to promote their German culture and left reams of German-language newspapers, pamphlets and books. Arnold argues that the Germans, who were largely Lutheran, fit in well with the majority Anglo Protestant establishment, even as they maintained ties to their homeland through their own schools and language. Arnold asserts that even German Jews of this period aligned themselves
with Germans instead of the Jewish community. Readers will want to consult new research by Eric Goldstein, who won the 2012 Joseph L. Arnold Award for Outstanding Writing on Baltimore History for his paper "How German Were ‘German’ Jews in America in the Nineteenth Century? A View from Baltimore."

In this chapter Arnold pays special attention to the self-help efforts of the black community, a mixture of enslaved and free people, most of whom held low-wage jobs. He shows that due to growing racism and increasing competition for jobs, many rural blacks by-passed Baltimore to try their luck in other towns. The African American population of Baltimore actually declined in these years when white immigrant populations were multiplying. Christopher Phillips enlarges upon the experiences of the antebellum black community in Baltimore in _Freedom's Port_.

For a political take on this period, readers might want to look at the work of Frank Towers, including his dissertation, "Ruffians on the Urban Border: Labor, Politics and Race in Baltimore, 1850-1861," his chapter in _From Mobtown to Charm City_ entitled "Secession in an Urban Context: Municipal reform and the Coming of the Civil War in Baltimore," and his 2004 book _The Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War_.
Chapter 5
A Diverse and Volatile City, 1820-1860

On the eve of the Civil War Baltimore’s 212,000 residents were a volatile mixture of rich and poor, immigrant and native born, Protestant and Catholic, black and white. The city itself had become a much larger and more complex group of urban environments. Merchants, manufacturers, and homebuilders had transformed the compact, waterfront town of 1819 into a big city that spread out in every direction across the suburban estates and farmlands of an earlier era. In response to the physical growth of the city, and the increasing turbulence among its residents, local leaders transformed Baltimore’s municipal government from a small, relatively weak institution into a powerful public authority expending millions of dollars and employing hundreds of public servants.

At first glance the city’s demographic profile did not appear very different in 1860 from the way it looked forty years earlier. The population was still divided between the rich, the middle classes, the working classes, and the poor. The major ethnic groups were still the Anglo Americans, Germans, Irish, and African Americans. However, the proportionate size of these groups changed considerably and that led to a high level of social tension and political conflict. In economic terms, the working classes and the poor loomed larger among the city’s total body of wage earners and proprietors. The city’s commercial and industrial revolution created a great deal of new wealth, but it did not get distributed very widely among the thousands of foreign immigrants and rural people who flooded into the city and took jobs as unskilled workers. The development of a large group of low paid, often unemployed workers did not lead to bitter class conflict in Baltimore, but it hardly contributed to social or political tranquility. More striking than the growth of an urban proletariat was the rise of the “foreign element” during the 1840s and 1850s. The census of 1860 showed that approximately 52,000 people, nearly one-third of Baltimore’s white residents, were foreign born. Of these immigrants 32,000 came from the German states, 16,000 from Ireland, and 3,000 from England and Scotland. Never again in its
history did the city have such a high percentage of foreign-born residents. When the immigrants are combined with their American-born children, the city’s “foreign element” amounted to forty percent of the white population. Another 14,000 people came to Baltimore from other states in the U. S., chiefly from Pennsylvania, New York, New England, and Virginia. The Virginians blended in quickly, but many of the Northern in-migrants, being generally well educated, economically aggressive, and often critical of Southern habits and institutions, were as disturbing a factor in their own way as the Germans and Irish. Finally, the city also had 27,898 African Americans residents, nearly all of whom were free. Thus by 1860 the “foreign element,” when combined with the African Americans, comprised a majority of the city’s population.

Of all the “foreign” groups in the city, the Irish Catholics caused the greatest alarm among native-born Americans—especially those connected with the evangelical Protestant churches. By the 1850s Irish immigrants and their American-born children comprised a majority of Baltimore’s roughly 40,000 Roman Catholics, and their poverty, their problems with alcohol, and their often violent behavior made them a multi-problem people. The Irish influx contributed heavily to the rise of the Know Nothing movement in the city and by the late 1850s many of the violent brawls between the Democratic and American (Know Nothing) parties were at least partly Irish-native clashes. On the other hand, direct religious conflict never reached the levels it attained in the cities of the Northeast. Part of the reason may be the existence of Baltimore’s old-line Catholic elite who worked with the more enlightened and cosmopolitan sectors of the city’s Protestant community. Certainly the municipal authorities, the great majority of whom were Protestants, did very well in protecting Catholic institutions from mobs and quieting the hysteria that sometimes developed when rumors spread about Catholic conspiracies to overthrow democracy, enslave Protestant children, or bring the Papacy to Baltimore. Also, the city’s two leading newspapers, The American and the Sun, continually presented the local Catholic community in a very positive light and vigorously condemned all manifestations of anti-Catholicism. Such a policy tended to focus attention on the Irish immigrants as a poverty-stricken people in need of aid rather than an ideological threat to the nation.

Baltimore’s German immigrants, twice as large a group as the Irish contingent, should have aroused more anxiety, but they did not. There was a good deal of grumbling about the massive numbers of Germans coming into the city, and some alarm that they seemed to be creating a Germanic city-within-a-city, but these criticisms were blunted by the fact that the majority of them were upright, hard working Protestants (less than a fifth were Roman Catholics). There was, of course, a group of unskilled, uneducated and violent German immigrants, but they were greatly outnumbered by those possessing important skills and an excellent education. Also, the large group of German Americans already residing in the city acted as a host population, taking care of poorer and more troublesome immigrants and providing bridges into the city’s mainstream. Nevertheless, it must have been galling to many native-born workers to watch so many skilled and educated German immigrants thrive in the city’s job market. In addition, a
sharp conflict developed in the 1850s when the mostly Anglo-American temperance groups began to campaign vigorously against the consumption of alcohol and many Germans (who loved beer and Sunday afternoon picnics) ignored them or made fun of their crusade.

The city’s 28,000 African Americans were in many ways the most marginalized of the three “alien” groups, even though they were all native-born and nearly all enthusiastic Protestants. The most striking aspect of the community was the fact that nearly all were free; just 2,200 remained enslaved. This ratio contrasted sharply with rural Maryland where only four out of ten were free. Unfortunately, this was about the only bright spot in an otherwise dim picture of life for Baltimore’s black residents. The weak hold that they held on some of the city’s better-paying jobs during the 1820s and 1830s was largely wiped out by the immigrant influx during the next two decades. John H.B. Latrobe noted in 1851 that in earlier years the ships at Fells Point were all loaded by free African American stevedores and the coal yards also used black workers, but all that had changed. As the immigrants arrived, “they enter into competition with the black man in all avenues of labor--in most of them they drive him to the wall.”129 The impact was devastating. The in-migration of free African Americans from the Maryland countryside dwindled and then almost stopped. While every other group in the city increased by several thousand during the 1850s, the total number of African Americans actually fell by almost 500. In spite of the enormous economic disadvantages under which they sought to earn a living, a small group held on to good jobs or made a success of small individual proprietorships that enabled them to live the semblance of a middle class life. They continued to build new churches and expand established ones. They founded social clubs, fraternal orders, and mutual benefit societies. The public schools did not admit black students (even the children of those paying the municipal school tax), so African Americans established private and church-related schools to provide education. The plight of the small black middle class was particularly poignant. Completely cut off from participation in white middle class society, they were also relatively isolated within their own community. Thus while the great yoke of slavery was almost completely lifted from the city’s African Americans, the vast majority remained chained to the bottom rungs of the economic ladder and watched in frustration as thousands of foreign immigrants climbed over and above them.

Housing

The influx of a large number of immigrants and white people from the countryside, caused a major reshuffling of neighborhoods within the old city and an overall expansion that more than doubled the extent of the built-up area from just over two square miles in 1819 to five square miles in 1860. During the 1850s the older part of the city, stretching around the harbor from Fells Point to Federal Hill, lost almost 5,000 residents while the outer wards gained about 50,000. The annual rate of construction, which had averaged only 400-500 houses per year in the 1820s and 1830s rose to approximately 1,500 per year in the 1840s and 2,000 in several years
during the 1850s. In 1860 federal census enumerators counted 34,160 dwellings within the city, inhabited by 41,115 households.

The row house remained the overwhelming favorite among all classes of residents. The size and quality of these dwellings varied dramatically with the income of their occupants, but the overall impression of visitors was quite favorable. James Silk Buckingham, one of the more discerning foreigners to tour the city during this era, said in 1840 that the residences of the wealthy “are handsome and commodious, without being imposing or ostentatious” and “taken as a whole there is greater uniformity of neatness, taste, and substantial comfort in the dwellings of the first class in Baltimore, than in New York.” Among the houses of the middle classes “the greater number are also excellent” and “even those of the mechanics and artisans are such as in England would be deemed comfortable abodes for persons far above that condition.” He also noticed that there were comparatively fewer “mean wooden houses.” Most were built with “fine red bricks which are manufactured of excellent quality and beautifully worked.”

Had Buckingham returned twenty years later he would still have gained a good impression of Baltimore’s houses, but at the two ends of the spectrum conditions had changed somewhat. By 1860 the rich now lived in new residences that were both imposing and ostentatious, while an increasing number of low-rent dwellings, thrown up quickly to accommodate the burgeoning working classes, (or converted from single family houses into cheap apartments) quickly deteriorated into slum dwellings. The growth of low-quality dwellings was to some degree balanced by the increasing number of middle-income row houses that were well built, comfortable and supplied with both water and gas. The working classes lived in twelve to fourteen foot wide dwellings that were one or two rooms deep and usually two stories high. These sold for $600-$800, but older, more dilapidated structures could be purchased for half that price. Many skilled blue-collar workers and the middle classes lived in fifteen to twenty foot wide houses that were usually three or three-and-one-half stories high and sometimes had back extensions forty to fifty feet deep. They sold from $1,000 to as much as $3,000. The upper middle classes and the rich occupied dwellings eighteen to twenty-six feet wide and their back extensions sometimes had a depth of one hundred feet. They ranged in price from about $3,000 up to $10,000 or more. A handful of really sumptuous houses, mostly in the Mount Vernon Place area, were very expensive. In 1849 John S. Gittings built a thirty-room house at the corner of St. Paul and Monument streets that cost over $23,000. In 1860 Zenus Barnum paid $27,000 for a house of similar size at Mount Vernon Place and Cathedral Street, and R. J. Capron purchased a house on Charles Street north of Lexington for $28,000.

Aside from the luxurious, show-place residences, Baltimore’s houses were not terribly expensive. In a city where the average wage was $300-$600 per year during the 1850s and those with incomes over $3,000-$5,000 were considered rich, the houses that sold in the broad range of $500-$5,000 appear to be quite affordable by modern standards. Even so, very few working-class families and only a minority of the middle classes purchased homes. In 1860 approximately two
out of ten Baltimore families owned their own dwelling, but there were significant variations from one section of the city to another. In the wealthy Eleventh Ward, surrounding Mount Vernon Place, four out of ten residents were home owners while in the relatively poor Fifth Ward (Old Town) only one out of ten owned his (or her) own residence. Residential ownership was clearly a function of wealth, but other factors did come into play. Germans of every occupational level prized home ownership and purchased dwellings at a rate unmatched by any other group in the city. The preponderance of renters probably stemmed from the fact that it was as just as economical to rent as to buy. Small one- or two-story row houses rented for approximately $40-$100 per year, middling size residences went for $100-$200 and larger ones for $200-$400. In a city where many people changed jobs quite regularly and most wished to live close to their place of employment, the continual buying and selling of houses was inconvenient and costly. Only in the 1850s, when the city’s omnibus system began to allow at least the middle and upper classes to ride downtown, did it become convenient to buy a permanent home in the outer wards, but even then not everyone who could have afforded to become a homeowner in one of these new neighborhoods did so.131

The outward movement of population was a very significant change, but it did not depopulate the center city. In 1860 the commercial and industrial heart of the city, the Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Wards, lost 22 percent of its residents but was still inhabited by nearly 12,000 people. The major losses occurred among the area’s middle-class families, and its wealthy residents disappeared almost entirely. During the 1820s the city’s wealthy merchants were divided between the old guard that continued to live within a few blocks of Exchange Place and the “uptown” elite residing around Monument Square. By the mid-1840s Exchange Place had lost all its elite residents and during the next decade almost all their former homes were replaced with larger commercial buildings. John Donnell’s mansion in Exchange Place itself was torn down in 1851 to make way for William T. Walters wholesale liquor store, and in 1859 wreckers pulled down William Pinkney’s dwelling, another Exchange Place landmark where in 1812 he had written the Declaration of War against the British. As the last vestiges of residential life disappeared from the downtown business district, Monument Square itself began to lose its more affluent residents who moved up to Franklin Street or further north towards Mount Vernon Place. The only families who remained in Monument Square were those who lived most of the year on their suburban or country estates and only spent the winter months at Barnum’s or Guy’s hotel.

The desire to get out of the downtown districts was tempered by the knowledge that too far a removal entailed a long walk in order to reach the city center, and almost everyone had to use the downtown district either as a place of employment or for shopping and socializing. In 1860 the Center Market, “Old Marsh,” as it was called, still carried on the largest volume of business and together with the Lexington and Hanover markets (both of which were now on the edge of the expanding business district) accounted for approximately 70 percent of the city’s
market business. The five outlying markets, Fells Point, Belair, Richmond, Hollins, and Cross Street, shared the remaining 30 percent. Also in the center city were the Holliday and Front Street theaters, the Assembly Rooms, The Maryland Institute, Barnum’s Hotel, Guy’s, the Eutaw House, and all the other places where dinners and banquets were held. Until the U. S. Post Office began to deliver mail to individual dwellings in 1859 and install “reception boxes” for mailing letters, everyone had to go down to the city’s only post office at Fayette and North (Guilford) Streets to pick up or mail letters and other materials. Thus while the residential movement was everywhere outward, it did not range very far. Henry Stockbridge, who came to Baltimore from Massachusetts in 1846, later recalled that at the time he arrived, the area beyond the Washington Monument was still quite wooded and only a few scattered houses stood west of Fremont Street. 132

Transportation

Young Stockbridge arrived just in time to see the last of Baltimore as an exclusively “walking city,” for by then a small revolution in public transit had already begun. The first stage of this revolution was the introduction of the omnibuses, vehicles that made their appearance on Baltimore’s streets in May 1844. Small, slow, and irregular in their schedules, these elongated stage coaches served as harbingers of things to come. With strong horses and a good pavement they could carry twenty to twenty-five passengers two or three miles for a fare of four to six and one-half cents. Previously, the only way to get a ride around town was to have one’s own vehicle or hire a hackney coach, the nineteenth century version of the taxicab. Private coaches were still a luxury and the hackneys charged a flat rate of fifty cents per ride, a price that even middle-income residents could not afford on a regular basis. Only the top quarter of the city’s families could afford to use even the omnibuses regularly, but it was enough to keep a fleet of the odd-looking vehicles in operation.

By 1857 ten omnibus lines operating a total of over seventy vehicles, carried several thousand passengers each day. Seven followed routes within the city and there were at least three suburban companies. The city lines ran from the vicinity of Exchange Place to Fells Point, Canton, Ashland Square, Greenmount Cemetery, Mount Vernon Square, Madison Avenue, and Franklin Square. Two omnibus lines operated along the York Turnpike, one to Govanstown and the other to Towsontown. The third ran west over the Frederick Turnpike to Catonsville.

In spite of their relatively short routes and limited schedules, the omnibuses were viewed as a great improvement. Comfortably upholstered on the inside and brightly painted on the outside, each had a name. The Citizens Line’s omnibuses were named for popular Marylanders: the Gilmor, Winder, McKim, and Carroll, while the Old Line Omnibus Company emblazoned its vehicles with its owners’ names: the J. H. T. Jerome, the William Chestnut, and the James V. Wagner. 133 Except for the suburban lines, none ran more than two miles out from Exchange Place,
but their routes opened hundreds of acres of land on the urban fringe for that relatively small group who could afford the fare and were able to adjust their commuting to the limited schedule of service. Thus while the omnibuses did not have a major impact on suburban development, they demonstrated that middle- and upper-income families might be willing to live beyond walking distance from the city center, especially if the service could be improved. It was not long before enterprising investors sought to put the omnibuses on rails, a step that would substantially increase their carrying capacity, speed, and comfort.

For those who visited New York or Philadelphia and rode the new railroad “horsecars” in those cities, Baltimore’s omnibuses soon seemed slow and bumpy. The first petition to establish a horsecar line in Baltimore, presented to the city council in 1854, called for a double-tracked line along Baltimore Street from Franklin Square to Canton. The city council rejected the project, citing the opposition of merchants along Baltimore Street. The Baltimore Street merchants, led by Hamilton Easter, were the largest and most influential in the city, and they believed that while the horsecars might bring some new customers, the rails would so obstruct carriages and wagons that the net result would be a loss of trade. Undeterred by the initial rebuff, the horsecar entrepreneurs continued to seek municipal approval for their projects. By 1858 four groups had entered the field, encouraged no doubt by the financial success of horsecar lines in New York and Philadelphia. The Baltimore Street merchants, who may also have seen the positive effect of the lines on retail sales in the two northern giants, now supported the idea.

By the early months of 1859 two of the four investor groups moved into a final round of lobbying and negotiating with the city government. One company, led by ex-B&O president Chauncy Brooks and Zenus Barnum (owner of the city’s largest and most famous hotel), offered to replace all the major city omnibus lines with a horsecar system and extend it out to the municipal boundaries. They proposed to charge a fare of only three cents and pay the city an annual franchise fee of $20,000. The other group, led by William Travers (and secretly acting for a group of Philadelphia investors), offered to build essentially the same lines, charge a four-cent fare, and pay the city an annual fee of twenty dollars for every car it operated.

For reasons never made clear, the city council awarded the franchise to the Travers group after Mayor Swann worked out a deal for the company to charge a five-cent fare and pay a tax of 20 percent on its gross receipts. This revenue would be used to develop a comprehensive public park system—a project Swann had been pushing for some time. Swann signed the bill on March 29, 1859. The Travers group, which eventually adopted the title “City Passenger Railway Company,” agreed to build four double-tracked routes radiating out in eight different directions from a central point at the intersection of Baltimore and Calvert streets, the center of the old Baltimore Town tract of 1730. Each of the eight radial lines would extend to the city boundary.

Two weeks later the Travers group sold a controlling interest in the company to a consortium of Philadelphia investors led by Jonathan Brock. Many Baltimoreans, but especially the Brooks group, were outraged that such an important and valuable franchise had been given to
“foreign” capitalists and that riders who might have paid only a three-cent fare would now pay a nickel. To counter the negative publicity, the Philadelphia group hired William S. Shoemaker, an experienced local contractor and former city councilman, to build the horsecar system. Shoemaker won widespread support from the city’s workingmen by hiring only local laborers for the project and paying good wages during a time of high unemployment. The Philadelphians also won friends among the omnibus owners by purchasing all their horses and stables at a price ($83,875) that was considered quite generous.

Construction began in May 1859, and on October 28, when the first major section of track was completed along Baltimore Street, a “grand opening” was staged. A parade of cars, “tastefully decorated with flags” was pulled by teams of two, four, and six horses from the foot of Broadway in Fells Point through the downtown and all the way out to the western city line at Baltimore and Smallwood Streets--more than half a mile beyond the edge of the built up area. By the spring of 1860 the company had spent almost $2,000,000 laying twenty-two miles of track and operating sixty-five horsecars on them (drawn by 360 horses). It had completed all the lines except the one running from Fells Point to the eastern city line at Canton and the South Baltimore line. Following the example of the omnibuses, the horsecars were color coded to the route on which they operated, thus in common parlance people spoke of taking the Red, Blue Green, or White line.

As the lines opened, thousands of curious Baltimoreans, many of whom had sworn never to ride the “foreign owned” cars, paid their nickels and took a ride. The company made money and the so-called “park tax” revenues (a penny out of each nickel) rolled into the city treasury. After the first three months, with only ten cars running on the Baltimore street line, $4,290 was collected by the city from the roughly 5,500 passengers that used the cars each day. In 1860 ridership increased to over 10,000 a day and the city took in $32,902 in taxes. The “foreign ownership” issue was finally resolved when the City Passenger Railway Company received a state charter in 1862. The Philadelphia owners and a group of the most interested Baltimore investors (including several members of the old Brooks group) came to an agreement to share control of the corporation. Henry Tyson, the former Master of Machinery for the B&O, became the company’s president. Gradually, the Baltimoreans bought out the Philadelphians and the company came under local control.

While the City Passenger Railway Company busied itself laying tracks within the city, local investors formed two suburban horsecar lines to carry passengers out to Catonsville and Towsontown. The Baltimore and Catonsville Passenger Horse Railway Company was launched at a large meeting held at the old Fairview Inn on the Frederick Turnpike in July of 1859. William Wilkins, a well-known manufacturer in southwest Baltimore, was elected as its first president and the major stockholders were George M. Gill, John Glenn, John C. Holland, James Stone, and Charles Shipley, all large landholders along the route. Construction began in March 1861. The company made a number of improvements along the turnpike road and replaced the old wooden
bridge across Gwynn’s Falls with a substantial iron structure. In July of 1862 the first car ran from the western city boundary at Baltimore and Smallwood Streets (the terminus of the City Passenger’s Red Line), making the trip to Catonsville in forty-two minutes.

The Towsontown Railroad Company was incorporated in March 1858, with another bevy of large-scale suburban property owners subscribing to the majority of the stock. The list included Archibald Stirling, Zenus Barnum, A. S. Abell, William Chew, John Stevenson, and G. M. Bosley. Construction began in September 1860, but was halted for some time by the crisis of 1860-1861 and the coming of the Civil War. Work started up again in 1863 and was completed all the way to Towson in August of that year.

Each of the suburban lines served a different clientele, but both managed to earn modest profits. The York Road line developed a steady ridership among those traveling between Baltimore and the new county courthouse in Towsontown, just as the old omnibus line had carried county residents down to their old courthouse on Monument Square. The city and county governments had finally been separated in 1853 and the next year local voters selected Towsontown as the new seat for their local government. The new county courthouse, opened in 1857, was placed conveniently one block west of the horsecar terminal. The Catonsville line earned the great majority of its income during June, July, and August from the “summer house” people and day-excursionists. Situated atop a broad, tree shaded ridge over 500 feet above sea level, Catonsville had already become a haven for those escaping the city’s heat and for excursionists who took their “pic-nics” out to one or another of the “many beautiful spots along the Frederick Turnpike.” The horsecar further popularized the turnpike corridor and made Catonsville the county’s premier summer resort.136

It is important to keep in mind that while the opening of the omnibus routes in the 1840s and the new horsecar lines in 1860-1863 were exciting events and promised to accelerate the dispersion of middle and upper income families, their actual impact was quite modest. The number of regular commuters was very small—something like six out of a hundred. The relatively modest numbers of regular commuters during this era is one of the indications that while the middle and upper income groups were removing themselves to the urban periphery, even the city’s outer wards remained fairly compact and contained a surprisingly broad mix of land uses. Each ward had its mini-slums: alleys or courts with old, dilapidated houses, streets blighted by slaughter houses and foundries, or suburban “patches” composed of shanties that remained in place even as builders put up middle and upper income housing around them.

New Out-ward Neighborhoods

The enlarged city of the 1840s and 1850s was composed of five geographic divisions, areas much more extensive than the ten little neighborhoods listed in the city directories of the 1820s. If one were to take a tour of the city in 1860, a good place to start would be the West End, a large
district that included the entire Eighteenth Ward and part of the Nineteenth. Among the city’s new “outer ward” neighborhoods, the West End encompassed the widest spectrum of residential, commercial and industrial localities. The wealthy clustered around Franklin Square, a three-acre piece of land at Fayette and Carey Streets that had been purchased by the city in 1839. It remained undeveloped until 1846, but by 1860 it had been nearly surrounded by expensive houses. Situated 100 feet above the downtown area, and yet just a mile and a quarter away, the area was regarded a healthy and convenient location. Within the square itself the city constructed a dignified Victorian garden with shade trees, ornamental shrubs, and flowerbeds. During the evening hours visitors could stroll the paved walkways or sit on benches under the flicker of gas lights. A list of “appropriate rules” prohibited rowdy or other types of objectionable behavior and “a keeper appointed to see to their enforcement.”

Waverly Terrace, on the east side of the square, was one of the city’s most fashionable rows of houses, its residents enjoying the services of numerous servants and quick access to their carriage houses in the rear alley. Nearby lived Philip and Evan Thomas of B&O fame, revered figures and among the wealthiest men in the city.

Much of the land north and west of the square was owned by the Steuart and Edmondson families who had been selling off parcels for development since the 1830s, but during that period, their land was too far from the downtown so few developers actually built on their parcels. In the late 1850s the promise of a horsecar line brought a spurt of construction. Dozens of lots were sold, but the families still retained several hundred acres valued at almost $400,000. George H. Steuart’s estate, located at what is now the intersection of Baltimore and Monroe Streets, was the suburban showplace of the West End with its beautiful mansion house, stables, and gardens.

South of Franklin Square the terrain sloped downward towards West Pratt Street, one of the city’s busiest commercial thoroughfares. The centers of activity along this section of Pratt Street were the B&O’s Mount Clare Shops, the Winans’ Locomotive Works, the Bartlett & Hayward Foundry, and the cluster of other factories. Skilled workers inhabited the streets in this area and the majority of their houses were small, comfortable dwellings. On the other hand, the alleys and back courts of the neighborhood could only be described as pocket-sized slums. South of Pratt Street and behind the factories the streets and alleys were inhabited primarily by unskilled factory workers. Alley dwellings in this neighborhood ranged from small to tiny and a large number of alleys were scenes of real poverty. Yet even here the better streets remained liberally sprinkled with the families of skilled craftsmen, white-collar clerks, and small independent businessmen.

Two families residing near the Mount Clare Shops stand out in particular. David Bartlett, who lived at Hollins and Parkin Streets, was a man of great wealth who could have lived on Franklin Square or Mount Vernon Place but chose to live just a short walk from his foundry. His home, while large and very comfortable, was hardly ostentatious. The same could not be said of his neighbor, Thomas Winans. Ross Winans’ son Thomas went to Russia in 1850 to build the locomotives and rolling stock for the Moscow-St. Petersburg Railroad. Winans succeeded
admirably and a grateful Tsar rewarded him handsomely. When he returned to Baltimore in the late 1850s his taxable wealth exceeded a million dollars and he was among the richest men in the city. Once back in town, he purchased the old James McHenry mansion that occupied the square block at Baltimore and Fremont Streets. The handsome suburban estate had long since fallen into disrepair and was surrounded by small row houses. Abutting the property on the west was St. Peter’s Catholic Church, an Irish stronghold in the West End. In this proletarian setting young Winans built “Alexandrofsky,” a huge Italianate palace reminiscent of those that he and his Franco-Russian wife had enjoyed in St. Petersburg. He surrounded the house with an elegant garden that featured exotic plants and imported Italian statuary (the nudity of some of the statues shocked the conservative parishioners at St. Peter’s, so Winans reportedly assuaged their sensibilities by surrounding his garden with a high wall). Here the Winans family lived in regal splendor waited on by a small army of servants, well on their way to establishing themselves as one of Baltimore’s most magnificent and unpredictable families.

To the north, most of the development during the 1840s and 1850s occurred in the area around St. Mary’s Seminary and just to the west on what remained of William Lux’s Chatsworth estate. Robert Gilmor, Jr. recalled that in 1844 the mansion house was still standing “and some of the old locust trees which formed the grand alley in the garden” were still visible. The grand dwelling, with its adjoining coach house and stable, by then faced onto the south side of Franklin Street between Pine and Pearl and was surrounded by less than an acre of land. It was put up for sale in 1845, advertised as “one of the most eligible residences in the United States.” Unfortunately, that part of West Franklin Street was not nearly so eligible, so the buyer tore the mansion down and covered the ground with small row houses. It was a melancholy end for Baltimore’s first suburban estate.\textsuperscript{138}

The major new development in this part of town in the 1850s was out along the streets that paralleled Reisterstown Turnpike (Pennsylvania Avenue), especially the lower blocks of Eutaw Place, Madison Avenue and McCulloh Street. This neighborhood was approximately 150 feet above the downtown and thus well suited for upper-income dwellings, but it was a long commute by omnibus, especially the uphill trip at the end of the day. The opening of horsecar lines up Pennsylvania Avenue and Madison Avenue in 1859 finally provided dependable commuting and the pace of residential construction picked up substantially. Pennsylvania Avenue, Eutaw Place, and Madison Avenue were graded, paved and curbed all the way up to the Northern Boundary Avenue (today’s North Avenue). As fine homes for the well-to-do appeared along the main streets, alley dwellings went up behind them. In this more distant location, the alley dwellings may have been more essential. Low-income white workers could not afford to ride the horsecars and African Americans were barred from them, so if middle and upper income residents in this area wanted cooks, servants, and other helpers, it was important to have housing nearby for them.
The one section that did not enjoy the prosperity of the larger region was the Orchard-Biddle neighborhood. Located where Pennsylvania Avenue turned into Greene Street, Orchard-Biddle area was an old suburban shantytown that had been developed into regular blocks of tiny dwellings during the 1820s and 1830s. Biddle, Union and Walnut alleys, inhabited almost entirely by African Americans, were some of the poorest alleys in the city. Biddle Alley was described in 1849 as "a scene of squalid wretchedness and misery not often beheld." It was a sea of mud mixed with "stagnant filth, slops, offal and various descriptions of decaying matter." Along the length of the alley "many groups of little children with hardly enough clothes to hide their nakedness, were moving about in the mud in common with the swine population with which that neglected locality abounds." The houses were "filthy hovels... hardly fit for beasts of burden."139

The premier residential location in the city by the 1850s was unquestionably the Mount Vernon Place neighborhood, but its rise to fame and fashion was also a slow process. The focal point of the neighborhood was the Washington Monument, which, it will be recalled, had been built on a large grassy knoll near the southwestern corner of John Eager Howard's "Belvidere" estate. Howard himself seems to have envisioned that the monument would eventually form the centerpiece of a grand intersection when the city extended Charles street north through his estate and crossed it with an east-west thoroughfare (eventually named Monument Street). The Fielding Lucas Map of 1822 shows a plan for the future intersection. Colonel Howard died in 1827 and four years later his heirs created the grand crossroads by widening both Charles and Monument Streets for one block in each direction from the monument and placing boulevard-style squares in the middle of these streets. The two blocks of Charles Street became Washington Place and those on Monument Street were named Mount Vernon Place. In 1829 Charles Howard, John Eager Howard's youngest son, built a large mansion on the northeast corner of the square and the family offered lots for sale all along the boulevard streets, but sales were slow. Even as late as 1852 there were still a few empty lots on East Mount Vernon Place. By this time, however, the neighborhood around the square had become the center of fashion and during the last half of the 1850s wealthy Baltimoreans flocked to the area in great numbers. After Charles Carroll Barrister's grandson finally gave up living at Mount Clare and moved permanently to 105 W. Monument Street, his son built a house just a few doors away. His brother Harry Dorsey Gough Carroll followed suit, selling his "Perry Hall" estate and moving into No. 94 W. Monument. Among their neighbors were J. H. McKim, Albert Schumacher, Enoch Pratt, John and Henry Garrett, Charles Gwinn, George Small, R. J. Capron, John S. Gittings, and Samuel G. Wyman.

Many of the city's wealthy businessmen continued to live in the area just south of the Mount Vernon Square neighborhood, especially along Franklin Street. Franklin, between Calvert and Park, was built up in the 1820s and remained fashionable until the 1890s, but it flourished most brightly during the middle decades of the century. In 1860 it boasted the residences of Mayor Thomas Swann, Gustav Lurman and Henry Oelrich, the Baring Brothers agents, Haslet McKim of the Baltimore and Cuba Copper Company, the attorneys Randall and Francis Moale,
Gilmor Meredith, agent for the Pacific Mail Company, Henry Mayhew, President of the Farmers and Planters Bank, and Daniel Banks, president of the Union Manufacturing Company. One measure of the wealth focused in Mount Vernon and Franklin Street areas is the number of live-in servants residing in its houses. Some households got along with only one or two servants, but dozens of families had four to six (often two Irish girls and two African Americans). A. S. Abell made due with six servants and while Thomas Swann required eight.

Yet even such a splendid neighborhood as the Franklin Street-Mount Vernon Place area was not without its share of narrow streets and alleys filled with immigrant laborers, servants, laundresses, and a variety of other low-income residents. The Northern Central’s passenger and freight station at Calvert and Franklin streets abutted a group of alleys inhabited by a variety of very poor residents and a cluster of “bawdy houses” where one could purchase the services of women ranging in age from sixteen to forty-eight.140

Altogether, the population of the Franklin street-Mount Vernon Place area, plus the Northwestern section and the Franklin Square neighborhood, increased by over 23,000 during the 1850s, accounting for almost half of the city’s new growth. Residential growth was reinforced in 1859-1860 when the City Passenger Railway Company ran four horsecar lines out through the quadrant located between Baltimore Street and Charles Street.

East of Jones Falls a major building boom began in the 1840s and escalated rapidly during the 1850s. As poor immigrant laborers flooded into Fells Point and Old Town, the middle classes and better paid artisans removed to the new housing being built north and east of these established centers. While the Second, Fourth and Fifth Wards (Fells Point, today’s “Little Italy” and Old Town) each declined slightly in total population, the overall decline was small, only 1,121 people. On the other hand, household densities increased noticeably because commercial and industrial enterprises replaced a number of formerly residential blocks and the newer, poorer residents crowded into homes that had formerly held only a single family. East Baltimore Street between the Jones Falls and Central Avenue, which had remained a “favorite promenade for fashionable folks” well into the 1840s, lost all such character during the 1850s.141 This general exodus of the “better sort” from the Second, Fourth and Fifth Wards increased east Baltimore’s three outer wards by over 15,000. Many of these families moved out the Gay Street corridor into the Ashland Square neighborhood and north towards Madison Square. Likewise, middle and upper income families who had been living in the upper section of Fells Point moved north along Broadway, Bond and Caroline Streets. By 1860 the elevated and airy neighborhood around the present Johns Hopkins Hospital had become a new middle class stronghold, but in spite of its strong economic base, neither this area, nor any other neighborhood east of Jones Falls obtained the prestige or popularity of those growing up in the northern or western sections of the city.

With the building of the horsecar lines in 1859-1861 a number of East Baltimore’s most affluent (and socially ambitious) families began to move across the falls into north and northwest Baltimore.
South and Southwest Baltimore, comprising the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Wards, was probably the poorest area of the city; nevertheless, it was a beehive of commercial and industrial activity and grew by over 10,000 during the 1850s. The Fifteenth Ward, the area immediately behind the Light Street docks and around to Federal Hill, was already well built up by 1820 and in the 1840s and 1850s it underwent further change. Many long-established families moved out and their residences were converted to commercial or industrial uses, while at the same time several thousand poor Irish and German immigrants crowded into the remaining dwellings. To the west in the Sixteenth Ward a residential upheaval occurred in 1852 when the B&O tore down several hundred dwellings to make room for Camden station and its rail yards.

The Seventeenth Ward, South Baltimore’s “outer” ward, experienced the greatest growth, expanding from 9,834 to 14,955 during the 1850s. It covered a huge area from Montgomery Street on the north all the way to Ferry Bar on the south and out to Fort McHenry. Only a small portion of this vast territory was developed by 1860. To encourage growth, the city built a food market on Cross Street, very near the southern edge of the city. It did very little business during its early years and in 1855 Mayor Samuel Hinks recommended that it be closed, complaining that it did not produce sufficient rents and many of its unoccupied stalls were “used mostly as lounging places for idlers and playgrounds for boys, and might for this reason alone be dispensed with.” Fortunately, the city council ignored the mayor’s recommendation and by 1860 the market had rented most of its stalls. South Baltimore was tilted more heavily towards a proletarian population than any other area of the city, but there were still far too many middle income families and even a scattering of rather wealthy households to characterize it as a completely working class region. William Swindell, the wealthy glass manufacturer, lived just a few blocks from his South Baltimore factory as did a number of other local manufacturers. The Cross Street Market itself became surrounded by a neighborhood containing many skilled workers: ship riggers, boilermakers, glassblowers, and master brickmakers. Not far away lived Benjamin Gould who listed himself in 1860 as a “Gentleman” who owned over $60,000 worth of property.

Clashing Ethnicities

Turning from the city’s streets and houses to the people who inhabited them, the picture is quite confusing and not a little bit grim. The social geography of the city made it impossible for most people to find housing on a block or a street inhabited by those of their same background and status. While most of the city’s wealthier families lived on streets with neighbors much like themselves, the middle classes did so only in the new outer wards and even there conditions were somewhat mixed. In older sections of the city this was hardly possible-- especially in the 1840s and 1850s when every neighborhood underwent significant change. Forcing people of widely different backgrounds and conditions to live in close proximity may under some conditions lead to mutual tolerance and respect, but at other times it can exacerbate bad feelings, leading to
conflict and violence. Many Baltimoreans found it difficult to live amicably with their neighbors and many young men enforced their various prejudices with fists, clubs, knives, and guns.

At the core of the turbulence were the major ethnic and religious differences among the city’s residents. Ethnicity proved to be even more divisive than economic divisions. “Class conflict,” as it came to be called in the 1840s and 1850s, was not an insignificant factor in Baltimore, and it was clearly intertwined with ethnic/religious rancor, but it was secondary. Like the rest of America’s large cities and towns, Baltimore’s workingmen were involved in a variety of labor union activities, countless small, bitter labor disputes, and several large-scale strikes, but all of it was piecemeal and sporadic. A machinists strike in 1853 dragged on for months and resulted in a number of violent incidents, but none resulted in serious injuries or deaths. A strike by B&O trainmen in the spring of 1857 led to a confrontation between several hundred strikers and the local militia. B&O president Chauncy Brooks and the militia commander said they were prepared to break the blockade by firing on the strikers, but before the conflict erupted into a full-scale battle the amazingly versatile Ross Winans placed himself between the opposing forces and almost single-handedly convinced the trainmen to end their blockade. In spite of much violent rhetoric, a number of bloody brawls and at least two incidents where gunfire might have erupted, labor conflicts within the city resulted in few if any deaths. At this same time perhaps as many as one hundred to two hundred people were killed in conflicts that were clearly a combination of ethnic, religious, and political divisions.

Some part of the anger and frustration which was vented in the ethnic, racial, and political violence of the 1840s and 1850s arose from the economic competition between the city’s native-born whites and those Germans, Irishmen and free blacks who were undercutting their privileged position in the labor market. During the 1850s the Know-Nothings and the American Party spoke mostly about the religious and cultural threat that Roman Catholics and immigrants presented, but the issue of economic competition was also woven into their rhetoric. The American Party kept the native-born workingman at arms length only because a number of American Party leaders were hard-headed businessmen who saw nothing wrong with hiring the cheapest labor regardless of ethnicity, race, or gender. This laissez-faire principle allowed thousands of foreign immigrants to enter the city’s labor force, but it also contributed to their deepening conflict with native-born Americans.

It is no surprise that conflict between the native-born and foreign immigrants carried with it a large religious dimension. Protestant concerns over Catholic influence had existed since the establishment of the Baltimore archbishopric in the 1790s, but the cosmopolitan and distinguished backgrounds of local Catholic leaders, plus the relatively small total number of Roman Catholics in the city, kept anti-Catholicism at bay. However, by the 1840s and 1850s the majority of Baltimore’s Catholics were German or Irish immigrants and their children. A number of them were distrustful of or even hostile to Protestants and Protestantism. Open religious conflict was bound to arise. The Protestant evangelicals, mostly Methodists, Baptists and
Presbyterians, charged that the city’s Catholics were not simply adherents of an outmoded and unenlightened form of Christianity, but were tools of the Italian Papacy rather than loyal citizens of the American Republic. The *Baltimore True Union*, a Baptist publication, continually referred to Roman Catholics as “papists” and expressed the fervent belief that the Papacy itself was “the working of Satan, with the deceivableness of unrighteousness.” Spokesmen for the city’s 60,000 Roman Catholics replied that religious faith had nothing to do with good citizenship. Many Catholic immigrants, hurt by the attacks on their religion (or convinced that the evangelicals were the real agents of Satan), tried to avoid social contact with Protestants just as much as the Protestants shunned them, but such behavior proved difficult in a city where everyone was thrown so closely together. While the older generation of Anglo American and Irish Catholics continued to hold more cosmopolitan views and moved easily among the city’s Protestants, especially the equally broad minded Episcopalians, this more enlightened and sophisticated world of religious toleration was overshadowed during the 1850s by the more strident words and actions of paranoid evangelicals and increasingly rigid, defensive Roman Catholic immigrants.

The result of this distrust and conflict was the development of two large, quite separate societies in Baltimore, each with its own churches, schools, charitable institutions, publications, and social organizations. There continued to be a wide range of supposedly non-denominational (often tax supported) charitable and educational institutions, but the Protestants, who comprised two-thirds of the white population, remained the clear majority and infused these agencies with their own religious ideas and practices, making it almost impossible for most Roman Catholics to support them. On the other hand, those educational, charitable or social institutions that were more thoroughly secular did not attract very wide support from either the city’s Catholic hierarchy or from the more evangelical Protestants.

The net result was a major expansion of Roman Catholic schools and other agencies while the city’s supposedly “public” or “nonsectarian” institutions such as the Baltimore Orphan Asylum, the Home for the Friendless, the House of Refuge, the Manual Training School, and even the public school system operated in a manner that was generally Protestant in character. The public schools, for example, employed several well-known Protestant ministers, but no Catholic priests or nuns. A few of the teachers were Roman Catholics and Fielding Lucas, Jr., one of the city’s prominent businessmen and civic leaders (and also a Catholic) served for many years on the school board, yet the system as a whole operated in a clearly Protestant atmosphere. For example, in 1839, regular Bible reading was introduced in the schools and the King James (Protestant) Bible was adopted for this purpose. Eventually, Catholic children were allowed to go to another room where they could hear the Catholic-sponsored Douay Bible read. Catholics still objected, quite rightly, that the procedure made an unfortunate distinction between the majority Protestants and the Catholic minority, plus the reading of the Douay Bible without any commentary was opposed to Catholic educational practice. The evangelical Protestant ministers saw these objections as an
attack on the Bible itself, a view which confirmed their suspicion that Catholics were not true Christians.

Religious acrimony escalated sharply in 1852-1853 when Martin J. Kearney, a delegate to the General Assembly from Baltimore and a leading member of the city’s Catholic community, introduced a bill to provide state tax funds for religious schools. The bill did not pass, but it aroused the ire of many Protestants who saw it as an attack on the public schools, an institution which they, of course, asserted was nonsectarian. The controversy over the Kearney Education bill dragged on for several years and became quite bitter—contributing substantially to the rise of the Know Nothing movement and the formation of the American Party in Baltimore and in Maryland.

It is difficult to assess the true depth of ethnic and religious strife in Baltimore during this era. It was certainly a major factor in the rise of Baltimore’s Know Nothing movement and the growth of the American Party, but there are reasons to believe that the city’s native-born Protestants were not as prejudiced as they sometimes appeared. The rapid and almost complete disappearance of anti-Catholicism in Baltimore during the 1860s and 1870s (decades when it continued to thrive in places like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston) leads to the suspicion that its roots were not all that deep in the 1840s and 1850s. Perhaps the somewhat smaller proportion of Irish Catholic immigrants in Baltimore, compared to that of the big Northern cities, played some role in quieting Protestant fears. Also, Baltimore’s old-line Catholic elite may have served as a bridge between the poorer Irish and German Catholic immigrants and the wealthy, more cosmopolitan portions of the Protestant community. Certainly the municipal authorities were on the job during these years in preventing the sort of direct religious violence that embittered religious feelings in a number of northern cities. On several occasions when Baltimore’s evangelical firebrands were tempted to attack one or another of the city’s Catholic institutions city authorities, almost all of whom were Protestants, responded promptly with police protection, and none of Baltimore’s numerous Catholic institution ever suffered any violence. Finally, most of the city’s major newspapers stood firmly against any type of religious bigotry and presented the Catholic Church in America in as positive a light as the various Protestant denominations. The American, while sympathetic to the American Party (it had been a staunchly Whig paper in the 1830s and 1840s), was never anti-Catholic. The Sun, a Democratic paper from its founding in 1837, was naturally sympathetic to Catholics since they were almost all supporters of the Democratic party by the 1850s, and also because the Sun’s owner and publisher, Arunah S. Abell, was married to a Catholic woman and they were raising their children in that faith. The only paper of any significance to endorse the anti-foreign and anti-Catholic position of the Know Nothings was the Baltimore Clipper, but this paper never had the circulation of the American or the Sun.

The “religious question,” was of course manifestly bound up with “the immigrant question,” in the minds of most American-born citizens, but the issue was quite complicated.
There is no doubt that the Baltimore of the 1820s and 1830s was changed significantly by the infusion of such large numbers of foreign immigrants during the following two decades, but exactly what (or who) changed is very difficult to pinpoint. Clearly, Baltimore had a huge impact on the immigrants and they in turn had altered, to one degree or another, the direction of the city’s mainstream culture and society.

Baltimore’s antebellum Irish immigrants are a rather obscure group. Many could not read or write and few of those who could left any personal records. A rather private and family-oriented group, more comfortable with informal associations rather than regular clubs and societies, the history of Baltimore’s Irish-Americans is seldom recorded in minute books or journals of proceedings. No local Irish-American newspaper or newsletter survived for any length of time and few examples of these publications have survived. The formal institutions that attracted Baltimore’s Irish men and women were almost all linked to the Catholic Church, but since the church was not a specifically Irish organization, especially in Maryland where Anglo-American and German Catholics played an influential role, even these records are disappointing.

Unfortunately, the views of other Baltimoreans regarding the Irish immigrants are plentiful and most are uncomplimentary. Irish men tended to be sneered at or pitied as almost hopelessly ignorant peasants and tools of crafty Roman Catholic priests. They were almost all stereotyped as formidable men with their fists—especially when they had been drinking. Descriptions of Irish brawls, presented with a mixture of amusement and disgust, were grist for even the city’s most respectable newspapers. Unfortunately, the stereotype had some foundation in fact. While there seems little doubt that the great majority of Irish men were individuals of generally sober character who worked hard and remained devoted to their families, too many of them were not. Adult Irish males (both the foreign born and their American-born descendants) composed about ten percent of the city’s adult male population, but during many years the almost one-third of the residents of the city jail were Irish. Likewise, one out of three inmates in the Baltimore Alms House was Irish—most of them women with dependent children whose husbands were dead or who had abandoned them. Irish women, thousands of whom found places as servants in Protestant homes or chambermaids in the city’s hotels, undoubtedly made a better impression of hardworking, honest and loyal employees, yet even their image was tarnished by the several hundred sad female alcoholics who wandered the streets, yelling, picking fights, and sleeping in doorways.

For those who wished to view the Irish as a hopelessly degraded and inferior ethnic group, there were many striking examples to be seen during the 1840s and 1850s, but overall the picture was actually quite different. No one has yet attempted a detailed comparison of Baltimore’s Irish community with those in the other large cities of the northeast, but there is good reason to believe that the Baltimore Irish were a good deal better off and better established in their community than the Irish of cities like Philadelphia, New York, or Boston. Baltimore had a much larger group of established middle and upper class Roman Catholics, including a number who
were themselves of Irish descent. They acted as a host population to the immigrants, providing charitable aid, finding them jobs and reaching out to poor youngsters through such organizations the Catholic Young Men’s Association. The attention appeared to pay off. The manuscript census of 1860 shows hundreds of Baltimore’s Irish immigrants holding skilled jobs, operating a variety of small businesses and living in comfortable homes. The majority were still poor laborers living in extremely modest circumstances, but the basis had been laid for the community’s remarkably broad movement into the middle classes during the 1870s and 1880s. There is no little irony in the fact that as Baltimore made headlines around the nation during the 1850s as a hotbed of anti-Catholic Know Nothingism, its Irish immigrants were taking the first quiet steps towards their rise to a level of material prosperity and social respectability that their kinsmen in most other American cities could only envy.

Baltimore’s German immigrant population, twice as large as the Irish contingent, dwarfed the older German-American group and exerted a major impact on the whole city. Along with their children, German immigrants comprised about a third of the white population. When the pre-1820 German Americans and the German background in-migrants from rural Maryland and Pennsylvania are added, the figure is close to 40 percent. Although the Germans had their share of drunken, brutal, and degraded men and women, these were balanced against a far greater number of solid, successful, hardworking families and hundreds of exceptionally talented individuals who moved quickly into positions of wealth and leadership. There is no mystery to the dramatic difference between the city’s two chief immigrant groups. The Irish came a from an impoverished, subjugated, nearly medieval backwater of the British Isles while the Germans came from a group of prosperous states that had provided many of them with job skills and a formal education which were clearly superior to those available in Baltimore. Therefore, while the Irish were largely dismissed as unskilled, turbulent peasants, the success of the Germans commanded wide attention and they aroused a curious mixture of respect, envy, and animosity. Germans achieved success at every level of the employment market and in almost every type of occupation. There were well over a thousand German butchers and saloon keepers, hundreds of artisans, dozens of brewers, and a number of large-scale manufacturers. In 1860 the piano maker William Knabe opened his huge factory in southeast Baltimore. It employed almost 300 workers and produced hundreds of pianos each year. Many native-born Anglo Americans simply found it impossible to compete with such educated, skilled and hardworking people. When Baltimore’s Know Nothings ranted in the 1850s about the immigrant threat to American workers, it was usually the Germans that they pointed to, and the accusation was not entirely groundless. Had the economy not been growing so rapidly, they would have been an even greater threat to American-born citizens. For Baltimore as a whole, the German contribution to the economy, government and society was enormous. It is difficult to imagine how the city could have prospered as it did during these years (and for many decades afterwards) without the German influx.
Unlike the Palatine Germans who had come to Baltimore during the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century German immigrants were a more diverse group. They came from a wide variety of local Germanic states, spoke half a dozen different dialects, and followed a number of different local customs. In religion they were divided between the Lutherans (the majority denomination), Roman Catholics, and Jews. Beyond these major religious divisions were further subgroups. The Lutheran and Reformed churches, which claimed the adherence of almost three quarters of German Christians, had split into several separate denominations over theological issues and the use of English in services. The German Jewish community, which numbered approximately 5,000 in 1860, was divided between Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative and supported three separate synagogues: Baltimore Hebrew Congregation (1829), Har Sinai (1842), and Oheb Shalom (1853). The members of Baltimore’s German Jewish community thought of themselves as German Americans almost as much as they considered themselves Jews and participated fully in Baltimore’s Germanic community, contributing to all the German charitable, literary, and civic associations.

Given their overall record of achievement, the Germans’ success in building an elaborate system of community institutions in Baltimore is no surprise, but the vast range and longevity of these societies, associations, businesses and clubs is without parallel. Between 1820 and 1850 twenty-five different German language newspapers were published in Baltimore. By the 1850s three of them were major publications: the Deutsche Correspondent, the Demokratsche, and the Wecker. The columns of these papers reveal the amazingly wide spectrum of organizations available to the city’s Germans: literary clubs, singing societies, dramatic groups, athletic clubs (including the semi-political turnverein clubs), and an almost endless list of purely social groups.

Educational programs and institutions formed a key element within the community. Almost every German club or association sponsored lectures, held debates, and maintained libraries. Attached to almost every church and synagogue was a school that provided religious instruction and German language courses. Henrich Scheib, pastor of Zion Church, opened a regular full-time school in 1836 that offered non-sectarian and bilingual classes. It quickly became one of the best educational institutions in the city. Wilhelm Knapp, one of the many talented and educated Germans forced to flee to America after the failure of the German Revolution of 1848, opened a school in 1853, which soon had over 700 students. Its chief claim to fame was one of its later graduates, Henry L. Mencken, but by the time young Henry entered its doors in 1886, Knapp’s Institute had trained many of the city’s leading German Americans.

In their zeal for education, and their thoroughness in organizing schools which either supplemented or stood beside (perhaps above) the city’s still somewhat shaky public school system, Baltimore’s Germans seemed the very model of enlightened progress. However, their insistence on the continued use of the German language, and their obvious preference for so many things Germanic, was off-putting to many Anglo Americans. There is of course no doubt that almost all German Americans loved their adopted country. They constantly celebrated
America’s freedom and its wide economic opportunities, but the still predominantly Anglo American culture seemed much less attractive to them. German culture and customs appeared to be clearly superior and more enjoyable. German music, both sacred and secular, was something almost every Baltimorean found praiseworthy and the habit of putting up an evergreen tree in the house at Christmas had gained wide acceptance, but other aspects of Germanic culture seemed odd, and some stirred real controversy. The insistence of German Americans on the continued use of the German language in their own newspapers as well as in public notices and other documents was annoying to some because it stemmed only partly from the convenience it offered to those with a poor command of English. The major reason was the view that German was a superior language for many purposes and its loss would close the door to a full understanding and appreciation of German culture—something that most German Americans regarded as a real tragedy.

While less of a purely German question, the alcohol issue was more inflammatory. Anglo American temperance advocates found the German love of beer and wine both sinful degrading. In addition, the Germans maintained a “continental Sabbath,” going to church on Sunday morning while enjoying themselves during the afternoon with family picnics, club outings, and other such sacrilegious amusements. Baltimore’s evangelicals were aghast at these practices and roundly condemned them. In response, the Germans made fun of what they regarded as a group of narrow-minded bigots who did not know how to enjoy themselves.

Clearly, by the 1850s there was a large German-American community in existence in Baltimore that, while scattered across every ward in the city, managed to carry on its life quite separately from the rest of their neighbors. Tied together by language, a common culture, a number of pan-Germanic social institutions, and a strong German language press, they were undoubtedly a foreign element. However, many other German Americans were far more American than German. They had relatively little to do with the local German institutions, having gradually moved into the city’s mainstream “American” culture. Their only affiliation was through the Lutheran church, but even here Americanization had become quite evident. By 1860 almost half of the city’s Lutheran churches had abandoned German in their services and there were half a dozen Methodist and Baptist churches with predominantly German congregations (all of which used English in their services). In demographic terms, the city’s “kleindeutschland” was a very dynamic entity, constantly losing members to the mainstream while gaining new ones from the immigrant ships. When the immigrants stopped arriving, the sub-community died.

The most grim and depressing chapter in the history of antebellum Baltimore is the story of its African Americans. While the Irish slowly made their way upward and the Germans moved rapidly into the middle and upper income levels, Baltimore’s African Americans were pushed further towards the edges of Baltimore’s economy and society. The great majority remained tied to the lowest rungs of the economic ladder, a number of those who held better paying occupations lost them, and in the 1850s the total number of black residents in the city actually declined.
slightly. The one bright spot was the continuing decline of slavery in Baltimore, but even this progressive trend was tempered by the fact that slavery remained very much alive in rural Maryland and the state government remained in the hands of slave-owning politicians who regarded the city’s free black community as a grave danger. Calls in the 1850s for the re-enslavement or banishment of Maryland’s free blacks aroused profound feelings of insecurity among a population already harassed by legal restraints and the powerful bonds of white supremacy. Table 5.1 shows that only 8 percent of the city’s 27,898 African American residents remained in slavery by 1860. The city’s slaveholders themselves had almost disappeared as an element in city politics. When a call went out in 1859 for each county in the state to select delegates for a statewide convention of slaveholders, so few Baltimore City slaveholders showed up that no delegates were chosen. This contrasted sharply with the Maryland countryside where 61 percent of African Americans remained in bondage and slaveholders remained a powerful political force.

The fear that this free community in Baltimore, in conjunction with the free blacks residing in the rural counties, might incite the state’s slaves to escape or revolt, led the Maryland General Assembly to place increasingly harsh restrictions on all freedmen. Baltimore’s (and Maryland’s) “free” African Americans enjoyed only the most restricted liberty and possessed almost none of the privileges that their white neighbors took for granted. The statutory constraints were onerous and degrading, but the powerful informal restrictions placed on their employment opportunities by the white majority during the 1840s and 1850s became even more devastating. White artisans and laborers sought to eliminate the competition of black workers and during the 1820s and 1830s petitioned the city council to limit trades such as ship caulker, drayman and carpenter to white men only. When this effort failed, many white workers took direct action, savagely attacking free blacks or slaves found working in their trades. The young Frederick Douglass, sent as a slave to work as a caulker at William Gardiner’s shipyard in Fells Point in the 1830s, was almost killed when a group of white workers set upon him.

While white violence was a real danger for African American artisans, a number continued to pursue these coveted jobs since they provided almost the only opportunity to rise above the ranks of the unskilled laborer. Black artisans continued to be sought after by white employers because, unlike the white artisans who tended to move from one job to another and were always haggling for higher wages or more time off, African Americans (regarding themselves fortunate to have any type of better paying job) had the reputation of being loyal workers with few complaints. Unfortunately, many Irish and German immigrants also counted themselves lucky to obtain an artisan-level job and while hardly popular with native white workers, they aroused less hostility than African Americans. Their arrival in Baltimore during the 1840s and 1850s was a severe economic setback not only for black artisans, but for black workers in every line of employment--even that of common laborer. Between 1850 and 1860 overall black employment declined by over 20 percent, while some occupations such as carpenter, sawyer, and shoemaker
declined by half or more. Even common laboring jobs fell by 28 percent. It was undoubtedly this narrowing of economic opportunity that slowed black in-migration to the city. The free black population, which had grown steadily since the 1790s, stagnated and with the continuing decline in the number of slaves, the city’s total African American population fell by 494 between 1850 and 1860. On the eve of the Civil War Baltimore’s African Americans appear to have been one of the eastern seaboard’s poorest black communities. Baltimore had a lower percentage of “propertied” black families than any major city except Washington D.C. and the aggregate wealth of the whole community was also among the lowest. Philadelphia’s African Americans, though less numerous than their Baltimore counterparts, possessed almost twice the amount of taxable property. Like every other group in the city, the majority of Baltimore’s free black residents were hard working, quiet, respectable people, but there was also a substantial congress of irresponsible, degraded and violent individuals, the equivalent of the “fighting Irish” and the “drunken Dutchman” and the classic Anglo-American “rowdy.” This group of young black men (and a few women) disturbed and victimized other members of the black community. Drunken and violent young black men disrupted picnics and other outings sponsored by black churches and sometimes even disturbed regular church services. Their frequent appearance in the city criminal court for various acts of violence received far more attention in the local press than the solid accomplishments of the black middle class.  

As a result of the declining economic conditions, the elaborate array of religious, social and economic institutions that Baltimore’s African Americans built up during the 1820-1840 era were hard pressed to sustain themselves. Very few of black congregations could pay their ministers a living wage and while Bethel A.M.E., Sharp Street, and St. James possessed handsome church buildings all of which were extensively remodeled and enlarged in the 1850s, most others African American houses of worship were extremely modest. Likewise, the fifteen African American Sunday schools that operated during the 1850s were often conducted in cellars, back rooms, and other grossly inadequate surroundings. The city’s public schools did not admit African American children (even though black taxpayers were compelled to pay the school tax), so African American Sunday schools were important institutions. Apparently they were successful. By the 1850s a majority of the city’s free blacks reported that they could read and write-- a vastly higher rate of literacy than existed in rural Maryland. Frederick Douglass recalled that a number of his fellow black caulkers could read, write and “cipher” (do math) quite well. They even organized a literary and debating group called the “East Baltimore Mental Improvement Society,” an organization that Douglass credited with aiding his own intellectual development.  

There is no doubt that the great majority of the African American community’s most active and successful members were not only literate, but well-read, and thoroughly informed. As a major commercial port Baltimore was awash in newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and books. Most of the larger black churches possessed a library and supported literary and debating
Chapter 5: A Diverse and Volatile City, 1820-1860

societies. For the city’s small African American elite, perhaps 500-600 men and women, something like a comfortable middle class existence was possible provided the jobs that supported this elevated life-style remained open. It was a precarious and somewhat isolated existence. Completely shut off from anything resembling normal contact with the white middle class and excluded from the city’s white cultural institutions, educated and cultured black families were likewise distanced from those of their own race whose fierce struggle for survival left little time for self-improvement. With so few people of even moderate wealth, it was next to impossible to support those types of institutions that white Baltimoreans enjoyed in abundance. On the eve of the Civil War, Baltimore’s free African American community, the largest in the nation, was for the most part a desperately poor urban proletariat restricted in the personal freedom and tied to the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder. Its middle class families were too few in number and insufficiently wealthy themselves to affect much change within their own community and almost totally without influence in the larger white world. This circumstance is particularly tragic since many were individuals of intelligence and ability who in a more enlightened age would have become community leaders and contributed substantially to the city’s general progress. James Handy, for example, was a minister at Bethel church, a founder of the Nazarite fraternal order and Grand Master of the city’s black Masonic Lodge. Hiram Revels led the Madison Street Presbyterian Church and later went on to a career in politics, serving for a time as U.S. senator from Mississippi. Outside the small circle of major leaders were several hundred men and women who took smaller responsibilities and contributed their hard earned money to support the community’s social and religious institutions. An example of these local pillars was James Wilson, an enslaved man who bought his own freedom in 1827, who taught reading at the Bethel Sunday School and served in a variety of church offices for over a half a century. Wilson worked for many years as an assistant to John H. B. Latrobe, one of his tasks reportedly being to drive the first B&O train from Baltimore to the Relay House in 1830.148 In the separate, nearly secret world of black Baltimore, such individuals were loved and respected. Outside of it, their talents were generally known only to the few white people who employed them. Occasionally one of the city’s newspapers praised some signal achievement as occurred in 1859 when Bethel Church completed a large and expensive renovation of their edifice. The American described the renovation in some detail, praising the building committee for its “zealous attention” to the project lauding especially Rev. J. M. Brown as a minister “known for his energetic and preserving yet sterling character... in forwarding the holy mission for which he is acting.”149 Unfortunately, newspaper coverage of such positive aspects of the black community were far outweighed by negative reportage, so unless someone made a point to inquire, the overall impression gained of America’s largest free African American community was quite bleak. Its 28,000 members knew they were generally looked upon as a useful source of cheap labor but also a vaguely troubling, alien element. They showed their allegiance to their enslaved counterparts in the wake of John Brown’s attempt to launch a slave revolt at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, forty miles west of the city. Shortly after the abolitionist’s
execution in December 1859 the Baltimore City police raided the annual dance the city’s black ship caulkers held at “Caulker’s Hall” in Shrewsbury Alley in Canton. In the raid the officers found a drawing of Brown with the words “The martyr--God Bless Him,” and another of Virginia’s governor Henry Wise accompanied by “inscriptions unfit for publication.” Some attending the dance reportedly carried pistols. Since Baltimore City’s black community was almost all free, there was obviously no threat of a slave revolt, but the discoveries the police made at the caulkers’ ball indicated that the city could not avoid the most pressing political and moral questions of the day.
Introduction to Chapter 6
Baltimore’s Civil War, 1861-1867
by Elizabeth M. Nix

The Civil War period tested Baltimore’s claim to remain America’s southernmost Northern city and its northernmost Southern city. While ardent Confederates and staunch Unionists resided in the city, Arnold asserts that they each held only small minorities. By Arnold’s calculations, most voters remained neutral during the conflict and mainly wanted to preserve their mercantile livelihood. Trade had always been the lifeblood of Baltimore’s economy, and there was never any real possibility that the city would support the secession of Maryland, a move that would have cut the city off from lucrative commerce with the North and the West. Arnold states that if Maryland had joined the Confederacy, it would have been "economic suicide" for Baltimore. While its citizens grumbled when the Union army took over after the 1861 Pratt Street Riots, Arnold argues that the "military occupation saved the city." Baltimore became a producer of provisions for the entire Union army that fed the boys in blue with Baltimore flour. Baltimore’s wharves proved ideal for repairing Union ships. The wounded recovered in the city’s hospitals. Baltimore’s location and its network of railroads and steamships made it a hub for people, communication and goods during the conflict. While Arnold found some evidence of letters and small packages moving through the city into enemy territory, he says that the movement of goods that aided the Confederacy was actually quite small. Arnold challenges other historians who see the war as a crisis for the city. Instead, in this chapter he shows that during the war years, Baltimore enjoyed "high profits, strong trade and nearly full employment."

Political turmoil gripped the city after peace was declared. Arnold recounts the struggles between the Democrats and Republicans to limit the voters their opponents could claim. Calling the resulting election judge crisis "the most dire since 1861," Arnold shows again that some Baltimoreans used the Civil War for their personal and political gain. The new Maryland constitutions, crafted by Republicans and then Democrats after the war to reduce the influence of former slaveholders on the Eastern Shore, granted more political power to Baltimore in the state.

In anticipation of the sesquicentennial of the war, Johns Hopkins University Press published two books that touched on the conflict’s impact on the Baltimore area. Readers can learn more about Baltimore’s role in supplying the Union troops in Mark Wilson’s book, The Business of the Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State. Charles W. Mitchell compiled an extensive collection of primary sources from this period in Maryland Voices of the Civil War.
Chapter 6: Baltimore’s Civil War, 1861-1867

The Civil War profoundly disrupted Baltimore and left an imprint that lasted for many decades, but the war itself was not the great watershed in the city’s history that some historians have suggested. For Baltimore, the upheaval of 1861-1865 completed the transition from the Golden Age to an era when Baltimoreans no longer thought of themselves as living in one of pioneering cities of the nation and finally seemed content to reside in a South Atlantic regional center.

The secession crisis and the long war that followed showed that while Baltimore (and most of Maryland) was Southern-oriented, it was not truly Southern in the sense that Richmond or Norfolk were Southern. Most Baltimoreans would probably have wished to remain neutral in the conflict, but when choosing sides became unavoidable, the majority chose the Union side. They did so with little enthusiasm, but the logic was inescapable. First, Baltimore’s long-term prosperity rested on the continuing economic unity of the North, South, and West. A permanent rift between these areas spelled economic doom. Second, the belief that a Republican administration would end slavery, the nightmare that drove so many Southerners over the political edge, was not a nightmare in either Baltimore or Maryland where tens of thousands of blacks already lived as free people and the whole institution appeared to be on the way out. Finally, Baltimore leaders, perhaps more than many of their more Southern counterparts, had traveled both on business and for pleasure in the Northeastern states and had a much more realistic sense of their commercial and industrial power.

Even though the city remained in the Union during the war, only a minority of its residents fervently supported the Union cause and when the fighting ended, most of the merchant community in the city quickly reestablished and strengthened their Southern ties. Baltimore and Maryland ended up on the Union side because those who really wanted the state to join the Confederacy were also a minority, and before these firebrands could even bring the issue before the Maryland General Assembly, the Lincoln administration sent federal troops into the state, securing the area for the Union. From May 1861 until the spring of 1865 the city of Baltimore and the state of Maryland were ruled jointly by a coalition of local Unionists and the U. S. Army.
The military occupation of Baltimore caused great conflict and much bitterness between those sympathetic to the Southern cause and the outspoken Unionists; but it saved the city from economic disaster. The loss of the city’s Southern trade was certainly a great blow to those merchants specializing in that area, but its international commerce, trade with the Northern and Middle Western states, plus a growing volume of military contracting, soon made up for the Southern embargo and Baltimore’s overall economic position was stronger in 1863-1865 than it had been before the war began.

The occupation made overt conflict between Southern and Union sympathizers impossible. Pro-Southern Baltimoreans, of whom there were thousands, either left the city to join the Confederate army or were forced to keep their views to themselves. Those who spoke out in any way considered disloyal to the Union were arrested and many ended up in jail. Thus it is impossible to guess exactly what proportion of the city’s residents supported the Union compared to those favoring the Confederacy. It appears that a relatively small group of Baltimoreans, perhaps 6,000-8,000 voters, clearly supported the Union cause and worked actively to suppress the Southern rebellion. A larger group, possibly 15,000-16,000 men, certainly supported the Confederacy. Among these, about 9,000 actually went South to serve in the Confederate army or navy (a number of these were young men under twenty-one years). This leaves approximately 25,000-30,000 men who remained deeply conflicted in their views and probably supported neither side in any active way. Baltimore’s women, who sometimes played a significant role in the conflict, probably held views in about the same proportions as the men, but because of their restricted freedom in public life, much smaller numbers took active roles on behalf of the Union or the Confederacy.

Strong feelings generated by the war sometimes strained social relations to the breaking point. Longtime friends, neighbors, and business associates--often with sons fighting in the opposing armies--ceased to speak to each other. Many social organizations and even church congregations nearly split or suffered massive losses of members because pro-Southern and pro-Northern members could not work together. On the other hand, the very nature of Baltimore as a half-Northern/half-Southern city sustained relations between those who ended up supporting one side or the other, or who supported neither side. Amy D’Arcy Wetmore, a wise and observant young woman who lived in the city throughout the war, recalled long afterwards that even though opinions among friends and neighbors were deeply divided, old friendships resumed once the war ended, "with a mutual agreement to taboo all references to the thrilling events of the four years just ended."151

Once the war ended, the group that probably suffered the most severe social (and political) reprimand from the majority of Baltimoreans was the city’s core group of ardent Unionists or Radical Unionists as they came to be called. They were of course beyond the pale for the city’s pro-Confederates, but the unwavering support they gave to the harsh and sometimes foolish oppressions of the military commanders who ruled the city also alienated the neutralists.
and even most of the more temperate Union supporters. Also, the Radical Unionists’ expressions of moral outrage at the Southern rebellion, and the obvious relish with which they observed the bloody destruction of the Confederacy, seemed insensitive and bigoted to all those Baltimoreans who, even though they thought the Southern secessionists were wrong headed and even foolish, nevertheless understood and respected them.

In 1860-1861 Baltimore’s business leaders, the group to whom nearly everyone had always turned to for leadership, came down solidly against secession since joining the southern rebellion would have been economic suicide. They were less sure, initially, that it was right or necessary to restore the Union, and that is why there was so much political confusion in the city during the spring of 1861, but as it became apparent that both the Confederates and the Northerners were prepared to use military force, they were compelled to accept the prospect of supporting the war as the only way of resolving the crisis and restoring to the city its now lost Southern trade. Conveniently, most of these reluctant Unionists did not need to play any active role in the suppression of the Confederacy. All they had to do was keep quiet, pay their taxes, and refrain from any overt statements or acts that could be interpreted as pro-Southern. The outspoken Radical Unionists eagerly took up the thankless task of actually raising the money, troops and supplies needed to crush the Confederacy. For this the reluctant Unionists were undoubtedly thankful, but when the war ended they tended to shun the Radical Unionists and welcome back the (now) ex-Confederates. Such a policy seems hypocritical and unfair, but since the vast majority of all white Baltimoreans never saw the war as a political crusade to uphold the federal Union, or a moral crusade to end slavery, there was every reason to bring the city’s Confederates back into the fold and resume the special relationship that the city had built up with the Southern states. On the other hand, Baltimore’s most loyal Radical Unionists (who by 1865 had formally joined the Republican Party) seemed to think that all ex-Confederates, whether they were former Baltimore residents or merchants in Richmond, were still the enemy and should be kept at arm’s length. Such a policy could never be tolerated if the city was to reunite internally and reestablish trade with its former customers in the South. Therefore, in 1867 the Unionist-Republicans were banished from city politics and did not reappear until the mid-1890s, and then only because the majority Democratic Party temporarily split. In this bizarre way, Baltimore was able to remain officially within the Union and supportive of the war, (profiting enormously from its role as a Union army supply center), while its more neutralist and pro-Confederate elements maintained quiet and private contacts with friends and former customers within the Confederate states. It is not a glorious tale, or even a very attractive one, but since the city was so deeply divided, it was probably the only course it could have taken if it was to survive the great storm of Civil War.

The great upheavals of 1861-1865 were of course not even imagined in the fall of 1860, but Baltimoreans were deeply concerned about the city’s future in the wake of Lincoln’s nomination as the Republican candidate for president and the strong Republican stand against
the expansion of slavery. In the Deep South slave states, the so-called Breckenridge Democrats
had made it clear they would seek secession if Lincoln was elected, while supporters of Bell and
Douglas (both nominated at conventions held in Baltimore) hoped for some compromise short of
disunion. Baltimore's new mayor, George William Brown, had been elected in October by a
combination of Breckenridge and Douglas supporters, and he expressed the hope that in spite of
difference on the great national issues surrounding the Republicans and slavery, Baltimoreans
would "be able to act together for the good of the community."152 The outcome of the presidential
election the next month in Baltimore was not encouraging. Breckenridge captured almost half the
vote, Bell got over 40 percent, while Lincoln and Douglas together received only 10 percent. The
secession of the six Deep South states in January 1861 threw the city into turmoil. Some thought
Maryland should secede, a larger number opposed the idea, and nearly all seemed to agree that
the federal government should not use military force to deal with the crisis. The Southern attack
on Fort Sumter raised the stakes and shifted opinions both in Baltimore and throughout
Maryland. Views changed again in late May with the secession of Virginia, Maryland's neighbor
and largest Southern customer, but even then it appears there was no majority either in the city or
the state to join the Confederacy. The firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers to
suppress the rebellion, and the secession of Virginia placed Maryland and Baltimore in a delicate
strategic position. Obviously, the Lincoln administration could not allow Maryland to secede or it
would have to abandon the capital in Washington. More than that, it could not allow any
interruption in the rail line that connected Washington with the North. The B&O's Washington
Branch was the only line into the capital and with the Potomac River route now compromised by
Virginia's secession, the security of the federal government depended on the B&O and the
movement of troops and supplies through Baltimore. The obstruction of these troop movements
through the city in April 1861 is the incident that led directly to its occupation by federal troops.

The movement of a group of troops from the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment through
Baltimore on April 19, 1861, and the circumstances under which they exchanged a deadly fire
with a large crowd of Southern sympathizers on Pratt Street, has been told in great detail by many
authors who have assigned blame on a variety of individuals and circumstances. Given the larger
political and military drama, of which the Baltimore "riot" of April 19 forms just a small part, a
series of all too human miscalculations by local authorities explain the events that day. There was
no direct connection between the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad and the
B&O, so the cars carrying the troops had to be drawn slowly along Pratt Street. The first group of
troops made the trip between the President Street Station and Camden Station safely, but an
angry, violent crowd blockaded the next cars, forcing the troops to get out and march along the
street. When Mayor Brown and Police Chief George Kane, realized what had happened, they
rushed to the scene from Camden Station and did their best to protect the troops. They were too
late. By the time they arrived, the crowd had felled several troops with bricks and gunshots. Even
as Brown tried to lead them down the street and Kane's police protected the rear, the troops began
firing at their attackers. By the time they reached Camden Station, four soldiers and a dozen Baltimoreans lay dead, and many more were wounded. While the commanding officer of the Massachusetts regiment later praised Brown and the city authorities for their efforts to protect his troops, municipal authorities seemed unable to guarantee safe passage through the city. Concerned that the movement of more troops through the city would result in a much larger and deadlier encounter, Brown, Kane and a number of other local leaders took the rash step of burning the railroad bridges along the PW&B and the Northern Central. This foolish action, taken in the heat of the moment, shifted responsibility for the problem from the Lincoln administration, which had ordered the troops to move through the city, to Baltimore's municipal leaders who now, in the name of public safety, had moved across the line into nearly treasonous behavior. At that point the president and his military leaders would have been irresponsible not to occupy Baltimore and the whole region through which the vital rail lines ran. In almost every respect, the bridge burning turned out to be a disaster. Not only did it provide the federal government with a sound legal basis for sending troops into the city, it cut Baltimore's merchants off from their most vital commercial links to the Northeast and Great Lakes. The federal government was able to commandeer boats to ferry Northern troops from Perryville where the PW&B crossed the Susquehanna River down to Annapolis and thence it was a short march into Washington; Baltimore’s merchants could make no such adjustments and they quickly began to lose money. They were soon imploring local authorities to repair the bridges. Perhaps the one positive effect of the bridge burning was to show Baltimore’s leaders and citizens the utter futility of trying to control events that had clearly grown far beyond the city and the state. It was foolish to think that the federal government would somehow exempt or exclude Baltimore from participation in the gigantic political and military crisis unfolding across the whole nation, especially when its position was so strategic. The truth of all this appears to have sunk in during the days following the "riot" and the bridge burning, for while there was still some talk of resisting further troop movements, excitement gave way to a sense of inevitability. Reading newspaper accounts of the thousands of Northern troops moving down towards Washington, most Baltimoreans sensed that open resistance was hopeless. Thus on May 13, 1861, when Gen. Benjamin Butler and about 2,000 other Massachusetts troops arrived in south Baltimore aboard several B&O trains that had met them at Annapolis Junction, they marched without incident up to Federal Hill and encamped. The next morning, the only Baltimoreans who accosted the soldiers were peddlers, food sellers, and merchants offering to provide the encampment with every convenience at the lowest prices. The following day, when Butler let some of the troops wander down into the center of the city, they encountered no problems. Even so, the suspicious general issued a proclamation placing the city under martial law. The order stood until the war ended in the spring of 1865.

Baltimore had a number of different military commanders during the war, three of them in the first month. General Butler was soon replaced by Gen. George Cadwalader from
Pennsylvania who was himself replaced on June 11th by Gen. Nathaniel Banks, the former Governor of Massachusetts. Banks had been a Know Nothing and was now a Republican, so he got on well with the former American Party men in Baltimore who formed a large portion of the city's Unionists movement.

The general's chief duty was the protection of the railroads leading in and out of the city and this responsibility required most of the men under his command. Therefore, he had to rely heavily on the local police to preserve order and escort companies of troops through the city. Sometimes the troops passed through peacefully, but other times groups of local residents jeered at them and occasionally threw stones or bricks. After about two weeks of watching the police escorts, General Banks decided Police Marshal Kane was at least unreliable and possibly disloyal, so he had Kane arrested. When the city's three police commissioners protested, they were thrown into prison. Several months later, Banks became convinced that Mayor Brown was not trustworthy and he, too, was marched off by the provost marshal. He remained under arrest until his term as mayor expired in late 1861. Whether the arrests of Kane, the commissioners, and the mayor were justified, it seemed to convince many of the pro-Southerners to keep quiet or leave town. Henry Winter Davis, a former local Know Nothing now prominent in the Unionist movement, thought the arrests were decisive. He wrote to a friend that the removal of these individuals "was the final blow to secessionism in Maryland--universally rejoiced over by Union men--whined over by the namby-pambies--and greeted with furious, but impotent rage by the traitors." Whether these arrests did indeed turn the tide, if indeed there was still any danger of a genuine secessionist movement in either the city or state, the change in police leadership from Kane to the fervent and able Unionist John R. Kenly virtually ended the problem of troop harassment.

Banks did his job well, but he was too able a commander (and too prominent a politician) to remain in a secondary command, so after a month he moved on and was replaced by Gen. John A. Dix, an able politician from New York who turned out to be a tough and efficient military ruler. President Lincoln had advised General Dix to hold Baltimore in line "with a gentle, but firm, and certain hand," but it appears that the general was often more firm than gentle. Dix concluded almost immediately that if he was to maintain order and security, he could tolerate no disloyalty or sign of support for the Southern cause. Unguarded remarks praising the South or critical of the Federal government were grounds for arrest as was the wearing of Confederate colors, or the possession of any pictures of Confederate leaders. More serious offenses such as sending or receiving letters from those living in the South, sending any type of goods South, or disrupting in any way the movement of Union troops or supplies through the city could land a man or woman in prison for an extended period of time. Hundreds of the arrests made for more minor offenses were probably of dubious value in preserving the Union and even such strong Unionists as Henry Winter Davis thought that "such petty suppressions... were needless and useless and damaging."
Despite the strict military surveillance, it seems that a heavy volume of illegal letters and packages passed from Baltimore down into the Confederacy. Families in the city continued to correspond with friends and relatives living in the Southern states or serving in the Confederate armies. Later in the war, when Gen. Lew Wallace, who was about to relieve Gen. Robert Schenk as commander in Baltimore, asked how so many letters traveled back and forth between Baltimore and the South, Schenk replied, "Go ask any little girl you see on the street." The movement of goods into the Confederacy from Baltimore was undoubtedly a problem, but it appears doubtful that the volume was ever very large. The Baltimorean Levi S. White claimed to moved substantial amounts of military supplies and medical goods from Baltimore into Virginia, but there is no way to substantiate his testimony, given long after the war ended. Stores were forbidden to sell any goods they suspected were being purchased for delivery to the South, but it was almost impossible to enforce such a rule since purchasers were unlikely to convict themselves by announcing that they were buying items for a friend in the Confederate army.

The one major attempt to crackdown on store sales to smugglers and/or clandestine Confederate purchasing agents came very late in war, in October 1864. Soldiers swooped down on seven of the city's most prominent retail merchants, arresting them and all their clerks. The most prominent target was Hamilton Easter, who argued, quite plausibly, that for a man with his size of retail operation to risk arrest and the confiscation of all his goods in order to sell a few low-priced pieces of cloth to someone he knew to be a Confederate agent was "rather a small profit for a transaction so risky." The chief problem with the whole affair was the government's informant who turned out to be a very shady character and possibly a double agent. After the merchants and their clerks had languished for several weeks in a Washington jail, several leading Baltimore Unionists, including Johns Hopkins and Enoch Pratt, wrote President Lincoln urging him to look into the matter. The president concluded that the government had no case. At his urging, judge advocate general finally released all the suspects and allowed them to reopen for business. It was an embarrassing fiasco.

There was no pressing need for Baltimore's merchants to trade with the South during the war since the Union gave them plenty of business. As the closest large port city to the major theater of fighting in the war, Baltimore became a huge center for supplies, ship repair, and medical care. By the end of 1862 the city's economy had returned to its pre-war level and by the next year had substantially exceeded it. For example, flour shipments, which amounted to 400,000 barrels in 1860, reached 513,000 in 1863. The War Department purchased over one-third of this flour (180,000 barrels). The Baltimore Corn and Flour Exchange, celebrating the banner year not only for flour but a wide variety of commodities, acknowledged that much of the success derived from "the liberal share of government patronage awarded our citizens during the year." The huge fleet of gunboats and transports that supplied the Army of the Potomac and maintained the naval blockade of the South Atlantic Confederate ports required constant refitting and repair, and Baltimore was the most convenient location for much of this activity. Not again until the Second
World War did the port’s shipbuilding and repair docks handle so much business. Manufacturers of military uniforms, tents, harnesses, cooking utensils, and medical supplies did a large and steady business filling government orders. The constant movement of thousands of troops through the city, often after a stay of a few days or a couple of weeks, provided retailers of every sort with unprecedented opportunities for sales to the soldiers. Along with the soldiers came thousands of horses and mules, all of which had to be fed and cared for while they awaited transfer to some new location, or, if they were to be taken out of service, replaced by new animals which Baltimore’s horse and mule dealers often provided. The city’s largest business, the B&O, suffered severely from Confederate raids and portions of it were constantly shut down, but when it was open it moved enormous amounts of goods and hundreds of thousands of troops. Not only did it continue to serve as the rail link between Washington and the North, it moved huge numbers of troops back and forth between the Eastern and Western theaters of the war, sometimes using thirty or forty complete trains in the operation. All that carrying trade brought handsome profits. Between 1861 and 1862, when the worst destruction of tracks and equipment occurred, the road’s profits fell from $2.3 million to $1.8, but then protection of the line improved and in 1864 it earned a record $5.3 million.

A good portion of the profits earned by the B&O, and many of the other local businesses that prospered under the flood of war orders, found their way into Baltimore’s banks. The banking system itself was strengthened by passage of the National Banking Act in 1863, and a new chapter in the city’s financial history opened that same year with the establishment of the First National Bank of Maryland under the leadership of Johns Hopkins. Baltimoreans may have complained about military rule during the war, but high profits, strong trade, and nearly full employment undoubtedly salved the pain that many felt.

Politics and government in Baltimore during the war were Unionist politics and Unionist government. The Unionist Party developed out of a broad coalition of former American Party members, old Whigs, and pro-union Democrats. The Democratic Party in both the city and the state simply fell to pieces and did not come back together until 1864 and 1865. Consequently, Baltimore’s city government was totally under the control of the Unionist Party. The mayor through the war years was a small businessman named John Lee Chapman, a hardworking, ardent Union man who had been elected to the First Branch of the City Council in 1861. A former American Party member, Chapman was chosen to be chairman of the Second Branch and thus when Mayor Brown was arrested he took over the position as mayor-ex officio. Perhaps because most of the more prominent Unionist leaders did not want to be burdened with the daily responsibilities of the mayor’s job, Chapman ran as the party’s candidate for a full term in October 1861 and easily won over an even more obscure Unionist candidate. Chapman was elected twice more and did not leave office until 1867. The Unionists were diligent public servants, collecting taxes, extending public services, raising money for troops, and cooperating with the military commanders to keep the city secure.
The two leading Unionists in the city during the war were Henry Stockbridge and Thomas Swann, and as the conflict wound down in 1864-1865 they came to represent the two diverging factions with the coalition party. Essentially, the two men parted ways over the basic orientation that Baltimore should take once the Confederacy had been defeated. Stockbridge was a New England-born attorney whose devotion to the Union cause, and his antipathy towards slavery and the whole Southern way of life made him eager to pull Baltimore and Maryland further away from the South and strengthen its ties with the Northern and Western states. Swann, on the other hand, believed that while the Southern slave system was a burden and should be eliminated, Baltimore’s economic ties to the South were essential to its long-term growth and must quickly be re-cemented after the war. This was a very broad question and did not arise in any specific way until 1865, so on most of the other wartime issues that the coalition had to deal with, the Unionists were in general agreement. On the question of emancipation, both believed that not only should the slaves of the Confederacy be freed, but those in Maryland as well. They further agreed that Southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore (the center of slave holding in the state) held undue power in the state and that Baltimore City should gain more than the token representation it held in the General Assembly. They also agreed that those Marylanders who had fought for the Confederacy should lose their political privileges if they chose to return to Maryland after the war.

The high watermark of cooperation between the two leaders and their respective factions within the Unionist movement was their support for the new Maryland Constitution of 1864. While Stockbridge played the leading role in writing the document, Swann, supported the constitution and helped to get it passed in a hard fought referendum, positioning himself to run for governor on the Unionist ticket in 1864. The constitution emancipated Maryland’s enslaved people, stripped the old slave-holding areas of their special political privileges, and redistributed seats in the General Assembly to more accurately reflect the large populations in the central and western parts of the state. Baltimore’s number of delegates rose from ten to eighteen and it received a third senator. The section of the constitution dealing with franchise was quite broad. It allowed election judges to bar from the polls any person who had fought for the Confederacy, but also those "who had given any aid, comfort, countenance, or support to those engaged in armed hostility." In spite of his private misgivings, Swann supported the whole constitution, and in return Stockbridge, Henry Winter Davis and the other so-called Radical Unionists backed his campaign for governor. Swann won the election in the fall of 1864, although under the new constitution he did not replace Governor Bradford until December, 1865. With the Stockbridge and Radical Unionists well entrenched in the city and operating virtually as a part of the Republican Party, and Swann, with his more conservative, some thought pro-Southern, views, headed for Annapolis, the future of the Unionist movement looked increasingly uncertain.

The underlying tensions between the two wings of the Unionist movement grew stronger as the war drew to a close. When General Grant finally captured Richmond in April, 1865 Mayor
Chapman ordered a general illumination of the city and the pro-Union American gave "Thanksgiving and praise for this overpowering blow which has crushed the life out of rebellion and left the monster bleeding, gasping and dying." Baltimore's newspapers, which were all closely scrutinized and censored by the military authorities, reported general compliance with Chapman's order, but pro-Confederates claimed that hundreds of dwellings remained darkened.

A week later when Lee surrendered to Grant, another round of celebrations burst forth among the Unionists and the American headline simply read, "The End! Surrender of General Lee." The Sun, which had long before given up writing any political articles or editorials for fear of being shut down by the military authorities, finally ventured back into the field. Under the title "The End Approaches," it expressed the hope that as the fighting ended, the hatreds that the war had bred might also cease. Referring in only slightly veiled terms to both the fire-eating Confederates and the vindictive Radical Republicans, it condemned both as "pernicious elements... growing more and more bitter, more narrow, and more intolerant." It called on those who could be sympathetic to both sides to come forward, put the past to rest, and exercise "true statesmanship."

The test of such statesmanship came sooner than most Baltimoreans probably expected. Almost everyone in the city regarded the assassination of President Lincoln as a disaster. The procession accompanying his body through the city included all but the most die-hard pro-Confederates. The Unionists, however, singled out several pro-Confederate Protestant ministers who they believed had uttered disrespectful, and thus disloyal, remarks concerning the President's death. They demanded that General Wallace, the current military leader in the city, banish the clerics. Wallace, a brave and utterly loyal Union man politely refused, telling the local Unionists that the evidence was confusing and such an action would only inflame public feelings further at a time when such strife such ought to be ending.

A minor dispute arose over the reception of Union troops passing through the city on their way home from the war. The vast armies of Generals Grant and Sherman converged on Washington where they were formally discharged and sent north over the B&O to Camden Station where they were then disbursed to whichever station was most convenient for their further transportation. Troops from the Philadelphia area, New York, and New England marched down Pratt Street to the President Street Station, those heading for Western Pennsylvania and the Great Lakes states headed for the Northern Central station, and those heading for Ohio, Indiana, and Southern Illinois departed from Mount Clare. Day after day, the regiments marched through the streets, until over 233,000 men had passed. For a city that had wanted no troops marching in their streets in 1861, Baltimore probably saw more soldiers in the spring of 1865 than any city in the nation. Local Unionists complained that not enough was being done to welcome the regiments, but several city councilmen replied that such gigantic numbers of troops were moving through that it was not feasible to greet them in any formal manner. The council tried to make up for it with a large and expensive reception for Maryland's troops in Druid Hill Park, an occasion
that went off very well from the Unionists’ perspective with several speeches condemning, once more, the Confederacy and its immoral rebellion. Governor-elect Swann also spoke briefly, but simply thanked the troops for their loyal service and wished them God’s speed in their future private lives.

The third controversy, and the one that probably convinced many Baltimoreans that the Unionist-Republicans had become a dangerous group, involved a far more substantive issue: the city’s trade with the now ex-Confederacy. Almost as soon as General Lee surrendered to Grant, Baltimore merchants began inquiring about traveling to Virginia and the other Southern Atlantic states to reestablish trade with their former customers. On April 28, 1865, the War Department lifted the requirement for passes for Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond, and shortly thereafter the whole South was opened for travel and trade. The first steamboats that set out from Baltimore headed for Southern ports were jammed with local merchants and salesmen intent on inviting Southern buyers to return to Baltimore. As the navy returned more ships to the private owners from whom it had bought or leased them, these vessels also entered the race to take Baltimore’s businessmen into the South and bring their former customers back to the city. All went well until the middle of May when the Baltimore City Council, still firmly in the hands of the Radical Unionists, passed an ordinance prohibiting the return to the city of any former Baltimore resident who had fought for the Confederacy. Somehow, the resolution became misinterpreted by the Virginia and Carolina newspapers and led many Southern merchants to believe that they too were banned from the city. In an attempt to rectify the problem the council’s Second Branch issued a resolution assuring the Southerners that “all who come... will receive not only safety and protection, but a cordial welcome.”¹⁶⁴ The phrase regarding safety and protection was not especially reassuring but worse was the fact that when the resolution went to the First Branch, it was permanently tabled. A few days later, the council voted down a resolution to send an official city delegation to Petersburg and Richmond whose main purpose was the reestablishment of trade. The local merchants, including many who had been strong Unionists, were appalled and the council’s actions, and even the American, which had almost never found cause to criticize the Radical Unionists, reminded them that the war was over and if Baltimore did not take up the Southern trade, others would do so. Finally, the council realized its blunder and issued a resolution assuring everyone that Southern merchants were very welcome in the city and the municipal government intended “to assist in opening every avenue of business” with its Southern neighbors.¹⁶⁵ Thus while the Radical Unionists eventually bowed to public sentiment, they showed themselves to be untrustworthy in protecting what most regarded as the essential business interests of the city.

Dislodging the Unionists from the city government took over two years and is a complicated story of local, state and nation political intrigue. First, the wide powers exercised by election judges under the Constitution of 1864 allowed the city and state Unionists to disqualify thousands of Democratic voters. This allowed the city Unionists, now openly campaigning under
the Republican Party label, to reelect Mayor Chapman and a majority of councilmen over a slate of Democratic candidates in the fall of 1866. In that election, Chapman received 5,405 votes to his opponent’s 2,574. With something like 30,000 adult males in the city, it was obvious that the Unionists were a small minority and only held power by virtue of the hold on the election judges.

A month after the municipal contest, city and state voters prepared to go to the polls again to elect members for the General Assembly. Baltimore Democrats, now swelled by the defection of almost all the more conservative Unionists, petitioned Governor Swann to replace the city’s two police commissioners who, as part of their responsibilities, selected the city election judges. The governor, now himself fully in the Democratic camp, held hearings on the petition. The Radicals presented their case through Henry Stockbridge while the Democrats relied on John H. B. Latrobe. Shortly before the election, Swann removed the two Radical Republican police commissioners, replacing them with men who pledged to open the electorate to almost all voters.

The governor’s decision precipitated the most dire crisis in the city since the spring of 1861. Several Radical Republican organizations held rallies where speakers vowed that the political clubs and Union veterans groups would resist by force Swann’s attempt to replace the “loyal” election judges by his “traitors.” They condemned governor himself as a turncoat and a Judas, who sought to give the city over to ex-Confederates. Alarmed at the reaction, Swann called on President Andrew Johnson to send federal troops to preserve order.

In this conflict President Johnson saw an opportunity to weaken his Republican opponents in the U.S. Senate. During this period, state legislatures elected U.S. Senators. If Swann defeated the Radical Republicans in Maryland, the legislature was not likely to send more Radical Republicans to Washington. Johnson was eager to support Swann. However, General Grant, Johnson’s Commander in Chief, was reluctant to become involved in what seemed to him to be a partisan contest in a loyal state. The general visited Baltimore a week before the election and urged both sides to refrain from violence. As a precaution, he ordered 700 regular army troops from New York to Fort McHenry, but directed them to stay in the fort unless ordered to take further steps. Three days before the election, Swann's police commissioners arrived in Baltimore and attempted to assume control of the police and the election judges. They were met with a bench warrant issued by Hugh Lennox Bond, the Radical Republican judge of the City Criminal Court asserting that their appointments were illegal. The men were refused entry into the commissioner’s office and arrested. Grant rushed back to the city and conferred again with both sides. An agreement was worked out whereby the Republican election judges would remain in office until the Maryland Court of Appeals decided the case. Since the court could not hear the case could for over a week, the Republican judges would be in control on Election Day, but they agreed that they would use more liberal guidelines in deciding who was a loyal citizen and eligible to cast a ballot. In the previous municipal election, only those who clearly identified themselves with the Union cause were considered loyal. This time around, the judges were to disqualify only those who had committed some disloyal act. The agreement held. There was no violence and the
election judges allowed a much larger number of voters to cast ballots. Over 16,000 voters participated, almost twice the number that cast votes in the mayoral election the year before. Many Democrats who had been strictly neutral during the war were still disqualified by the judges, but not quite enough to save the election for the Republicans. While the vote in almost every ward was close, the Democrats captured all eighteen of the city seats in the House of Delegates and its three senatorial seats as well. Statewide the Democrats were also successful. Shortly after the election the Maryland Court of Appeals overturned Judge Bond's ruling and Swann's police commissioners quietly assumed office in Baltimore, taking control of both the police force and the election judges. With Democrats in control of the legislature and Swann as governor, Republican rule came to an end in Maryland.

The most important action Democrats took in 1867 was to call a new constitutional convention to rewrite the Republicans' 1864 constitution. Rural political leaders played a large role in the 1867 convention and there was some fear that many of the progressive changes instituted by the 1864 constitution would be overturned, but nothing of the sort occurred. Only a few major changes were made, the most significant one being the reopening of the electorate to every adult white male, even those who had fought for the Confederacy. The state's free African Americans, while allowed full personal and property rights, were barred from any participation in politics. In contrast to the city and state Republicans, who by this time were urging political equality for African Americans, Swann and the Democrats were firmly committed to keeping Maryland and its government strictly in the hands of white men.

Considering the fact that Baltimore had been a leading center of Radical Republicanism during the war, rural Democrats might have attempted to pull back the increased power the city had gained under the constitution of 1864, but they did not. Even though the city Democrats were still not back in control of the municipal government, they expected to return quite soon and were therefore anxious to hold on to the advantages gained in 1864. Among the half dozen articles dealing with the city, only two important new restrictions were placed on its municipal government. First, the city's power to borrow funds and increase the municipal debt now required approval by the General Assembly. Beginning with Mayor Swann, and continuing through the war under Mayor Chapman, Baltimore's municipal debt had grown substantially, and rural leaders did not want to end up at some future date paying for the city's bad debts. A second provision stipulated that any future annexations of suburban territory by the city required the approval of a majority of voters in the area to be annexed. The exact reason for this provision is obscure, but it appears that either Baltimore County residents were nervous about losing more territory to the city, or the restriction was designed to keep the city from growing and demanding a larger number of delegates or state senators. A third article affecting the city did so only in a minor way by reorganizing the City Criminal Court, mainly to allow the Democrats to get rid of Judge Bond.
The last act in the long drama of Civil War Baltimore was the anti-climatic removal of the Republicans from the municipal government. Now that all white voters could cast ballots again, Democrats outnumbered the Republicans almost three to one in the city and it was obvious the next municipal election would result in a Democratic victory. The election was set by the 1867 Constitution for October 23, 1867. The Republicans bypassed Mayor Chapman to nominate Andrew W. Denison, one of the city’s bravest and most honored Union generals. The faithful soldier accepted the call, but admitted publicly that he did so more out of duty than any expectation of victory. The campaign waged by the Republicans was vigorous and bitter. Speaker after speaker condemned the ex-Unionists, especially governor Swann, as "turncoats" and "traitors" who had gained power with Republican support but now made common cause with ex-Confederates. True believers within the local party, men such as R. Stockett Matthews, spoke of the Republicans' "holy mission... in doing men good and making the world better." The Republicans' anger and bitterness stemmed not simply from the defection of Swann and a host of other leading Unionists in Baltimore, but from the realization that all their efforts to save the Union now seemed discounted and forgotten. In addition, their more recent move to grant some degree of civil equality to Maryland's freed slaves and Baltimore's free black community had been almost universally condemned by Democrats as the first steps towards complete social equality, something far beyond what even most Radical Republicans endorsed.

In contrast to the Republicans, the Democrats carried on a low-key campaign emphasizing reunion and harmony. Their candidate, Robert T. Banks, seemed a perfect choice. He had been born in Virginia, but came to Baltimore as a young man. During the 1850s he rose to prominence as a merchant and identified with the Democratic Party. While he never supported the secession movement or the Confederacy, neither did he lend any support to the Unionists beyond what the law required. As a merchant himself with close ties to the Southern trade, he took the position that Baltimore's best policy was to forget the war and concentrate on its role as the chief commercial center of the Southern Atlantic region. Banks did not bother to attack Republican policies and treated his distinguished opponent with the respect due a war hero. However, the signs his Democratic supporters carried at the big rallies in Monument Square made it clear that the local party stood for cordial relations with all sections of the nation and white supremacy in both government and society.

On Election Day, voters streamed to the polls and the event went off without a single disturbance. Banks rolled up 18,430 votes while Denison received only 4,876. Two weeks later, Banks took the oath of office in a crowded row house on Holliday Street that for the past decade had accommodated the mayor and his staff. After Banks had been sworn in, Mayor Chapman gave a short farewell address, recounting the impressive accomplishments of the Republicans during their six years in office. Not only did they vigorously support the military effort, they built a large modern almshouse, began the huge Gunpowder River water supply system, improved Druid Hill and Patterson Parks, and began construction of a big magnificent city hall. Chapman
thanked his staff and, turning to Banks, congratulated him saying he had always respected him "as a gentleman of integrity." He offered further to remain available if the new mayor required any information from him. With that, Chapman and his secretary walked out into Holliday Street and Banks entered his new office. Thus the great conflict in Baltimore ended on a singularly quiet and civil note.

The quiet changing of the guard in the fall of 1867 ushered in an era strikingly different from those that had gone before; it seemed to take a cue from the harmonious event at city hall. For the next half century or more, the city continued to grow, but the pace was remarkably slow and even. There were some occasional public disorders, the worst in 1877 during a strike on the B&O Railroad, but the overall level of violence fell compared to the tempestuous antebellum years. Ethnic and religious conflict subsided; white supremacy went unchallenged and almost unquestioned. Most significant, Baltimoreans finally ceased talking or worrying much about the fact that city after city was gradually overtaking it in size and wealth.

While there is no doubt that John W. Garrett strove for some twenty years after the war to take the B&O on one or another great forward leap, none of his expansionist ventures paid off as he had hoped. Garrett was perhaps the last Baltimorean to believe that the B&O and its headquarter city could still run with the likes of Philadelphia, New York, and Boston and their gigantic rail systems; by the time he died in 1884 he too must have had his doubts. The war of course, did have a major effect on the B&O, limiting its service to the Middle West at a time when the more northern railroads consolidated their grip, but much of their advantage was already apparent by the late 1850s. Likewise, Baltimore’s manufacturing base, while impressive in 1860, was clearly no match for the Northeastern giants. What the Civil War did was temporarily rob Baltimore of its position as a north-south trader. When in 1865 that trade opened again, the city merchants pounced on it and used their Southern orientation to nurture it. This trading hinterland seemed manageable and steady, unlike the larger world in which the city had attempted to operate during the Golden Age. Thus even as the B&O was building a rail line north into New Jersey with a terminal on New York harbor, the city of Baltimore drifted further South. From the fastest growing city in America in 1820, it seemed content in 1870 or 1900 to be the first city of the Upper South.
Introduction to Chapter 7
Downtown, Neighborhood and Suburb, the Social and Economic Geography of the Baltimore Urban Region: Post-Civil War to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century
by Elizabeth M. Nix

Even in the twenty-first century, Baltimore is known as a City of Neighborhoods, and in this chapter, Arnold shows the trends that created many of the urban designations we still see today. Arnold describes post-Civil-War Baltimore as similar to a European city, a complete urban world where people of all classes lived, worked, dined and were entertained. He sees the city’s settlement patterns as different from that of other American urban areas during this period. Arnold attributes Baltimore’s residents’ tendency to stay in the city instead of moving to the county as typical of Baltimoreans’ basic conservatism, a characteristic that caused customers at every income level to continue to buy row houses all over the city. As they had in the antebellum period, business owners lived in wide houses on the main thoroughfares, while domestic and factory workers lived in the same districts in alley houses. One of the most illuminating sections of this chapter comes when Arnold compares the childhoods of H.L. Mencken and Babe Ruth, residents of the West End who grew up only four blocks apart but occupied very different worlds due to class differences. Arnold shows that this era saw a widening divide between the East and West sides of town: industrial and textile workers crowded into the neighborhoods east and south of the harbor, while professional classes bought houses around the appealing western squares, choosing to reside in the city but staying far away from the harbor. In those sea-level neighborhoods, toxic fumes from fertilizer plants and oyster shell lime kilns killed trees and damaged clothing.

Richard Paul Fuke discusses the particular situation of post-war black Baltimoreans in "Race and Public Policy in Post-Emancipation Baltimore," his chapter in From Mobtown to Charm City. Readers who would like to further investigate the retail establishments that were built downtown during this period should consult the work of Michael J. Lisicky including Baltimore’s Bygone Department Stores: Many Happy Returns and Hutzler’s: Where Baltimore Shops. In addition, Elizabeth Fee, Linda Shopes and Linda Zeidman have collected essays about working class Baltimore neighborhoods in The Baltimore Book: New Views of Local History. W. Edward Orser charts the development of the industrial and working class neighborhoods in the southwest portion of the city in The Gwynns Falls: Baltimore Greenway to the Chesapeake Bay.
Chapter 7: Downtown, Neighborhood and Suburb, the Social and Economic Geography of the Baltimore Urban Region, 1865-1920

In the expansion of their city, Baltimore’s middle and upper class leaders took the same slow, cautious, and conservative approach they exhibited in their business dealings. Therefore, while they city grew considerably larger, its basic appearance and pattern changed little in the three decades following the Civil War. Baltimore’s total population grew from 212,000 in 1860 to 500,000 in 1900, but the basic components of that population remained quite stable. American-born white citizens continued to be the largest group. Their natural rate of increase was not large, but they received continual reinforcements from the surrounding countryside. The Germans and Irish comprised almost the entire “foreign” element in 1900 as they had in 1860, but by the end of the century the number of actual foreign born was declining rapidly as immigration slowed. A growing population of Polish and Russian Jews plus a sprinkling of other groups from eastern and southern Europe added a new dimension to the city’s ethnic mix, but in 1900 they were altogether still a small and insignificant group. Baltimore’s African American residents, shut out of almost all the city’s job opportunities except the most menial or dangerous ones, actually declined as a percentage of the city’s total population. Most important of all, the total rate of population growth provided no great shocks to the city’s neighborhood system or its builders and developers. The slow, steady increase in numbers allowed for a remarkably orderly process of new construction on the fringe and in the central business district while its old “inner city” neighborhoods were transformed by leisurely tides of outward and inward migrations of families.

The net result of this growth rate was that almost all the neighborhood patterns of 1850 or 1860 continued to unfold in the same ways in the 1865-1900 era: east and south Baltimore grew
into more thoroughly industrial and working-class districts, the western and southwestern
districts still struggled to maintain a mixture of industrial and middle-class neighborhoods while
the northern and northwestern quadrants, building on their already fashionable heritage of the
1850s, continued to attract an ever larger percentage of the city’s more comfortable residents.

While Baltimore’s lack of economic competitiveness disappointed many of its citizens,
the city scored very high marks among them as a place in which to live. This high quality of life
was especially significant for its middle and upper income families who, thanks to the railroad,
horsecar and trolley line, gained the increasing ability to remove themselves to the urban fringes
while still remaining within the city limits. Elsewhere by 1900, the urban middle and upper classes
were abandoning the major central cities in very large numbers, walling themselves off in separate
suburban towns and commuting into the central business district from an increasing distance.
Baltimoreans were among the last of the major Eastern cities to join the suburban trend, doing so
only tentatively in the years after 1890 and then expanding the city boundaries in 1918 to take in
almost the entire suburban districts that had been developed in the 1890-1920 era. Thus the great
majority of Baltimore’s middle and upper classes chose to remain a part of the city of Baltimore,
dominating its political, economic, and social life. They developed strategies for the improvement
of the urban environment aimed at keeping it first and foremost the sort of place in which they
would enjoy living and working, but they also sought to make Baltimore a place in which those of
lower income could live with a reasonable level of health, safety, and even some educational
opportunities, a real rarity for any city below the Mason-Dixon line. Only in the years after 1910
did some elements of Baltimore’s middle and upper income residents begin to become
discouraged with this effort and to view the suburban alternative more positively. Thus for the
entire 1865-1920 era Baltimore remained a complete city in the classic form, a place where almost
the entire urban population lived, worked, and entertained themselves in a compact, vibrant,
heterogeneous, and often highly contentious urban world.

While other cities of similar size moved rapidly towards more single-family detached
housing as more of their residents removed to a greater distance from the center city, most
Baltimoreans of all classes stuck with their row houses. Even the major outer developments
featuring detached homes stayed remarkably close to the row house city. As income, ethnic, and
racial segregation became more pronounced elsewhere in the North, Baltimore’s middle and
upper classes seemed more comfortable living near people of lower incomes and vastly different
racial or ethnic backgrounds. Also, the city’s real estate leaders were slow to recognize the
possibilities that large-scale residential housing segregation offered for regularizing the real estate
market. As other cities pushed ahead with large and expensive programs to improve streets,
expand transit service, and provide the increasingly large package of utilities and amenities
middle and upper income families desired, Baltimore’s real estate and neighborhood leaders often
appeared uninterested or unable to affect similar changes in Baltimore. Thus the city as a whole
exhibited a physical plan and a pattern of local neighborhoods that bore a closer resemblance to
the slipshod, heterogeneous, and old-fashioned city of 1860s than almost any urban area of
similar size in the nation. To ascribe Baltimore’s continuity of development simply to its leisurely
pace of economic growth is of course too simple. At least three other major factors account for it:
the basic configuration of the land; the strong social and cultural conservatism of Baltimore’s
residents; and the vicissitudes of Baltimore’s system of local transportation.

First and foremost was the basic configuration of the land. Baltimore and its suburbs lay
astride the dividing line that separates the flat coastal plain from the Maryland Piedmont region.
The landscape tilts downward from the northwest to the southeast. From the corner of Pratt and
Light Streets, which sits just a few feet above sea level, the land rises steadily to the north and west.
Moving up Charles Street from the Inner Harbor to Mount Vernon Place, about three quarters of
a mile, the land rises about 130 feet. Druid Hill Park, a little more than a mile further to the
northwest, commands a sweeping view of the city and harbor from its 200-foot elevation.
Similarly, as one moves along Baltimore Street from Center Market Space (five feet above sea
level) one reaches the intersection of Payson Street near the city’s 1865 western boundary at an
elevation of 181 feet. South Baltimore (with the exception of Federal Hill), the Inner Harbor area,
Fells Point, and the Canton Waterfront all lie just fifteen to twenty-five feet above sea level. In east
Baltimore the land rises above Fells Point and Canton, but levels off at about 120 feet. The
commanding heights are all to the north and northwest. The city’s suburban towns, Catonsville in
the west, Pikesville and Mount Washington in the northwest, Waverly and Towsontown to the
north, all sit at 400-500 feet above the city, making them favorite summering spots for sweltering
Baltimoreans.

It was only natural for Baltimore’s manufacturing plants to seek the level lands of the
coastal plain in south, southwest and east Baltimore while the more affluent residents would move
“uphill” to gain some relief from the air pollution and heat of the old sea-level city. The chief
merchants and professional people, who originally lived just a few blocks back from the Pratt
Street wharves, began moving north in the 1820s and 1830s to neighborhoods around Monument
Square and west out towards Fremont Street. In the 1840s and 1850s, when John Eager Howard’s
estate was subdivided and developed into Mount Vernon Square, the neighborhood around this
attractive site became the city’s fashionable center, but the West End neighborhood around
Franklin Square also attracted its share of wealthy businessmen. While the Mount Vernon area
and the West End led all other neighborhoods in wealth and prestige by 1860, the city’s wealthy
families did not by any means all converge there. Some hung on in the old city center into the
1870s, a number of Fells Point sea captains and ship builders remained there or moved north up
Broadway to higher ground. By the 1880s East Baltimore had a large number of very expensive
dwellings on upper Broadway and out towards Patterson Park, the homes of the managers and
owners of the factories and shops which stretched along the waterfront from Fells Point to
Canton. South Baltimore’s manufacturing elite remained for many years in the local
neighborhood where their factories were located since this area was rather isolated and could only be reached from the north or west by traveling through the congested streets of the city center.

Undoubtedly part of the remarkable persistence of the city’s antebellum pattern of social and economic geography is owed to the fact that Baltimoreans proved to be as conservative in their housing choices as they were in everything else. Builders and real estate developers continued to produce row houses for the low, middle, and upper income families of the city through the entire 1865-1920 era, responding, no doubt, to a steady demand. There is no question that the detached suburban house began to make significant inroads in Baltimore’s housing market after 1900, but the going was slow. Likewise, Baltimore’s developers continued almost until the opening of the new century to build for a startlingly wide variety of income levels in the same neighborhood, a practice that had been common throughout urban America in the antebellum era, but which most large cities abandoned thereafter. The habit of constructing fine middle or upper income row houses on handsome streets while simultaneously building little alley dwellings on unpaved alleys behind them continued to some degree until the late 1890s. Clearly, many well-to-do Baltimoreans felt that such a close juxtaposition of housing was at least not objectionable or perhaps even a positive value since it provided a ready supply of servants and helpers. Finally, it appears that many Baltimoreans seemed reluctant to buy into the new suburban gospel of grass, trees, and air. They remained suspicious that removal to such an admittedly attractive natural environment carried with it a loss of convenience and community. To some degree like Europeans, many of Baltimore’s residents seemed to prefer to take outings and short vacations in the surrounding countryside instead of permanently removing from the city.

Finally, there was the whole question of transportation, utilities, and services, which related quite closely to the issue of Baltimore conservatism. Without a detailed and extensive comparison, it is difficult to determine whether Baltimore’s local transportation systems and its whole service and utility infrastructure were better or worse than those of other large cities, but there was universal agreement among Baltimoreans that they were fairly bad by any reasonable standards of the day. Prior to 1900 Baltimore’s streets were in poor condition and its transit lines inadequate and inefficient. Water, sewers, electricity, gas, schools, and other services varied dramatically from one section of the city to another, but it was generally agreed that as poor as some of these city services were, conditions in Baltimore County were worse. Why did Maryland’s greatest metropolis and its wealthiest county fail to invest sufficient amounts of money in their local transportation facilities and other basic utilities and services? Baltimore was not as wealthy as most of the other large northern cities, but it was hardly poor. The answer may be that Baltimoreans simply saw less compelling reasons to so invest in infrastructure. They appeared for much of this era to be fairly content with their old fashioned, compact, and highly mixed neighborhoods and preferred them to an untried and suspect world of suburban living. So long as the great majority of middle and upper income families felt this way, they could control the
pattern of local public and private expenditures and direct the policies of those institutions that aided and protected their more privileged position in this urban world. Once they felt they were no longer protected, of course, the city versus suburb question took on a fundamentally different cast, but in Baltimore, this did not begin to happen until World War I era.

Before looking in more detail at these issues, it is important to become at least somewhat familiar with Baltimore’s neighborhoods and sub-regions. A short tour d’horizon is in order. Fortunately, Sachse’s magnificent “Bird’s Eye View of Baltimore,” which he engraved in 1869 offers an incomparable visual documentation of the post-Civil-War city. In 1896 the Bromley Atlas offers a second look at the city in even greater detail, its plates showing every structure in the city. With these two documents, one can easily pick out the city’s eight sub-regions and watch their development during the quarter century that separates their publication. The first thing the viewer notes is the remarkably compact and restricted area of the city in 1869 and the continuation of this pattern in 1904. The city is widest from the east to west along Baltimore Street, the major commercial thoroughfare. In the 1860s and 1870s the street measured about three miles, its built-up portion running from city center out to Patterson Park on the east and west to the city line. On the western side Baltimore Street was solidly built up for about a mile and a half, almost as far as the Union Square neighborhood where Henry L. Mencken’s family would move in the 1880s. In the remaining distance to the western city line, another half a mile, Baltimore Street passed through what was still largely undeveloped land. The Baltimore City Passenger Railway, the city’s chief east-west horsecar line, ran three miles along Baltimore Street from Smallwood Street in the West End all the way through the downtown to Broadway in East Baltimore. In the 1860s and 1870s, before the heavy migration to the north and northwest, somewhere near a third of the city’s residents lived within walking distance of this car line, so the commerce on Baltimore Street created a district of convenience that few other streets could match. In the city center Baltimore Street was, for a distance of about a dozen blocks, an unbroken line of commercial, professional and light industrial businesses. Many major retail shops had gravitated to prestigious Baltimore Street addresses, but even beyond the central city area, the street boasted dozens more local neighborhood businesses that Baltimoreans could patronize on a daily basis. In this manner it came close to being the city’s “main street.” The 1873 Baltimore City Directory lists 789 businesses on Baltimore Street, offering almost the full array of goods and services available in the city. On this street one could find twenty-five sellers of boots and shoes, nineteen bookstores, seven carpet dealers, twenty-two fruit and candy sellers, seventy-nine shops selling women’s millinery, notions, trimmings and fancy goods, twenty shops selling “men’s furnishings,” (there were thirty-eight of these shops in the whole city), twenty-one of the city’s thirty-six photographic studios, thirty-two watch and jewelry stores, thirty-eight tobacco and cigar dealers, four hotels, twelve restaurants, eight stove dealers, five flour and feed stores, and eighteen stationery shops.
The other major east-west artery was Pratt Street which ran along the edge of the inner harbor and out to the B&O’s Mount Clare shops. This street, lined with railroad tracks, was of great importance to the city’s wholesale and shipping concerns, providing warehouses and offices with ready access to both the wharves and railroad. Pratt Street’s convenience for wholesalers was a decided nuisance to retailers attempting to lure the general public. In the nineteenth century Pratt Street was a narrower street than it is today, and by the 1870s was “one of the most crowded thoroughfares in the city… day and night filled with carts, drays and other vehicles.” The B&O as well as the Philadelphia and Wilmington railroads had apparently begun running steam locomotives along the street some time after 1861 and continued the practice after the war. In 1873 a group of Pratt Street merchants petitioned the city council to remove the tracks, arguing that the railroad ferry between Canton and Locust Point now made the Pratt Street rail connection unnecessary. The wholesalers and shipping merchants quickly responded with their own petition and carried the day.169

The tracks remained on Pratt Street and retailers moved further uptown. As they exited, more and more of their little two story business houses (often quite literally an old house turned into a shop or office) were replaced by tall warehouses, banks, or office buildings of four or five stories. The downtown construction boom of the 1865-1873 era turned much of the whole area south of Saratoga and east of Eutaw Streets into a commercial district that merged with the much smaller central district of 1860. The total extent of the central city expanded by almost fifty percent in the years from 1865 to 1880, and in the next twenty years the expansion was even more rapid. Not only did the area of commercial activity grow in the years following the Civil War, but the central district turned into a place dominated by large, handsome commercial buildings instead of the awkwardly converted dwelling houses in which the majority of the city businessmen had carried on their trades in 1865. The process, however, was far from complete even in some of the most central parts of the commercial district. The replacement of the quaint old dwelling houses, taverns and other antebellum landmarks with modern office warehouse and factory buildings took several decades. For example, on South Street in the first block below Baltimore Street, in the very heart of the banking and commercial district of the 1860s, stood the four eighteenth century buildings alongside the little old brick house in which Thomas Kelso had been born in 1791. Most of these structures had been put to commercial uses for over forty years, one as Boyd’s Restaurant and Ale Cellar, a famous rendezvous for politicians, actors, and men about town since the 1820s. Boyd’s was finally replaced by the Safe Deposit Company’s bank in 1874 and the Kelso house remained standing until 1881.170 Some famous structures like the Baltimore Museum and Fine Arts Gallery, a fixture on the northwest corner of Baltimore and Calvert Streets since 1840, burned in 1873 and was replaced by the headquarters building of the B&O Railroad. A number of other landmark buildings in the area survived until the Great Fire of 1904 swept away everything in the old downtown—including the B&O headquarters. One of the greatest anomalies in the 1865-1904 era was the survival of Kamensky’s Tavern at Grant and
Mercer Streets, just a stone’s throw from the corner of Pratt and Light Streets. Built in 1750, it looked more medieval than anything else with its gabled roof, narrow little windows, and weathered wooden siding. It endured through the entire downtown renovation and succumbed only to the Great Fire. Nevertheless, the continued existence of a number of the city’s old dwellings and taverns in the commercial center did not deter the final denouement of the area as a residential neighborhood. The last of the residents moved out by 1870 and indeed few inhabited dwellings remained along Baltimore or Saratoga Street in 1880.

As residents left, so did the churches. The downtown churches had begun to move north or west in the 1850s, and by 1865 only four were left below Baltimore Street. In the area behind the Pratt Street wharves, the extension of Holliday Street in 1866 and that of German Street (now Redwood) in 1869 removed the last two churches in this neighborhood: old German Reformed Church and the Light Street Methodist, both dating from the 1790s. While saddened by the loss of two of the city’s great eighteenth-century landmarks, the congregations were glad to take their condemnation money and build anew uptown since their congregations had all removed and it had become increasingly difficult to conduct services or meetings amidst the din of the central business district. In 1865 the Light Street Church attempted to host a regional meeting of the Methodist clergy, but was forced by “the noise and confusion incident to the business of the street during the week,” to move up to the Eutaw Street church “situated in a much more quiet neighborhood.” To the west of the harbor in the neighborhood around Camden Station, commercial expansion overtook another old section of the antebellum city. The neighborhood around South Sharp Street which contained “residences of the most substantial construction, which were calculated to resist the ravages of time for many decades, and which were but recently the homes of some of the wealthy families of the city,” are “giving place to massive structures which are now pointed to with pride as an evidence of the commercial progress of Baltimore.” Again, as the residents fled the march of progress, their churches were sold (at top prices) to commercial developers. The famous First Baptist Church, the so-called “Round Top” church and St. Peter’s Protestant Episcopal church, “two of the oldest and most powerful congregations in their respective denominations in the city,” were relocated to the northwestern section of the city.

While it was sad to watch the old Baltimore of the 1820s and 1830s disappear, there was no doubt that the retail stores and places of entertainment that gradually replaced their old antebellum counterparts were vastly superior. Armstrong, Cator and Company refurbished its dry goods house in 1872 by purchasing warehouse space in back of their store allowing them to open the entire building for retail purposes. A new skylight brightened the whole establishment, larger and more elegant counters were installed, and a ladies lounge opened “where those from either the city or the country can have their meals furnished from a neighboring restaurant, and where every modern convenience for the adjustment of toilettes, &c., is found.” Not only were the major retail establishments upgraded, but small shops, particularly those occupying valuable sites
in the city center, were able to sell out at a good price and move a few blocks north or west where they could reopen in larger and far more attractive spaces. For example, J.S. Waters book shop on Hanover Street was purchased in 1865 for a large warehouse. Waters relocated uptown at Charles and Bank Streets in a five story building which he fitted out in the most luxurious manner with large “French plate glass windows,” looking in on rows of walnut bookcases “filled with the standard English, French, German and American works, in the richest and most costly binding.” On the back wall of the first floor was a stained glass window “which throws a mellow and varicolored light on the rear of the store.”

Looking back on the retail establishments of the 1850s, Mayor Ferdinand Latrobe told a group of businessmen in 1881 that he recalled many Baltimore stores “with their fine goods and their jail-like interior, their long credits and short counters, their seven by ten inch window panes and their old-fashioned salesmen” which have now “given place to the glass fronted palace, with a hundred clerks to wait on you, birds singing, fountains spraying cologne, everything for sale, one price and no credit…” What Mayor Latrobe was referring to was a broad and fundamental upgrading of the city’s entire central city retail district, but his specific example pointed to one type of establishment in particular: the city’s emerging department stores.

Certainly the two most important changes in the central city in the period from 1865 to the early twentieth century was the development of the clothing factory district in the area just to the northwest of Camden Station centering on Paca and Pratt Streets and the relocation of Baltimore’s retail center through the establishment of a group of about half a dozen large and splendid department stores in the vicinity of Howard and Lexington Streets. In 1869 Sachse’s Bird’s Eye View shows both the Paca and Pratt Street area as well as the area around Howard and Lexington to be obviously residential in character even though a number of the dwellings were being converted into small shops. The clothing manufacturers, still operating in small shops and converted houses, are invisible; but beginning in the 1870s and 1880s clothing manufacturers begin to transform the area into a center for large loft-style factories. The neighborhood was by this time ripe for change. Because it was just a little more than half a mile west of the business center, this had been a place where many of the city’s businessmen had lived in the 1830s and 1840s, but beginning in the 1850s, newer families and those seeking larger houses moved out and across Fremont Street leaving the area inhabited by an aging population too settled in their ways to follow the majority outward. Among those who stayed on were a large number of “Old Defenders,” men who had fought the British in 1814, and an equally large contingent of older businessmen of the 1830s-1860s. Their little row houses lined Lombard, German, Baltimore, Fayette, and Lexington streets in the area where they crossed Eutaw, Paca, Green, and Pine Streets. A good deal can be known about these men since almost all of them died in the 1865-1880 era and their long obituaries were very often followed in a few weeks by short notices that their residences had been purchased for conversion to some commercial purpose or torn down to make way for a large factory or warehouse.
manufacturers, looking for more space on land that was not so expensive, naturally turned to this locality. In the years between 1875 and 1900 an almost complete transformation occurred. The Greif brothers appear to have been the first to put up a large clothing factory in the area. Levi Greif and his brother Max had immigrated to Baltimore from Germany in the 1850s and prospered in the manufacture of clothing during the Civil War. By 1877 they had established one of the first large factories in the western section of the city. Even more successful were the Strouse brothers who came to the city during the Civil War and by the 1870s had built a huge, seven-story clothing factory at Paca and Lombard Streets. The Schloss brothers, Oppenheimer, Rothholz brothers, the Gusdorffs, the Weinberg brothers, Henry Sonneborn, and J. Schoeneman constituted a remarkable group of German Jewish businessmen that made Baltimore the leading manufacturer of men’s clothing in the South. In so doing they transformed the area around the old University of Maryland Medical School into a neighborhood of huge loft-style factories.  

The Howard and Lexington area was a bit slower to develop, but by 1900 its transformation was even more dramatic. In 1869 the neighborhood in the vicinity of the bustling Lexington Market was still the edge of the central commercial district, but it did have a long tradition of commercial activity, attracting large crowds of shoppers since the market had opened in 1803. The Sun said in 1869 that in spite of the existence of six other local markets scattered throughout the city, one-third of Baltimore’s households still did their food shopping at Lexington, the city’s largest market. Part of the reason was undoubtedly the fact that it was the most heavily served by the country farmers whose wagons were often lined up for several blocks around the market house. Perhaps because of the congestion around the market and the adjacent streets, the neighborhood had never become a middle or upper income residential area, so the price of lots along its streets were a good deal lower than they were a few blocks to the south or east. Consequently, retailers seeking to expand their stores found it easier to do so in this “uptown” area. This area of Lexington Street became even more strategic as middle- and upper-class families moved to the northern and northwestern sections of the city in the 1870s and 1880s. The three horsecar lines running into the central city from these new neighborhoods came down Howard, Eutaw, and Paca Streets, so it was quite convenient for riders to reach any of the Lexington Street stores located between Charles and Paca. This became the hub of almost all the city’s major department stores by 1900.

The redevelopment of this neighborhood as Baltimore’s department store district is inseparable from the gradual evolution of the department store as a retail institution. In 1865 the city had nothing that could be described as a department store. Its dry good, millinery and fancy goods shops, a number of which conducted both wholesale and retail operations, were still rather specialized businesses. Hamilton Easter & Sons (who recovered rapidly from their war-time troubles with General Wallace) Armstrong, Cator & Company, and Hurst, Purnell & Company were all located on Baltimore Street while Hodges Brothers was just around the corner on Hanover Street. Oddly, none of the city’s great merchants of the Civil War era moved over into
the department stores’ field of business. Instead the owners of smaller dry goods and fancy goods stores became the pioneers in the city’s retail sector who moved the center of that business to the Howard and Lexington area. Fortunately, the city had a group of German Jewish shop owners and merchants who saw great possibilities in the department store model and developed five out of the city’s six major retail outlets of this type. The first to invest in the Howard and Lexington area as the future premier retail center were the Hutzler brothers who had a fancy goods store at No 12 Hanover Street just off Baltimore and opened another “uptown” store at No 71 N. Howard Street, a block up from the Howard and Lexington intersection. Joel Gutman, another fancy goods merchant, established a store on Eutaw Street just a few doors from Lexington. Gradually in the 1880s and 1890s the Hutzlers, the Hochschilds (Hochschild, Kohn after 1896), the Gutmans, the Bragers, Samuel Posner, and Thomas O’Neil, (two men who had only entered the retail trade in 1876 and 1882 respectively) had turned the Howard and Lexington area into a department store center that began to dominate the city and suburban retail trade. While none of the Baltimore department stores quite matched the size and fame of Marshall Fields, Stewart’s or Macy’s, they were by the end of the century large, elegant, well-stocked emporiums. In the same way that German Jews dominated Baltimore’s clothing industry a small group of German Jewish families developed six out of the city’s seven major department stores. Why the older dry goods merchants of the antebellum era did not join in this development is difficult to understand, but it may have had something to do with the unwillingness, or perhaps the inability, of the sons of these older dry goods merchants to pursue the businesses of their fathers. A large number of these old firms, in fact, gradually disappeared in the 1865-1900 era as the founders died. Hodges Bros. Wholesale Dry Goods, one of the city’s most famous firms, founded in 1846 by James Hodges who was elected mayor of Baltimore in 1885, was taken over by his son and son-in-law after the founder’s death, but the business failed in 1900.180 In contrast, the German Jewish dry goods and wholesale merchants who scrambled for a living in the 1850s and 1860s were able to build on these foundations with sons, sons-in-law and other younger family members to create a group of remarkably successful department stores as well as some of the city’s major wholesalers in the years stretching from 1890 to the early twentieth century.

Baltimore’s department stores were by the end of the century the largest and most elegant such stores south of Mason-Dixon line and they drew customers from Washington, D.C., Virginia, West Virginia, and the Carolinas. When compared to Baltimore’s old dry goods stores, they were retail palaces. For example, the Posner brothers, who opened a small dry goods store on Lexington Street in 1874, bought up adjoining buildings and by 1881 had a store with a fifty-foot front that ran a depth of 200 feet.181 By 1900 they had bought up all eight of the buildings that stood between their original store and Howard Street and replaced them with an entirely new structure, which was by Baltimore standards a retail palace. When it opened on the northeast corner of Howard and Lexington, Posner Brothers was said to embody all the features of the best New York stores. Its seven floors covered an area of 142,000 square feet, the equivalent of thirty of
the city’s old two-story retail shops. A staff of 600 men and women served customers along two and a half miles of aisles. By the opening of the new century the Howard Street department stores together employed 3,000 people, more than the B&O’s Mount Clare shops. The cost of the Posner buildings, over $550,000, was also an indication of the new scale of the city’s retail business.182

The little two- and three-story shops on Lexington Street stores now looked almost comical next to these shining giants. The smaller and more old-fashioned specialty stores were clearly hurt by the department stores and in 1897-1898 attempted to legislate them out of existence by prohibiting them from selling more than one type of goods. Not only did the large Howard Street department stores attack the bill, a number of the city’s smaller department-type stores in east and south Baltimore joined them. The Sun, the American, and Baltimore News all joined in the protests, arguing that it was an unfair restraint on the city’s most imaginative and progressive retailers and would wreak great havoc on the city’s whole trade. The bill failed and the department stores reigned supreme in the city for another sixty years until suburbanization and discount stores began to do them in.183 Rather than driving the small, downtown stores out of business, however, the department stores continued to make the downtown attractive to all sorts of shoppers who shopped not only at Hutzler’s, Hecht’s or Posner’s, but who also visited some of the more specialized little stores which clustered around them and spread out into other streets. In fact, the city’s more specialized stores continued to grow and prosper from 1865 to the early years of the twentieth century, both in the central city where they carved out niches for themselves and out in the local neighborhoods where they served as convenience stores for those who did not wish to spend money or time travelling downtown.

East Baltimore, the area generally defined as lying east of Jones Falls and including Oldtown, Little Italy, Fells Point, and Canton, was a section of the city that maintained a remarkably separate existence from the regions west of this stream. The reason for this cleavage was only to a degree geographic since the Jones Falls was by 1860 crossed by more than a dozen bridges. More significant was the fact that the land to the east of the Jones Falls was low and marshy all the way over to Fells Point while west of the falls the land rose much more abruptly; by the 1830s even the low spots in the western section, between Lombard and Pratt, had been filled to a height of eighteen feet.184 The marshy lowlands to the east of Jones Falls could not be so elevated and were thus less desirable for residential or commercial purposes. Consequently, in the course of the 1800-1860 era they developed as shipping and industrial sections, especially after the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad build their President Street Station just a block east of the falls near the point where it emptied into the harbor. The wharves and small factories drew a working-class population. By the 1840s and 1850s middle and upper income families began moving out, leaving the area increasingly in the hands of the city’s working classes. By the 1860s it was the largest low income area of the city with thousands of people crowded into the crescent shaped region running from the State Penitentiary around to Jackson’s wharf at Fells Point, one and a half miles long and almost half a mile wide. Thus, by the time of the Civil War
East Baltimore was the city’s preeminently industrial area and, next to the Pratt Street and Light street dock area, its most significant shipping locale. Just east of Fells Point lay the extensive lands of the Canton Company, which began to grow rapidly in the 1850s and even faster in the 1865-1900 era. As a result, the streets behind its wharves and its waterfront factories filled up with a very large population of longshoremen, canning factory workers, iron moulders, and oil refinery employees. The whole region, then, within four or five blocks of the falls and the harbor, was peopled with a dense population of hard-working, low-income people. The great majority of residents were thrifty and solid citizens, but the area also contained a number of people (mostly women and their dependent children) who hovered near destitution living alongside one or two thousand rough and turbulent young men. When the Saturday night arrest figures were published in the *Sun* in 1871, the article began “as is usually the case, the number of arrests for drunkenness in the eastern district Saturday night exceeded those in all other districts of the city…”\(^{185}\) While Oldtown contributed its share of rowdiness, the center of east side turbulence was in and around the dozens of saloons that stretched from what is today called Little Italy around past the President Street Station, the City Dock and into lower Fells Point. The term Little Italy was, during most of the nineteenth century, a misnomer. In the 1870s a small colony of Italians settled into the streets just north of the President Street Station and the area gradually took on the name Little Italy even though a majority of the residents in the area were of other backgrounds until about 1910. In 1865 the majority of residents were Germans, but by the 1890s a mixture of Italians, African Americans, and Polish-Russian Jewish immigrants crammed themselves into the neighborhood making it the most densely populated and rundown part of the city. When the federal government published its landmark study of urban slums, selecting New York, Chicago, Philadelphia and Baltimore for its examples, the report singled out Little Italy. Incensed at the accusation that they lived in a slum, local businessmen and prominent residents (of which there were still a surprising number) flooded the Baltimore newspapers with protests, saying that while “portions of some streets…might be termed slums,” the majority of residents were “thrifty, hard-working people.”\(^{186}\) While there were still in the 1890s a number of prosperous and articulate people living in the old antebellum sections of East Baltimore which ran from Oldtown through Little Italy and around the harbor to Fells Point and Canton, thousands of others had moved east and north out towards the new Johns Hopkins Hospital and Patterson Park. In the immediate post-Civil War era the major new growth occurred along the streets above Fells Point and out from Oldtown along Gay Street towards Madison Square. Gay Street crossed Jones Falls at Oldtown, a commercial and industrial settlement which by the 1840s had been engulfed by the expanding city, but which still retained a strong local identity. The Belair Market at Forrest and Gay Streets was the original focal point of the community, which until the Civil War still retained something of a village atmosphere with its wooden houses and stores, but in the 1860s and 1870s it also had grown into a densely populated and bustling commercial and industrial neighborhood. While the development made Oldtown more productive and prosperous, the area shifted from a
slightly disheveled village to a densely packed industrial and commercial center. Gay Street and
some of the adjoining thoroughfares had large fine stores and several local banks, but many of its
back streets and alleys filled up with unsightly factories and what could only be described as slum
housing, the dwellings of its former residents now cut up into working-class tenements.187 African
Americans had always lived in Oldtown, but they began to move out towards Johns Hopkins
Hospital in the 1870s and 1880s.188 As Oldtown became more unattractive as a place of residence,
the neighborhood out along Gay Street underwent steady improvement, especially after 1871
when the City Passenger Railway built a line on the thoroughfare which ran two miles out to
Baltimore Cemetery, one of the city’s most popular and attractive burial grounds. A reporter
travelling out Gay Street in 1871 was surprised by the remarkable improvements that had been
made in the frowzy old cottages and shops which used to stand along the roadside. Now one
passed by dozens of modern, well-lighted stores filled with customers from the new residences
that had been built on the streets running back from this heavily traveled thoroughfare. There was
hardly a vacant piece of land all the way out to Madison Square and the square itself was now
completely built up with new three-story row houses. Those who had moved out into this area
before the Civil War in order to live “in the country,” now found themselves “surrounded with
dwellings on every side.”189

Like Oldtown and Little Italy, the waterfront community of Fells Point became a more
densely populated and more thoroughly industrialized section of the city. Its sturdy but now
antiquated wooden houses, built mostly in the eighteenth century, began to be replaced with three
and four story brick buildings.190 Some of the old prominent families hung on in the area. Captain
Hutson’s grand old mansion at Broadway and Lombard Streets, which was already old when he
had bought it in 1840, was still the home of his three daughters in 1909. They were, however,
among the last of the wealthy antebellum families left in Fells Point itself. While the waterfront
community became more solidly working class, its commercial district continued to draw both
rich and poor from a wide area of East Baltimore. In the late 1860s, the old Fells Point market
building was replaced with a large and attractive new structure with a public hall on the second
floor. The market, located at the foot of Broadway, was one of the city’s most active, especially on
Saturday evenings when, as a Sun reporter put it, such an “immense number of persons” crowded
its stalls that movement from one to another was often very difficult. “The scene, viewed from the
vicinity of Baltimore and Broadway, presents a very picturesque appearance. The numberless
flickering lights, stretching on both side of Broadway, look like a moving torchlight procession.
Nearly all classes of persons attend these night markets, the greater number bent upon business,
but many strolling through the crowd to gratify their curiosity and enjoy the pleasant
spectacle.”191 As in Oldtown, the economic growth and physical reconstruction created hundreds
of new jobs and greater profits, but it made living in “the Point” more uncomfortable. Certainly
from the 1871 description of the Fells Point Market, a wide mixture of income groups still lived
close enough to mingle there, but it is apparent from both the census and the city directories that
those with the requisite income began from 1870 onward to move north towards the higher ground adjacent to the Maryland Hospital and Patterson Park. By the 1880s the tide of row house building moving north out of Fells Point merged with the Gay Street developments and the streets running east towards Patterson Park were almost full of houses. North Broadway, which had seen just a scattering of houses in 1865, was now a rather splendid thoroughfare with expensive homes lining both sides of the wide avenue for over a mile above Fells Point. In the 1870s the avenue was curbed and there were elaborate plantings in the squares, which ran up the middle of the boulevard with the intention of developing the area into east Baltimore’s fashionable resort. These plans were thrown into momentary disarray in 1870 when Johns Hopkins announced he had purchased the old Maryland Hospital with the intention of turning it into a facility that would “admit the indigent poor – without regard to sex, age or color,” this at a time when no other Baltimore hospitals admitted black patients. Fearing that the area would become a mecca for the underclass of the city, development faltered. After Johns Hopkins established separate wards for its white and black patients the capitulation to segregationists calmed neighborhood fears, and middle-income families purchased the new homes in the area, although not in the numbers that flocked into the equivalent type of housing being built in north and northwest Baltimore. To the east, around Patterson Park, the development of new housing, especially of the more expensive sort, was quite slow in the 1870s and early 1880s. The Park, which should have attracted a large number of fine houses to its precincts as Druid Hill Park had done in the northwest, was hobbled by its proximity to the marshes around Harris Creek, which lay just to the east and which received and held “the filth of a vast area of the city.” The fetid marsh was finally filled and Harris Creek turned into a storm sewer in the 1890s, but by this time the Patterson Park area had lost its opportunity to become a premier housing area and builders were forced to put up hundreds of quite modest little row houses for those working in the factories down in Fells Point and Canton. While the land speculators and builders may have regretted this shift, large tracts of land in East Baltimore which otherwise would have been closed off and reserved for larger, more profitable middle and upper income dwellings were now available for the working classes of Fells Point and Canton. Canton itself grew very rapidly in the years from 1865 to the 1890s. New shipping facilities were built along its waterfront, large factories went up behind them and rows of little houses spread out and up the hill towards Patterson Park. When occasional articles in the local press depicted their neighborhood as a slum, Canton’s residents, like those in Fells Point and Little Italy, denounced such accusations. Rev. Ephraim Felton of the Messiah English Lutheran Church in Canton (the area was overwhelmingly German) castigated the press for lying and insulting the people of Canton whom he said, maintained “a quiet, orderly neighborhood,” and at least ten churches, “most of which are self-sustaining, built for the people and by the people of the neighborhood.” While admitting that there were some poor families in the area, “our neighborhood is not in a poverty-stricken condition…most of our people live well.” Indeed, Canton was not a slum by the standards of the late nineteenth century, but its residents could not
afford anything more than tiny row houses so builders who wanted to do business in East Baltimore learned to cater to this income group. It is clear that the builders were successful since several thousand of their small, solidly built row houses survive to this day in the Canton-Patterson Park area.

The failure of the Patterson Park area to live up to the expectations of east Baltimore’s builders forced them to concentrate their upscale housing efforts in upper Broadway-Madison Square, but this was made difficult by its relatively close proximity to the older, heavily populated, and industrialized areas which were themselves pushing outward. So great was the expansion of the warehouse and factory districts of Oldtown, Little Italy and Fells Point in from 1865 to 1890 that they pushed working-class residents out of what had formerly been residential blocks. By the 1880s and 1890s East Baltimore’s working classes lived in the most densely packed neighborhoods of any in the city, so they naturally sought any housing that opened up and began to move to middle-income streets, which had only been settled in the late 1860s and early 1870s. As the middle classes of Oldtown and Fells Point shifted into the upper Broadway Madison Square area, low-income families pushed in not far behind them, especially in the narrower streets and alleys which were still being opened and built upon in the 1870s and 1880s. An increasingly large number of African-American residents in the area between Oldtown and Johns Hopkins Hospital populated the neighborhoods north and west of Little Italy. Almost all these African Americans lived in alley dwellings, and in the 1890s they were joined by the first significant waves of low-income Polish-Russian Jews, Italians, and other immigrant groups. Symbolic of the struggle to maintain the upper Broadway area as an attractive middle-income area was the effort of the Broadway residents (and the police) to maintain the elaborate plantings of shrubs and flowers in the center squares of their grand boulevard. As soon as the flowers came up in the spring, children from the congested slums of Oldtown, Little Italy and Fells Point would come over to play on the squares, trampling the shrubs and picking the flowers.196 The establishment of the Oldtown Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the East Baltimore Improvement Association in the 1880s was motivated primarily by the desire to see that the area would get its fair share of public facilities and services, but the growing numbers of low-income, African American, and immigrants in the area were also catalysts for their formation.

South Baltimore and Locust Point, surrounded on three sides by water, and after the 1850s sharply defined by the northwest by the B&O’s Camden rail yards, was the most well-defined and isolated section of the city. Dominated from the late eighteenth century by wharves, ship building yards, iron forges, factories and (after 1865) railroads, it never made a pretense of having a fashionable middle or upper income neighborhood. However, because of its relative isolation and poor communication with other parts of the city, its major economic leaders, the owners and managers of its many factories and the proprietors of its many stores and shops, lived there along with its working class majority. It was impossible for South Baltimore’s business leaders to try to live in the West End or up in north Baltimore and use the horsecars to get to
work until two lines were opened into the peninsula in 1878 and 1879, but even then service was poor and erratic for another two decades. As soon as commuting became feasible after the consolidation and electrification of the transit lines, a number of South Baltimore’s more affluent residents did leave for other more pleasant parts of the city. During the last half of the nineteenth century South Baltimore’s industrial environment, especially its air quality was so obnoxious that few people would choose to live there. Sachse’s Bird’s Eye View shows that even in 1869 South Baltimore was a great smoke producer, and the problem only grew worse as the main peninsula and Locust Point became increasingly industrialized. In common parlance, one entered south Baltimore as soon as one crossed Pratt Street, so the area behind the Light Street docks was the original core of the district. Its history stretched back to the eighteenth century. By the 1820s the neighborhood extended as far south as Montgomery Street and west to the area where Camden Station now stands. Growth was steady in the 1830–1860 era as large numbers of German immigrants moved in to work in the waterfront factories that stretched from Light Street around the base of Federal Hill and out onto Locust Point. The opening of the Cross Street Market in 1847, on what was then the southern edge of the area, encouraged more building, but by 1869 it is plain that the built up area extended only a third of the way to Ferry Bar, and Locust Point was still without any significant residential area. That all changed very rapidly in the 1870s and 1880s when the B&O decided to establish its major seaport facility on Locust Point. The Locust Point Terminals, the long warehouses and tall grain elevators, and the huge round house below Riverside Park turned the entire Locust Point and Ferry Bar area into a prime industrial and commercial location. Previously, most of the land on Locust Point, and much of the acreage down toward Ferry Bar was considered to be of only marginal value. Between 1870 and 1900 almost every acre had been built up with rail yards, shipyards, factories and houses. The B&O itself brought several hundred workers into Locust Point in the late 1860s and early 1870s. In 1866 the city provided the area with water. By 1873 the B&O had moved over a thousand of its employees from the Mount Clare shops and yards over to Locust Point and several hundred more freight conductors, engineers, and firemen came over when the Riverside Roundhouse opened in 1875. Taking advantage of the new railroad, a number of manufacturing firms set up shop adjacent to the new rail line, drawing more men to “the point.” Hundreds of small brick row houses went up to accommodate the influx of workers. Standing at the corner of Hanover and Fort Streets in 1876, a reporter said he could look down towards the rail terminals at Fort McHenry and count seventy-four new houses going up in the streets behind the wharves. During the 1880s shipyards, fertilizer plants, iron furnaces, brickyards, sewer pipe factories, and a white-lead factory sprang up on the peninsula and several hundred more homes were built for their workers. By 1900 almost the entire peninsula was covered with rail yards, factories, and row houses. On the main peninsula economic activity also increased. Before the war, much of the lower portion of the peninsula was owned by the Winans family. It was here that Ross Winans built his “cigar ship” a streamlined steam-driven propeller vessel that never made it past the prototype stage. At the
southern tip of the peninsula lay Ferry Bar, the site of a long wooden toll bridge that connected Baltimore with Anne Arundel County. In the late 1870s Thomas Winans began to develop his lands by selling off portions of it to manufacturers and then paving the streets and building houses for the workers who came to work in them. The chief difficulty with all this wonderful economic growth was that the smoke and stench were at times intolerable. The smoke was generated by dozens of B&O engines that operated around the clock, combined with the outpourings from the brick and clay pipe factories, the iron furnaces, and the dozens of smaller manufacturers whose smokestacks now dotted the area. The most nauseous stenches, however, came from the fertilizer plants and the oyster shell lime kilns, which it was said not only choked local residents, but ruined trees, shrubs and even clothing. The increasing pollution of the waters caused fish kills that added further to the general stench. Beginning in the 1880s, residents organized to try to get the fertilizer factories to control their vapor emissions and to get the kilns removed entirely. The courts blocked the removal of the lime kilns, and the fertilizer plants and while they promised to control their emissions, it appears they did not do so until after the turn of the century. In spite of these and other problems—the dumping of the city garbage carts on vacant lands at the southern end of the peninsula and the continual delays and accidents resulting from the constant movement of the B&O’s trains across the major streets of the area (the B&O didn’t bridge them until 1910), South Baltimore proved to be a stable and vibrant working class community which also included many middle-income residents who managed the factories and owned the hundreds of small shops and stores that dotted the area by the 1880s. Its churches were important community institutions, every major denomination having at least one church or mission in the area by the 1870s. There was also the South Baltimore Mechanics Library, established in 1863 and the South Baltimore Literary Association, which in the 1870s met at the Light Street Presbyterian Church. The opening of the City Passenger Railway’s horsecar line down Light Street to Ferry Bar in 1878 and the People’s Passenger Railway line down Charles and out Fort Avenue to Fort McHenry the next year gave residents at least some form of public transportation with the rest of the city, but it was really not until the coming of electric rapid transit that South Baltimore became accessible. Even then it remained, as it did a century later, the city’s most insulated (or isolated) section.

The West End is in one way the city’s most famous section since it was the home of what are arguably the city’s two most famous native sons, Henry L. Mencken and George Herman “Babe” Ruth. Henry L. Mencken was born in 1880 at 811 W. Lexington Street and three years later moved into the house at 1524 Hollins Street, facing onto Union Square. Here “the sage of Baltimore” continued to live (with one brief interruption) until he died in 1956. In 1895 George Herman “Babe” Ruth was born at 216 Emory Street, three blocks west of Camden Station and during his early years lived at 339 S. Woodyear Street, four blocks south of Union Square. While living just a few hundred yards from each other at the turn of the century, Mencken and Ruth did not know each other. Mencken was, of course fifteen years older than Ruth and a rising young
reporter when Ruth began to attract notice as a Baltimore baseball player, but the major reason they remained unknown to each other was that they inhabited very different worlds in the West End. Union Square was one of the city’s most attractive little parks and the houses around it were all owned by successful businessmen like Henry’s father, a cigar manufacturer whose factory at 368 West Baltimore Street provided the family with a comfortable living. The cramped little house that Babe Ruth’s father rented on Woodyear Street (really an alley), was located a block west of the B&O’s Mount Clare Shops and thoroughly working class in its population. Woodyear Street was peopled by hardworking, moderate-income families who could afford to rent a whole house, but a block or two below them were areas of real poverty where the housing could only be described as a slum. It was, Mencken recalled, a rough neighborhood in the 1890s and when his Hollins Street “gang” had the misfortune to run into a group of the “tough boys from the region of the B&O repair shops,” they left the encounter battered and bruised.203

The close juxtaposition of Union Square and Woodyear Street was symptomatic of the fundamental character of the entire West End. The area contained the homes of some of Baltimore’s most important leaders, its public squares were among the city’s most attractive, and the majority of its streets were lined with hundreds of very substantial dwellings such as the Mencken house. Like most Baltimore districts it was crossed with small streets and alleys that housed working class residents in close proximity to their upper class neighbors. But in the West End in the 1880s and 1890s these mixed residential neighborhoods were surrounded by problematic land developments. From Franklin Square into the city center, the former streets on which West End residents (or their parents) had lived were being converted into commercial and industrial uses and low income families now filled the remaining houses, which had been cut up into tenements. On the south along Pratt Street were the Mount Clare shops and the numerous factories behind them, which stretched off into southwest Baltimore. The more toxic enterprises lay to the west. In the 1880s and 1890s when Henry Mencken was growing up, he and his friends enjoyed roaming the open fields that lay west of Union Square, but even more fun (for them) was the rag tag industrial district, which lay just beyond between Silver Run and Gwynns Falls. Here were cattle pens, slaughterhouses, lime kilns, a soap factory, and down at the southern end at Calverton were three breweries, a glue works, a leather tanning factory, and assorted lumber and coal yards. A bit further to the south was the famous Wilkins Hair Factory, a large manufacturing, plant whose fumes, if the breeze blew from the southwest, filled the Union Square area and much of the West End with what Henry Mencken called “poison gas.”204

Silver Run was popularly known as “Bloody Run” since the slaughterhouses all emptied into it and the whole unsavory area stood as a barrier to further growth. Cattle regularly moved through some of the main streets of the West End on their way to Calverton, creating an additional nuisance for residents. “The West End” never had very well defined boundaries, perhaps because its residents did not wish to include the Mount. Clare and Calverton industrial districts within its purview, but the whole region continued to carry the name well into the
twentieth century. The West End as a name first appeared in the 1830s and 1840s and applied to the area immediately west of Fremont Street, which had begun to be built up during those decades, especially in the area around the former country estate of James McHenry. To the west lay an extensive tract of land that had been the Steuart and Donnell estates. To the northwest was the Edmondson family estate. By 1900 these and other adjoining suburban farms and estates had been almost entirely laid off into streets and alleys with hundreds of two- and three-story row houses on them. This new, post-Civil War West End had less well defined boundaries than the old one, especially on the north where no major topographic feature separated it from the Eutaw Place neighborhood, but in the 1860s the West Baltimore Improvement Association, which represented the residents living in this area, defined its boundaries as Green Street on the east, Fulton Avenue on the west, Pratt Street on the south and Franklin Street on the north. Beyond Franklin Street lay the Edmondson estate. There in the 1870s and 1880s a group of builders created a new residential neighborhood focused on a green area, which they named Harlem Park. The fifty-seven acre Edmondson tract and several others surrounding it were laid off into streets upon which were built five or six hundred substantial row houses for middle- and upper-income families. Typical of these homes were the nine dwellings erected in the spring of 1879 by Robert Diffenderfer on Mount Street, just a block off the square. They had a sixteen-foot front and were sixty feet deep; the fronts were pressed brick with marble trimming and had all the modern conveniences of hot water, gas lighting, and water closets. The builders put up a number of alley dwellings for lower-income families, their small houses providing extra income for the middle-class owners as well as a convenient supply of domestic servants for the larger houses in adjoining blocks. Soon they had developed their own local improvement association.

In spite of the division of the western portion of the city into two somewhat different local neighborhoods, most Baltimoreans called the whole region west of Fremont Street the West End. By the 1880s and 1890s this included the entire area up to Harlem Square, out to Gwynns Falls and the Mount Clare neighborhood. The focal points of the vast stretch of land were its public market house at Hollins and Arlington streets, built in 1837, and its three public squares: Franklin (1841), Union (1847), and Harlem (1868). From the dates of these landmarks it can be seen that what was centered in 1865 in the southeastern corner was by 1900 was a much larger area. The roots of the Franklin and Union Square localities, of course, lay in the antebellum era.

In 1839 two real estate developers advertised building lots on Franklin Square in Fayette and Carey streets, about a mile and a quarter from the inner harbor and four blocks northwest of the Hollins Market. Sitting at a slightly higher elevation than Mount Vernon Place, the real estate promoters said Franklin Square “offers particular advantages for the residence of families wishing to retire from the more confined parts of the city.” A future omnibus line running into the city center from the square, it was asserted, would “enable merchants and others...to secure to their families a residence in a delightful and airy situation without inconvenience.” By the Civil War several hundred families had availed themselves of the opportunity to remove into this attractive
neighborhood. Just to the southwest, at Hollins and Stricker Streets, Union Square had been laid off and awaited the outward push of row houses. Sachse’s Bird’s Eye View in 1869 shows the edge of development just to the east of Union Square. The Bird’s Eye View also shows clearly that the middle classes were not the only ones on the scene. From the 1830s onward the Mount. Clare Shops had generated a good deal of building of small working class housing in its immediate neighborhood. Also, builders who had been putting up middle-income housing on the main streets of the West End had been running alleys through many of the blocks upon which they erected tiny back dwellings for servants and household helpers. In the years following the Civil War the city spent large sums of money on the three squares. Franklin Square was replanted, a large fountain and pavilion installed and its iron fence taken down (after residents were assured that the herds of cattle that were sometimes driven down the streets of the West End would not use the square for grazing). By the 1870s Union Square had a fish pond, an elaborate fountain, a springhouse covered with a cast-iron Greek temple, extensive flower beds, benches, iron fencing and a full time keeper to maintain the premises and supervise its use by the local residents. From 1873 onward, during summer evenings and weekends when the square was crowded, a policeman was stationed there “so that even if anyone was thoughtless enough to pluck the flowers or deface the property, or behave improperly otherwise, instantaneous punishment would follow.” The squares were for the enjoyment of the neighborhood’s white residents. While African Americans were not legally prohibited from entering them, the only ones who gathered there were female servants pushing carriages or tending small children. In the Union Square neighborhood its little alleys served as the open spaces for its African American residents. Each alley had its own income groups and lifestyle. Mencken said that his African American neighbors in Booth Street, the alley behind his house, “were of a peaceful disposition, and the few ructions back there were almost always caused by visitors,” but in Vincent alley, two blocks to the west, “the wars continued round the calendar, and were especially bloody on Saturday nights.” Almost every weekend on that night, he said, police officer Murphy could be seen “dragging the wounded out of its tenements and clubbing the felonious into insensibility.”

What Henry Menken found amusing, other West end residents found increasingly disturbing. This was especially the case in the older Franklin Square section. Franklin Square itself was still in the 1870s a prestigious locale, with its three- and four-story townhouses selling for as much as $10,000, but in the rest of the neighborhood housing was beginning to turn over more rapidly. However, the building of newer homes in the 1870s, particularly in the Harlem Park area and further north in the fashionable Eutaw Place neighborhood cut deeply into the middle and upper income population that lived around Franklin Square. One of the neighborhood’s ornaments was St. Luke’s Protestant Episcopal Church, built in 1846 and ranking among the city’s most prominent congregations. By 1879, however, its position had begun to slip and its rector, Rev. Charles Rankin, confessed to the vestrymen that its future appeared bleak. This he blamed on the declining neighborhood.
We have within a stone’s throw of the church two noisy public schools, a livery stable and a negro chapel, all of which are drawbacks to the neighborhood. Coincident with this state of things, the acquisition of Druid Hill Park by the city has determined northward and northwestward the tide of population, which at one time promised to flow westward in our direction. Tide after tide of changing population has drifted through our walls and as the geologist can stratify the country through which he travels, so it is an easy matter to indicate the deposits which each succeeding tide has left among us. It has become no unusual thing to see our communion list change by additions and removals to the extent from one hundred and fifty to two hundred yearly. Also, the congregation has remained large, but with the increase in numbers there has been no corresponding increase in pecuniary power.212

Reverend Rankin stayed on for another seven years and the church itself survived well into the twentieth century, but as the neighborhood was converted into a lower income working-class area, St. Luke’s middle-class congregation fled to the west and north. Instead of articles on the attractive spring flowers in Franklin Square, the local papers more often carried stories in the 1880s of the “misconduct of youths” along its paths and attempts of the police to quell their depravations.213 By 1898 a survey of city churches stated the change succinctly. “The character of the neighborhood has materially changed of late, and much of the strength of St. Luke’s has removed to other parts of the city.”214

While the Franklin Square area was gradually converted into a lower income neighborhood in the 1880s and 1890s, the remaining middle class sections of the West End organized to try to protect their neighborhoods. The formation of the West Baltimore Association and the Harlem Park Improvement Association both in 1886 indicated the resolve of local residents to gain a fair share of the city’s facilities and services and otherwise protect themselves against changes that would drive away middle class families.

It is self-evident by this point that the major outward thrust of Baltimore’s middle and upper income families in the post-Civil War era was out to the North and Northwest. Most Baltimoreans agreed with Reverend Rankin that the key factor had been the 1860 purchase of Druid Hill from the Rogers family and its conversion into one of the nation’s great public parks. But even before this very significant purchase, it was clear that the tide of middle and upper class housing had been moving north. By 1865 the streets around and above Mount Vernon Place had become filled with the homes of the city’s wealthiest and most prominent families—far outnumbering those who had removed to the West End. The edge of development had not reached the city line at North Avenue, but out beyond this boundary lay the most elevated and beautiful countryside in the urban region. Not only was it lovely to behold, its ownership carried a prestige that neither the eastern nor western environs could match. Not only the former Rogers estate, but the suburban estate and properties of most of the city’s great landed families were located in the northern quadrant, a pie-shaped region spreading out beyond North Avenue from
the Reisterstown Turnpike around to the Belair Turnpike and extending north to Towsontown and beyond. From the 1770s onward many of the city’s chief merchants had turned themselves into country gentlemen by purchasing suburban tracts on the hills and ridges north of town and, imitating the English gentry, built county houses, stabled horses and even farmed a bit in a gentlemanly manner as far as their money and time would allow. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a number of these estates covered hundreds of acres, but relative few survived into the 1860s and 1870s. Druid Hill, Guilford, Mondawmin, and Clifton were four of the most prominent. Most others, however, especially in the area adjacent to the city itself, were much smaller to begin with or had been subdivided into “estates” of ten to fifty acres. These smaller tracts, usually fronting on the major roads running into the city, were highly sought after and by the 1860s were held by many of the city’s leading families. Johns Hopkins, of course, led the field with his magnificent home at Clifton, the former estate of Henry Thompson. A.S. Abell, a major suburban land speculator as well as a famous newspaper man, owned Guilford, but several dozen other familiar names are spread across the maps of the northern district. These include the Garrett family, the Wymans, John S. Gittings, the Shipley and Ellicott families, Edward Patterson, J.C. Matthai, William T. Walters, D.S. Wilson, the Numsens, David Perine, the Tyson brothers, the Merrymans, the Turnbulls, the Gilmores, and the Brooks.
Introduction to Chapter 8
Getting Around Town: From a Walking City to Motor Vehicle Metropolis 1844-1920
by Elizabeth M. Nix

It took Baltimore only a few short years to go from a walking city of dense neighborhoods to a metropolitan area shaped by rapid transit. Arnold charts this progress as he shows how the horsecar ushered in Baltimore's first commuter suburbs, Waverly and Govanstown. In the 1890s cable cars and electric trolleys supplanted the horsecar and opened up new "Trolley Car Suburbs" including Roland Park, Guilford, Sudbrook Park and Ten Hills. These neighborhoods remain models of creative suburban development, and their continuing popularity is a testament to the vision of the Olmsted family who designed large portions of them. The suburban districts were miles away from the congested central city. Arnold emphasizes the crowding and the filth but also illuminates the sound of the center city; by 1900 residents had to endure the constant noise of 24-hour trolley service.

Arnold continues his interest in class when he describes the ridership of the trolleys. Not only were these large cars fast, but also they were cheap, so working class Baltimoreans of all races and ethnicities could afford to travel on them every day, sitting right next to the elite. Arnold argues that this uncomfortable urban mixture led to the upper classes' quick adoption of the auto. He begins to explain this transition through a description of the bicycle craze, which he argues was a "dress rehearsal for the automobile." These "swift and silent" cycles moved more rapidly around the town than any other vehicle, and, after some initial skepticism, 33,000 Baltimoreans became recreational cyclists. Their new hobby led them to political activism as they advocated for bicycle lanes throughout the city. When the automobile was introduced in the last years of the 19th century, its benefits over bicycles and trolleys were clearly evident. Baltimoreans of all classes rushed to purchase automobiles, and by 1913 there were more autos in the city than horses.

This transition may be a familiar story to students of American history, but Arnold adds a fresh perspective to the tale. First, he discusses the pedestrian experience at great length, recounting bicycle accidents and auto collisions. He makes readers realize the profound difference cars brought to everyone moving about the streets. Next, he includes a discussion of trucks, telling readers about Baltimore's municipal departments' eagerness to incorporate trucks into their horse-drawn fleets. Finally, he goes into detail about the street improvements that the car required. After decades of putting off street upgrades, Baltimore was finally forced by the advent of the auto to replace its cobblestone streets. The walking city that resembled a European town was quickly disappearing.
The Baltimore Trolley Museum would be a good choice for students who want to discover more about the region's mass transportation history. Ed Orser also includes a short chapter on streetcars in *The Gwynns Falls: Baltimore Greenway to the Chesapeake Bay.*
Chapter 8: Getting Around Town: From Walking City To Motor Vehicle Metropolis, 1844-1920

One of the most striking characteristics of American cities is the relatively short time that so many of them served as the centers of urban life. Baltimore followed this pattern. Rising from a small tobacco landing during 1730s and 1740s, Baltimore developed into a bustling port town of 26,500 by the opening of the nineteenth century. It emerged as a full-scale city during the 1840s and 1850s. Its population finally topped 100,000 in 1840 and twenty years later stood at 212,000—the fourth largest city in the nation. The Chesapeake metropolis possessed a mature commercial and industrial economy, a sophisticated cultural life, and a modern municipal government. The downtown district, fronting on the inner harbor, employed thousands of people in retail shops, wholesale houses, banks, shipping firms, factories, shipyards, hotels, and saloons. Beyond this district stood block after block of row houses that held the city’s rich, middling, and poorer households. The edges of the city were quite sharply defined. Beyond the last blocks of row houses lay open countryside, dotted with cottages, farms and a few suburban estates, but nothing resembling a modern suburb.

Today, the picture is radically different. The Baltimore metropolitan region now stretches far beyond the old row-house city, covering four counties and hundreds of square miles. This suburban region now contains the overwhelming majority of residents and economic activities formerly located within the central city. Baltimore’s downtown district still performs some important functions, but is a shadow of its former self. Its factories disappeared many years ago, along with its department stores, retail shops, and wholesale warehouses. While some of its grand old office buildings have survived, and several attractive new ones have been constructed, they employ only a small portion of the region’s white-collar work force. Baltimore’s inner harbor area stands out as a vibrant entertainment center and a handful of affluent residents live in adjacent
luxury high-rises or gentrified row homes, but the whole central district has devolved into a
specialized subdivision that plays almost no role in the daily lives of the vast majority of the
region’s residents. Baltimore City, the roughly ninety square miles contained within the current
municipal boundaries, contains some important and unique institutions such as The Johns
Hopkins University and Hospital, the professional schools of the University of Maryland, and two
major league sports stadiums, but it serves primarily as a haven for lower income households that
cannot afford the higher priced suburban dwellings.

The major reason for this great transformation has been the long-standing, deep-seated
desire of the urban middle and upper classes to remove themselves from the densely built up city
that emerged during the nineteenth century. This move is now largely accomplished. Over two-
thirds of those living in the Baltimore region work, shop, and play in suburbs characterized by
detached housing, large open spaces, shopping malls, and office/industrial parks—all of them
linked and sustained by the auto and the truck. Baltimoreans may have appeared to have been
quite attached to their dense, row house city, but in fact, from the 1840s onward, families with
sufficient income moved farther and farther away from the central district by taking advantage of
each new mode of public transit that made their removal feasible: first the omnibus, then the
horsecar, and after that the “rapid transit” trolley car. In each of these cases, riders at first
delighted in the new transit system, but over time they became more critical of the service and
looked forward to the next innovation. Only with the arrival of the automobile did Baltimoreans,
like almost all other Americans, believe they had found the perfect transit vehicle. After a brief
period of skepticism and opposition during the opening years of the twentieth century,
Baltimoreans participated fully in the rush to embrace the motor vehicle as the ultimate mode of
transportation. This collective decision assured that a dispersed, suburbanized region would
replace the old compact city of the nineteenth century, consigning huge swaths of it to a cycle of
decay, abandonment, and demolition.²¹⁶

One of the most striking aspects of this phenomenon is the remarkably short period of
time in which Baltimore, like so many other American cities, moved from a compact, walking city
to a motorized metropolitan region. Elderly men and women who watched hundreds of autos and
trucks speed up Charles Street in 1915 bound for distant and affluent suburbs could recall a time
in their childhood when every class of resident lived in the city and moved about it on foot. The
seventy years that passed between the introduction of the omnibus in 1844 and the emergence of
the motor vehicle during the second decade of the twentieth century has not been replicated by
any such radical change during the subsequent eighty years. Today, the auto and truck remain the
dominant form of urban transit, and the current juxtaposition of inner city and suburban ring is
simply an extrapolation of a pattern that had formed in Baltimore by 1915.

Until the introduction of public transit vehicles in 1844 only the very rich moved about
the city or the countryside with any speed or comfort. A private carriage with a fine set of horses
and a good driver were the possession of perhaps three out every hundred Baltimore families.
More people owned one-horse buggies or small wagons, but these vehicles and their horses were also expensive to keep if one lived in town, so their number was also limited. Hiring a hackney coach (the horse-drawn equivalent of the modern taxi cab) was also an expensive luxury. Hackmen charged fifty cents per trip—half a day’s wages for most Baltimoreans. Even the fortunate few who owned or hired horse-drawn vehicles were restricted in both speed and freedom of movement. In the city, carriages moved slowly over the cobblestone streets to avoid jostling their passengers or breaking a wheel. In addition, the municipality set the speed limit for all vehicles at six miles per hour. Out on the country roads, carriage drivers who pushed their horses even to a fast trot risked knocking their passengers off their seats or damaging the vehicles since large holes and deep ruts were common, even on the turnpike roads. Carriages were often compelled to make detours around washed-out bridges or impassable stretches of roadway. Therefore, almost no one who needed to spend each working day in the downtown district attempted to reside permanently outside the city. The wealthy few who kept suburban houses used them primarily in the summer.

Baltimore’s first small step beyond walking, so to speak, commenced in May 1844 when an omnibus began carrying passengers from the West End to Exchange Place (the commercial center of the city) and eastward to Fells Point. The omnibus was a French invention that New Yorkers had adopted in 1829; it took over a decade to appear on the streets of Baltimore. Perhaps the city’s residents were already displaying the cautious conservatism that has characterized much of their behavior, but the delay may also have been due to the fact that the city was not yet so spread out that people thought it worth the price to ride. A relatively short walk still took Baltimoreans to almost any part of town.

By the 1840s this convenient situation began to change. The formerly compact city had expanded to the point where those living on the periphery found walking in and out of the central district a long and sometimes arduous task. Wealthy merchants and manufacturers had built splendid new town houses on a commanding site surrounding the city’s monument to George Washington, about a mile north of the waterfront. On the west side of town, new construction had reached Franklin Square, located on an elevated site just over a mile west of the inner harbor. The outward movement of families was inevitable given the great increase in population between 1840 and 1860; in addition, the downtown district itself was intruding into what had been residential blocks during the 1820s and 1830s. Finally, Baltimore’s growing industrial activities created a noisy, smoky atmosphere that drove hundreds of more affluent residents out to higher ground where they could enjoy fresh air and less noise. Between 1850 and 1860 the older waterfront wards lost 5,000 residents while the outer wards gained just over 50,000. Not everyone in the outer wards was well to do. Builders constructed small alley dwellings behind the large, street-facing houses, and small patches of low-rent houses, many of them little more than shanties thrown up on what had formerly been the outskirts of town, were by-passed by builders, creating mini-slums adjacent to blocks of middle- or upper-income housing.
Chapter 8: Getting Around Town

Omnibuses and Horsecars

Those now living some distance from the harbor now faced the daily problem of getting back and forth from the downtown district. Not only was this district the source of nearly all employment, it was the focal point of Baltimore’s social and cultural life. Its retail shops and food markets continued to draw customers from throughout the city. The Center Market, plus the Hanover and Lexington markets, all located in the downtown area, accounted for eighty percent of the city’s market business in 1850 and still handled a majority of it in 1860. The five outlying markets (Fells Point, Richmond, Hollins, and Cross Street) were all much smaller and carried a more narrow range of items. For those who went downtown to shop, the long uphill walk to the outer wards was not an easy trek, especially if one was laden with goods. In summer it was hot and dusty, while cold weather brought sleet, snow and slippery footing.

If one could afford it, the omnibuses provided the answer. The *Sun* quickly grasped the larger significance of the vehicles, stating that “in addition to their general convenience,” they would “enhance the value of property in the outskirts of the city, enabling persons to reside at a distance from their businesses... without loss of time and fatigue of walking, whilst the cost is but a trifle.” While the cost was certainly more than a trifle for the average Baltimorean, a sizable number of middle- and upper-income residents made regular use of them, enjoying their convenience and comfort in the knowledge that nearly all their fellow passengers were also ladies and gentlemen. Poorer people residing in the outer wards could only watch the omnibuses roll by as they tramped along on foot.

The suburban lines owned relatively few omnibuses and charged much higher fares—twenty to twenty-five cents each way. For this reason they never became regular commuter lines except during June, July, and August when they served those who owned or rented summer homes outside the city. During the winter, they operated only when the weather and road conditions made travel possible.

The chief opponents of the innovation were the Baltimore Street merchants who thought the rails would obstruct wagons, carriages, and buggies. During the next five years the expansion of horsecar lines in New York and Philadelphia, facilitated by a newly designed rail that was nearly flush with the pavement, ended the merchants’ objections and by 1859 several groups of investors had presented plans to replace all of Baltimore’s omnibuses with horsecars.

Over the next twenty years several new horsecar companies obtained franchises to operate new lines within the city, and local investors built four more suburban lines along the other turnpikes radiating out from the urban center. Together, all these companies provided Baltimore and its environs with a far larger, faster, and more reliable transit system than the omnibuses. Even so, the lines running out beyond the city boundaries did not create anything like a modern suburban district. While they allowed a number of middle- and upper-income residents to move further out from the downtown area, the city remained a row-house community, and its
overall population density changed very little over the twenty-five years. In 1865 Baltimore had a population of approximately 240,000 living in a built-up area covering about four and half square miles, giving it an overall population density of eighty-three people per acre. While working-class neighborhoods adjacent to the downtown were often very crowded, the pervasiveness of the row house, even in the middle and upper income areas on the urban periphery, kept population densities high and Baltimore City’s edges remained fairly well defined. By 1890 the city’s population reached 434,000 and covered just under nine square miles, so the overall density had only declined to seventy-six persons per acre. The one small change was the appearance of half a dozen slender residential tendrils stretching outward from the city along the suburban horsecar lines.

In 1888 the residents living in the areas north and west of the city boundaries (beyond North Avenue and west of Smallwood Street) voted to annex themselves to the city, increasing the municipal territory from fourteen to thirty-one square miles. Most of the newly annexed territory was open land. While nearly solid blocks of row houses had been erected in the areas just beyond the old municipal boundaries, further out along the horsecar lines a number of detached dwellings had been built. For this reason the population density on the fringe was now somewhat lower than it was in the older wards, but the total number of those residing along the horsecar lines was too small to make a significant difference in the city’s overall population density.

The faster and more reliable service offered by the horsecars was at first greatly appreciated, but passengers gradually forgot the omnibuses that had once bounced along the streets and became more critical of the new transit companies. In fact, the horsecars did have problems. Even when operating on rails with a well-maintained strip of pavement between them to give the horses a firmer footing, the pace was still much slower than a private carriage or buggy drawn by a good team of horses. The transit company’s horses were probably not of the highest quality. One rider remembered them as “lean, hungry-looking animals with drooping heads and mangy tails.” On the steeper grades coming out from the downtown district, the two regular horses were aided by a “hill horse” that was attached at the bottom of an incline and detached at the top. During the most torrid summer days, and in rainy or icy weather, long delays often occurred. In one way the fixed rail horsecars were at a distinct disadvantage to the old omnibuses: if a horse was overcome with heat, or fell on wet or icy pavement and was injured, all the cars behind it were held up until a replacement could be brought. Yet even with their problems, the horsecars carried more passengers each year and by the 1880s had become a major fixture in the city. The horsecars were larger than the omnibuses, almost seven times more numerous, and traveled through nearly every neighborhood. By the mid-1880s they carried over 30,000,000 passengers each year which meant that approximately one quarter of the city’s residents used them almost daily.

The horsecar companies provided reasonably good service up to approximately three miles, and nine out of ten of them went no further. The suburban horsecar companies certainly
did better than the old omnibuses, but they never attracted a large percentage of the city’s regular commuters. By 1890 the six suburban horsecar companies carried passengers out along the major turnpikes for distances of eight to twelve miles at a cost of twenty to twenty-five cents each way—still too expensive for the vast majority of city residents to think of using them very regularly. Much of these company’s income came from carrying passengers out to summer homes, but after a municipal referendum in 1867 allowed the cars to operate on Sundays, they did an even larger business taking Sunday excursionists out to picnic groves and church camp grounds between May and October.219 Some limited service was maintained during the winter months, but like the omnibuses, it was highly dependent on the weather and road conditions. Some hardly operated at all during this season. The York Road line proved most successful because it carried people back and forth to the Baltimore County Court House in Towson, and it even developed a small commuter service as far as Waverly and Govanstown (a distance of three and five miles respectively). These two villages became Baltimore’s first commuter suburbs, but until the coming of the rapid transit lines in the 1890s, they remained quite small. Even though the York Road line was fairly well maintained, passengers constantly lodged the familiar complaint about the slow and erratic service—occasionally with an ironic touch of humor:

It was drizzling softly one day last week as two horses with sad, gazelle-like eyes and a dirge-like movement drew a York Road car thoughtfully northward toward Govanstown. Inside, wrapped in moist overcoats and a doleful silence, sat a number of patient travelers thinking of distant firesides, and wondering whether their wives were much older-looking than when they had left home, or how much their children had grown in their absence... Just then the car stopped, and the rain came pouring down, and a passenger opened the door and asked, ‘driver, why have you stopped the car? Anything broken?’ ‘I know my business’ was the reply. I’waitin till this shower stops. Some people are so impatient, there’s no reasoning with ‘em at all.”220

The Bicycle

The impatient commuter’s prayers were finally answered by the introduction of electric trolley cars during the 1890s, but about this same time a large number of Baltimoreans took up a form of transportation that vaguely foreshadowed the automobile. This was the bicycle. The bicycle (then called an “ordinary” or “high wheeler”) was a rarity in Baltimore before 1888. The huge front wheel with the pedals directly attached to it made the machine very difficult to ride. In addition, a bicycle was expensive and its freedom of movement was restricted by the municipal government. Even though bicycles, like all other vehicles, were limited to the city speed limit of six miles per hour, in 1882 a man on a high wheeler frightened a horse in Druid Hill Park causing the animal to overturn the carriage it was pulling. Since several hundred carriages drove in the
park each weekday and well over a thousand on the weekends, the park board quickly banned cycling in Druid Hill as well as the other the city parks. The next year, after negotiations between the park board and local bicycle enthusiasts (which included a number of prominent young Baltimoreans) the parks were opened to them for two hours each day.221

The major “bicycle revolution” occurred during the latter half of the 1880s with the development of the sprocket-chain drive system and pneumatic tires of the same size on the front and rear.222 The newly designed bicycles were much easier and safer to ride and suddenly created a huge new clientele. As the Sun commented, “The bicycle is undoubtedly conquering a large place in our modern life... Formerly it was a toy of the ‘sport,’ or adventurous athlete, but now, since the introduction of the ‘safety’ plan for construction, it is within the powers of the small boy, the man of middle age and even the ladies.”223 In Baltimore, the bicycle received a major boost in 1888 when the city’s chief cycling association, the Maryland Bicycle Club, hosted the convention of the League of American Wheelmen, a national association of local cycling clubs. Following the convention, bicycle sales increased dramatically. High quality bicycles were initially quite expensive, selling for $50-$70, but as more manufacturers entered the field and became more efficient, prices dropped significantly. Beginning in 1896 bicycle manufacturers held annual shows in Baltimore and other large cities to introduce their latest models—a practice automakers took up a decade later. Few Baltimore firms produced bicycles, although for a time the Maryland Manufacturing Company marketed three styles of bikes: the “Suburban,” the “Postal,” and the “Druid.”224

By 1897 it was estimated that over 33,000 Baltimoreans had become cyclists. Druid Hill Park, now open to bicycles at all times, became a popular destination. On a typical weekend morning in the mid-1890s several thousand men, women, and children cycled into the park. Apparently the horses became more accustomed to sharing the roadway with cyclists, but the drivers of horse-drawn vehicles needed to keep a sharp eye out for those who peddled their machines recklessly. The sheer number of cyclists also became a problem for horse-drawn vehicles, not only in the parks, but also on the major roadways. Because of its hard, relatively smooth surface, the Pimlico Road had long been a favorite haunt for the drivers of fast rigs and spirited horses, but by the mid-1890s as many as 4,000 cyclists could be found peddling along this thoroughfare, almost engulfing the horse-drawn vehicles.225 Indeed cyclists could be found on almost any of the city’s relatively smooth streets and, out in the suburbs, they invaded the turnpikes and other country roads that were not too deeply rutted or pockmarked with holes.

The great popularity of the bicycle stemmed in large part from the freedom of movement one gained and, if a cyclist was more daring, the high speeds that could be achieved. The ability to ride out along any suburban or country road that was at all passable opened a new world to thousands of city dwellers. As the editor of The American commented, “Before the bicycle... the country surrounding the city was generally a terra incognito to every city-bred person,” but as
they began cycling out ten or fifteen miles and exploring side roads and rural lanes, the knowledge they gained of the city’s environs “is almost beyond calculation.”

If the bicycle opened horizons never seen before, its speed provided a thrilling new experience. The safety-style bicycles, which could be ridden by almost anyone in good physical condition, could move along at fifteen to twenty miles per hour on a relatively flat, smooth roadway. Those with more strength and a high quality bicycle could travel much faster. Going downhill, a brave cyclist could equal the speed of an express train. Such speeds put cyclists at odds with traditional speed laws. In 1897, after much lobbying, the Maryland Bicycle Club, supported by many owners of light horse-drawn vehicles, convinced the municipal park board to raise the speed limit for both types of vehicles from six to eight miles per hour within Druid Hill Park and the other city parks. In Baltimore County there was no specific speed limit for any type of vehicle, but all were governed by the general rule that they could not exceed a reasonable speed for road and traffic conditions. While the city and county police attempted to arrest speeding or reckless cyclists, the vast number of people peddling along the roads made the job difficult, so they usually targeted only the most blatant offenders.

Drivers of horse-drawn vehicles, and the horses themselves, gradually accommodated to the bicycle; however, there was a good deal of resentment towards the fast new machines and alterations on the roads were not uncommon. In response, the Baltimore cycle clubs, almost all of which were affiliated with the League of American Wheelmen, pressed their case for equal access to the public thoroughfares. Their legal actions met with almost universal success. Judges imposed heavy fines on drivers of horse-drawn vehicles who purposely impeded cyclists or tried to run them off the road. In turn cyclists were required to warn others of their approach with a bell or horn. The bicycle certainly did not contribute in any direct way to the decline of the horse, but they were the first new vehicles to appear on city streets and suburban roads, forcing teamsters and carriage drivers to exercise more caution, making their drive a bit less pleasurable and, when they faced large numbers of cyclists, a nerve-racking chore. Most important, by establishing their right to use public streets and roads, cyclists cracked open a door that motorists soon knocked completely off its hinges.

The bicycle also changed the behavior of pedestrians. In most bicycle accidents cyclists injured only themselves, but many times they ran into pedestrians who either did not hear (or did not receive) a warning of a cyclist’s approach. As was later to be the case with automobiles, children and older people were the chief victims. Since most of those struck by bicycles were not severely injured, the public outcry against reckless or speeding cyclists remained muted. On the other hand, the speed, silence and unpredictable path of bicycles did compel pedestrians to be much more watchful, when they stepped into a street, crossed a road or (after 1908) walked on sidewalks in the outer wards of the city and the suburbs. Thus in several ways, the bicycle provided a dress rehearsal for the motor vehicle.
The other major impact of the bicycle craze was the nationwide campaign waged by the League of American Wheelmen to improve city streets and country roads. At the national level, the league, along with farm groups such as the National Grange, convinced the federal government in 1893 to establish the Bureau of Roads Inquiry to assess the state of the nation’s roads and (cyclists and farmers hoped) oversee a program of federal financial aid to states that would modernize the nation’s highways. At the state and local level, Maryland’s cyclists, led by the Maryland Bicycle Club, sought to upgrade Baltimore’s bumpy streets and Maryland’s muddy rural roads. In 1898 the cycle clubs, along with a much larger and more influential group of farm organizations in the rural counties, did get the General Assembly to undertake a complete survey of road conditions in Maryland and examine the whole question of road improvement. In 1900 the cycle clubs drew up a bill to create “side paths” along the state’s highways for the exclusive use of bicycles. Nothing came of the proposal, and relatively little was done to create a modern system of state highways until the establishment of the Maryland State Roads Commission in 1909. Nevertheless, cyclists persisted as an important pressure group in Baltimore City and Baltimore County. Cycling remained a popular sport and leisure-time activity for many men and women through the first decade of the twentieth century. There continued to be cycling enthusiasts until the coming of the automobile left the bicycle, quite literally, trailing in the dust—reduced in large measure to a children’s toy. A few hardy souls may have commuted to work on bicycles when the weather permitted, but they escaped any notice in the local press and therefore must not have been a large group. Baltimore’s hilly terrain, plus the increasing number of motor vehicles on the city’s streets after 1910 made commuting by bicycle both arduous and perilous.

Cable Cars and Electric Trolleys

For those seeking a better way to commute to work or get around the city, a new day dawned during the 1890s when a combination of cable cars and electric trolley cars brought the “rapid transit” revolution to the city and its suburbs. Once again, Baltimore was a bit late in adopting these innovations. As Chicago, San Francisco, and Boston built rapid transit systems, Baltimore’s business and civic leaders complained that their city was falling behind the march of progress. The Sun declared that “we must have rapid transit, or we shall be left in the rear by our rivals.” Noting that Boston had installed an excellent electric car system that moved its vehicles along at fifteen miles per hour, “the jog-trot of our street cars is absurd.”

Baltimore’s first rapid car began operating on May 16, 1890 along a 1.8 mile stretch of North Avenue. It was powered by an overhead electric trolley system developed by Frank J. Sprague and first demonstrated in Richmond, Virginia in 1888. Because the line was so short, it functioned as an experimental curiosity more than the beginning of any fundamental change in the city’s transit system. The first major rapid transit line, linking Druid Hill and Patterson parks, was over four miles long and powered by a moving steel cable located in a groove between the
tracks—a system first put into operation in San Francisco in 1872. The line ran south from Druid Hill Park to Fayette Street, through the downtown area on Fayette, and eastward to Patterson Park. The newspapers followed the project closely, and the public eagerly anticipated its opening on May 21, 1891. The new cars, weighing 17,000 pounds, looked gigantic next to little horsecars that weighed only 5,000 pounds. When fully loaded with “strap hangers” and those seated, the new cable cars could carry nearly a hundred passengers at a speed of ten miles per hour, the limit set for them by the City Council. (The very first car exceeded this speed on its maiden run.) On opening day, 60,000 people rode the new cars. Baltimoreans were thrilled with the innovation and clamored for rapid transit on all the lines.

For a year or two the city council required that lines running through the downtown be powered by cable rather than electricity because many of those who went downtown to work or shop feared walking beneath the overhead electric wires, and a number of downtown merchants thought the wires and posts were unsightly and impeded the sidewalks. Five of the old lines, including the Red Line (the first omnibus line to be converted to horsecars back in 1859) were converted to cable power. When the Red Line switched, the first cable car carried among its passengers Mrs. Robert H. Gilbert, a woman who had ridden on the first Red Line horsecar in October, 1859. The suburban routes all converted directly to electricity because they were far too long for cable power. Flying along at ten miles an hour or more, they halved the time it took to go into the city from places such as Towson, Pikesville, and Catonsville. In 1892 the horsecar line through South Baltimore was electrified and extended across the Long Bridge at Ferry Bar into Anne Arundel County; a year later the first electric trolley cars whisked into Towson. The arrival of rapid transit in the county seat “caused a considerable stir among the residents and crowds watched the cars arrive and depart.” Over 3,000 people rode the line during its first day of operation. Soon passengers could board an electric car in Catonsville, change to a York Road car downtown, and travel to Towson, a distance of seventeen miles, at a cost of only twenty cents. The same trip by horsecar had cost forty-five cents. Resistance to the running of electric lines through the downtown was overcome by the example of the suburban lines and by the fall of 1892 electric cars began to move through the city’s main commercial streets, bringing faster service to city residents. The Central Line, running from Fulton Avenue through the city center to Fells Point, converted to electricity in September 1891 and made the trip in thirty-five minutes compared to the hour and six minutes that the old horsecars took. Those who rode the line on opening day arrived at the horsecar barn and were greeted by a large sign reading “Horses For Sale.” By the spring of 1894, nineteen of the city’s twenty-three horsecar lines had been converted to cable or electric power and plans to convert the remaining lines had been announced. Thus, only thirty-five years after the first horsecar line opened, and been hailed as a great advance for Baltimore, The American noted that “the last vestige of the antiquated system of horse power on street railways is fast disappearing.” The last major horsecar line disappeared in 1896. By the end of the decade improvements in the electric trolley cars made them clearly
superior to those powered by cable; electricity now moved the masses. More routes were opened within the city and the number of suburban lines increased from seven to sixteen. The Baltimore Union Passenger Railway electrified its line running out Edmondson Avenue into Baltimore County. Passing north of Catonsville, it ran through open fields and dense woods to the Patapsco River where a bridge carried it across to Ellicott City in Howard County. Electric lines now connected the city with all three of its surrounding counties. The old horsecar line out Reisterstown Road to Pikesville was electrified and extended nine miles further to “the picturesque... home-like village of Reisterstown” and the Methodist camp ground at Emory Grove, twenty-three miles from downtown Baltimore and just three miles from the Carroll County line. The conversion to electric trolleys was too expensive for the smaller horsecar companies, so they were bought out by the larger ones and in 1899 a financial syndicate led by Alex Brown & Sons brought all the city and suburban transit companies together under the control of the United Railways and Electric Company, capitalized at $76 million dollars.

The introduction of rapid transit, and the construction of so many new suburban lines, opened the countryside around the city to tens of thousands of Baltimoreans who had not participated in the bicycle craze and had seldom ventured beyond the city boundaries. During the horsecar days, 20,000-30,000 passengers was a good total for Sunday or holiday excursionists traveling out to the suburban picnic groves or church camps. By 1897, the suburban rapid transit lines often carried over 100,000 excursionists on these days, and in 1915 the total rose to nearly 200,000. With the extension of the old suburban lines and the construction of so many new ones, the travelers now scattered themselves over a much larger hinterland—once again leading to predictions of increased residential dispersion. In 1895 the Baltimore Morning Herald echoed the views of many Baltimoreans, saying that the development of the new rapid transit lines “will scatter the population over a wide area” and “it would be difficult to conceive of any force or forces which can check this growth.” While not everyone who traveled out into the country on a Sunday afternoon bought a home there, several thousand families did determine to become suburbanites. In response, builders and land speculators created dozens of housing developments along the transit lines.

Trolley Car Suburbs

The new “trolley car suburbs,” as they came to be called, ranged from well planned and expensive developments to rows of cheap, jerry-built cottages or lots marked off on former corn fields. At the high end were Roland Park and Guilford, located four miles north of the downtown district, straddling the city-county boundary. The first plat of Roland Park opened in 1892 and was designed by the well-known architect George E. Kessler. Breaking with the traditional gridiron street pattern, Kessler created a development with curvilinear streets, large lots and dwellings set well back from the sidewalks. A writer for The American, assessing the development
five years after it opened, was a bit perplexed by “its bewildering system of streets and avenues,” but also thought the general effect was “delightful to behold.” Roland Park as a whole, he concluded, “is in a class by itself... its well-bred, well-groomed lawns are the envy and despair of all other suburban places.” At Roland Park houses could be purchased for $2,000-$4,000 during the depressed 1890s, but by 1910 they sold for more than double their original price. Guilford opened in 1910 as a lavish development designed by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr’s planning firm. Magnificent homes set on beautifully landscaped lots cost $16,000-$18,000. Inflation had increased the price of all housing, but accounted for only a portion of the fancy price tags on dwellings in Guilford—it was the most elegant and costly suburban development in the Baltimore region and attracted the largest percentage of families listed in the Baltimore Social Register. Both Roland Park and Guilford possessed all the most modern conveniences: paved streets, sewers, water, gas, electricity, and telephone service. Trolley service into downtown Baltimore was not very convenient until a direct line opened in 1905, so a number of Roland Park residents kept a house “in town,” but gradually more and more of them sold their townhouses and became permanent suburbanites. As automobiles became more common after 1910, large new homes, and the conversion of summer houses into year around residences, began to transform the York Road corridor all the way out to Towson. In 1910 the Ridgleys finally gave up their townhouse on Gay Street and converted “Hampton,” their ancestral estate, into a year-round home.

Upscale developments were not limited to northern transit corridor. Near Pikesville was Sudbrook Park, an 850-acre development designed by Frederick Law Olmsted Sr. Its streets twisted and turned even more than those at Roland Park, but its distance from the Reisterstown trolley (a little over a mile) slowed development until the arrival of the automobile. No house could be built in Sudbrook Park for less than $2,500, and by 1915 most of its dwellings cost considerably more and were occupied by a number of families listed in the Baltimore Social Register. Catonsville, Oak Forest Park, and Eden Terrace featured large, heavily wooded lots and big, charming Victorian homes selling for $4,000 to $8,000. On the new the Edmondson Avenue car line the developers of the “country suburb” of Ten Hills offered spacious, wooded lots on winding roads with each house built from a different design. They sold for about the same price as Eden Terrace and Oak Forest Park.

In the mid-price range were developments such as Walbrook, Ashburton, Forest Park, and West Arlington where builders put up comfortable detached houses and provided water, gas, electricity, telephone lines, and sewers, but placed them on smaller lots and sometimes skimped on amenities such as sidewalks—using wood planks instead of stone or cement. In addition, the sewers were inadequate, causing residents some serious problems. Homes in these suburbs initially sold for about $2,000-$3,000, but by 1915 larger, more substantial houses in these areas cost over $4,000.

A number of moderately priced developments offered very small lots and detached cottages for about $2,000. Other real estate companies simply purchased a piece of land, put up a
sign with a fancy name such as "Melvale Heights" or "Belmar" and sold lots for $5.00 down and $5.00 per week. The advertisement for Belmar, on the Belair Road, claimed that a small, detached cottage could be put up for $1,500, "Same Price As A House In A Row." Advertisements for these cut-rate developments seldom mentioned that they lacked most basic utilities. Whether they were large or small, splendid or humble, residential developments with detached houses, lawns, and gardens sprung up along all the trolley lines, firmly establishing a new and different residential environment. Prominent advertisements for lawn mowers began to appear in Baltimore newspapers.

The key to nearly all these suburban developments was easy access to a trolley line. Spring Hill on the York Road trolley line advertised cottages in 1905 for $2,500 that featured "Water, Gas and a Five Cent Car Fare." "Wherever the trolley car goes," commented the Sun, "suburbs have sprung up." The growth of these residential corridors not only put pressure on the United Railways Company to place more cars on its suburban lines, it even spawned the suggestion that the suburbs be linked by a peripheral trolley line encircling the city from Sparrows Point to Towson, down to Catonsville and around to Westport on the Middle Branch of the Patapsco. Although a group of investors created a corporation called the Girdle Electric Railway Company in 1901, nothing came of the plan, probably because the cost of the project, estimated to be about a million dollars, was too large for the projected number of riders. The route approximated the path of the Baltimore Interstate Beltway that would be built during the 1960s.

At the same time the trolleys were spawning suburban development in Baltimore County, the noise and speed of the cars within the older sections of the city made life less attractive and more dangerous. The city’s streets, particularly the major thoroughfares, had always been somewhat noisy with the clip-clop of horses’ hooves and iron-rimmed wagon wheels bumping over the pavement, not to mention the racket made by German street bands, Italian organ grinders, the stentorian calls of roving vendors, and the hollering of children as they played on the sidewalks and streets. The electric trolleys, however, raised the din to unprecedented levels, and in 1899, when they began to run all night, many city dwellers found it nearly impossible to get a decent rest. The well-known Baltimorean John Henry Keene sent a now famous letter to the Sun, excoriating the new transit system:

It is a system of rapid transit by hissing monsters, often hurled at frightful rates of speed, thumping and bumping at every step. They ascend and descend every grade with Babylonish howls. The air rings with the shrieks of their gongs, and by day and by night, with a flesh-creeping, saw-mill buzz, with showers of electric sparks, make their struggling, groaning course through the highways of a densely populated city.

William Keyser, one of Baltimore’s leading businessmen, moved his bed into a closet to shut out the noise from the all-night trolley cars that began running along his street in 1900. He soon
resolved to move “to a more quiet locality, as far away as possible from those intolerable
nuisances, the electric roads.”

In addition to raising the noise levels on the street, the trolleys made the city streets
considerably more dangerous. Even though trolley cars were limited to ten miles per hour within
the city, this was nearly twice the speed of the horsecars and it is clear that many motormen
exceeded the ten-mile limit. Even before the first rapid transit line opened, some residents
predicted that the new system would pose a serious danger to pedestrians:

The idea of rapid transit in this old established town is something fearful to contemplate. Our people who have for so many years been accustomed to strolling leisurely across the street in front of our quiet [horse] cars, will all be killed under the new regime. The next generation may get used to the change, but this generation of Baltimoreans will just be slaughtered. Another distressing thing is the upsetting of all our ideas of courtesy and good manners; our cars have always waited at the corner for any body to waddle or hobble up, and the rudeness of “rapid transit” will not be understood by our people; it will pain them very much.

As more lines were converted to rapid transit during the 1890s, the speeding cars injured or killed an increasing number of people. Almost all the deaths were pedestrians, with older people and children again being the chief victims. For some time, horse-drawn vehicles (mostly wagons) had been responsible for ten to twelve deaths per year; by 1894 trolley cars were killing almost twice that number seriously injuring many more. Such a death rate seemed appalling. After considerable prodding from the public and sermons with titles such as “Rapid Transit Murders,” the city council finally required the United Railway Company to install safety fenders on the front of its cars. The company itself began a public education campaign that amounted to telling people to watch more carefully before stepping into the street. Nevertheless, injuries and deaths continued. For example, on April 21, 1896, trolley cars killed a bicycle rider on the York Road, fractured the skull of a five-year-old girl on Charles Street, mangled the legs of a sixty-year-old man on Howard Street and injured three more children at other locations around the city. The only sure solution was to slow the speed of the cars, but as the Sun stated in an editorial in 1902, this nullified the progress that electric transit had brought to the city. The average citizen “apparently prefers dodging street cars... to an existence in some secluded spot where the reckless motorman is unknown.” The Sun’s assumption proved correct. The public came to accept the proposition that an increased number of deaths and injuries was the price to be paid for a more swift transit system. In 1907 twenty-six people were killed and over a hundred injured by trolley cars, but there was no outcry or even much discussion of these accidents. They were simply noted on the inside pages of the city papers.

The arrival of the trolley car and the merger of all the separate transit companies into the United Electric Railways Company revolutionized public transit. It established faster, more
efficient and lower cost service that was vastly superior to the old horsecar system. A free transfer system, inaugurated in 1900, allowed riders to travel to almost any part of the city for five cents. Also, while wages in Baltimore increased during the first decade of the twentieth century, the carfare remained five cents within the city and also in a number of the suburbs just beyond the municipal boundaries. The fares to even more distant suburbs were reduced. Residents with very moderate incomes could now afford to ride the trolley cars more often. The number of passengers increased from approximately 54 million in 1890 (the last year before the conversion to rapid transit began) to 103 million in 1902. In addition, 40 million transfers were issued. By 1915 the United’s 895 trolley cars carried 185 million riders a year and issued 75 million transfers. Its 400 miles of tracks covered nearly every city neighborhood and stretched out in every direction into the suburbs.

In spite of these substantial improvements, discontent arose once again. Some complaints echoed those heard half a century before, but others were new. The most familiar criticism was the lack of enough cars to prevent long waits and overcrowding. The rapid growth of the city’s suburbs in the years after 1890, and their increasing distance from the centers of employment, made it difficult for the United to provide all these new residential areas with enough cars to prevent riders from waiting sometimes twenty or thirty minutes to get a ride downtown. If they had to transfer to another line, the wait for a car that was not already full caused further frustration. The problem was of course particularly severe during the morning and evening rush hours. Finding a seat, or even a place to stand, on car heading out of town at the end of the day was always difficult. For example, a commuter living in Catonsville complained that between 5:00 and 7:00 P. M. he often had to ride all the way home hanging on a strap and before reaching Irvington, about the half-way point in the ride, “even standing room is at a premium.”256 Prior to the establishment of the United Railways in 1899, complaints about poor service were diffused among a number of separate transit companies, but the creation of the transit monopoly made it an easy target for public complaints.

The United made a reasonable effort to reduce delays and overcrowding, but the task was extremely difficult. Passengers continued to complain about too few cars and long delays—especially in the downtown district. While Baltimoreans moved to residences in the outlying areas, the great majority still travelled to the downtown district to work and shop. By 1916 an immense number of trolleys moved through this area. For example, during the evening rush, trolley cars passed through the intersection of Howard and Fayette streets at the rate of 329 per hour. The streets were also crowded with hundreds of wagons carrying goods. When a wagon blocked the tracks, huge backups resulted, tempers flared and the police were often called to intervene. The officers had the unenviable task of determining whether the wagon driver should be arrested for obstructing the car tracks or had been simply stuck in traffic with no place to pull over. After a Sun editorial urged both “pig-headed” wagon drivers and angry, aggressive motormen to exercise more patience and “brotherly kindness” towards each other, a wagon driver
responded with the observation that the difficulty arose from too much traffic on some of the more narrow downtown streets, and the motormen’s assumption that their trolleys had precedence over all other vehicles:

There are without doubt many pig-headed drivers of wagons who delay street cars purely in a spirit of stubbornness, and there are equally many unreasonable motormen who seem to have an idea that no other vehicle than the trolley car has any right upon the public streets. Often have I been caught in a narrow street lined on both sides with standing wagons, with absolutely no way to turn out, and doing my level best to get out of the way of one of these juggernauts, and be roundly abused by the bell-banging motorman for not getting out of his way. Apparently he thought I was navigating a flying machine, for there was absolutely no other way of escape than by rising upward... The police justices seem to be too much ready to take the corporation’s side of every case of this kind which comes before them. There is great danger of the rights of a large class of people being overridden in this way... The United Railways must not imagine that it owns the streets because it has been granted the use of them free.257

A number of civic leaders and public officials recommended building a subway system to relieve trolley congestion in the downtown district. Others suggested connecting Fells Point with Locust Point by tunneling under the inner harbor or crossing over it on a suspension bridge so that traffic moving between East Baltimore and South Baltimore would not have to pass through the downtown. Unfortunately, like the beltway-style trolley line, these ideas never materialized.258

A different set of complaints against the United arose from middle- and upper-income passengers stemming from the larger number of working-class people who could now afford the five cent fare. Those who liked to be thought of as ladies and gentlemen found themselves riding with sweaty, dirty factory workers smelling of oil and chemical fumes. African American passengers came in for particular criticism. Baltimore’s horsecars were desegregated in 1871 by a decision of the Federal Circuit Court in 1871, but the continuing poverty of African Americans forced the great majority to remain pedestrians until the early years of the twentieth century. Once working-class African Americans began to ride the trolleys, objections arose to the presence particularly of those employed in the dirty, smelly jobs that white people refused to take: working in the city’s fertilizer factories, repairing privy vaults and sanitary sewer connections, cleaning stables, and collecting garbage. Foreign immigrants came in for criticism because they smelled of garlic and other culinary items that many native-born Baltimoreans found offensive. In addition, spitting on trolley car floors came in for some severe criticism during the 1890s, and was accompanied by warnings from public health officials. There is almost no mention of this problem prior to the 1890s, but by 1896 many passengers had begun to complain that the trolley car floors “are daily covered with a liquid carpeting as disgusting to the sight as it is deleterious to health and offensive to all sense of good order.”259
Lawrence Turnbull, one of the city’s prominent businessmen, complained that the trolley cars on the line he used each day were always full and the aisles “packed to the point of indecency... crowded with men and women, boys and girls, whites and negroes, sober and some occasionally drunk, clean and soiled, packed so closely that it is impossible to move without being rudely pushed.” Trolley cars traveling back and forth to the suburban beer gardens, waterside saloons, and amusement parks in the evenings and on the weekends carried a number of men and women whose language and behavior became a serious problem. Newspapers printed a continual stream of outraged complaints from more decorous riders, and a number of incidents were reported where motormen had to seek assistance from passengers or the police to deal with drunken, boisterous, or violent passengers. For a time plain-clothed policemen and special guards hired by the transit company were put on cars where the most trouble occurred.

Thus the rapid transit trolley car, while a tremendous improvement over the horsecar, still had a number of drawbacks–some quite real, others arising from class or ethnic prejudice, but the fact is that for many individuals, a private carriage pulled by a fine team of swift horses remained the transport vehicle of their dreams. The dream became a reality with the development of the “horseless carriage,” a vehicle faster, more reliable, and more comfortable than the carriage of a king– and available at a price that steadily dropped to the level where middle income or even skilled blue collar workers could buy one.

Automobiles and Trucks

Like other Americans, Baltimoreans followed with interest the European experiments with various types of “horseless carriages,” and “horseless road wagons,” and the Sun predicted in 1895 that “the usefulness of the horse, already circumscribed by the introduction of the trolley car and bicycle, seems destined to be narrowed the more, and that at no very distant date.” The Sun reflected the prevailing view that the motor vehicle would further reduce reliance on the horse, but there was no expectation that it would replace the animal that had been the major form of motive power for centuries. In 1896 Messrs. Ingram and Matthai, the city’s largest manufacturers of tinware, announced plans to manufacture some type of “horseless carriages,” but no vehicle ever appeared. The first automobile did not arrive in Baltimore until 1898 when Martin Gillet, a tea importer, drove into town with a Stanley Steamer. Shortly thereafter, W. Lee Crouch built his own steam-powered vehicle that appeared to run quite well. In May 1899 he took several friends for a ride around Roland Park and vicinity at speeds up to forty miles per hour, “a rate that put trolley cars and horses far in the rear.” A short while later he drove a Sun reporter around Druid Hill Park with the same breathtaking result. In 1899 Crouch began to turn out steam automobiles at his factory on North Avenue, but he could not make the transition to a large-scale producer and went out of business. This became the fate of half a dozen other Baltimoreans who tried to manufacture autos or trucks.
Chapter 8: Getting Around Town

Unlike the previous innovations in Baltimore’s transit system, the auto made no grand entrance, and, until 1906 or 1907, remained a fairly rare sight on the city’s streets or suburban roads. Like the early bicycles, they were expensive and difficult to operate, required constant maintenance, and were inhibited by the city speed ordinance. By 1904 only about 300-350 were operating in the Baltimore metropolitan region. They were considered a rich man’s toy or a thrilling machine for the “sport.” On a particularly balmy Sunday in the spring of 1904 a reporter from The American noted that the roads leading out of the city were filled with hundreds of vehicles drawn by every type of horse from “the speedy trotter of the race track to the ordinary plow-puller. Even the automobile, owned by the more opulent of the residents, found its way through the parade and dashed off at a rapid speed.”

Around 1906 the number of autos began to increase more rapidly. They became easier to operate, more reliable, and less expensive. Large, powerful autos remained expensive, costing $2,000-$6,000, but a number of smaller vehicles now sold for around $1,000. The Model T Ford cost $500 and a three-passenger Brush auto sold for $485. A few years later the Chevrolet Company began selling a two-passenger auto for $460 and the Eastwick Motor Company on North Avenue was selling Ford Runabouts for $390. Even larger autos began to come on the market at lower prices. By 1916 a Willys Overland could be purchased for $850 and Ford’s largest auto, its Sedan, cost $750. Also, one could go to used car dealers like Standard Motors that sold vehicles ranging from $400-$1,600 or Little Joe’s on German Street where one could buy an older auto for $150-$200.

In April 1906 the Maryland Automobile Club hosted the first of what became an annual series of auto shows where manufacturers introduced their new models to the public. Several thousand people, among whom were many prominent residents of the city and its suburbs, attended the show. A number of them, including Baltimore’s mayor, E. Clay Timanus, purchased autos. As the auto shows grew larger and more elaborate, attendance increased. The Tenth Annual Baltimore Auto Show in 1916 attracted over 55,000 visitors. By this time the city had almost fifty auto or truck dealers. Almost half of these dealers were located between North Avenue and Mount Royal Avenue—leading the newspapers to dub the area “Gasoline Row.” The auto shows, plus the growing phalanx of local dealerships, enticed increasing numbers of Baltimoreans to buy one of the marvelous new machines. By the end of 1906 approximately 700 area families owned an auto. Four years later, in 1910, the number exceeded 4,000. In his annual message to the city council that year, Mayor J. Berry Mahool took note of this increase. “There is no doubt that the automobile is with us to stay” and “the number of automobiles in our city is bound to grow and to grow rapidly.” By 1912 the number of autos in the Baltimore region exceeded 6,000 and henceforth growth became exponential—4,000 in 1914, 28,000 in 1916, and 64,000 in 1920. Thus the number of families owning an auto rose from approximately 0.6 percent in 1906 to 11 percent in 1915 and 30 percent by 1920. In contrast, auto ownership among the rest of...
Maryland’s families had only reached 15 percent by 1920 and a sizable number of these motorists lived in the Washington, D.C. suburbs.\textsuperscript{272}

The vast majority of Baltimore area motorists were white males. In 1914 approximately 6 percent of Maryland’s licensed drivers were females, and nearly eight out of ten lived in the Baltimore region.\textsuperscript{273} There are no statistics on the race of vehicle owners, but articles appearing in the \textit{Baltimore Afro-American} indicate that by 1912 at least some of the city’s small African American elite owned autos and gave “automobile parties,” excursions of groups of autos into the countryside or down to Washington to visit friends or relatives living in the nation’s capital. The Maryland Automobile Club was open only to white males and there is no indication that African Americans formed their own auto club.\textsuperscript{274} The only auto-related groups were associations of professional chauffeurs, organizations similar to old African American carriage drivers’ associations.\textsuperscript{275}

By 1914, a large percentage of Baltimore’s more affluent families had purchased an auto. Many of them were influential men—business and civic leaders, the professional classes, and politicians. Looking over the list of auto license holders in 1914, several hundred locally important names appear. The addresses also are telling. It seems that almost every resident of Roland Park and Guilford owned an auto, and even those living along the fashionable streets around Mount Vernon Place and Eutaw Place, where trolley cars could take them into the city center in ten or fifteen minutes, had also purchased a touring car or large sedan. Residents of Catonsville, Pikesville, Sudbrook Park, Mount Washington, Riderwood, Ruxton and Towson were also well represented among the list of motorists. None of these people owned a Ford. Charles Carroll of Carrollton owned a Cadillac, Daniel Willard, President of the B&O Railroad, Solomon Greif, one of the city’s most famous clothing manufacturers, and Frank Furst, President of the Arundel Construction Company, had Pierce Arrows. Among those connected with the \textit{Baltimore Sun} papers, Walter W. Abell, owned a Buick, the editor Charles H. Grasty had a Packard, and Van Lear Black owned a Locomobile. The brewer George Gunther had a Peerless, John S. Gittings of “Ashburton,” one of the city’s largest real estate owners, had a Packard, and T. Edward Hambleton, a financier who had played a central role in establishing the United Electric Railways Corporation in 1899, probably did not use the company’s services very much after he purchased a Buick Sedan.

The fact that so many wealthy Baltimoreans had become motorists by 1914 led many to conclude that the auto remained a rich man’s luxury, but more observant individuals saw that they were “owned to a great extent by people of moderate circumstances” and “will take the place of the horse just as the electric trolley has taken the place of the horsecar.”\textsuperscript{276} In spite of warnings that the “motor craze,” fueled by the supposed blandishments of “wily and expert auto salesmen” were luring those of moderate income into buying autos they could not afford, hundreds of Baltimoreans living in modest, middle-class neighborhoods had purchased autos by 1914.\textsuperscript{277} To be sure, Pierce Arrows were seldom seen parked in front of these houses. More often they were Fords
or some other type of small, less expensive vehicle. While autos were much less prevalent in working-class areas, they were not a rarity in 1914 and certainly not by 1918. A reporter for the Sun, visiting the yards of the Baltimore Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company at Locust Point in 1918 noticed over fifty automobiles parked outside the gate. Upon inquiry, he was told that they were all owned by the shipyard workers—riveters, ironworkers, steamfitters, electricians, and other skilled blue-collar laborers who were making good wages. “Look around the yard and you’ll see some fine cars,” said one of the riveters:

A glance around the enclosure where the cars are parked showed this to be a fact. Nearly all the well-known makes were represented. There were touring cars, runabouts and racing cars. One of the latter was a converted touring car and had been rebuilt by its owner with considerable ingenuity and skill. It looked exactly like a high-class racer. Many of the cars were distinctly sporty in appearance, a smart maroon touring car and a grey roadster being especially conspicuous.

Thus in a relatively short space of time the number of autos roaming the Baltimore region rose from several hundred to several thousand and then many thousands. The impact of so many vehicles on the streets, and the influence of their owners, moved both the city and the surrounding county to recast the region’s roads and traffic laws for their benefit.

Along with improving automobiles, manufacturers began to build trucks, and as soon as they became available in Baltimore, both businesses and government agencies began to purchase them. The number of trucks operating in the Baltimore region rose from twenty in 1906 to over 5,000 in 1915 and approximately 13,000 by 1920. Local dealers began to sell trucks in 1906. Mack trucks and White trucks were at first the most popular, but Neely & Ensor, which had previously sold carriages and wagons, switched to selling Diamond-T trucks and soon developed a large business. Their sales manager, Louis Fox, came from the family that owned Moses Fox & Sons Stables, Maryland’s largest and most famous horse dealer. The Fox family finally closed its stable in 1919 and eventually began selling autos. The earliest public agency to purchase trucks was the Baltimore Post Office, which experimented with a small truck to collect mail in the fall of 1906. It proved so successful that several more vehicles were purchased, and by 1916 nearly all the city’s mail was picked up by trucks.

The first local government agency to begin using a motor vehicle appears to have been the park board, which purchased a Cadillac in 1906. The next year it purchased its first motor truck and by 1917 had replaced all its horse-drawn wagons with trucks. In 1908 the city Police Department ordered its first “Motorized Patrol Wagon” (that also served as an ambulance) and began to replace some of its mounted patrolmen with a small squad of men on motorcycles that could travel up to thirty miles an hour “in cases of emergency.” The next year Police Chief Farnan gave up his horse-drawn wagon for a Locomobile, and shortly thereafter ordered several
more motor wagons to cover the larger and more sparsely settled outer wards. By 1916 the department was using motor wagons and autos throughout the city. In response to the ever-increasing speed of motor vehicles, the motorcycle squad grew and replaced its antiquated machines with a “flying squadron” of new Indian motorcycles capable of going sixty miles per hour.²⁸³

The Fire Department purchased its first “Motorized Hose Wagon” in 1911 and Fire Chief Horton switched from a horse and wagon to an auto. The performance of the department’s first fire truck, said Horton, “has practically revolutionized the department’s attitude” towards motor vehicles. By 1914 the department possessed forty-four motorized fire trucks and planned to eliminate all its horse drawn vehicles as soon as funds became available. The savings were dramatic. The cost of maintaining a motorized fire truck averaged $38.60 for six months, while the cost of feeding and maintaining the two horses that drew each of the old fire vehicles was $108.²⁸⁴ In 1915 the City Salvage Corps, whose wagons were drawn by the fastest horses in the city, began to replace their swift steeds with even faster motor trucks.²⁸⁵ By 1920 the motor vehicle had spread through almost every city department. The public works department began replacing its horse drawn wagons with trucks, and an increasing number of municipal officials who needed to move about the city were provided with autos. In Baltimore County the roads department purchased a number of motorized dump-trucks, the fire department began replacing its horse drawn vehicles with motorized fire trucks, the police department purchased several motorized wagons and motorcycles, and the superintendent of schools received an auto. The Gilman School, one of the city’s elite private preparatory schools that drew students from both the city and suburbs, purchased a large truck in 1916 and had it converted into a school bus.²⁸⁶

Private business also moved quickly to replace their horse-drawn vehicles with autos and trucks. In 1911 Wiessner’s and Gunther’s breweries began to deliver their kegs of beer to saloons in large trucks, the Sun papers began distributing their newspapers to dealers around the city and suburbs with a fleet of small trucks, and Stewart’s Stable, a well-established renter of horses and buggies, switched to renting automobiles. In 1914 the Mitchell Funeral Home began advertising “Limousine Funerals Without Extra Charge: Easier Riding & Protection From The Inclemencies Of The Weather.”²⁸⁷ By the end of the year The American noted that “merchants are daily installing motor cars or delivery trucks to take the place of horse-drawn vehicles.”²⁸⁸ A short time later, the big downtown department stores purchased entire fleets of trucks to deliver merchandise to customers throughout the city and suburbs. One Baltimore firm that switched to trucks said that with their horses and wagons they were limited to five miles for deliveries, but with trucks “we think nothing of going 10, 15 or even more miles.”²⁸⁹ By 1915 hundreds of Baltimore firms owned at least one truck, and many of them had several, the total amounting to approximately 3,500. Like autos, the early trucks were costly, but the price quickly dropped. By 1915 a 1,500 pound capacity International Harvester truck sold for $950.²⁹⁰ The 13,000 trucks operating in the Baltimore region by 1920, ranged from small delivery vehicles to large Mack
trucks with a capacity of seven tons; consequently, there was hardly a business in the city that could not become more efficient by the purchase of an auto or truck. Even long-distance shipping, which had been dominated by the steam railroads since the 1840s, began to see some competition from trucks. Beginning in 1918 the Beam-Fletcher Company inaugurated an inter-city service between New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore with a fleet of thirty-five large trucks.

The introduction of autos and trucks steadily reduced the number of horses in the city. A major shift occurred among those owning carriages and buggies, but as might be guessed, an even larger divestiture occurred among city businesses. For example, between 1908 and 1917 the introduction of motorized taxicabs reduced the number of horse-drawn hacks from approximately 150 to eighteen. By 1920 they had completely disappeared. In 1900 there were 17,917 horses owned by individuals or business within in city. This number was reduced to 15,346 in 1910 and 7,378 in 1920. The signal year was 1913 when the number of motor vehicles in the city finally exceeded the number of horses.

The spectacular rise of the motor vehicle in Baltimore can now been seen as virtually inevitable. Its impact on the city and the metropolitan region, in both its physical form and the behavior of its residents, likewise seems preordained. Those who proclaimed the future importance of the motor vehicle during its early years certainly proved to be accurate prophets. They foresaw that the number of vehicles would escalate rapidly and cause numerous changes in the city and its suburbs. In 1912, when only six out of every hundred families in the Baltimore area owned an auto, Henry M. Rowe, president of the Maryland Automobile Club spoke of:

> the tremendous effect the motor vehicle is already having, and the very much greater influence it will have in the near future... so rapidly are we passing through the almost kaleidoscope panorama of motor events and achievements that the average citizen seldom stops to realize just what is going on about us every day. Here is the field for those who are inclined towards studying the phenomena of startling things.

Men like Rowe, who later became Maryland Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, were convinced they were riding on the flood tide of history, but this was not so apparent to those who still walked the city’s streets or used horse-drawn vehicles. Many of these pedestrians sought to keep autos from intruding so massively into the older city, which moved in a slower, but safer and more casual environment.

From the very beginning, the dangers as well as the benefits of the motor vehicle were clearly understood. In 1899 the Sun echoed papers in New York and France (the French had more autos than any nation in the world in 1899) stating that in view of the injuries “inflicted by reckless bicycle riders” the operator of a motor vehicle could do far more damage “if he should take a notion to run amuck through the streets, or should lose control of his machine.” The editorial is remarkable in view of the fact that only four or five autos were running on Baltimore’s streets at this time. On the other hand, Baltimoreans remembered the exponential growth of
bicycles after 1888, and the impact these swift, silent machines exerted on all others who used the streets. Automobiles certainly made more noise than bicycles, but compared to the clip-clop of horse drawn vehicles or the thundering and screeching of the trolleys, they seemed almost silent, even when traveling at speeds far exceeding any other vehicle. Thus it was not unreasonable to think, as the *Sun* did in 1902, that “In a few years from now the streets of Baltimore may be filled with [autos]... and they will require strict supervision.”

Long before autos did fill the city’s streets, their owners organized and began pressing for adjustments that would allow them to use more freely the power and speed their machines could generate. A clash of basic attitudes over the place of the automobile in the city began almost immediately. In February 1900 eleven local motorists established The Automobile Club of Baltimore, which soon changed its name to the Automobile Club of Maryland. Almost all were prominent businessmen and two were relatives of former mayor Alcaeus Hooper. They first sought more free use of their vehicles. In 1900 a number of horse-drawn vehicle owners complained to the city park board that gasoline and steam-powered autos driving through Druid Hill Park let out a “tootling noise that frighten the horses and cause much trouble.” In response, the park board banned all except electric cars from the parks. In May 1902 autos were prohibited from entering the grounds of the prestigious Elkridge Fox-Hunt Club after an auto crashed into a horse-drawn vehicle coming out of the club—causing what was possibly Baltimore’s first collision involving an automobile. The auto club’s first victory came later in 1902 when they gained the right to drive autos of all types through the city’s parks. Winning this first battle encouraged the club to tackle more ambitious goals, namely, a general increase in speed limits for autos, restrictions on the movement of pedestrians when crossing streets, and the creation of smoothly paved streets and highways. As the auto club grew in size (it had over 2,000 members by 1914) it hired a series of prominent attorneys to promote these goals.

Attempts to raise the speed limits for motor vehicles occupied the auto club throughout the years from 1904 to 1920. Prior to 1904 neither the city of state governments regulated motor vehicles in any way, but Baltimore’s six-mile limit automatically applied since it covered all types of vehicles. In 1904 the Maryland General Assembly enacted the state’s first motor vehicle law. It required owners to register their autos and extended the long-established speed limit of six miles per hour in all cities and towns. Out in the countryside, autos were allowed to rush along at twelve miles per hour. Motorists regarded these speed limits as ridiculously low and largely ignored them. The Maryland Auto Club worked during the next two years to change the law. In 1906 the club was able to slip wording into a revision of the 1904 law that appeared to raise the limit in Baltimore to twelve miles per hour. The issue went to court where the auto club won. They could now move about the city at twice the speed of horse-drawn vehicles, a privilege that naturally galled carriage and wagon owners. The auto club kept after the legislature and played a large role in the Motor Vehicle Act of 1910, a law that established a state commissioner of motor vehicles, required every driver to obtain a driver’s license, and established statewide speed limits.
of twelve miles per hour in cities and towns, eighteen miles in suburban areas, and twenty miles in the open country.299

Improvements to Infrastructure

The most ambitious and costly goal sought by the auto club was the improvement of streets and roads. Solid, smooth pavements were essential if autos and trucks were to move about freely, safely, and with less wear and tear on their machinery. The bicycle clubs had been lobbying for such improvements since the 1880s, but achieved little success. They were now joined by the much more influential auto club. The road improvements they sought were eventually carried out in Baltimore and in Maryland, but the two groups could claim only partial credit for this development. Political support for improved roads came primarily from owners of wagons, carriages, and buggies. For years, everyone who drove a wheeled vehicle on city streets and country roads longed for an end to the ruts, holes, and mud puddles that made travel unpleasant and often dangerous, but the extremely high cost of laying a good crushed stone base (the stone had to be broken up by men wielding sledge hammers) and covering it with some type of surfacing material required a level of taxation that the majority of voters were unwilling to assume. The whole issue changed dramatically during the 1880s and 1890s when a series of technological advances finally made it economically feasible to build hundreds of miles of streets and roads that stood up to drenching rain and heavy wagon traffic. The basic innovations were the development of efficient rock crushing machinery, steam shovels, large road graders and heavy steamrollers. Equally important, especially in Baltimore and its suburbs, was the development of several types of relatively inexpensive asphalt pavement to lie over the stone base. The new machinery allowed road crews to cut down large hillocks and fill muddy gullies so horses could pull their loads more easily. Next, the big new road graders easily created a convex surface to drain off water. Rock crushing machines, invented in New Haven, Connecticut in 1858 but not used extensively until the 1890s (when steel grinders replaced iron) produced thousands of tons of gravel at a fraction of the cost to break stone by hand. The gravel base could be more firmly compacted by heavy steamrollers— a French invention of the late 1850s, but also not employed very much until the 1890s. Thus a thick, firmly packed base of crushed stone could be laid down and if done according to the British “macadam” road building process, it would hold up well for a number of years if properly maintained. On more heavily traveled thoroughfares, some type of surfacing material (oil, asphalt, bricks, or stone blocks) was laid over the macadamized base to reduce dust and provide further insurance against the impact of heavy wagons with their narrow iron-rimmed wheels.300

In Baltimore City, where almost every street carried more traffic than any country road, macadamized streets were insufficient and an oiled surface, while by far the most economical, did not last very long and was unacceptable to pedestrians. Therefore, the city experimented with a
wide variety of other surfacing materials: granite blocks, asphalt blocks, wooden blocks, vitrified bricks, common bricks, sheet asphalt, and bituminous asphalt.

With a few small exceptions, city streets, suburban thoroughfares, and rural roads in Maryland were in very poor condition at the opening of the twentieth century. In Baltimore City, approximately 250 of the city’s 500 miles of streets were still paved with cobblestones. Forty-three miles of the downtown streets that carried the largest volume of traffic had been paved with granite blocks (commonly called Belgian blocks). Outside the downtown district, a few streets were paved with asphalt blocks, vitrified bricks, or wooden blocks. The other two hundred miles of streets were dirt or covered with a thin layer of gravel or oyster shells. Baltimore’s sixty miles of alleys were almost all unpaved. Most of the city’s bridges were also very inadequate. Outside the downtown area many were still made of wood. The city street department spent nearly its entire budget repairing the cobblestone streets—a task that kept over 300 men constantly at work at an annual cost of around $250,000. The city had begun to use cobblestones in its streets in 1781.

Irregularly shaped and set in a sand base, the stones were dislodged by the thousands each year in rainstorms and winter ice. Their only asset was the firm footing they provided for horses (if they were in good repair). Unfortunately they required almost constant attention. In 1904 the City Engineer, Benjamin T. Fendall, reported that the severe winter of 1903-1904 had damaged so many cobble stone streets that the only action he could take and stay within the street repair budget “was to patch up the worst places so as to insure some degree of safety as quickly as possible.” Whatever funds were left over after repairs of the cobble stone streets went to maintaining and extending, (a few hundred yards at a time) the granite block pavements of the downtown area, and re-paving small sections of streets in other parts of the city.

Given the paucity of paving funds, the local homeowner associations that existed in almost every neighborhood waited years to have just a block or two paved. For example, in 1906 the Collington Square Improvement Association, representing a neighborhood located about two miles northeast of the downtown area, finally succeeded in getting the city to pave a stretch of Collington Avenue between Biddle and Preston Streets with asphalt blocks. It had previously been essentially a dirt road with some gravel thrown into the deepest ruts and holes. To celebrate their good fortune the association held a formal opening of the two-block-long improvement. Collington Square itself was illuminated with Japanese lanterns, American flags floated from windows along the street, and a band was hired to provide a musical background. Several city officials and the president of the local association gave speeches, and refreshments were served to the large crowd gathered for the occasion. Dr. Henry Snyder, president of the local association, said that the paving constituted a major improvement for the whole neighborhood. Previously, the avenue “was worse than a country road in poor condition and in rainy weather resembled a huge mud puddle.”

By 1906, the era of such small, piecemeal projects was drawing to a close and from 1907 onward, the city began to spend much larger sums on its streets. This was part of a general
upgrading of the city’s entire physical plant, a movement led by Baltimore’s Progressive Era reformers and funded by a significant growth in the city’s tax base that began in the late 1890s and continued until the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 1898 a new city charter modernized the municipal government and placed more authority in the hands of the mayor so that long-term, citywide projects could be more easily undertaken. Among those projects, the improvement of the city’s streets, especially those paved with cobblestones, ranked very high. By the 1890s this quaint form of street paving had become one of the chief symbols of Baltimore’s general backwardness. In 1898 an editorial in The American said “the cobblestone must go, it has no place in any modern city of the first class.” It noted that replacing the cobblestones with a surface such as asphalt was more expensive, but concluded that “the benefit more than pays for the added outlay.” About this same time a group of civic leaders established the Baltimore Municipal Art Society, an organization that, in spite of its name, became a champion for a variety of citywide improvements such as a comprehensive sewer system, the acquisition of land for more parks and open spaces, the development of a series of scenic boulevards, and a complete system of well-paved streets. As one member of the society said, in 1902, “certainly as long as we are cursed with the present miserable streets, the value of property will not enhance and the few well-paved thoroughfares will become even more clogged with traffic.”

Between 1907 and 1920 the city spent $29.7 million supplanting its cobblestone streets, (along with its macadam and dirt streets) with smoother, more long-lasting surfaces. Several large bond issues for street paving were approved and the city’s increasing annual revenues pumped additional funds into street work. Annual expenditures for street improvements increased from an average of $300,000 in the 1896-1906 era to a high of $3.2 million in 1914. The work was directed by a nonpartisan paving commission made up of prominent business and civic leaders who received excellent technical advice from Benjamin T. Fendall, the City Engineer. In addition to upgrading its existing streets, the city constructed several large new boulevards and replaced almost all its old wooden bridges with modern cement or steel structures. The largest of the street projects were two major thoroughfares: the Fallsway, a wide highway running into the downtown district along the Jones Falls Valley, and the Key Highway encircling the harbor, and the repaving of all the major thoroughfares leading in and out of the city. Following the Great Fire of 1904, which destroyed a large portion of the central business district, a special bond issue was passed that allowed a number of streets in the burnt district to be widened and repaved. While street improvements took the great majority of funds (the Fallsway alone cost over $2 million) several bridge projects were also expensive. The Edmondson Avenue Bridge over Gwynns Falls, completed in 1910, cost over $200,000, and the Hanover Street Bridge, replacing the old wooden Long Bridge connecting the city with Anne Arundel County, cost over $700,000.

During these years the types of materials used to pave streets and roads underwent numerous improvements, and more efficient types of construction machinery came on the market, which were employed in street- and bridgework. For example, at the opening of the new
century, the rollers used to compress the gravel base on city streets were drawn by horses and generally weighed only three or four tons. By 1914 fifteen-ton steamrollers had come into use.

The paving (or repaving) of each street in the city presented slightly different problems depending on the topography, the grade, the number, and weight of vehicles traversing it. Streets and roads that had a high volume of traffic, especially those used by heavy wagons, required a thicker gravel base and some type of substantial surfacing material. The city experimented with six different types of paving material. The central business district continued to be paved with granite blocks. They provided a surface that was almost impervious to the heaviest traffic, and gave horses a secure footing. Streets with a moderate amount of use, or those on an incline, were paved with vitrified or asphalt bricks that stood up well to traffic and also supported horse traffic. Unfortunately, these surfacing materials were all quite expensive. The less costly surfaces were oil, sheet asphalt, and bituminous asphalt. A macadamized street, surfaced with oil, cost a quarter of one paved with granite blocks. An oiled roadway kept down the dust, a problem that became more serious as motor vehicles began speeding along, raising clouds that were a combination of rock dust and dried powdery horse manure. Its chief drawbacks were its impermanence and the fact that in hot weather it tended to melt and become sticky. Sheet asphalt was more permanent, did not melt and, while more costly than oil, was less expensive than bituminous asphalt. It could also be placed directly over the old cobblestone streets, creating a surface that was a bit bumpy, but saved the cost of removing the old pavement and laying down a crushed stone base. Initially, there was much trial and error in manufacturing sheet asphalt with a low viscosity, but by 1905 engineers had developed a high quality product and found the best way to apply it in order to create a strong, long lasting road surface. Bituminous asphalt, made with a mixture of asphalt and ground up pieces of coal, was marketed under a patented process called “bitulithic.” It had a rougher surface than sheet asphalt and was touted as more long lasting, but it was also more expensive. City Engineer Fendell tried both surfaces and concluded that bitulithic did not last any longer than sheet asphalt, so the city paving commission employed the less expensive material. The only problem with sheet asphalt was its smoothness. While perfect for autos or bicycles, it was much more slippery for horses, especially when they were pulling heavy loads on steep grades. Bitulithic had a slightly rougher surface, but was more expensive and did not last any longer than sheet asphalt. Decisions over which surface to use caused considerable debate. In 1907 when Charles Street was to be paved between North Avenue and Merryman’s Lane (a distance of about 2.5 miles) paving it with sheet asphalt was estimated to be $13,000 less than a bitulithic surface; however the more expensive material was laid down because those who traveled the street most often, among whom were a number of the city’s most wealthy and prominent citizens, used their influence at city hall to obtain the rougher surface because they feared their horses would fall on the asphalt.

Eventually the greater economy of sheet asphalt won out over the complaints of wagon and carriage owners. For example, in 1910 Park Heights Avenue, formerly an oiled macadam
road, became slated for repaving with asphalt or bitulithic. City Engineer Fendell said it was one of the busiest roads connecting the city to the northwestern suburbs, traversed by “hundreds of automobiles” as well as “wagons carrying heavy loads.” Bitulithic was naturally the choice of the horse people, but Fendell and the city paving commission said the length of the road, plus its width, made a bitulithic surface too expensive, so it was covered with sheet asphalt. Where a street descended at a steep grade, it was paved with a more expensive surface. For example, East Franklin, Mulberry, and Pleasant Streets all descended into the Jones Falls Valley at a very steep grade. The chairman of the paving commission remarked that “a goat could hardly travel up or down that hill.” It was paved with very tightly packed cobblestones and kept in constant repair to give horses the best possible grip. However, where no special problems existed, sheet asphalt became the usual choice for the city’s economy-minded leaders.

It was alleged that political influence played some role in the triumph of sheet asphalt. Robert J. “Bob” Padgett, one of the city’s powerful political bosses, held a major interest in the city’s largest asphalt paving company, but the paving commission, made up of wealthy civic leaders rather than ward bosses, agreed that in the long run sheet asphalt was the most economical surface. The one major concession the city engineer and the paving commission made to the auto was the priority they gave to paving (with sheet asphalt) the major streets leading into the downtown area from the north and northwest—Cathedral, Charles, St. Paul and Calvert Streets. These thoroughfares carried a heavy volume of auto traffic into the downtown district from the affluent northern suburbs. With these exceptions, the city’s streets were paved according to a schedule the commission had agreed upon back in 1905 when motor vehicles were still something of a rarity and were given no special consideration. Therefore, while the local auto and bicycle clubs may have claimed responsibility for the increasing number of smooth asphalt streets in the city, the economics of road surfacing determined the issue.

Unfortunately, this decision left the drivers of horse-drawn vehicles to do the best they could on the smooth surface of the newly paved streets. Most horses managed to keep their footing, but a number did not, especially in wet or icy weather. Mount Royal Avenue illustrated the problem. In January 1910 it was reported that after a performance at the Lyric Theater, “carriages and other vehicles had much trouble along Mount Royal Avenue on account of the slippery conditions of the avenue. The horses felt their way along the glassy asphalt with caution and in several instances fell.” Such mishaps led to a continual stream of letters to the local papers denouncing such “improved” thoroughfares. After Belair Road had been paved with sheet asphalt in 1915, one regular user of the highway wrote that while the thoroughfare was now “almost perfect for the automobilist” the road was “an abomination for the poor horse.” He claimed that during the first year after it was paved, one particular hill caused eight horses to fall and break a leg, requiring that they be killed. Less than a week later another letter writer began, “Pity the poor horse! In these days of smooth and slippery streets which serve well the automobile, the horse has a ghastly chance.” On one recent wet morning, the resident said, he had
walked only a short distance from his house near Eutaw Place before he counted “three horses stretched out, struggling and frightened... and a few minutes later “a fourth horse slipped and fell with an appalling thud... Is there no remedy?” A common suggestion from the horsemen was to construct rough surfaced lanes on either side of the asphalt thoroughfares, but this was not really possible because most city streets were too narrow, and the cost of such a project on wider roadways was undoubtedly beyond what the majority of taxpayers, few of whom owned either a horse or auto, were willing to spend.

In Baltimore County the story of modern roadways is somewhat different. Even with its substantial wealth, the rural-dominated government refused to tax county residents heavily enough to provide high quality paving on the majority of its roughly 1,000 miles of roads. However, from 1910 to 1920 the Maryland State Roads Commission made great strides towards improving the major thoroughfares leading into Baltimore City, allowing the county to create a modern system of well-paved streets and roads in the districts adjacent to the city that housed most of the county’s suburbanites. There was also enough money in the rapidly growing county to provide some improvements in its more heavily traveled rural roads. Prior to 1888 the county government did little for either its farmers or suburban residents. What taxes were collected for the road fund came disproportionately from the suburbanites in the county’s lower districts; but no section of the county had good roads. Dirt roads and streets were common in the suburban area and almost universal in the rural districts. In addition, the school system remained antiquated and police and fire protection was abysmal. In 1888 the city invited the county’s residents to join them through annexation, and suburbanites living immediately north and west of the city voted to do so. From that point until 1920, Baltimore’s northern boundary ran through present-day Guilford, and the western line lay just beyond what is now Hilton Parkway. Fortunately for the county, the electrification of the transit system and its outward expansion quickly created a new suburban ring beyond the new municipal boundaries. County political leaders determined to mend their ways and provide their fast-growing new suburbs with a more modern infrastructure and efficient public services that would remove any incentive for them to seek annexation by the city. The county commissioners established a modern school system, built a series of fire stations in the suburbs, upgraded police protection, and made significant improvements in the county’s roads—particularly in the lower districts.

From 1889 onward, the two leading items in the county budget were the public schools and road improvements. Modernization of the county schools proceeded rapidly, but road paving proved costly and even with a substantial increase in expenditures, progress was slow. Houses and barns only a few miles away from a fire station continued to burn to the ground because an impassable stretch of road prevented the fire engines from reaching the blaze. By 1900 the county had 310 miles of crushed stone roads (half of which were privately owned turnpikes), 110 miles paved with oyster shells, and 680 miles of dirt roads. The greatest advantage of the county was the 154 miles of privately owned turnpike roads, far more than any other county in the state.
Of the fourteen turnpikes that ran through the county, eight of them fanned out from the Baltimore and constituted almost all the principal thoroughfares connecting the county and the city. The major turnpikes were heavily used and collected a large income from tolls, but even though they spent the great majority of these revenues trying to maintain their roadbeds, their efforts always fell short. Those paying the tolls to use these highways complained bitterly about their miserable condition. The state commission that examined all of Maryland’s turnpikes and public roads in 1899 was polite enough to say simply that the turnpikes in Baltimore County “leave much to be desired.” The county’s own roads were maintained by a group of local road supervisors, men selected on the basis of political loyalty rather than skill or honesty. After 1888 there was an attempt to appoint more competent supervisors and they were given more money. In 1892 the county purchased a rock-crushing machine in order to reduce their dependence on private suppliers. During the 1890s road expenditures doubled, from approximately $70,000 in 1889 to $160,000. Even with these changes, progress remained slow. A number of road supervisors continued to play politics with the road funds, and during the unusually wet winter of 1897-1898 The American complained that “the county roads are worse this winter than at any time for years.” This was especially irritating to suburban residents who, while using the electric trolleys to get in and out of the city, owned carriages and buggies that required decent roads. It was clear that a more fundamental reform of the administrative machinery and a much larger increase in expenditures were necessary if the county was ever to obtain good roads.

In 1900 the county finally established a centralized Department of Roads and hired Walter Crosby, one of the nation’s best young road engineers, to manage it. Crosby left in 1904 to work for Baltimore’s municipal government and in 1909 became Maryland’s first State Roads Engineer. Crosby’s replacement in Baltimore County was Henry G. Shirley, another outstanding engineer who served until he replaced Crosby as State Roads Engineer in 1912. The county then turned to William Sucro, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who maintained the high standard of his two predecessors.

Because almost all of its major highways were turnpikes, Baltimore County profited enormously when Governor Austin Crothers, who had been elected partly on a “good roads” platform, established a State Roads Commission in 1909 and began to purchase Maryland’s turnpikes, converting most of them into trunk line public highways. Between 1910 and 1912 almost all the major turnpikes in the county (and the remaining portions of them within Baltimore City) were purchased by the state government, the tolls eliminated, and work begun to bring them up to modern standards. The state highway program was enthusiastically supported by Baltimore’s motorists and the bicycle clubs, but they represented a small portion of the state’s population. The major support came from farm organizations and the state’s rural residents who wanted to end the private toll roads, and convert them into free, all-weather roads for their farm wagons, carriages, and buggies. At some of the tollhouses, the turnpike gates were burned in ceremonies celebrating the end of the unpopular toll payments. When the tollgate on the
Reisterstown Turnpike at Park Heights Avenue (the last remaining tollgate within the city) was removed, Governor Crothers and a large delegation of state and local officials gathered before a crowd of over 3,000 people to remove the barrier. Prophetically, the first vehicle through was not a carriage or a farm wagon. It was an automobile.

With the State Roads Commission providing funds to upgrade the former turnpikes, the county’s road engineer could concentrate on its other thoroughfares, but the task was complicated by the fact that both the suburbanites and upcountry farmers wanted the improvements in their localities “to begin at once.” The suburbanites in the lower districts were an articulate and influential group. They were also rapidly exchanging their horse-drawn vehicles for autos. By 1914 auto traffic was augmented by delivery trucks coming out from the city. The dust raised by all these motor vehicles became a major issue. Those who traveled any distance around the county on its gravel or dirt roads often arrived at their destination “so begrimed with dust that they were hardly recognizable.” Needless to say, suburbanites wanted their streets and roads to be at least oiled and preferably surfaced with asphalt. Farmers in the upper county, who still carried a great deal of influence in Towson, demanded that their dirt roads be improved by the application of a firm, macadamized base. Because their slow moving wagons raised little dust, they did not want to pay for oiled or asphalt road surfaces. Bridges were another issue. Wooden bridges required almost constant maintenance and fast moving autos and trucks gave them a beating, so the county began to replace them with concrete or steel structures. Fortunately, the trio of county road engineers managed to keep everyone reasonably satisfied because the amount of money at their disposal rose significantly during the early years of the new century. County expenditures for roads and bridges rose from $157,000 in 1898 to approximately $550,000 in 1914 (approximately $250,000 of which came from the State Roads Commission). By 1919 the combined total exceeded $700,000. Farmers got their macadamized roads while the suburbanites obtained oiled roads and the increasing use of sheet asphalt on more heavily traveled thoroughfares and residential streets. Beginning about 1912, home builders began to open entirely new streets and roads into housing developments some distance away from the trolley lines for those who owned automobiles and motored into the city or were driven back and forth to the local trolley stop each day. One enterprising builder in 1916 offered a package deal that included a house, garage, and an automobile—all for $2,750. With a little money down and “reasonable” monthly payments, one could “become the proud owner of one of these beautiful homes and a fine machine.”

Acceleration

With the steady improvement of streets and roads in Baltimore City and the surrounding county, motor vehicles could travel more comfortably—and faster. There is no doubt that the speed of the automobile was one of its greatest attractions. Not only did it reduce the time it took to travel from one place to another, it also provided a thrill that the driver of even the swiftest
team of horses had never known. Almost immediately, the sport of auto racing was introduced into the city. The first formal auto race around a track was held in 1903 and in 1906, when Barney Oldfield came to the city with his race car, over 6,000 people went out to the old Pimlico race course to watch “the supreme champion automobile racer of America” thunder around the dirt track at speeds exceeding seventy miles an hour. The crowd was reportedly “greater than any that has witnessed a horse race there in modern days.”

Two years later another auto race at Pimlico drew over 8,000 spectators. Auto manufacturers were well aware that powerful, fast autos were in demand, and many of their advertisements in local papers prominently featured the top speed of their machines. Ads for the 1909 Haynes Model 19 said “it has plenty of speed–60 miles an hour if you want it.” The manufacturer of the Hupmobile Runabout said it could go fifty miles an hour, and even ads for the little $500 Ford Runabout claimed it could travel forty miles an hour. Ads for the 1910 Hudson were more subtle, but still got the point across, stating that “Here is a car that is big and racy looking... Strong–Speedy–Roomy.”

The introduction of such fast and powerful autos on local streets and roadways created a major disconnect between the law and the natural inclinations of motorists. The auto club’s court victory in 1906 that raised the city speed limit from six to twelve miles an hour was regarded merely as an opening wedge to gain a higher limit. Motorists believed that autos could be driven safely through the city’s streets at twenty to twenty-five miles per hour, and at higher speeds in the suburbs and open country. Commenting on the club’s court victory in 1906, one of its officers said that when an auto was run at six miles per hour, “a horse going slowly could pass it. A man buys an automobile in preference to a horse because it can go faster... when he is told he cannot run it faster than six miles in town, he takes the law into his own hands and goes ahead on chances.”

Another motor enthusiast placed the issue in broader terms, saying:

many of our people are opposed to anything that is quick and with the times... these people should remember that Baltimore is no longer what it was a few years ago– a slow town– it is becoming more active every day... If we are to have an active city we must have active people and be with the times... we cannot afford to say that we will not have automobiles. Other cities have them and wish for them more and more.

As autos sped through the city streets and raced along suburban roads, pedestrians and drivers of horse-drawn vehicles wrote countless letters denouncing the practice. Writers had no trouble blaming the increasing number of auto-related injuries and deaths on motorists who raced along the streets a break neck speed–defined by some as twenty or thirty miles an hour, by others as any speed over six miles. Dr. Howard A. Kelly, the famous Johns Hopkins physician called the auto “undoubtedly the greatest present danger to human life.” He asserted that many autos were driven by individuals who “know nothing about machinery, and have utter disregard for life.” These individuals “run through our streets like an express train.” Many city residents
were particularly incensed that autos had gained the right to travel at twice the speed of horse
drawn vehicles. One typical letter to the Sun called for the repeal of “this special class privilege,”
compelling all vehicles to keep to the traditional six-mile limit.331

While pedestrians were indeed the chief victims of auto accidents, motorists also began to
collide with carriages and wagons at an increasing rate. In most cases it was the driver or
passenger in the horse-drawn vehicle that got the worst of the encounter. In April 1911 Dr. J.
Houston Eccleston, the well-known and beloved rector of Emmanuel Episcopal Church, was
killed when an auto smashed into his carriage. Just a few weeks later Cardinal Gibbons’ carriage
was struck by an auto and the venerable prelate was severely shaken up. A large number of
collisions between autos and horse-drawn vehicles arose from driver confusion regarding the
right-of-way at intersections, none of which had traffic signals. In the slower days of horse-drawn
vehicles, the rule gave the right-of-way to the first vehicle entering the intersection. When several
of them arrived at approximately the same time, there was time for the drivers to call or signal to
one another to determine who should cross first. The faster autos and trucks required a revision
in this rule. It was decided that vehicles moving on north-south streets had the right-of-way over
those moving on east-west streets. The major problem here was the fact that some streets,
particularly those between North Avenue and Druid Hill Park, ran northwest while the cross
streets ran southeast. Other major thoroughfares such as the Liberty Road, Gay Street (which
became the Belair Road) and the Harford Road also ran at nearly the same angle. Not until 1916
did the state legislature intervene with a law requiring vehicles to give the right-of-way to vehicles
on their right.332

Enforcement of the laws against speeding and reckless driving was very inconsistent.
Reckless driving laws had been on the books for many decades to protect the public from
irresponsible drivers of horse-drawn vehicles, but autos and trucks presented police magistrates,
grand juries and judges with a new set of new circumstances that required a reinterpretation of
what constituted reckless driving. One of the chief causes of injury or death to pedestrians was the
relatively silent movement of autos, particularly on the smooth asphalt pavements. A celebrated
case involving this issue occurred in 1907 when the son of ex-governor Brown, driving out
Baltimore Street late at night, ran over and killed James Grinnell, an elderly African American
man returning home from work as a porter at a downtown hotel. Brown then drove on without
stopping to help the dying man. The Baltimore City Grand Jury heard testimony from the only
witness to the incident who said that Grinnell stepped out into the path of the auto, but he could
not judge whether the vehicle was speeding or could have avoided hitting the man if the driver
had been more alert. There was a strong suspicion that the governor’s son had been drinking, but
since he did not turn himself in to the police for some time after the accident, there was no way to
determine if he had been intoxicated. Another individual testified that Grinnell was hard of
hearing and perhaps did not hear the approaching vehicle. The Grand Jury found the governor’s
son innocent—blaming Grinnell for failing to look carefully enough before stepping off the curb.
There was a good deal of ill feeling about the Grand Jury’s decision, with many white as well as African American residents believing that the governor’s son was at least partly responsible for Grinnell’s death and that he should have received some type of punishment. The Maryland Automobile Club, which included young Brown as a member, expelled him for the “brutal and cowardly act” of leaving the man on the street, but took no official position on the incident itself.\textsuperscript{333} Motorists found guilty of speeding or driving recklessly in the city were sometimes fined as much as fifty dollars by some police magistrates, but those who could afford to hire a good lawyer and appeal their case to the City Criminal Court could often get their fines reduced to a dollar or two.

Out in Baltimore County, police magistrates and judges handed down punishments that varied considerably. In a case that occurred in 1907, several months before the Grinnell incident in the city, an auto struck a buggy on the Reisterstown Road and, like Brown, the driver left the scene of the accident. The local police justice fined the motorist $260, even though the driver of the buggy was not seriously injured. This was a huge sum in an age when most people earned between $800 and $1,500 per year.\textsuperscript{334} For over a decade, Baltimore County’s most ardent crusader against speeding autos was police officer Noah Walker who used a stopwatch to determine their rate of travel. Those who appealed their cases from the police justices to the county circuit court found that its judge took a much more lenient view and dismissed most of those brought before him.\textsuperscript{335} Some claimed that Walker harbored a grudge against autos because he initially began chasing speeders on his horse; in 1905, while pursuing an auto near the Pimlico Race Track, his horse steeped into a deep hole in the roadbed, breaking its leg. The valuable and well-trained animal had to be killed and Walker thereafter went after speeding autos as a personal crusade—some called it a vendetta. On at least one occasion he fired his pistol at an allegedly speeding auto in an attempt to shoot out its tires.\textsuperscript{336}

Those who still went about in horse-drawn vehicles or on foot became increasingly frustrated by what they believed to be the irresponsible behavior of nearly every motorist, and they lashed out against them at every opportunity. John Henry Keene, that notable enemy of the rapid transit cars, found the auto to be an even greater nemesis. Writing to the \textit{Sun} in the wake of the Grinnell case, he related an incident he had just witnessed where two pedestrians were almost run down by a reckless motorist on Cathedral Street:

The driver of the machine sped off, yelling, “Why the h--don’t you look where you are going?” If death had ensued, murder as a fine art could not have had a more sublime illustration... It begins to look as if organized autoist murder upon Baltimore’s highways is no longer suppressible. Automobile systems of speed seem compulsory. The autoist’s right is so well established by custom and precedent that it is now tolerated in our civilized community.”\textsuperscript{337}
Keene’s underlying assumption was undoubtedly correct. Neighborhood associations in the city, especially those in areas traversed by major thoroughfares, complained to city authorities about autos speeding along their streets. The police responded by placing an extra officer in the neighborhood to arrest speeders. For a time the problem abated, but as soon as the officer was removed, speeding resumed.

In 1913 the Maryland Auto Club sought to reduce the number of pedestrians, especially children, injured or killed by autos. It suggested several regulations, among which was a rule that pedestrians be compelled to cross streets only at intersections. The club also offered to help instruct Baltimore City school children about auto safety. In making the announcement, the club’s president commented that when a pedestrian was struck by an auto, the public was “prone to lay all the blame on the driver” even though the motorist “is not at fault all the time.” He said the auto club was anxious to lessen the danger from autos through “intelligent steps to have pedestrians, do their part in protecting themselves.” A short while later a resident living on St. Paul Street shot back an angry reply:

The automobile owners have privileges on our streets and roads far in excess of any other class of citizens and are yet not satisfied. They want legal enactments which will compel the citizens to be restricted to certain crossings on public streets... and to cause the instruction of children to look out for their own security, and thus relieve auto drivers from care for the limbs and lives of the little ones.... The fact is auto people seek to be a class with special privileges, for they not only violate the speed law with impunity, but they violate the unwritten law which makes every just man a factor in promoting the welfare of his neighbor... To establish the truth of this statement, it is only necessary to visit St. Paul Street between Mount Royal and North avenues, where hundreds of automobiles pass daily, and you will scarcely find one in 20 observe the speed law. From 20 to 25 miles per hour is their usual gait, and little or no regard is paid to pedestrians. To cross the street safely you have to watch your opportunity, for you need never calculate that your safety will be respected by the average driver... It is time the people of Baltimore should demand redress of these intolerable conditions. Surely pedestrians have some rights which should be respected by these speed fiends.\textsuperscript{338}

The angry correspondent certainly painted too dark a picture of the average motorist, but there is no doubt that the auto club’s endorsement of pedestrian crosswalks at street corners caused deep resentment among those who wanted to retain the traditional freedom to cross streets wherever they wished. There is also no doubt that the “Traffic Safety” columns placed in local papers by the auto club placed more emphases on instructing pedestrians to watch out for autos than cautioning motorists to keep an eye out for individuals crossing the streets.

In answer to those who accused motorists of a general disregard for the public’s safety, one of the auto club’s officers appealed to a different “unwritten law.” Osborne Yellott, the auto club’s chief counsel (and its chief lobbyist in Annapolis) said that those who supported the
unrealistically low speed limit of twelve miles per hour for autos, or wished to cut it back to the six-mile limit, were really attempting to legislate autos off the streets. In spite of these malevolent attacks, said Yellott, “we have gone on and increased in numbers... notwithstanding the laws. The moral of all this is that we of America have a law which is higher than the law set by our lawmakers, and that is the law of progress.”

In fact, the twelve-mile speed law appears to have been very loosely enforced in the city prior to 1917, perhaps because an increasing number of city political leaders, police magistrates, and judges became auto owners themselves and found that the twelve-mile limit was indeed unnecessarily low. Until the number of people injured or killed by motor vehicles rose to the point where it became identified as a major menace—sometime around 1916 or 1917, the police allowed traffic to flow at twenty to twenty-five miles per hour, arresting only those whose excessive speed or recklessness posed a clear danger.

Pedestrians were most endangered in the downtown district where the combination of trolley cars, horse-drawn vehicles, autos, and trucks often made crossing the street a perilous adventure. For the protection of pedestrians, and to deal with the mounting volume of downtown traffic, a special police squad was organized shortly after the turn of the century to direct traffic at the major downtown intersections. At first the idea of using policemen simply to direct traffic was met with derision, some labeling it a waste of taxpayers’ money. The half dozen officers assigned to direct traffic were initially called “The Beauty Squad.” But as the volume of traffic grew, and the speed of both trolley cars and autos increased, the traffic squad, which had been increased to thirty-nine men by 1914, became an indispensable feature in the downtown district—particularly at intersections that many Baltimoreans referred to as “automobile death traps,” places such as Charles and North Avenue, St. Paul and Chase Streets, and St. Paul and Mount Royal Avenue. In 1908 the squad began directing traffic from the center of the major intersections using whistles to control the movement of vehicles and pedestrians—a system imported from New York. In 1914 the city finally began to compel pedestrians to cross major downtown streets within painted pedestrian lanes located at intersections. “There will be no ‘cutting catty-corner’ at these intersections, stated the Sun. Everyone must hew to the line or the policeman stationed at these crossings will know the reason why.”

In spite of the crossing lanes and the traffic police, an increasing number of pedestrians were struck by autos and trucks. By 1917 the motor vehicle had replaced the trolley car as the city’s major menace. In that year motor vehicles killed seventy-six people (nearly all of them pedestrians) compared to forty-six killed by trolley cars. The same held true in Baltimore County’s suburbs where approximately a dozen pedestrians died after being struck by autos compared to half that number who lost their lives to trolley cars.

While motor vehicle deaths occurred elsewhere in Maryland, the problem was overwhelmingly concentrated in Baltimore and its suburbs. In 1917 only fourteen auto-related deaths occurred in all the other counties of Maryland combined. As in the Grinnell Case, local
grand juries in Baltimore and elsewhere in the state were very reluctant to charge drivers for these fatalities. During the first eight months of 1917 only three motorists involved in fatal traffic accidents were bound over for trial, a record that led the state commissioner of motor vehicles to recommend the establishment of a special traffic court in Baltimore City to rein in speeding and careless drivers.\textsuperscript{343} When the Maryland General Assembly met in January 1918 it undertook a major revision of the state’s traffic laws that included the creation of a traffic court for the city.

The need for a better system to deal with the motor vehicle danger was underlined in February 1918 when Baltimore’s building inspector was killed by an auto while crossing a downtown street. The \textit{Sun} used the incident to call attention to the “appalling number of injuries and deaths” in the city caused by autos. It recognized that “there were certain things from which the inherent risk cannot be entirely eliminated... working in a coal mine for instance... But should crossing a street involve the daily risk of death?” The average Baltimorean “now undertakes a journey from curb to curb with nearly the keen sense of danger and with as much alert vigilance as the early pioneers showed in guarding against Indian forays and surprises... we must find a way to make streets as safe for human beings as they are convenient for traffic.”\textsuperscript{344} Naturally, the Maryland Auto Club took a deep interest in the motor vehicle bill and its influence can be seen in the final version signed by Governor Emerson Harrington. Bowing to the auto club’s lobbying, and perhaps to the realization that the existing speed limits were unrealistic and nearly unenforceable, the law increased speed limits to fifteen miles per hour in cities and towns, twenty miles in suburban areas, and thirty-five miles in the open country. This was not as much of an increase as the auto club had wished, but was regarded as a major improvement over the 1910 law with its limits of twelve, fifteen, and twenty miles per hour. With the support of the auto club, the law provided harsh punishments for those driving at excessive speeds, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, or failing to stop and render assistance following an accident. These offences carried fines of $100-$1,000 and one to twelve months in jail. Finally, a traffic court was established for Baltimore City.\textsuperscript{345}

The governor appointed Edward M. Staylor, a well-known Baltimore attorney, as judge of the new court. Staylor took his job seriously. He slapped fines on almost every speeder or reckless driver brought before him and sent to jail those convicted of more serious offences. As a result of the judge’s vigilance, the police began arresting more drivers and the number of cases coming before the traffic court rose from a handful to fifty or sixty a day. One day in August, 1918, Staylor handled 124 cases, collecting over $400 in fines.\textsuperscript{346} Unfortunately, the faster the traffic court processed speeders and reckless drivers, the more new motorists entered the streets and highways of the region—approximately 850 more per month during the year 1918. They continued to kill and maim at an alarming rate. In 1918 they killed 108 people (streetcars killed 48 and horse-drawn vehicles caused approximately ten deaths).\textsuperscript{347} Judge Staylor may have felt that he was trying to hold back the tide with a broom.
In addition to the dangers of crossing downtown streets, the crush of autos, trucks, trolley cars, and horse-drawn vehicles in the city center caused major traffic jams that made drivers angry and less willing to give way to pedestrians when a clear traffic lane opened up. A major impediment to the movement of traffic was the large number of vehicles, particularly autos and trucks, parked on downtown streets. By 1915 the number of parked vehicles had grown so large that the city passed an ordinance limiting them to two hours during the day and three hours at night. As a result, off-street parking garages sprang up throughout the downtown area—the largest being the four-story Mid-City Garage at Charles and German Streets, opened in 1916. It had room for 500 vehicles. A number of downtown stables had been built during the last half of the nineteenth century where horses and their vehicles could be parked, but none approached the size of the Mid-City Garage. The mammoth new structure symbolized the arrival of the auto as the premier vehicle of the new century. Yet parking garages could not be put up fast enough to accommodate all the vehicles entering the downtown district. Soon the city forbade any daytime parking on some of the busiest downtown streets. Beginning in 1916, parking was banned on Lexington Street between Eutaw and Howard. The one exception to the regulation allowed Hochschild Kohn’s department store, on the north side of Lexington, to park its delivery trucks in front of the store for limited periods four times a day to load them with merchandise.

By 1916 an increasing number of local observers recognized that the motor vehicle had been converted from an expensive toy into a machine that was recasting the Baltimore region and the state of Maryland. The *Sun* took the opportunity of the opening of the tenth annual auto show in 1916 to gauge the amazingly rapid impact of these machines.

It is almost impossible to divorce the motor vehicle in the mind from its function as a contributor to human pleasure. It is not always a thing of beauty, but it is essentially a thing of joy, and it promises to remain a joy forever. But the fact which strikes the mind most forcibly... is its practical significance in the everyday work of the world, and the transformation which it is creating in almost all our surroundings. We are adjusting ourselves to it in every direction, and all kinds of businesses and all classes of society are being influenced by it more powerfully than by almost any other material agency. ...Familiar as the motor vehicle now is in the city and country, few of us realize what a far-reaching power it has become in industry, trade, finance, travel and modern upbuilding. ... From a sign of supposed extravagance and luxury, the automobile has come to be recognized as a sign as well as a promoter of general prosperity.

The *Sun’s* assessment of the motor vehicle captures the profound enthusiasm that the new machine generated in the minds and hearts of those who had spent most of their years moving about the city and its region at the slow, clip clop pace of the horse. From the late 1880s they could enjoy the speed and freedom the bicycle brought—so long as the weather was dry, the road smooth and the terrain relatively flat. The speed and comfort of the trolley car was itself a marvel,
but it only traveled where the tracks could carry it, one traveled on it with an increasingly wide
spectrum of the city’s residents, and it moved only according to the transit company’s schedule.

The motor vehicle trumped them all, and during the first two decades of the twentieth
century, thousands of Baltimoreans dug deep into their pockets to buy them, spent large amounts
of time and money maintaining them, and poured countless gallons gasoline into them at a cost
of seventeen to twenty cents a gallon ($4.00-$5.00 in current dollars). In return motorists enjoyed
the speed, convenience, and freedom of movement that the auto bestowed on them. In particular,
they could now conceive of living some distance from the city, enjoying the quiet, bucolic
atmosphere of a semi-rural existence while possessing the ability to drive “downtown” whenever
they pleased. Alternatively, they could use the telephone and have city goods arrive at their front
door via the delivery truck. The chief drawback was the temptation of travelling at speeds of
twenty, thirty, or fifty miles an hour along streets and roads that autos shared with pedestrians,
carriages, wagons, and other fast moving autos or trucks. Obviously, more and more people were
quite willing to assume these risks. Some believed the problems created by the motor vehicle
could be resolved in the near future. Others were less sanguine about eliminating the heavy
financial burdens autos placed on most families, or the dangers one courted on the road, but they
thought it was a price worth paying for the benefits attained. On the other side of the great divide
stood nearly all those who attempted to stick with the horse, and who viewed the growth of the
auto as an ongoing and needless calamity that could only be ended by limiting their speed to the
safe, placid gait of their four-legged competitors.

What is most missing from the discussion of the motor vehicle during this era is the
breadth and depth of the influence it had already exerted by 1915 or 1920, and the far greater
impact it was to have over the next fifty years. In 1914, when the Olmsted brothers’ firm and the
city’s Municipal Art Society laid out their combined vision for a system of parks and scenic
boulevards in the city, there was much discussion of how carriages would move along the planned
boulevards and whether there were sufficient bridle paths for horses, but little mention of the
13,000 autos and trucks already operating on the city’s streets and suburban roads. There was
little inkling of how, over the next fifty years, the motor vehicle and the highway would utterly
transform Baltimore into the vast, 2,000-square mile metropolitan region in which three fourths
of its residents live in a low density “suburban” environment where the motor vehicle operates as
an indispensable utility akin to water or electricity— and the old city of Baltimore plays a modest,
largely tragic role.

Back in the early years of the twentieth century, a few individuals such as Henry M. Rowe
did have some sense of how profound the motor vehicle revolution might be, but he did not know
where it would lead. There is no shame to be attached to this failure. At the opening of the twenty-
first century, we are daily made aware of how technological and scientific innovations are
currently changing our lives and will certainly change them more in the future. Yet it would be a
bold prophet who would predict what the huge region we call Baltimore will be like in 2050 or

264
2070 and whether its people will be more free and safe. The only prediction that seems secure is that the vast majority of those living in this region, like almost all Americans, will wish to move about as freely and swiftly as possible—extending the personal independence that began over a century ago when Messrs. Gill and Crouch began sputtering around town in their horseless carriages.
Introduction to Chapter 9
The Battle for Baltimore County: Farmers, Suburbanites and the City, 1865-1920
by Elizabeth M. Nix

In the last chapter of his manuscript, Arnold discusses the development of "The Belt," the suburbs within the 10-mile radius of Baltimore City's 1865 boundaries. The inner ring of Baltimore County included mill towns like Hampden and Mt. Washington, the industrial center of Canton and rural seats of landed gentry. Since city taxes were twice those of the county, the county had less money to invest and as a result lagged behind the city in infrastructure like roads and bridges and essential services like water delivery, fire and police protection, and education. Arnold highlights a tension inherent in debates about raising county or city taxes to pay for improvements: most of the deciding elites were residents of both the city and the county, maintaining country estates and city townhouses. Two major turnpikes, Frederick Road and York Road, determined the direction of development, but efforts in the 1880s and 1890s to turn the sleepy farming towns along them into thriving suburban communities largely failed, mainly because badly maintained roads made the trip in to Baltimore City long and unpleasant. Only when the landowners of the large estates just outside the city line started selling their properties for development did the suburban ring take off. As transportation from the outskirts improved, area residents started thinking of the surrounding areas as year-round residences, not just summer places.

The years between the annexation of 1888, which brought western and northern suburbs into the city limits, and the final annexation of 1918 saw spectacular suburban growth. Arnold pays special attention to the development of Roland Park, a planned suburb that restricted the ways its residents could design their houses and use their ample lots. He notes that Roland Park and Guilford, originally in the county but eventually annexed by the city, were the first residential areas of Baltimore that were segregated racially and economically. Arnold also notes that the new development replicated the old patterns of status in Baltimore: the population that had a choice had moved northwest but again a northern address was more fashionable than a western one. Just as Mt. Vernon had been more desirable than Franklin Square, so was a Roland Park house more sought after than a similar house in Ten Hills. He asserts, "The whole social geography of the city was gradually replicated in the new suburban ring except of course that the scale and the degree of socio-economic segregation of housing were substantially greater."

Antero Pietila expands on the increasing segregation of the city in Not in My Neighborhood, focusing on the restrictive covenants of Roland Park and Guilford and Baltimore's
attempts to use legislation to deem certain blocks white and others black. Eric Holcomb tells the story of one area of the belt in *The City as Suburb: A History of Northeast Baltimore Since 1660*. 
Chapter 9: The Battle for Baltimore County: Farmers, Suburbanites, and the City, 1865-1920

Unlike many regions in other parts of the country that surrounded major urban centers, Baltimore County did not fully transform from a rural and agricultural region to a place where suburban development played the dominant role during the 1865-1920 era. In 1888 and again in 1920 Baltimore City annexed the majority of the county’s suburban residents, keeping the remaining areas largely rural. The city of Baltimore was successful in bringing these residents into the municipality in 1888 because it offered them a level of services that the county government failed to provide. Most of the county’s residents lived in the belt, three regions that formed concentric circles around the city. People living in the belt were, of course, not eager to have their local taxes doubled by entering the city, (although this did not happen immediately) but they came to see annexation as the only way they gain the public improvements they desired. It also seems clear that the generation of suburban residents who moved out to the belt and beyond in the post-Civil War era were motivated by the same sort of revolution of rising expectations as their city brethren. As A.S. Bloor, the noted New York architect told a Baltimore audience in 1875, the current suburban home owner “is more cultivated in his perception of the commodious and the beautiful than it was in the last generation. Those who…choose residences in the county will not consent to put up with the homely surroundings and crude appliance with which the farming population have hitherto been content.” From the standpoint of convenience, sanitation and aesthetics, the suburban house must have adequate sanitation, services and surroundings. “A piece of land anywhere is worth just what it approaches, surroundings and enclosures make it worth.”

In its simplest form it was a struggle of the fairly well off, city-oriented suburbanites wishing to live in a more safe, convenient and attractive suburban environment pitted against less
affluent upcountry farmers who saw much expense and little need for amenities. While there is truth to this image, it masks a more complex situation. Baltimore County was the richest and most heavily populated county in Maryland. It had the belt to thank for much of its wealth, but in addition it was the wealthiest and most productive agricultural county in the state. In the belt residents were packed rather tightly into blocks of row houses on streets which extended little more than a mile from the city line on the north, southwest and east, and these areas were almost indistinguishable from the city itself. Beyond the belt, in the region two to eight miles from the city, lived a large number of true suburbanites—wealthy businessmen in splendid Italianate suburban villas, middling folk in attractive Gothic cottages, and even low-income families living on small lots in little frame houses, shacks, and hovels. This suburban population was interspersed with almost a thousand farms that varied in size from just a few acres to great agricultural estates with 500 or 1000 acres. The outer edges of this zone reached just beyond the circle of villages running from Catonsville around through Pikesville and Reisterstown to Lutherville and Towsontown. Beyond this zone the country became entirely rural except for a scattering of crossroads villages and tiny rural mill towns. The county’s 4,000 “farmers” were an extremely varied group, ranging from small, truly rustic sons of the soil to wealthy and sophisticated landed aristocrats and an increasingly large group of gentleman farmers from the city.

The agricultural aristocracy, a group of approximately 200-300 men, lived on large farms and estates with plenty of servants and helpers and were nearly self-sufficient. They might have liked better roads, but otherwise needed little from the county government. Many spent the winter months in the city. The middling income farmers were a large group, more numerous than in most other counties. Fertile soil and easy proximity to the city gave them advantages other counties did not enjoy, but they worked hard for their living and consistently cautioned the county commissioners not to burden them with taxes. Little is known about the county’s poorer farmers since they almost never wrote to the local newspapers or sent petitions, but it’s hard to believe they supported tax increases that bore heavily on them whether they owned or rented their land. The residents of the belt and the suburban hinterland varied as greatly in wealth and social position as did the rural residents, but there was a distinctly greater degree of geographic segregation among these groups. The northern belt was dominated by middle- and upper-income families who had moved there to escape city taxes. The industrial towns of Hampden and Woodberry held a number of low-income mill workers. The county’s African American residents, who varied in wealth from moderate to quite poor, were concentrated in the suburban region, particularly in the Catonsville and Towsontown areas. The western suburbs had the most mixed social geography, ranging from large and beautiful estates such as Lyndhurst, Gelston Heights, and Hunting Ridge to the clusters of working class cottages surrounding the cattle yards, slaughterhouses, breweries, and factories along Frederick Road and Wilkins Avenue. Across the eastern city line in Canton and Highlandtown was the largest concentration of industrial workers.
in the county. A number of them were skilled artisans and mechanics who lived comfortably, but an increasing number of unskilled laborers lived in narrow row houses or tiny shacks.

In spite of its relative complexity, the belt and the suburban region beyond it were really quite small compared to the sprawling suburban regions of the late twentieth century. On the eve of annexation in 1888 the built-up areas of the belt comprised little more than three or four square miles and the suburban region beyond it encompassed about forty square miles. This represented about seven percent of the county’s total land area. In 1888 the belt and suburbs housed about 40,000 people or just under half of the county’s 95,000 residents. The annexation of seventeen square miles of territory (and about 35,000 people) was a substantial loss of population, but it hardly dented the county’s land area.

Because of proximity to the city, Baltimore County had a peculiar elite. There were, to be sure, an old and aristocratic landed gentry. Some of them were very wealthy in both land and other investments. In purely economic terms, however, most were simply wealthy farmers with large, often multiple tracts of land, some of which they managed themselves and some of which they rented out to tenants. The remarkably detailed 1877 Atlas of Baltimore County, which shows the names of almost every major landholder, provides a vivid catalogue of the landed wealthy. On page after page one encounters names in large letters spread across hundreds, even thousands of acres: Ridgley, Carroll, Merryman, Dulany, Cradock Gorsuch, Gittings, Jenkins, Cromwell, Worthington, Dorsey, Cockey, Gilmore, Bosley, Shipley, Glenn, and others. Many were large extended families with land and official positions extending back into the eighteenth century. By the 1860s a number of their houses were, by American standards, ancient and historic structures. Their inhabitants were, however, no longer the major landholders in the county. By the 1870s, their estates were interspersed with the more numerous and more recently established lands of the gentleman farmers, city men who bought out old families or put together several small tracts to form rural retreats which varied from fifty or a hundred acres to a thousand or more. In the Green Spring Valley, for example, the estates of old families such as John M. Carroll’s “The Canes,” T. Edward Hambleton’s castle-like “Hambledure,” a 400-acre estate overlooking the Valley and Lake Roland, and Thomas Cradock’s “Trentham” were outclassed by Samuel Shoemaker’s “Iris” and Alexander D. Brown’s “Brooklynwood.” On these properties they erected large houses in a variety of styles, depending on their image of a proper country squire. Some of these city businessmen gradually became genuine “county men,” taking an interest in local affairs, mixing socially with the old landed families and becoming as much farmer, dairyman or horseman as those who had been on the land for generations. Others were more like Enoch Pratt, who spent much of the summer on his county farm, but never considered himself a county man and kept his official residences in the city even though it cost him more in taxes.352

Whether they dated from the eighteenth century or were newly created, the county’s large farms and estates dominated the landscape and accounted for a large share of the county’s agricultural wealth. Something like three or four hundred of these large “country seats,” were
scattered around the county, but the greatest number were concentrated within ten or twelve miles of the city. The estates closest to town, often only a mile or two from the edge of the built-up area, had by the 1860s and 1870s been broken up into smaller "suburban villas," where lawns and gardens replaced pastures and fields, but a surprising number of farms survived in the suburban belt even after it was taken into the city in 1888. As late as 1900 Baltimore City still contained 159 farms, several of them over a hundred acres. As the city grew up around them, these farms and suburban villas were in turn eventually converted to regular blocks of row houses.

While Baltimore never experienced any real boom in suburban lands until the late 1890s and first decades of the twentieth century, there was a very steady and active real estate market in county estates, small farms, and suburban villas. Purchasers bought them not only as pleasant summer residences, but also as investments. One did not need to be very rich to enter the field of suburban land acquisition. For example, the Baltimore businessman Jesse Marden bought a good fifty-acre farm “improved by a comfortable dwelling, a good barn and necessary out buildings” in the Green Spring Valley near Brooklandville for $5,000 in 1868. More elaborate country seats of suburban villas with ten or twenty acres situated on a main road sold in the 1865-1880 era at prices ranging from $5,000 to $15,000, about the same amount one would pay for a large comfortable row house. Even large, elegant estates sold for prices not much more than the city’s biggest town homes. In 1866 William Troxell, the Baltimore iron merchant, bought the famous twenty-two acre Montrose estate on Charles Street Avenue for $42,000, about the same price as a large townhouse on Mount Vernon Place. In 1869 John W. Garrett bought Archibald Stirling’s beautiful seventy-acre rural estate located near Hillen Road and Cold Spring Lane, about three miles north of Baltimore, for $45,000. In 1873 he bought the ninety-acre Chestnut Hill estate adjacent to his own Montebello for $75,000. In 1878, Garrett paid $70,000 for Evergreen, the spectacular country seat built by Stephen Broadbent. In 1900 Frank A. Furst was able to buy Henry M. Walker’s beautiful twenty-seven acre estate “Drumquhazel” at York Road and Walker Avenue for only $18,000. In 1903 William F. Cochran, Jr. paid only $50,000 for “Woodbrook,” the very well-known sixty-acre estate of William H. Perot on Charles Street Avenue just beyond the Elk Ridge Club.

While the particular property and its improvements determined much of its value, distance from the city was always a factor. For example, the Carrington estate of forty-five acres, eight miles out on the Frederick Road near Catonsville was sold in 1867 for $16,000, while “Tremont,” a very similar country seat of forty-eight acres but located only three miles out sold at the same time for $24,000. The Frederick Road corridor did not develop nearly as rapidly as the York Road sector in the 1870s and 1880s and even in 1895 the American noted that aside from C. Irving Ditty’s housing development at Irvington, the Frederick Road area was almost fully lacking in suburban development. Part of the reason, it said, was the comparatively poor service on the Catonsville horsecar line, but in addition almost all the good building sites along the road were “held in large estates, and owners have not encourage the selling of property in small lots.”
Whether or not suburban estate owners were willing to subdivide their properties, they seem to have bought and sold them quite regularly, an indication that they were purchased as much for investment as for actual living. Also, it appears that the value of these country seats did not increase very much during the years from the 1860s to the early 1890s. John Glenn, the owner of Hilton outside Catonsville, may have exaggerated somewhat when he said in 1891 that suburban real estate values were “no higher than in 1872 and in many instances no higher than in 1857,” but the sale and auction prices quoted in local newspapers did not seem to advance dramatically before the 1890s. For example, the fine 469-acre Dumbarton estate on the Reisterstown Road just beyond Pikesville was purchased by the Baltimore merchant Noah Walker in 1854 for $85.00 an acre and sold in 1893 for $211 per acre, an annual increase of 6.3 percent. This slow rate of appreciation might also have contributed to the rapid turnover as disappointed investors sold out to ever-hopeful newcomers. As both the population figures and county maps indicate, the total number of suburban residences grew slowly but steadily in the 1865-1890 era, but only those properties on the edge of the city and the built-up belt commanded really high prices. There was, however, a slow and steady escalation of land values in the northern and northwestern suburbs from the Liberty road around to the area of Charles Street Avenue, York and Hillen roads. The majority of the city’s great business leaders resided in this quadrant during the summer: Alexander Brown at Mondawmin, John S. Gittings at Ashburton, J.C. Matthai at Linden Hill, the Garretts at Montebello and Evergreen, Abell at Guilford, Wyman at Homewood Park, R.W. Cator at Maplewood, Pratt at Tivoli, and Hopkins at Clifton. Because of the prestige associated with this area, it became the major focus of suburban development. Efforts were made in the late 1860s and early 1870s to develop some of the estates, but aside from those tracts of land immediately adjacent to the built-up area of the city, almost all ended in failure. Even as late as 1894 the American said this area remained slow to develop, saying it was “held by people who are conservatives and afraid to make improvements.”

The most significant and widely discussed of the developments in the Charles-St. Paul corridor was Peabody Heights, the area now known as Charles Village. Its story provides one of the best illustrations of the problems facing Baltimore’s suburban developers in the horsecar era. In the fall of 1870 a group of real estate developers purchased “Lilliandale,” the forty-six acre estate of William Holmes for $150,000. Located just half a mile beyond North Avenue on the line with St. Paul Street and Maryland Avenue, not far from Abell’s Guilford estate, the tract seemed perfectly located to receive the northward movement of population. The development was named Peabody Heights and the investors proposed to build on it what they told the public would be “FIRST CLASS RESIDENCES.” Streets were laid out and the first offering of lots brought a number of the city’s real estate speculators who purchased almost $100,000 worth of them. Shortly thereafter the Panic of 1873 struck and development almost ceased. However, even when prosperity returned in the late 1870s and 1880s, building was very slow and the auctioning of lots brought only modest returns. Horsecar service was never very good, there were not water and gas.
lines until 1885 and the original trees, said to cost over a thousand dollars, were destroyed by
dozens of free roaming cows and horses who trampled them down and ate their leaves. With the
annexation of 1888, Peabody Heights became part of the city, but street paving and other
improvements were still slow in coming. Only in the late 1890s, when Thomas E. Yewell bought
the remaining thirty acres of unsold land (for $420,000) did more rapid development commence.
At that point the original investors did finally begin to make a handsome profit on their land, but
it had taken almost thirty years.363

Another type of suburban housing venture that had proved successful in other American
cities in this era was railroad suburbs, but only two such places were developed in the Baltimore
region. These were Mount Washington and Lutherville. Mount Washington, originally a tiny mill
town on the upper Jones Falls, was located about five miles north of the city on the Northern
Central Railroad. An attempt had been made as early as 1854 to develop it as a summer retreat.
Nothing came of the first effort except a pamphlet extolling the beauties of the spot. In the late
1860s a group of Baltimore real estate developers made a more serious effort to convert the mill
town into a modern suburban village. A public school was built in 1875 and over the next two
decades a local water company was formed, electrical lighting brought in and other modern
conveniences added. By 1890 twenty trains a day stopped at the village. Nevertheless, the
population still numbered less than 1,500 and many of these people were summer residents.
Lutherville, about five miles farther out on the Northern Central, achieved only modest growth
and was really not much of a community except in the summer. By 1890 it had 663 residents. It
appears that in the 1870s and 1880s Baltimoreans just could not conceive of living permanently so
far away from the city in what they perceived to be a relatively isolated rural village.364

A more reasonable basis for suburban growth was presented by Baltimore’s two major
turnpikes, the Frederick and York Roads. Each had a major horsecar line and even by 1865 a large
number of summer homes, cottages, and rural estates were liberally scattered among the roadside
farms. In addition, each highway possessed a well-established suburban village. Catonsville and
Towson each straddled their respective turnpikes at a distance of about eight miles from the
center of Baltimore. Between 1865 and 1900 the lower portions of these two highways became
heavily developed; estates and cottages had almost entirely replaced the farms over three or four
miles out the Frederick Road and even further on the York Road. Nevertheless, neither
Catonsville nor Towsontown could be developed into major suburbs.

The Frederick Turnpike was Baltimore’s most important highway, linking the city with
the great National Road to the Middle West. The B&O Railroad had taken the bulk of the
commerce that used to crowd the old turnpike, but even in the late nineteenth century it remained
an important and well-travelled highway from Baltimore out to Howard, Frederick, and
Washington counties. By the 1870s and 1880s the Frederick Road was dotted with “handsome
villas” bearing such names as “Elysian Fields,” “Paradise,” “Sunny Holme,” “Afton,” “Belle
Grove,” and “Athol.” At 500 feet above sea level, it occupied the highest point on the road before
it started down towards the Patapsco River at Ellicott City, which was by the 1870s a well-established village with churches, a large private academy and a variety of provision stores, blacksmith shops, livery stables, and inns. Its high elevation made it a perfect summer retreat and it was gradually surrounded by dozens of small summer homes and several great rural estates, the most famous being Gustav Lurman’s 600-acre “Farmlands,” and “Hilton,” the thousand-acre seat of the John Glenn family. Interspersed with these great and small estates were a large number of prosperous farms. Within the village itself was “Summit,” the summer home of James A. Gary, a wealthy textile mill owner and Postmaster General under William McKinley. As a local center for all these groups, Catonsville became the largest and most prosperous village in the county. Encouraged by this growth, local entrepreneurs attempted to turn the village into a much larger, modern railroad suburb.

Commuting was the great obstacle. The trip out to Catonsville on the old horsecar took well over an hour under the best conditions, so the construction of a steam railroad seemed to be essential to development. In 1881-1882 a group of Catonsville merchants and local landowners invested $60,000 in what they called the Catonsville Short Line Railroad. James A. Gary was president and John Glenn of Hilton became treasurer. The 3.8-mile branch line meandered east from Catonsville through farms and fields until it joined the Pennsylvania Railroad’s tracks near St. Agnes Hospital. From here trains ran into Baltimore’s Calvert Station. The whole trip took about thirty minutes.

The little railroad opened for business in 1884. In 1885 the Consolidated Gas Company of Baltimore, under the leadership of James A. Gary, laid a gas main out the Frederick Road to Catonsville, and for many years it remained the company’s only suburban line. In 1887 a local water company was established. As the only suburban town with both water and gas service at this time, Catonsville could demonstrate that at least in these areas it could combine the advantage of the country with city conveniences. A local newspaper, *The Argus*, was established in 1881 and published detailed accounts of the town’s progress. Each year during the 1880s more houses were built in and around the village, forty of them being put up in 1889 alone. While encouraging, such growth could hardly be called a great housing boom and many of the residences remained summer homes. From June to September the summer guests gave it a bustling appearance. The “fashionable contingent” was especially evident as they drove their “smart turnouts along the beautiful drives of this picturesque suburb.” Despite this, however, during the rest of the year Catonsville reverted to a quiet country town, surrounded on every side by farms and heavily wooded estates. By 1890 still only 2,115 people lived in the town, so the census bureau continued to classify it as a village. Commuter transportation was the root problem. Ridership on the short line railroad was never heavy, especially in the winter months when so many local residents returned to the city. There were complaints of too few trains, but without profits or the investment of more capital it was impossible to increase service. The railroad never appears to have earned a profit. When the Frederick Road horsecar line was electrified in 1895 the CSL’s
existence as passenger line was doomed. It was sold to outside investors in the 1890s and then resold to the Pennsylvania railroad, which ended the passenger service, using the line only occasionally to deliver coal, lumber, and other items to the town and the adjacent Spring Grove Asylum.

The York Turnpike had not been as important as the great western highway to Frederick, but in the years from 1865 to 1890 it became the premier corridor of suburban development—a position it has occupied to the present day. The Sun, always a great booster of suburban development, said in 1868 that the York Road from Baltimore to Govanstown “is almost one continuous village,” and the next year announced that the whole way out to Towsontown “is beginning to assume the appearance of a prolonged village.” In reality, the pace of development was much slower, and by the 1890s only the lower two or three miles of the York Road corridor had been transformed into a genuinely suburban environment. This can be seen in the development of its three major York Road communities: Waverly, Govanstown, and Towsontown. Waverly, a mile and a half beyond North Avenue, was a village of fifteen houses and two general stores in 1866, but by 1888 when it was annexed by the city, it had turned into a large and thriving neighborhood center for the approximately 8,000-10,000 people living in this part of the belt. By 1900 it had become completely engulfed by the city’s row houses and ceased to have any “village” look about it.

Govanstown, two miles farther out, was quite a different story. Shaw’s Hill, which separated Govanstown from Waverly, was a formidable obstacle to wagons and horsecars in the day, so development beyond it was much slower. The Cold Spring Hotel at Cold Spring Lane and York Road, about half a mile beyond Waverly, remained a country-style hostelry surrounded by open land until 1894 when it was finally torn down to make way for residential expansion, but even at that date there was still little development beyond Cold Spring Lane. In addition Govanstown lay beyond the new northern city boundary established in 1888 so it held no hope of city services. Hardly even a village at all in 1865, it did become something of a roadside town by 1890, but nevertheless retained a more rustic than urbane appearance with its ragged cluster of stables, taverns and blacksmith shops. A number of suburban villas and cottages had been built on roads running back from the main highway at Shaw’s Hill and Govanstown, but small farms, patches of woods and meadows (with the usual complement of barnyard animals) still greeted the eyes and noses of visitors. As of 1890 the area had neither gas, water service, paved streets, nor fire protection. A village improvement association was established in 1890, but progress was slow. Beyond Govanstown one travelled the four miles on out to Towsontown through an agricultural landscape, where the occasional County house intruded into the farmlands. Even Towson (its name finally changed by the Post Office Department in 1886) still maintained more the appearance of rural village in 1890. Prior to the separation of the city and county government to Towsontown, the place where Ezekiel Towson’s tavern had stood in the late eighteenth century was simply a crossroads. In 1857 a fine courthouse was built just off the York Turnpike and Enos
Smedley, a recent arrival from Pennsylvania, purchased fifty acres of adjacent land on which he laid off streets for a substantial village. His tavern, the Smedley House, became a favorite gathering place for county politicians and the courthouse crowd. By the 1880s Towson had grown into a regular village and even had a residential development on its outskirts with the romantic name of Aigburth Vale, the former estate of the famous actor John Owens. Unfortunately neither Towson nor its “suburb” prospered much in this decade. The town had no fire department and a number of destructive conflagrations discouraged building. There was a good deal of nightly disorder emanating from its taverns, and poor sanitary conditions hurt its reputation as a summer retreat. In an attempt to institute some sort of local improvements a group of the town’s major property holders obtained a municipal charter, but two years later got the legislature to rescind it. It seems the local Democrats were divided politically and this allowed a coalition of white and African American Republicans win the first two municipal elections. The Democrats preferred no government to one in which black people played a role. The town struggled on without a local government or the help of wealthy patrons like those that Catonsville enjoyed, so public services remained sparse. A narrow gauge railroad, the Baltimore and Delta, linked the town to Baltimore in 1886 and although this excited a good deal of local enthusiasm, it generated little suburban growth. The railroad, renamed the Maryland and Pennsylvania, ran on up to the state line and did a successful freight business, but could not run enough passenger trains to make living in Towson very feasible.

As late as 1890 the town was still without an adequate water system and had no electricity. Its streets were lighted with kerosene lamps, but there weren’t enough of them. There was some police protection, but nightly drunken disorders continued and the town’s two special officers, one of whom was also the town lamplighter, admitted they could not control them. Free roaming horses, cattle, and pigs destroyed gardens and lawns. Some crude efforts had been made to improve drainage in the town, but sanitation remained poor and several outbreaks of typhoid fever occurred. Given these difficulties it is no surprise that growth was slow. In 1890 Towson still had only 1,487 residents, only 171 more than it had possessed in 1880. Real estate values, the surest measure of progress, remained low. “Urban’s Café,” a popular saloon right across the street from the courthouse, sold in 1890 for only $4,750.

In a number of ways, the village of Towson was a microcosm of the whole county. A number of efforts were made in the 1870s and 1880s to improve the belt and the county towns, but every one seemed to fall short of expectations. The basic failure was political. The county, by virtue of its division between the middle-class suburbanites, the lower-income belt residents and the upcountry farmers, was inevitably going to have unsettled politics and unsatisfactory government administration. Since the rural voters remained the majority until the first decade of the twentieth century their views usually predominated at the courthouse in Towson. Speaking for many of the area’s farm groups, the Baltimore County Grange met in January 1894, to consider methods for reducing taxation, one of which was the elimination of the county fire
While suburbanites did not clamor for higher taxes, they felt far more acutely the need for modern services and were willing to pay for them. At the same time the county grange was calling for lower taxes, its suburban residents, speaking through the American, told county officials that they deserved to “be supplied with pure water, the sanitation should be made as perfect as possible and there should be good protection against fire.” With the exception of expenditures for rural roads, the county farmers were low-tax, low-spend conservatives. The general philosophy of the county’s three commissioners was also quite conservative on fiscal matters. They didn’t like to impose taxes and they felt that the creation of a bonded debt was disgraceful. The view was summarized in 1896 by Commissioner A.A. Blakeney who said his motto was, “Pay as you go, and if you can’t pay, don’t go.” In actual practice, the county did not always follow this stern financial advice. Its per capita expenditures and its tax rate crept up steadily.

In 1866 the county tax levy, the amount the commissioners taxed property owners to meet county expenses, was $124,000. The three largest items in the county budget were the schools, the circuit court, and the road and bridge fund. The tax rate was fifty-three cents per hundred dollars of assessed valuation. A decade later in 1876 the tax levy was $272,000 and the tax rate had risen to fifty-eight cents. Schools required $75,000 (to which was added $40,000 from the state government and from student book fees). The roads and bridges required $56,000, accounting for about half the total expenses. Not only did the total amount of taxes rise, as would be expected with a growing population, but the per capita tax bill increased as well. The amount of taxes collected for each resident of the county rose from $2.50 per person in 1866 and $4.00 in 1876. By comparison Baltimore City’s per capita tax collection was approximately $6.80 in 1866 and rose to $12.60 by 1876. In 1900 the county tax rate was ninety cents and the per capita tax was $7.55 while the city rate was $1.67 and the per capita tax $13.10. By 1914 the county levy was up to $9.80 and its tax rate stood at one dollar per thousand, and the city, with a tax rate of $1.98, collected $24.30. A comparison of per capita expenditures would show about the same ratio between the city and county as the tax levy and tax rate. The total public expenditures of the two governments, of course, exceeded the amount collected from the property tax since both received varying amounts of funds from the state legislature and the city had several taxes and fees, like the park tax, which were unique. Because of the way state taxes were collected by the government in Annapolis and redistributed back to the city and the counties, Baltimore City ended up subsidizing Baltimore County (as well as the other counties in the state) for something like 10 percent of their total expenditures. In the final analysis, the county generally taxed its residents at about half the city rate and tried to get along by spending somewhat less than half as much as the city in providing its public services.

Attitudes towards taxation and spending in the county are difficult to assess. It is likely that opinions varied considerably depending on an individual’s economic position and perspective. Those who compared their tax bill with those of their friends in the city found much
to be pleased about, while those who compared the old fifty-three or sixty cent tax rates of the 1860s and 1870s with those approaching one dollar by the turn of the century saw an ominous trend. It appeared to this latter group that the county was caught in a never-ending cycle of increasing expenditures and taxes for facilities and services, which many of them regarded as overly luxurious. One could point out that even with the loss of residents in 1888, the county’s population had tripled between 1866 and 1914, but the fact that its government was spending twelve times more money seemed to be clear evidence that the variety and the level of county services had increased enormously over the half century. From an 1866 budget of $124,000 to one that topped $1,477,000 in 1914, the increase was remarkable. It seemed stupendous to the older county residents, especially those who lived outside the suburban belt where most of this money was raised and spent.

As in Baltimore City, partisan politics played no discernible role in the long term-struggle over taxes and local services. Another similarity was the major course of the county’s two political parties. With only a brief exception in the 1890s, the Democrats ran county government. Their control was based on the county’s Civil War politics. With so many county Democrats away in the Confederate army or disenfranchised during the war, a Republican-Unionist alliance ruled in Towson. As in the city, the Republicans were overthrown as soon as the Confederate veterans returned and the wartime voting restrictions were lifted in 1867. The willingness of the county Republicans to support black suffrage and the membership of African Americans in their party after 1870 was a stigma that could never be overcome. The first registration in which black voters participated in 1870 showed the relative proportions of voters in each party that would remain in place for the next half century. The list showed 1,531 black voters which, combined with the roughly 1,700 white Republicans, gave them a combined strength of about 3,200. The county Democrats in 1870 could muster about 8,000, so the Republican position was hopeless.377 Local politics took on the character usually found in such situations—the dominant Democrats waged a continual series of factional fights while the Republicans, if they could overcome their own factionalism, sought alliances with disgruntled elements of the majority party.

There was a remarkable continuity of political leadership in the county, much of it coming from a relatively small number of families. Indeed, the history of Baltimore county politics in the whole 1865-1920 era might be as profitably studied by the genealogist as by the political scientist. The central figure in the Democratic Party was Joshua Frederick Cockey (J.F.C) Talbott. Born near Lutherville in 1843, “Marse Fred” went south to serve in the Second Maryland Confederate Cavalry, part of the time with Harry Gilmore’s command. After the war he became a lawyer and in 1871 was, at age twenty-eight, elected prosecuting attorney for Baltimore County. While a capable young man to be sure, family and social connections were important to his early rise in county politics. His father, Edward C. Talbott was a prominent man in county affairs in the years before the Civil War and his mother, Temperance Ellen Talbott, was a popular and accomplished woman who was close friends with the Ridgleys, Howards, and other great landed
families in the county. Elected to Congress in 1878, J.F.C Talbott served intermittently in the 1880s and 1890s and then continuously from 1900 until his death in 1918. The Sun called Talbott “a politician of the old school…a spoilsman, a fighter and a schemer [but]…nevertheless so genial, so lovable, so human, so lacking in rancor, so generous, so loyal that he numbered among his friends a host of people who opposed his political ideas and practices.” He built a strong political organization in the county that combined members of the old aristocracy, upcountry farmers, affluent suburbanites, and Highlandtown saloonkeepers. The boss himself who lived all his adult life in Lutherville, which was strategically located near the county seat and straddled the line between the suburbs and the upcountry districts. Among his longest and closest allies were E. Gittings Merryman of Hayfields, son of the famous John Merryman, and Stanton Bosley, a friend and relative whose large and extended family held dozens of county offices during the 1865-1920 era and, through William Bosley, links to Baltimore’s business and financial leaders. Like I. Freeman Rasin, Talbott enjoyed the game of politics and was “corrupt” only in the sense that he ran a spoilsman’s machine, doling out favors to key individuals, including many of the county’s tavern owners and saloonkeepers, in return for political support. The Talbott machine’s alliance with the liquor interests, especially in the heavily industrialized Twelfth District with its urban saloons and “wide open” shore resorts, brought the wrath of the prohibitionists down on him, but it was one of the keystones of his control of this populous area. It is doubtful that Talbott ever used his political position for any personal profit. He lived comfortably, but without any real luxury; his law practice and position at the Towson National bank, which his father-in-law, John G. Cockey, founded, provided him with all the money he needed. When he died he left an estate of about $100,000, not a princely sum for a man who had been the politician chieftain of the richest county in the state. Because the county was so divided in its basic social, economic, and regional character, Talbott’s political machine never ran very smoothly and anti-Talbott Democrats, sometimes with Republican help, temporarily unseated his organization on several occasions. Talbott’s support for important county legislation was usually essential, but even when he went to bat for a particular measure its passage was not always assured.

The Republican Party was dominated by the father-son combination of John T. Ensor and his son John S. Ensor of Mount Washington. The father had been the leader of the county Republican Party during the Civil War and served as the local state’s attorney until he and his party were thrown out in 1867. His son, John S. Ensor, was a very capable lawyer and led the party to victory in the county in 1895, being elected himself to the state’s attorney’s office, the first Republican to do so since his father’s election thirty years before. Ensor drew much of his support from the lower districts—particularly the middle-class suburbs just north of the city. He was a charter member of Baltimore Country Club at Roland Park and a spokesman for the Confederated Improvement Associations of Baltimore County, a coalition of suburban associations. His strong leadership on behalf of the suburban districts provoked bitter factional fights within the party, but he was popular with many anti-Talbott Democrats so was often put up
for major offices. Unfortunately, while campaigning for state senator in 1915 he was struck and killed by a trolley car on Park Heights Avenue.385

While county politics revolved around the byzantine factional and family alliances within the local parties, finance and administration focused on the territorial struggles between the suburban region and the rest of the county over taxes and services. The growth of the belt and the suburban region beyond in the years between 1865 and 1887 brought some significant responses from the county government, but with the unspoken rule that the county tax rate should never rise above half the city rate, only half-way measures could be instituted to meet the needs of the suburbanites. An examination of the development of the county’s major services, police force, fire department, road repair and school system demonstrates the cost of this ceiling.

The County Police Force

The county government’s first innovation on behalf of the belt was the establishment of a police force. Almost as soon as any significant number of people began to move across the city’s boundaries in the years after 1865, crime followed. The establishment of some form of police protection became one of the earliest goals of belt residents. In the industrial areas of Canton and Highlandtown, and along the Frederick Road and other turnpikes, the chief problem was public rowdyism and drunken assaults—some of which turned into small riots. In the more affluent northern section of the belt the chief problem was theft. Without a police force or street lighting, robbers wandered through suburban yards and the grounds of the large estates almost at will, helping themselves to chickens, tools, horses, harnesses, and clothing hung out to dry. More bold or professional thieves found it easy to enter suburban houses that stood alone on large lots and were often left unoccupied for long periods. They helped themselves to cash, clothing, liquor, china, silver, and watches. On occasion they even carted away large clocks and furniture. Towson’s sheriff, believed that city residents committed most of the robberies, and so he and his district constables often called on the city police to locate and arrest the guilty parties. In June 1866 city police broke up a gang of young men who had for months been going out to the belt to rob homes and stores.386 Such arrests however, did not appear to turn the tide. When a robber attempted to murder a prominent county resident in his own house in April 1871 the Sun asked “whether the county commissioners have not the power by law to provide for some sort of police for the protection of life and property.”387 The answer was that they did not have the authority and it was only on the eve of the annexation referendum of 1874 that they sought it.388

The Baltimore County Police Law of April 1874 provided for a force of men to patrol an area two miles around the city and authorized the county to raise $15,000 a year for their support. It was the state’s only police department outside Baltimore City and one of the earliest suburban forces in the nation. There are conflicting views on efficiency and effectiveness of the force. As might be expected, the Maryland Journal in Towson presented numerous testimonials to the good
work of its mounted officers and foot patrolmen while the Sun and the American, still campaigning to annex the belt, said they were making no significant impact on suburban crime and disorder. Like all other county employees, the policemen were straight-out political appointees. This system of patronage did not mean that officers were inefficient or dishonest, but it presented yet another complication for a small organization attempting to suppress crime in a very large territory. It certainly disrupted police activity in 1875 when a new faction gained control of the county commission and replaced the entire force with their own appointees. Nothing quite so sweeping occurred again, but it is apparent from the record that politics was the essential prerequisite to finding a place on the force. There were continual charges that the police were lax in enforcing the Sunday laws and generally willing to wink at liquor violations, and these accusations were undoubtedly true since liquor licenses provided the county with an increasing amount of its local revenue, and saloonkeepers were important to every political faction. For example, one police marshal through much of this period was Joseph R. Knight whose brother Perry Knight was proprietor of the Cross Keys Inn on the Falls Road, a center for “the sporting crowd” and the scene of many turbulent affairs. In 1883 a dispute over a bet, and too much drinking, at one of the Cross Keys’ regular cockfights led to a full scale riot in which six people were shot and dozen others stabbed or clubbed. Knight was himself an important county politician and ran successfully for sheriff after serving a number of terms as police marshal.

In some locations, including the infamous “Haymarket” on West Baltimore Street, the lack of police oversight had some serious consequences. The Haymarket was located three feet outside the city line and was one of a number of rough saloons in the western suburbs. The drunken brawls, stabbings, and occasional murders that took place there made the Cross Keys Inn look tame, and the place was undoubtedly a hindrance to the development of the West End. Part of the problem in controlling what was usually liquor-inspired disorder was the lack of police stations. One small station was built in Waverly in 1878 and another in Canton in 1879, but it was not very feasible to arrest large numbers of intoxicated rowdies at a place like the Haymarket and try to transport them several miles to Waverly. Prior to the construction of the stationhouse at Canton, the police tried to take those they arrested to the city’s Eastern District station, but as the city police would only take the most serious offenders, the Canton district policemen were forced “to quell disturbances as best they can without making arrests.”

In the important areas of protection against theft and the basic security of the streets and highways of the belt, the county police appear to have made a good, honest effort and must have acted to some degree as a crime deterrent. However, the sixteen men who composed this force simply could not cover a territory of almost thirty square miles, which was filling each year with hundreds of new residents. By the 1880s petty thefts and major robberies had become such a serious problem that residents in the Charles Street Avenue region began meeting to organize a private protective association and hire their own police. One disgusted resident said that a four-man private force in the neighborhood would be far superior to the county’s men whom he
dismissed as “raw bumpkins …hangers-on of some cross-roads politician.” The criticism was unfounded. Throughout the nineteenth century the relatively high wage paid county policemen drew very capable men from skilled trades, but they were spread too thin. In the Charles Street area they could not even provide the full-time service of even a single man. Security, or at least convenience, in the more heavily populated areas of the belt probably improved some after 1877 when the county installed 339 gasoline lamps along the major streets and roads in the suburbs, but like the police themselves, the lights were spread out over such a large territory that their effect was considerably reduced. In 1886, with the city again breathing down its neck over annexation and belt residents supporting a legislative bill to establish a belt commission to operate police, fire, and other services themselves, the county commissioners approved a bill to raise the police appropriation from $15,000 to $25,000. This would allow the force to grow to about twenty-seven or twenty-eight men (the belt commissioner bill called for a force of fifty). The belt commission bill failed and the new police appropriation passed. The enlarged force was undoubtedly better able to cope with crime and disorder, but it was still too small to be very effective. In 1888 when the city took over the northern and western sections of the belt, it put forty-five policemen into this area alone at an annual cost of about $60,000. Had the eastern district been annexed, it would probably have required another twenty-five men and pushed the cost up to about $90,000—almost four times what the county commissioners had been willing to pay. The commissioners, divested of a large portion of their suburban territory, but retaining all of the eastern district and more than half the land within the old northern and western belt, cut the police force to ten men and their budget down to $8,400.

Fire Protection

The story of fire protection in the county follows much the same pattern as the police. Until 1881 the county government offered no fire protection. A private volunteer company was established in Highlandtown in 1876, and in 1878 residents in Waverly offered to build a firehouse if the county would purchase an engine. The commissioners refused, so the local residents (actually several of the wealthy estate owners in the immediate vicinity of the village) paid for both the engine and the firehouse. Horses were too expensive so the engine was pulled by hand. Businesses and residents in the rest of the belt relied on the charity of the Baltimore City Fire Department to come across the city line and put out fires. For a number of years the city complied, but the expense mounted and county officials offered no compensation to the city for their efforts. In 1881 after the city had gone to twelve fires in the county at a cost of $10,700, they decided to force the county to pay. In April they stopped going to fires in the county unless it paid $12,000 a year for the service. The county commissioners offered $7,200. The city came down to $10,000, but would not accept less so the county decided to create its own department.
Once the decision was made, the county commissioners went about the task with uncharacteristic efficiency. The commissioners were either fortunate or shrewd enough to obtain the services of Charles T. Holloway to create their fire department. Holloway was a Baltimorean and also one of the leading fire department experts in the nation. He had been the first chief engineer for the city’s municipal fire department when it was established in 1858, serving until 1864 when he resigned to go into the manufacturing of fire equipment. In 1870 he helped establish the Pittsburgh Fire Department. The county agreed to buy seven of his fire engines plus three hook and ladder trucks for $42,000. Hollaway planned and built seven fire stations at strategic locations around the belt, outfitted them with engines, horses, and other equipment and hired eighteen men to serve as full-time firemen. The operating expense of the department ran about $28,000 a year. A fire-alarm telegraph system was constructed with twenty call boxes and each of the fire stations were linked so in the event of a large fire, engines could be summoned from several stations.

The system as a whole was probably not big enough to give first-rate protection, but apparently the fire insurance companies in the city which insured most property in the county were pleased and may in fact have played a significant role in the whole affair since Holloway was very closely associated with a number of them. In 1883 Mayor Latrobe, always the gracious gentleman, got the city fire commissioners to rescind their order of 1881. Henceforth, if the county fire department needed help in fighting a large fire, the city would usually help. Because no formal agreement was ever made, the city fire Board and City Solicitor sometimes abrogated Latrobe’s policy.

Two problems remained. The outer districts of the belt, including Catonsville, Govanstown, and Towson, had no fire stations or engines and many parts of the belt had uneven access to water. Each of the fire engines carried its own supply of water, but this was only a few hundred gallons. For a fee, the city connected each of the belt fire stations to the city water supply system and the county (or private individuals) paid to install thirteen fireplugs on these lines. All the plugs were within a mile of the city line, so many areas had to use unreliable streams or ponds. Complaints about the lack of water supply brought no response from Towson. By 1888 there were nine fire houses and engines in the belt and they operated with great efficiency, but it was clear from the debate over the annexation bill of 1888 that many belt residents still thought fire protection was inadequate, and compared to Baltimore city it certainly was. The city had sixty-nine pieces of equipment and over two hundred men—kept at an annual expense of over $190,000.

**County School System**

The county’s public school system dated back to the antebellum era, but its major expansion came after 1865, and by the late 1860s it was the largest single item in the county.
budget. Thanks to the local Republican leaders during the Civil War era, Baltimore County had a reasonably good rural school system by 1867. The board of school commissioners included some of the county’s leading citizens along with the usual company of aspiring politicians. A leading figure on the board in the 1860s was Prof. L. Van Bokkelen, head of the famous St. Timothy’s School in Catonsville and the first state superintendent of schools in 1868. One testimony to the Republican’s commitment to the school system was the fact that of the sixty-four schools owned by the board in 1865, fifty-two of them had been built since 1861. In addition to the schools it owned, the board rented space (often in local churches) for thirty-eight other schools. When the Democrats returned to power in 1867, they maintained and even expanded the system. By 1869 there were 104 schools, sixty-six of which were one-room institutions with a single teacher. The average school had fifty-one students, but many of the more remote ones had only fifteen or twenty. The larger schools, all located in the suburban areas, had well over a hundred students and were taught by a principal teacher and one or two assistant teachers. In 1868 the average number of students in attendance was 5,300, although a total of 8,521 different children attended for some period of the year, mostly in the winter term when they were not needed for farm work. The teachers were paid on a sliding scale depending on the number of students they taught. They could earn up to $600 a year (although the average pay that year was $490) while the assistants earned $228. As might be expected with such relatively low pay, just over half of the teachers and all the assistants were women. Even with the moderate salaries, the system was costly, but county taxpayers bore only a portion of this amount. For example, in 1870 the school budget was $102,000. Of this amount, $36,000 came from Maryland’s state school tax, the great bulk of which was contributed by Baltimore City. Another $12,500 was received from the students in book fees. Until the state legislature eliminated this fee in 1896, each student was required to pay for the cost of his or her books. In Baltimore County this was seventy-five cents per quarter, or $3.00 per year. Families willing to sign a statement testifying to their poverty were excused, but as the major jump in enrollment in 1897 indicates, many poor parents had kept their children out of school rather than stigmatize themselves as charity cases.

The school system, and its expense, grew steadily in the 1870s and 1880s, with most of the expansion coming in the suburbs. By 1880 there were just over 7,000 white students and, in a separate system, 1,600 black students. The colored schools, as they were called, were under the control of the white board of school commissioners, but the teachers themselves were African Americans. These schools were financed separately from the white system, with about 80 percent of their budgets coming directly from the state and the rest from book fees (which, despite their general poverty, about four-fifths of African American students paid). The county built over fifty new brick school houses in the rural areas during the 1870s. They were small, spartan, and relatively cheap, but on a cost-per-student basis were probably more expensive than the big suburban schools such as those built in Catonsville, Towson, Waverly, and Highlandtown. These larger facilities held over 200 students and, while still quite plain, seemed expensive to county
taxpayers who were used to seeing rural schools erected for $500-$600. The seven-classroom Govans School, which opened in 1882 cost over $6,000. Between 1870 and 1882 the total value of the county's school buildings rose from $53,000 to about $270,000. This program of school building gave the county 166 schools by 1880 and the school commissioners said there was now a schoolhouse within two miles of every student in the county, even in the upcountry rural districts. Staffing this large number of rural schools was expensive because many of them had only a handful of students, but the revenues drawn from the belt were sufficient to support them. Even with a subsidy from the suburban district, these one-room, single-teacher institutions were clearly lacking in many ways, particularly because for the most part they could only attract the most junior and inexperienced teachers. The suburban schools offered not only more experienced and specialized teachers, they provided more and better equipment along with a wider curriculum. During the 1870s the school commissioners developed what they called high school classes at the Towson, Waverly, and Woodbury schools so that a few advanced students could take at least some upper-level coursework. While an important step forward, these classes did not comprise anything like the full high school curriculum offered at Baltimore City College High School.

The larger question of the overall quality of the county schools is impossible to assess. The Baltimore County Teachers Association provided regular quarterly sessions of in-service training with lectures on both academic and pedagogical subjects. Since the teachers received their pay at these quarterly meetings, they were very well attended. Beyond this, the evidence of teaching quality is anecdotal. For example, the annual public examination of the Towson high school students in 1874 “gave great satisfaction” to the large number of school and county officials who attended it, and the Sun, which often looked down its nose at county institutions, reported that the Towson school’s principal teacher, T.C. Bruff, was a man of great ability. Bruff later headed the Govans School and was, for a time, secretary-treasurer and principal examiner of the whole system (a job he did in addition to his regular teaching duties and for which he was paid an extra $1,500).405

During the 1880s the school population increased steadily in the suburbs as it declined slightly in some of the rural districts. In the fall of 1888 it had over 11,000 students and 305 teachers in its white and black systems. By this time the belt schools had almost all become quite large compared to the rural schools. The fourteen schools that became part of the city system through the annexation of 1888 had an average size of 260 students whereas the more rural schools continued to average around forty. By 1887 at the Waverly school a principal and ten assistants taught over 300 students. It was very overcrowded.

Even with its overcrowding and limited curriculum it appears that by 1888 the county had built a fairly good schools system by investing a large amount of money in it, more per student than any other county in the state. It was, of course, still considerably less than Baltimore City invested in each of its students. The large amounts expended on the county schools generated little complaint about the school tax. Conversely, few residents, even in the more posh
middle-class sections of the belt, complained about poor quality or paid the relatively small fee to send their children in to the city schools. Perhaps the county leaders had in this case hit a happy medium, or more likely, even middle-class parents did not yet perceive formal education to be the crucial factor in success. For whatever reasons, county residents seemed generally happy with their schools.

Roads and Bridges

When one turns from schools to the subjects of roads and bridges, there was no comparable satisfaction. Almost everyone, including many of the road supervisors themselves, agreed that this was the worst and most inefficient county service. The county’s streets and roads were almost all dirt and many of the gravel ones were thus in name only. The overwhelming majority of the bridges, even in the belt, were made of wood. Roads and bridges seemed to deteriorate almost overnight, and after severe storms this perception was undoubtedly correct. The thankless but essential job of repairing them cost almost as much as the schools, but as the school system improved, the county’s roads seemed to get worse. The 700 miles of roads that existed in the county in 1865 had, by 1890, grown to 876 miles, one third of which were in the four lower suburban districts. In 1898, when a complete survey was conducted, the county had 1,060 miles of roads, and most of the new roads had been created in the suburbs. Approximately 640 miles of the county’s roads were still dirt, 420 were gravel or shell roads, and there were 154 miles of gravel turnpikes. The dirt roads were impossible to keep in good condition, many of the gravel or shell roads had too thin a layer of crushed stone or shell to stand up in wet weather and even many of the gravel turnpikes were in very poor condition.

Relatively speaking, the county’s ten major turnpikes, fanning out in every direction from Baltimore city, offered the most reliable travel, but did so, of course for a fee. The tolls were not cheap. During the 1870-1890 era the Falls Turnpike charged two and one-half cents a mile for a coach or wagon pulled by two horses, and it appears that the other pikes charged roughly similar rates. Thus a farmer with his wagon or suburbanite with his family in a carriage would pay fifteen to twenty cents each way for a trip into the city from the Catonsville, Reisterstown, or Towson areas. Those living in the upper county could easily pay $1.00 for a round trip to Baltimore. Even with their relatively high cost, the turnpikes were often not very much better than the county roads. William Hollifield’s history of the county turnpikes is filled with descriptions of indignant meetings, legal proceedings and outright violence by travelers trying to force the companies to repair their roads or trying to avoid paying what they regarded as exorbitant tolls. Typical of the public complaints was that which appeared in the Towsontown Journal in 1867. It said that the Falls Road Turnpike was “about the meanest road we have travelled.” Two bridges washed out months before were still not rebuilt and many places the road was almost impassable. “The company should either repair their pike or turn it over to the county.”
the road over to the county, of course, would probably not have improved it. In spite of annual
expenditures of $40,000-$50,000 in the immediate post-war era, and $70,000-$88,000 by the
1880s, the public roads and bridges always seemed bad. Their construction and repair was the
responsibility of the county’s thirteen district road supervisors, but the actual work was carried
out by over 350 deputy supervisors, a small army of political appointees. Some of the road
deputies probably did an adequate job, but others simply threw a little dirt into the deepest ruts
and collected their money from the district supervisor after he collected his 10 percent
administrative fee. In 1868 the individual road supervisors were replaced with a board of five
men in each district and the deputies were eliminated in favor of private contractors, a number of
whom appear to have been the supervisors themselves. These sixty-five officials proved no more
successful than the previous ones even though they were given more money. Since all the road
officials were members of one or another political faction and the contracting for repairs part of
the spoils system, those who actually worked on the roads and bridges felt they were being paid
more for political services than their ability to repair a road or rebuild a bridge. Despite numerous
citizens’ resolutions that roadwork “should be separated from county politics,” it was just too
large a political plum to be let go. The upcountry farmers complained, but the most emphatic
condemnations came from the suburban belt. The Sun published a steady stream of editorials
excoriating the county’s road officials and accompanied them with letters from disgusted
suburbanites who decried “our much neglected roads and bridges, the condition of which ought
to be humiliating to our worthy (or, if you like, our unworthy) officials.” A writer from the mill
town of Woodberry in the Jones Falls Valley told of watching one local bridge supervisor
“wending his way through our village…with square and compass in hand and, followed by that
notorious one horse and cart, picking his way through the mud as best he could to the bridges
which span the Jones Falls and the mill race at this place, for the reason, as everybody supposed,
or applying that which it has stood in need of for the past six months—a new flooring. No; but
judge the chagrin in seeing a small and uncouth looking patch placed on each, which adds very
little to the safety of vehicles or pedestrians, as they stand much higher than the old flooring.”
In 1874 the county road administration was reorganized again and the county commissioners were
given the authority to appoint the supervisors. This proved even worse than the old system so in
1875 another law was passed returning to elected supervisors, but now the number varied with
the district. This system produced little improvement and the familiar chorus of complaints
continued to be heard: “the roads are disgraceful and the [repair] system bad.” One aspect of
the road law that was particularly nettlesome to the suburbanites was the fact that the upper
districts were getting more than their fair share of the roads money. Two-thirds of the funds
raised from the roads and bridges tax had to be spent in the district from which it was raised, but
the other third could be directed wherever the county commissions thought the need was
greatest. A number of the rural districts, with comparatively small populations and low assessed
valuations, had more miles of roads per capita and many of them were in quite hilly terrain,
which tended to wash our more often and require more repairs. On the other hand, the suburbanites complained that their roads were much more heavily traveled and thus needed special consideration. Even though the upper districts received more repair money than they paid out in road taxes, the great majority of the county’s funds were spent in the lower districts and several road and bridge projects within the belt were very large and costly. In 1875 the extension of Edmondson Avenue from the western city line out to its intersection with the Old Frederick Road required a very large bridge across Gwynns Falls which cost the county over $40,000. Squabbles over the distribution of funds were small issues compared to the fundamental problem of the high and relatively inflexible costs of maintaining good roads in the manner in which the county operated. The county’s schools could be run satisfactorily in part because they were subsidized by the state government, the book fee, and a large force of underpaid women. When money was tight, class sizes could be enlarged, fewer books purchased, or the school term shortened. In contrast, a cut in the road funds could not be made up by hiring men who would shovel or break stone faster. Roadwork required lots of unskilled, but hard labor and the political nature of the work made it difficult to gain any real efficiency. This was not, of course, a problem peculiar to the county.

The only district to make real progress in roadwork was the First, but this was due to the fact that Gustav Lurman, the wealthy owner of “Farmland” outside Catonsville, took a fancy to roadbuilding and got himself appointed district roads supervisor. In 1887 he purchased, at his own expense, a $4,000 stone-crushing machine, the first in the county. He and his wealthy friends got the legislature to pass a special road law for the First District, taxing all property owners in the district an extra ten cents for roads. Even with this mixture of private philanthropy and higher taxes, a number of roads in the First District remained in poor condition until the first decades of the twentieth century. Since Lurman’s efforts were just getting started and the other districts were as yet to even begin to move in the direction of special taxes, the county’s roads in the spring of 1887 were “infinitely worse than ever before.” Road supervisors pointed to unusually heavy spring rains, but the poor state of the county roads, was undoubtedly a factor in the annexation contest in the winter and spring of that year. Perhaps if the county had followed Lurman’s lead and purchased its own stone crushing machinery, the storm-damaged roads of 1887-1888 could have been put in much better condition, but the county continued to hire men to break all its stone for the roads by hand. While this practice was two to three times more expensive, it generated lots of work for political loyalists to pass around. Once the city annexed the belt in 1888 one of the first things it did was employ a stone-crushing machine to pave the muddy annexed streets and roads. Even Latrobe felt some pressure to use people rather than a crusher, since, as he told a reporter, “a machine doesn’t vote.” However, he said there was so much paving to be done in the belt that “an army of stone-breakers would not serve the purpose.”
Sanitation and Water Supply

Sanitation, and the closely related issue of water supply, was another serious failure of the county, but since their effects were more localized they failed to generate much general interest. Providing a piped water supply for the belt and the suburbs was such a large project that the county never gave it any serious consideration, and the city, still struggling to supply water to all parts of the municipality, was not about to try to extend pipes beyond its boundaries except in the special case of the county firehouses. Without a water supply, good sanitation was difficult at best. Wells and springs became increasingly polluted and the streams in the belt were often little more than open sewers. The county’s sanitation efforts in the belt were miniscule. There were not sanitary officers in the county until 1874 and they had no noticeable impact until quite late in the 1890s. During the 1880s the Maryland State Board of Health attempted to interest the county commissioners in sanitary matters among the county commissioners, but with little effect. The Secretary of the State Health Board called sanitation in the belt “very bad,” and said “there is more need for sanitary reform in Baltimore County than in any other part of the state.”\footnote{418} Only on the eve of the annexation battle in 1887 did the commissioners even begin to provide for some minimal level of county garbage removal, but it was a classic case of too little too late. In February 1888, one resident of the belt, failing to get any of his garbage picked up for some time, placed a sign on his garbage cans, “Lost or Stole, One Belt Garbage Department.”\footnote{419}

1888 Belt Annexation

It is difficult to determine whether the county’s political leaders were genuinely surprised by the outcome of the 1888 referendum. It is possible that the decisive rejection of annexation in 1874 had convinced the Towson leaders that the county’s low taxes would overcome the belt’s carping about poor services, and there seems little doubt that the county commissioners made what was, by their own view, a reasonable effort to give the belt at least a portion of what they demanded in the way of city-style services. This effort, of course, always fell short in the eyes of the middle-income suburbanites. The unwillingness of the commissioners to push the tax rate any higher than half of the city rate meant that the county could never hope to give the belt what it wanted. Yet in 1886 when Baltimore County delegate William Pole, a longtime belt resident, went to the state legislature to create a special tax district and a belt commission to create its own services, the leaders in Towson, and a number of belt residents themselves, opposed the move. Belt residents were upset by the fact that the bill called for the governor to appoint the belt commissioners, a feature that made the proposal look a bit suspicious. County delegates outside the belt feared that such a move would endanger the ability of the county commissioners to transfer a portion of the belt’s revenues to the upper districts.\footnote{420} The belt commission bill was an imperfect solution and it failed, but the debate surrounding it focused attention on where the belt’s tax money was being spent and its whole relationship to the rest of the county. These
became central and perhaps decisive issues in the debate during the annexation referendum of 1888. Winfield J. Taylor, one of the leading real estate developers in the belt in the 1870s and 1880s, told an audience in the western district that he had worked hard to defeat the city’s annexation attempt in 1874, but now admitted that he had been “amply punished by fourteen long years of inefficient county administration” and inequitable spending policies. “What have we been in the past but ministering angels to the wants of Towson? They take our votes and take our taxes, and give us next to nothing in return; and when they ask us to come and see them, they ask us into the kitchen and never into the parlor.” Speaking to another audience in Waverly in the Ninth District Taylor said, “Why is it that we get less than the seventh and fourth Districts that have at least two hundred less voters than we? Seven districts out of thirteen have less voters than the ninth, yet the ninth suffers continually from inadequate returns for taxes paid. The trouble is that the men sent to Annapolis are forever in favor of the upper districts; and you are the sufferers and you have no redress.” The vote was close, but the northern and western districts decided to go with the city. The northern district vote was 1896 to 1538, and in the western district it was 613 to 423. Even the eastern district, whose low-income residents had made it very clear in 1874 that they preferred lower taxes to city services, cast 40 percent in favor of annexation (317 to 485). In 1874 only 12 percent favored the city. Had the city allowed the total vote to determine the outcome, it would have gotten the eastern section too. Even so, the city gained seventeen and a half square miles of the county’s most valuable property along with about 35,000 residents, and a number of the county’s schools, firehouses and police stations. Predictions of financial disaster for the county proved groundless. In fact, the county received a windfall bonus for their loss of schools, firehouses, and police stations—a cash payment from the city of $116,000. Ever responsive to the low-tax, low-spending voters, the commissioners used most of it to give county residents a tax reduction. The rate in 1889 dropped to thirty-six cents! The county’s tax levy, which had hovered around $400,000 in the mid-1880s, was reduced in 1889 to $283,000. This was due not only to the money received from the city, but the loss of eighty-three teachers from the school system, almost a hundred miles of roads and over twenty policemen.

Utilities

The loss of two-thirds of the belt, of course, caused only a short pause in the county’s growth. The electrification and extension of the horsecar lines in the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century brought suburban areas closer to the city. The installation of suburban telephones begun in the late 1890s put those living out in the county in immediate communication with city friends and stores. By 1906 exchanges operated at Elkridge, Catonsville, Woodlawn, Arlington, Pikesville, Tuxedo (Roland Park), and Towson, and in that year the cost of a local call was reduced from ten cents to five cents (although it still cost ten cents to call the city). In 1913 there were approximately 3,500 residential telephones in the suburbs, with 1,500 of these
in the Tuxedo Exchange. The city by this time had about 19,000 homes with the service. By 1915 telephone service was available in every part of the suburbs from Back River and Sparrows Point around to Catonsville, Ellicott City, Elkridge, and Curtis Bay. Most areas of the upper county were also connected.

The transit revolution was the single greatest factor in the development of new suburbs in the county, but it was also part of much wider provision of utilities and services which began to transform the semi-rural landscape into something approaching the package of facilities and services enjoyed by city residents. An editorial in the Sun in 1895 surveyed the great suburban revolution then underway. Purchasers of suburban homes had always been able to obtain a “beautiful and healthful” environment, but soon they will have “water, electric lights—in some cases gas—quick cars at short intervals, churches, schools, lecture halls, and other advantages which are felt to be absolutely necessary in an age like this.” The residential effects of the new rapid transit lines were almost immediate. In 1890 the Sun began a series of articles on Baltimore’s “new belt,” noting how the rapid transit lines had caused the city to expand “as if by magic.” The suburbs, it said, “are undergoing development as never before” and “are blooming with pretty homes or preparing for them in a business-like style hitherto unseen.” In the seven years following the annexation, the districts adjacent to the new city boundaries had added $16.5 million to the county tax base, while the rural areas added only $1.5 million. Two years later, in 1897 the four suburban districts once again came to dominate the county’s assessed wealth accounting for 70 percent of its tax base. Real estate developers and city businessmen joined in a rush to purchase farms and estates for residential subdivisions. Richard Walzl, the well-known Baltimore photographer, was an inveterate speculator in suburban developments all around the city. Between 1875 and 1895 he invested in St. Denis Park, Ruxton Heights, Timonium Park, Lutherville Heights, Linden Place, Cedar Heights, and Sherwood Heights. In the extreme northwestern section of the city and on across into the county, development was very rapid in the 1890s and even more so after 1900. The establishment of Walbrook on the old Galloway Cheston estate in 1890, and the consequent development of Arlington and West Arlington pushed suburban growth in this area across the new city line into the new belt. Forest Park also grew fast and soon spilled over into the county. Advertising itself as “the ideal suburb” with “home owners, not renters,” Forest Park became a substantial development with large frame and stucco houses costing from $3,000 to $10,000. To the north Pimlico racetrack, considered to be “in the country,” in the 1870s, was by 1905 being surrounded by houses. One after another farms and country estates along The Pimlico Road, Reisterstown Road, Park Heights Avenue, and Garrison Avenue were converted into subdivisions. Dumbarton, Noah Walker’s 470-acre estate on the Reisterstown Road, six miles from the city line, sold to developers in 1893 for $98,959 or $211 an acre. It proved to be too far out of town to interest buyers during the 1890s, but its sale indicated how deep into the country Baltimore builders were willing to go to obtain large tracts of land. The Williamson and Perot farms, the Darbyshire and Oakford estates, and eventually John C.
Matthai’s “Linden Hill” were sold for development. Out Windsor Mill Road, still well beyond the suburban fringe, Henry Winter Davis’ old country house and its thirty-four acres went to a developer in 1896 for $294 an acre. Even the Greenspring Valley felt the real estate fever. “The Caves,” the old John N. Carroll estate (which he lost through poor management) had its 1,600 acres broken up by a real estate syndicate into fifty-one country estates of ten to fifty acres and offered for sale to the public.435

By 1905 development along Reisterstown Road had reached the little village of Pikesville.436 With the construction of an electric line out the Frederick Road in 1895, suburban development finally boomed. Catonsville began to see several hundred permanent residents who built large homes on its shady streets or in one of its new subdivisions such as Eden Terrace, Oak Forest Park, and Forest Spring Park. In the York Road corridor, out beyond the city line near Govanstown the subdivision of “Spring Hill” (on old Shaw’s Hill) advertised its cottages, which sold for about $2,500 as having water, gas, a five cent carfare and “Baltimore County taxes.”437 Out the Belair Road the Kennard Land Company did a brisk business selling lots, and a few houses, at Overlea.438

In characteristic fashion, Baltimoreans were venturing out into the new suburban developments, but there was no mass exodus. Perhaps the loss of city services was still a factor, but beyond this was still some degree of resistance to the whole suburban way of life. Francis Cary, the developer of Walbrook, said that his subdivision had difficult times initially since Baltimoreans “had to be educated up to suburban development.” Walbrook, he believed, had done much to turn the tide of opinion, but he also mentioned Roland Park,439 The development that became the great trendsetter in turning Baltimoreans to the suburbs and the lifestyle they offered.

Situated just east of Charles Street right at the city line, Roland Park occupied one of the largest tracts of land on the most fashionable and valuable street in the city and county. In the 1880s, a number of large estates along Charles Street corridor had been broken up into suburban lots for a distance of almost six miles beyond the city. Even ex-Governor Bradford’s estate at Charles Street and Lake Avenue, had been bought by developers who renamed it “Multavideo Park” and sold it off in parcels of three to five acres. Most sold well except for the lot that contained the charred remains of the governor’s house.440 In 1890 a group of builders and real estate speculators began to lay plans for widening Charles Street, and perhaps building housing developments themselves on the valuable lands adjacent to it. The major figures in this work were the Peabody Heights Company, the Abell family (Charles Street was to run through part of “Guilford”), the Wyman estate and Richard Capron, who owned “Woodlawn,” and “Oakland.”441 Nothing came of these plans, so the next year Capron sold both his properties to the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company of Kansas City, which added two smaller adjacent properties to form a tract of 486 acres. The total purchase price was $400,102.442 Backed with a generous amount of capital from the Lands Trust Company Ltd., a London investment firm, Jarvis Conklin
announced its intention of building on this large tract one of the finest suburban housing
developments in the nation.443 Several Baltimoreans besides Capron were involved in the
enterprise, but the key figure was Edward H. Bouton whom the Kansas City firm appears to have
sent to Baltimore to help set up the project. He gradually assumed complete control of the
development and managed every aspect of its development until his death at age eighty-two, in
1941.444 How the Kansas City-London financiers came to Baltimore to develop a suburb is a bit of
a mystery. Richard Capron was a native Baltimorean (another Confederate veteran) who spent
much of the 1865-1880 era in a New York banking house and through his financial connections
there may well have come to know both Jarvis-Conklin and the Lands Trust Company.445 A more
likely possibility is that Charles H. Grasty was the go-between. Grasty, it will be recalled, had
come to Baltimore from the Kansas City Star to run the manufacturer’s Record newspaper and
knew both Bouton and the Jarvis-Conklin firm well, having done business with them in Kansas
City.446 By one account, Grasty was impressed with the absence of major suburban development
in Baltimore as well as the relatively low prices for even well situated suburban properties and this
is what led him to contact Jarvis and Conklin.447 Grasty bought the Baltimore Evening News in
1891 and became deeply involved in its development, so whatever direct interest he may have had
in the Roland Park company faded, but by this time Bouton was on the scene and his skills, plus
the very generous financial support of the British Lands Trust Company were the combination of
factors which made Roland Park one of the most famous suburban developments in the nation in
the early twentieth century. The British investors were willing to put up far more money than any
other local developers were able to obtain. Consequently, Roland Park, and later Guilford, were
laid out with an initial level of utilities and amenities which no other local developer could match.

To create such a large and complete suburban development in Baltimore in the 1890s,
and to market it to the upper-income families who seemed so settled in their precious and
convenient townhomes and their summer estates, seemed as risky as it was unprecedented. There
was clearly some concern that too few Baltimoreans were ready to live year round in a suburb,
even if it was just a thirty-minute ride from downtown. One of Bouton’s friends from Kansas
City, writing to encourage him in the project, said the new suburb would create “…a glorious
chance for the people of Baltimore to get out of their blocks of homes…and show the world that
they have some artistic desires and tastes in the residential line.”448

Aside from buyer resistance to suburban homes, the financial Panic of 1893 and the sharp
depression that followed it almost ended the project in its infancy. A number of Baltimore’s
suburban land development companies went bankrupt during the depression and Kansas City
was also hard hit—Jarvis-Conklin itself going into receivership. The Roland Park Company was
reorganized and Bouton and a group of Baltimoreans assumed control, but fortunately, the Lands
Trust Company, while skeptical of Roland Park’s future, never pulled out and by 1896-1897 sales
had begun to rise. At some point in the late 1890s Bouton and Baltimorean George Miller were
able to buy out the Lands Trust Company’s interest to assume direct control of the
development. The return of prosperity was probably the critical factor, but Bouton’s shrewd advertising campaign, which placed “news” articles about Roland Park in the papers along with a large number of carefully crafted advertisements (the company’s advertising budget in these years was $2,500 a year), was also of undoubted importance. Roland Park’s ads in the 1890s were more sophisticated (and numerous) than those of any other developer, explaining that this suburb was being developed with a level of amenity like no other and yet was only a short trolley ride from the business center.

If the advertising could get people out to Roland Park, Bouton was sure they would be impressed. The natural landscape was a series of rolling hillsides that George H. Kessler had made full use of as he laid out the streets and house lots. Kessler, the already well-known Kansas City landscape architect, had worked briefly with Frederick Law Olmsted, and the famous landscape architect’s philosophy was evident in the plans for Roland Park. George H. Waring, the leading sanitary expert in the nation, was consulted in the sewer construction. Roland Park had paved and lighted streets, gas lines, its own water system, trash collection, and (in 1896) telephone service. Bouton built two elegant model homes to show customers what a completed lot would look like. Each property was protected by a legal covenant that severely restricted the residential architecture, landscaping, and land use on each lot. Of greatest importance was the clause that stipulated that homes on the major streets must cost at least $5,000 while those on more narrow streets could cost $3,000. By 1908 the average cost of a Roland Park house was $8,750. Social restrictions were also enforced. No African Americans would be allowed, and Jewish families, while not specifically mentioned in the covenants, were also barred. Nothing was left undone that might scare off Baltimore’s major elite class. The crowning touch was the construction of Roland Park’s country club, called the Baltimore Country Club. In 1896 the company purchased the grounds of the famous Elkridge Hunt Club and built a first-class golf course and clubhouse and in 1898 1,000 members accepted invitations to join, paying a $25.00 initiation fee and $20.00 a year (ladies paid $12.50 to join and $10.00 a year). The list of charter members included many of the city’s great Protestant and Roman Catholic families, and a number of Johns Hopkins faculty. Mendes Cohen and his daughter Emile were the only Jewish members. Prominent Baltimore businessmen were recruited as well as good looking and fashionable young women who liked to play golf. In 1901, the club bought the clubhouse and grounds for $60,000 and became an independent organization, although Bouton remained on its Board of Directors. The Elkridge Club moved just north to ex-governor Bradford’s old estate. Bouton’s hope was that “many people after joining the club would be induced to buy lots and settle in Roland Park.” He judged matters correctly. The original plan to limit membership to 1,000 was revised due to the clamor of people to enter. By 1905 the club had a membership of approximately 1,800, many of whom were now Roland Park residents or had bought lots there, and there was a long waiting list. The Sun said the profitable club was “now one of the most exclusive and selective in the city.” Indeed it was. For women of less athletic tastes, the Roland Park Women’s Club was established in the
1890s and moved into its large new clubhouse in 1904. The city’s leading Jewish families were excluded from the Baltimore County club as well as Roland Park, so in 1901 they formed their own golf club, the Suburban Club.

The Roland Park Company, which had never declared a dividend, paid its stockholders $450,000 in 1904 (Bouton and George Miller, as the majority stockholders, got $400,000). Not only were total sales good, they were selling houses to some of the city’s most prominent families. In 1900 Roland Park had only six residents listed in the Baltimore Social Register, but a decade later it had sixty-six, more than all the other suburbs combined. The only serious problem the development encountered was, not surprisingly, with transit lines into the city. There was no trolley service out to Roland Park, so the company built its own line, the Lake Roland Elevated. There were legal problems and service did not begin until 1893. From this point onward the difficulties were mostly financial. It was hard to operate enough cars to satisfy the residents without a heavy subsidy. Passengers also had to transfer to get downtown. The route passed through the mill towns of Hampden and Woodberry and there were concerns that the refined Roland Park ladies, returning from shopping downtown on summer afternoons would be compelled to ride with sweaty workmen. In 1895 the line was sold to the City and Suburban Railway Company for $1,250,000 and four years later it became part of the United Railways. In the hands of these much larger companies, service improved. A direct route into the downtown, the so-called “boulevard route” was opened in 1908. No longer did Roland Park residents need to transfer at North Avenue, there were more cars and, presumably, fewer sweaty workingmen.

With Roland Park now the premier suburban development in the region, the company moved to expand its operations into adjacent territories. In 1911 it absorbed the Guilford Park Company, a Baltimore firm that had purchased the old Abell estate in 1907 for a million dollars, but was having difficulty developing it. The Roland Park Company, now an experienced builder, set to work creating a second magnificent enclave on the three-hundred-acre tract. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., who had provided much advice to Bouton on the latter stages of Roland Park’s development, laid out Guilford. The plan envisioned not only very expensive detached houses, but some semi-detached houses as well. The advertisements for Guilford said it was not only for Baltimore’s wealthy families, but also for “the man of moderate means.”

It was a huge undertaking. The plat that the company filed was the largest one ever recorded in either the city or the county. Over a million dollars were spent on grading, road building and sewers. Approximately 150,000 trees and shrubs were planted. When it finally opened for the sale of lots in May 1913, full-page advertisements in the local papers announced the great event. Lots sold for around $2,000. The first detached houses that went up cost an average of $16,000 or approximately ten times the price of a typical city row house. The semi-detached houses were much more moderately priced at about $5,000-$7,000, but still well within the range to keep the development in the most exclusive category. A huge, lavishly illustrated four-page ad in the Sun in July, 1914 announced that in the first fourteen months ninety-one
houses had been either completed or were under construction in Guilford representing an investment of $952,000. Ads now carried the motto, “Live in the Roland Park-Guilford District; A Thousand Acres of Restricted Land,” touting the advantages of a development that restricted variation in lot dimensions, house size and residents. The development of the Roland Park and Guilford had a profound impact on both the city and its suburbs. It was summarized in 1915 by Richard H. Edmonds of the Manufacturers Record (and a Roland Park resident since 1899), “Baltimore has not yet fully waked up to the fact that its growth in business and population is causing the residence section, which once centered around Charles Street and the Monument, to be moved bodily to the Guilford-Roland Park region…Charles Street, from the Johns Hopkins University to Towson, and the country beyond to Lutherville and to the Green Spring Valley territory, are to be the great high-class residence section of Baltimore…The rich people are beginning to build homes commensurate with their wealth and with the superb natural beauty of the region. Roland Park and Guilford will be the dominating center of this great region, and it is therefore vitally important to the Johns Hopkins University and to the city itself that there are in the Roland Park-Guilford District about a thousand acres of restricted land which must for all time be the very heart of the highest-class residence in Baltimore.” Along with Sudbrook Park, the Roland Park-Guilford District finally brought Baltimore into the suburban era. Once the city elite opted to remove permanently to suburban-style homes, the larger middle income groups followed them as best they could—seeking their own more modest versions of rus in urbe. The builder of a development in the southwestern suburbs advertising tiny semi-detached houses on denuded little lots, announced that “they carry that air of beauty and refinement that becomes the high-priced homes of Guildford and Roland Park.”

The fact was, of course, that only a very small number of Baltimore’s families who wished to move to the suburbs could afford to move to Roland Park or Guilford. The vast majority settled for a lot or a house in one of the ninety more modest suburban developments that advertised in the Baltimore newspapers between 1890 and 1917. The largest such developments were in the northwestern corner of the 1888 annex, but by the turn of the century they had begun to spill over into the country. Walbrook, North Walbrook (which changed its name to Forest Park in 1900), Arlington, West Arlington, and Windsor Hills were all carved out of former estates in the area between 1889 and 1893 by land development companies that were a mixture of local capitalists (some of them the former estate owners), investors from Philadelphia and New York and, in the case of West Arlington, the Baltimore Traction Company. A number of these companies failed or were merged in the depression of the 1890s, and “reorganizations” continued into the twentieth century, but new developers quickly took the places of those who went bankrupt and building continued. Walbrook, which also took its name from the country seat of Galloway Cheston, also included the lands of “Beech Hill,” the old Slingluff estate which dated back to the eighteenth century, had the most turbulent financial history of all the northwestern suburbs. The legacy of these continual financial troubles was that buyers got very little beyond a title to their
property. Local amenities were meager or entirely absent for a number of years. Walbrook and Forest Park, being a little closer into town, did better than West Arlington where amenities and shopping facilities were still quiet sparse, even at the turn of the century. Even in the early 1900s, the slowness of the public authorities and the financial difficulties of the private developers gave Walbrook, Forrest Park, and West Arlington an unfinished and rather rustic look. Residents typically complained about their wooden sidewalks. Developers of these suburbs never put in the stone or cement sidewalks (a standard feature at Roland Park and Guilford), and local homeowners through their improvement associations were forced to build the wooden ones themselves. The boardwalks relieved residents from trudging through the mud, but in solving that problem they created another. In the summertime, with windows open “the midnight pedestrian’s lightest footfalls go reverberating down the avenues,” alerting all the neighbors to a latecomer’s arrival home. By 1910, after twenty years of development, Walbrook and its neighboring suburbs did finally achieve a completeness and maturity of a regular streetcar suburb. Their streets were nearly all macadamized and illuminated with electric lights, the boardwalks had been replaced by cement and were shaded by maturing trees and shrubs. There were small retail stores, five churches, and an athletic club. The Walbrook athletic club, while modest compared to Roland Park’s golf club was a powerhouse in the more plebeian sports of baseball and football. Even West Arlington had by this time developed into a nearly completely serviced suburb with all the utilities, paved streets, sidewalks, schools, churches, and a “country club,” which had tennis courts and a baseball field. In contrast to Walbrook, West Arlington remained in the hands of the same developers during the entire period during which its 400 some cottage-size lots were sold and built upon. It even classified itself as a “restricted” suburb—lot owners could only put one cottage on each of the town’s 50 x 150 foot lots. While there were no restrictions on the cost of a cottage in West Arlington or any of the other northwestern suburban developments, those that were built clearly were for Baltimore’s upper half. One can find small cottages selling for $2,000-$3,000, but by 1912-1913, for example, new four-bedroom houses in Forest Park, built on 50 x 140 foot lots were selling for $5,000 while large ones went for $6,200-$7,000.

While the northwestern annex territory developed as Baltimore city’s major suburban-style region in this era, most of the suburban growth was across the city boundaries. As the Sun said in 1910, “Nothing in Baltimore County has been more noticeable to the travelling public, the different departments of the county government, and to land owners and investors than the great development that has been going on during the past ten years within a radius of 10 miles of the city line.” From the Catonsville area around through the Reisterstown Road and Park Heights corridor to Mount Washington, Towson, Lutherville and across the developments on the Belair Road, dozens of small land companies purchased farms and estates that they subdivided for sale. The development ranged from a few which were every bit as elegant and pricy as Roland Park, (though none were nearly as large) to wheat fields, which had been improved by surveyors’ stakes and a sign announcing “prime suburban lots for sale.” The older suburban places now reached a
level of maturity comparable to Walbrook, Forest Park, and West Arlington. Beginning in the 1890s, the Catonsville area became a mecca for expensive suburban developments. In 1895 construction began on a second trolley line into the suburbs. The Edmondson Avenue, Catonsville and Ellicott City Electric Railway was built by Bernard Baker, John Hobner and George Yakel, all owners of large tracts of land in the area, and in spite of its relatively small size, (just under six miles long) it spurred a whole series of new housing developments along the Edmondson Avenue Corridor. Oak Forest Park and Eden Terrace offered large lots on which wealthy Baltimoreans, mostly from the Old West End, built large homes costing $6,000-$12,000, fairly close to the prices at Roland Park. However, in and around the town, smaller cottages sold for the more standard $3,000-$5,000 price. Even Paradise, Catonsville’s African-American enclave, which included a number of small farms and large shady building sites, became something of a summer home destination for more well-to-do city residents. The Rev. Harvey Johnson of Union Church built a second home there in 1895. The town of Catonsville itself was transformed from a village of feed stores and quaint country-style shops into a substantial town of brick and stone, its wooden sidewalks replaced by cement. Frederick Road, purchased by the state highway commission in 1910, was finally paved and curbed. The First National Bank of Catonsville, opened in 1906, was designed by Baldwin and Pennington, Baltimore’s leading architectural firm and remains today an elegant Renaissance-style building. The Catonsville Country Club, organized in 1892, was a major institution where the town’s middle class mixed with the more elite summer residents. Its large clubhouse and athletic grounds were opened in 1894, financed by local people plus the more prominent summer families, including John Glenn, Gustav Lurman, James A. Gary, Robert Garrett (Uplands was only three miles away), Bernard Baker of “Ingleside,” and Henry James of “Tower Hill” (always with his son Normand and his son-in-law Allan McLane). The grand opening of the casino in the suburb was a major event. “Not for many seasons has society so generally presented itself at any country function as it did yesterday afternoon in honor of the opening of the new casino at Catonsville.” For a number of years thereafter, the first summer dance at the casino (a black tie affair) brought the local squires in from their county houses while special trains carried several hundred of the city elite out for the evening. As Catonsville’s permanent population increased, the club’s athletic dances began in April and continued late into the winter. Major athletic events, often followed by dinner and dancing, brought the well-to-do in from the surrounding countryside (where many were converting their summer homes into all-weather dwellings), while those who had returned to their city homes were brought back out on special trains. Baseball, cricket, lacrosse, and football were played, but tennis was the major focus. Its courts were among the best in the nation and leading tennis players from the United States, Britain and Australia played tournaments there. Horse jumping was also popular and brought to the club not only local equestrians, but horsemen from the Greenspring Valley and the great estates in neighboring Howard County. By 1912, however, both the club and the suburb itself had leveled off in its social ascent. The club’s
magnificent house, the oldest and largest of the suburban clubhouses, burned in 1906 and while a new (much smaller and less expensive) one was built in 1908, many of the former elite members drifted to other clubs surrounding the city, especially Roland Park’s club which had a golf course. Catonsville’s local middle class formed their own club, which emphasized social rather than athletic events.\(^ {487} \) This organization, the Pot and Kettle Club, began as a club of the elite estate people, but as they left it became more middle class, although still quite selective.\(^ {488} \) The transition from elite summer colony to middle class suburb was most clearly signaled in 1919 when E. Stanley Gary, James’ son, sold “Summit.” The extensive gardens and grounds were developed into “Summit Park,” a pleasant middle-income housing development, and the mansion was turned into an apartment house. John Heidelbach, Catonsville’s chief provisioner to the old elite, remained in town to serve the new middle-class residents, but opened a store in Roland Park to keep the business of the many former Catonsville-area families who had removed to that suburb.\(^ {489} \)

The inability of Catonsville to maintain itself as a mixture of middle class and elite families after the 1890s reflected a larger reality. Those who built the new suburban developments almost all targeted them to a particular social and economic stratum. Developers came to accept the perceived wisdom that buyers wished to be surrounded by those having houses of approximately the same value. In the more restricted developments such as Roland Park there were minimum price requirements for houses, but less restrictive developments still were able to guide home building through lot sizes and house specifications. Less exclusive developers simply required that only one dwelling could be put on each lot. Those who attempted to be quite restrictive sometimes found it difficult to sell many lots. At Sudbrook Park on the Western Maryland Railroad, development was slow for some time for this reason. This elegant suburb, financed originally by Boston capitalists and drawing on the design skills of Frederick Law Olmsted, required that all lots be at least one acre and that the houses stay in keeping with the community’s upscale tastes. Most of the houses were quite grand, but the place remained largely a posh summer colony and by 1905 still had only about thirty families.\(^ {490} \) Future suburban centers like Owings Mills and Reisterstown at five and eight miles beyond Sudbrook, remained picturesque rural villages.\(^ {491} \)

Mount Washington, on the other hand, was less restrictive and continued to grow. By 1914 it had developed all the amenities its residents required except perhaps enough trolley cars. It too had an athletic club (originally a cricket club), which in the early years of the new century became a large and socially prominent institution fielding championship teams in baseball, football and lacrosse. By this time the suburb was itself surrounded by suburbs: Mount Washington Heights, Elderslie, Chestnut Hill, Green Spring Park, and Hilltop Park. Some bought lots there with intention of building while others purchased them for investment. Mount Washington Heights lots were advertised as “Better Than a Savings Bank.”\(^ {492} \) Lots in the area were, however, not cheap. Hilltop Park’s lots, which averaged 50x165, went for $600 and up and
could be purchased for $25.00 down and $15.00 per month. A lot with a comfortable bungalow on it sold for $5,750 and the monthly payments were $45.00. Chestnut Hill, aiming exclusively at a more moneyed clientele, showed photos in its ads of substantial homes and called itself a “strictly first-class neighborhood” with “every city convenience.” In the village of Mount Washington itself many improvements were made. There were paved streets, sidewalks, and substantial retail shops. The Mount Washington Water and Electric Company provided these amenities not only to the village, but to the widening circle of residential developments in the surrounding hills and valleys. In 1911 local residents even built a sewer system and treatment plant, a move that, as will be seen shortly, set off one of the county’s greatest legal battles.

The village of Towson still struggled to modernize itself in the early years of the twentieth century. Its curious old frame buildings were gradually torn down or burned up (fire service was still not very good). They were replaced by better looking structures. The town’s gas lamps were replaced by electric lights in 1894. As the county government grew, more houses were built in and around the town. Aigberth Vale finally became an actual residential community. The Towson National Bank (1912) was as handsome a structure as the Catonsville bank. The local residents and shopkeepers also managed to lay sidewalks in 1908 and artesian wells provided a limited supply of good quality water.

The majority of suburban developments in the county were not in the towns, but out along the major highways and streetcar lines. Most of them required an outlay of $2,000-3,000 for a house and lot, but some sold lots that were quite inexpensive where one could erect a small cottage at a total cost of about $1,500, about the average price of a typical Baltimore row house of the 1900-1917 era. Out Eastern Avenue along the trolley line to Sparrows Point, was Essex where 50 x 145 lots sold for as low as $100 with $5.00 down and $5.00 a month. “Just Beyond the City Limits: County Taxes: High-Dry-Healthy,” said the ads, “35 minutes from city hall.” While actually almost four miles east of the city line and occupying land not very far above sea level, Essex was a good buy for working-class families wishing to live between the Canton and Sparrows Point industrial centers. Further out on this line, in what became Dundalk, was “New Pittsburgh,” a suburban tract offering lots for $1.00 down and $5.00 a week. Out the Belair Road, Overlea, and New Belgravia competed with Essex in offering their lots for $5.00 down and $10.00 a month. On the Harford Road, allegedly “28 minutes from City Hall” by a five-cent trolley ride, was Ailsa Terraces where lots were $150-$600 dollars and a nine room cottage could be bought for $2,500 or as their ads said, “a small cash downpayment” and $30.00 a month. Further out the Harford Road, on the 218-acre estate of the old Weissner beer baron, was the relatively large and ambitious development of Evergreen Lawn, selling little two-story, three bedroom cottages on 60 x 160 foot lots for $2,750. The developer claimed in 1910 to provide all the standard utilities including telephone service. On the York Road, lots and houses were more expensive, but prices varied considerably. Beaumont Park, north of Govanstown (formerly the estate of Col. L. B. McCabe) had 150 lots with cottages selling for $3,500-$5,000. On the Liberty Road was “Cheswold
Chapter 9: The Battle for Baltimore County

Farms,” a development that took its name seriously. It told prospective buyers that their quarter-acre and half acre lots ($250 and $450) had “plenty of room for a lawn, garden, poultry yard and fruit orchard.” For $10.00 down and $10.00 a month one could become an agriculturalist. It was, perhaps, not a bad sales approach at least for the half-acre lots since the area was, in 1908, without any utilities. It made less sense for the developer of Meridale Little Farms to follow this pitch since many of the 188 lots on his tract of land at Edmondson Avenue near North Bend Road were barely one-third of an acre. Nevertheless, ads showed a house, a lawn and winding driveway, orchards, a grape arbor, a garden, a barn and a chicken yard—a all presumably in miniature form. With the purchase of one of his lots, which sold for $340 to $790, ($5.00 down and $10.00 a month) the buyer got three fruit trees, five grape vine plants, and five raspberry bushes. Alas, no free chickens. While Little Farms may represent something near the absurd, just to the east was Ten Hills, one of the largest and most upscale residential developments in the western suburbs. Laid out on a series of lovely high ridges where Edmondson Avenue (with its new trolley line) turned southwest towards Catonsville, the development was a miniature Roland Park. It had carefully engineered and landscaped paved streets which wound around the ridge tops in the style of the northern suburb. Each lot was provided with sidewalks, gas, electricity, water, and phone lines, and the development even had its own sanitary sewer system. Each of its custom-built houses had to be a unique design and the average price was quite comparable to those in Roland Park. The difference between two developments, however, was that Ten Hills was only about a hundred acres and never spawned any neighboring developments of a similar nature. It was as if the old rivalry between the West End and Eutaw Place-Mount Vernon Square areas had been replayed between the western and northern suburbs, and once again the northern had won. The whole social geography of the city was gradually replicated in the new suburban ring, except of course that the scale and the degree of socio-economic segregation of housing were substantially greater.

Whether they lived in tiny cottages in Essex, comfortable stucco homes in Catonsville, or Tudor mansions in Guilford, over 100,000 people had established themselves in the suburban region of Baltimore County by 1917. Over half were in the southeastern industrial areas stretching from Highlandtown to Sparrows Point. This was a population over three times the size of the one that lived in the old belt in 1888. The total population of the county in 1917 was somewhere around 150,000. How did Baltimore County’s government deal with this huge new suburban population between 1889 and 1917? The answer is that with some major help from the outside, the politicians and administrators in Towson made far more progress than had been made in the 1865-1888 era.

While the basic structure of the county’s government did not change, the volume and variety of the business it conducted grew enormously. The size of the county’s workforce increased, and operated with far greater efficiency and organization. A key reform in county administration was the introduction in 1900 of a modern bookkeeping system. Prior to this,
county officials had no clear idea how much tax money it was taking in, how much went out in expenditures, and how much money the government had on hand at one time. As a consequence the county often ended the year by spending more than it collected and had to quickly borrow to meet its payroll and other daily expenses. The introduction of a modern financial system was replicated in other offices as well. Gradually, the county’s whole system of record keeping and daily business was rationalized. Even with more efficient procedures, and in part because of them, more clerks and administrative supervisors had to be employed and the county’s offices began to spill over into old houses and stores surrounding the courthouse. Finally, in 1908 the architectural firm of Baldwin and Pennington began work to expand and modernize the courthouse building itself, adding two large wings, which doubled the size of the building. They installed a modern heating system, a proper electrical system, and completely remodeled the inside. The virtually new courthouse was dedicated on May 17, 1911 with a ceremony that drew 20,000 to the village. A parade, with 8,000 people in the line, showed dramatically how far the county had come in the twenty-three years since it lost the old belt. The parade was led by the forty-man county police force, followed by men and machines from the twenty-six county fire companies. Marching groups and floats came next from the three county high schools and several of its grammar schools. Nineteen of the suburban improvement associations marched along with several of the county farm organizations. The new country roads department made the most elaborate display. Old wagons with a small load of crushed stone (“all the horses could pull” said a sign) were followed by a large truck carrying a huge load of stone. Old wooden road rollers were followed by modern steamrollers. The two most striking features of the parade were the relatively small agricultural contingent and the large array of men and equipment the county now possessed to serve its residents.

Part of the county’s success was due to the rise of a new generation of county leaders like John S. Ensor who lived in the suburbs and played an increasing role in local government and administration. Two other suburbanites are also important. John Hubner of Catonsville and Carville D. Benson from Halethorpe in the Thirteenth District were representative of the new suburban leaders. Hubner was in real estate development in and around Catonsville, and Benson’s father, Oregon E. Benson, was one of the chief developers of Halethorpe, a growing suburb in the Thirteenth District. Hubner was an important figure in reforming both the finances and administration of the county government following the 1888 annexation. In Towson T. Scott Offutt and Osborn I. Yellott were major figures in the county’s efforts to modernize and improve its services. All these men, of course, were politicians and like it or not were forced to work with local political machines and factions. Petty politics and the old corrupt system of payoffs to friends and associates were so deeply ingrained in the system that no one seriously attempted to root it out. Services could be improved, but the effort was continually hobbled by the necessity of tailoring them to the needs of the politicians as well as the taxpayers and residents. The one county organization that rose above partisan politics, the Baltimore County
Confederation Improvement and Protective Associations, was deeply enmeshed in regional politics. The suburban associations had cooperated closely from the 1890s onward, and thirty-seven of them united into a single organization in 1907. While John S. Ensor was often their chief spokesman and led a number of campaigns on behalf of the confederation, a number of Democrats and independents were also active and the confederation remained a non-partisan organization. It was a powerful voice for the suburbs.501

Not only did the county have some new capable leaders, it gained large new financial resources. The county’s tax base bounced back rapidly as the new wave of suburbanization brought thousands of new properties onto the tax rolls. By 1897 the tax base was $73.5 million, larger than it had been in 1888. By 1908 it was $97 million and in 1914 reached $123 million. As the tax base rose, the county commissioners slowly raised the tax rate, from sixty-three cents in 1890 to $1.00 in 1914. The combination brought vast new sums into the county treasury. The total amount raised from local taxes in the county went from $315,000 in 1890 to $1,477,000 in 1914. In fact, actual county expenditures in 1914 approached $2,000,000 when the state contributions for schools and, after 1903, for roads and highways are counted in.

The county’s police and fire departments grew in size and became increasingly professional. The fire department had to be almost completely reorganized after the 1888 annexation, and there were serious problems for some time. The paid firemen did not get along with the volunteers who, while essential, were largely untrained and unorganized. In 1907 the volunteers were organized into an association and training improved steadily.502 The regular paid department added more men and improved its equipment. The fire alarm system, a large portion of which was taken over by the city in 1888, was completely rebuilt and expanded into the new belt while all the suburban towns added more modern fire engines.503 The major improvement was the introduction of motor driven fire trucks in 1909. By 1914 the latest model “auto-fire trucks” were installed at Mt. Winans, Catonsville, West Arlington, Roland Park, Govanstown, Towson, Highlandtown, and Canton. The old horse-drawn vehicles were sent to the outlying districts.504 The modernization of the fire service, particularly the purchase of the motorized fire trucks, led the Baltimore fire underwriters to decide in 1913 to substantially reduce the price of fire insurance in the area five miles around the city.505

The police department came in for a great deal of criticism during this era, but it had little to do with department’s general efficiency. A basic problem was the inability of the force to provide patrolmen for all the suburban developments or even to cover some of the larger old settlements. In 1898 residents in and around Pikesville were plagued by a series of robberies that the police seemed unable to solve, and the American reported that so many families had purchased guns to protect themselves “that the stocks of the hardware stores are depleted.”506 Places such as Govanstown, which by 1898 was indistinguishable from the city itself, still had only one policeman who patrolled at night, but no one watched the streets there during the daytime.507 While this was a continuing issue, the greatest controversy surrounded the department’s
relationship to the liquor interests. The saloonkeepers and shore resort owners continued to play a major role in both local parties. Consequently, enforcement of the liquor and the Sunday laws was deeply influenced by politics. Since Baltimore City enforced its Sunday laws more strictly, there were great profits from the illegal Sunday sale of beer and other alcoholic beverages in the county, especially in the saloons and waterside resorts of the Twelfth District. By 1898 there were 120 licensed saloons in the Twelfth District centered in Highlandtown, Canton, and along the road to the shore resorts. They all did a thriving Sunday business selling booze to thirsty city people who, a local minister said, created “scenes of moral depravity…which were not surpassed even in Sodom and Gomorrah.” From the 1890s down to 1915 a parade of men moved through the office of police marshal. Each attempted to find the right degree of enforcement that would placate the temperance groups and the Lord’s Day Alliance while allowing the lucrative saloon and resort business to prosper. None succeeded. The county anti-saloon league gained control of the grand jury in 1914 and denounced the whole police department: “The police force is rotten to the core;” from the marshal down to the patrolman, “we have a class of man whose first allegiance is to the saloon.” The charge was undoubtedly correct, but in all other areas of law enforcement, it was clearly untrue. While the county police were not the equal of those in the city, there is no indication that crime and disorder were serious problems anywhere in the suburbs except, of course, around the saloons and resorts. By 1910 the department had over forty officers and a number of them had been on the force for many years. Pay remained low ($840 a year was the beginning wage for patrolmen) and this was a drawback, but aside from the liquor issue, remarkably few complaints about county police reached the county or city papers. In 1916 in a burst of progressive-inspired reform and noblesse oblige, John C. Cockey, the Worthington valley aristocrat, agreed to become police marshal. He was a man of ability and experience. Cockey had commanded Company A of the Maryland National Guard, a mounted unit composed mostly of socially prominent valley horsemen. In spite of its aristocratic nature, it was a class military organization. Cockey reorganized the police force and gave it more military discipline. His apparently honest effort to enforce the liquor and Sunday laws caused him no end of political trouble in Towson. Before it was resolved, he died during the 1918 influenza epidemic. Nevertheless, Cockey is credited with moving the county police into a new level of professionalism. By 1918, they were a credible department doing what by all appearances seems to have been a good solid job of preserving general public order, protecting lives and property, and shielding as best they could the county’s saloons and resorts from the attacks of the anti-saloon league. Such a record was bound to draw mixed reviews, but no one could honestly argue, as the city had done in 1888, that suburbanites were in real danger due to lack of police protection.

The county school system grew enormously in the 1889-1920 era, but more important, many of its schools, especially in the suburbs, became the equal of the city’s best schools. The annexation of 1888 had removed a number of the largest schools and best teachers, dropping enrollment from 11,800 to 8,000, but the new suburban wave soon flooded the schools with
children and launched the county onto a new round of construction and teacher recruitment that overshadowed anything attempted in the pre-1888 era. By 1897, nine years after the loss of the old belt, the schools had over 12,000 students. Part of the increase stemmed from the removal of the textbook fee in 1897, but the overwhelming cause was the rapid increase in new suburban homes.509 Over the next decade and a half suburban growth was even more rapid and by 1914 the number of county school children grew to 23,500. The school operating budget rose from $126,000 in 1889 to $566,000 in 1914 while the capital budget for new schools, additions and repairs often ran $50,000-$60,000 a year. The major figure in the county schools was Albert S. Cook who took over the old position of secretary-treasurer of the Board of School Commissioners at the turn of the century and became the county's first superintendent of schools in 1903. A student of the famous John Dewey, Cook was a man of high intellectual ability and great political skill. He stayed in Baltimore County until 1920 when he moved on to become the Maryland superintendent of Schools. During his seventeen years in the county, he and a cohort of talented teachers and administrators brought national acclaim to the county’s schools. This was not done, however, without a struggle with county residents who objected to the increasing size, complexity and expense of the school system. Fundamental to the upgrading of the schools was the infusion of more money and in this task Cook was, to a point, quite successful. From 1870 to 1900 per-pupil expenditures had remained almost stationary, averaging around $15.00. By 1914 it had risen to just under $25.00. Inflation played some role in this, but even when this is taken into account, it was a substantial increase. Most of the new money went to raise the salaries of chronically underpaid teachers. With higher paychecks, better teachers could be hired and retained. The 25 percent raise approved in 1910 finally attracted a number of teachers having a regular college diploma rather than just a normal school certificate.510 Gradually, the county began to hire some of the best teachers and administrators away from Baltimore City’s school system. Samuel North, head of the Department of English and Modern Languages at Baltimore Polytechnic Institute, was hired in 1914 to be principal of the Franklin High School.511 Cook’s political skills were tested by the two very different groups he had to accommodate. The suburban groups, who spoke through the Confederated Civic Associations and the Confederated School Patrons Association (forerunner of the PTA), placed increasing emphasis on quality education and the development of the upper grades and the new high schools. The rural sections thought little of Cook and his fancy “progressive” curriculum ideas. They generally overlooked the heavy subsidy from the suburban taxpayers that supported their schools, including a fine agricultural high school at Sparks opened in 1910, complete with a horse-drawn “bus” service for rural children. Many rural county residents viewed the high school as an expensive frill and saw little reason for Cook’s insistence on a variety of academic and liberal arts coursework for farm children.512 They particularly resented the huge expenditures made in the suburbs. The Highlandtown-Canton people, largely in the grip of the county machine, had few articulate or effective voices speaking for good schools and stood at the end of the line for new schools and programs. Cook made some effort to get more and
better schools for Highlandtown and Canton, but the pressure from the middle- and upper-class suburbs made this difficult. Local communities in Catonsville, Mount Washington, Roland Park, and several other suburbs put up some of their own money where public funds were wanting. At Sparrows Point the Maryland Steel Company put up extra money for school construction. Cook’s greatest contribution was the development of a modern curriculum and administrative system in what had previously been a large number of almost autonomous schools having little coordination, oversight or help. Working in close contact with leaders in the education field like George Strayer of Columbia University, Cook was able to convince the school board to allow him to develop a small cadre of school administrators who could work more closely with the teachers and assistants to bring modern educational practices into the classroom. In the grammar schools Dr. Lida Lee Tall became a major figure in the introduction of standardized testing and a variety of teaching innovations before moving to the Maryland State Normal School (which moved from Baltimore City to a large tract just south of Towson in 1915 and would become Towson State later in the century). The greatest challenge was in the large suburban schools. In the middle- and upper-income suburbs the expectations of parents were high, and the problems of growth and overcrowding were serious. In the area from Highlandtown to Sparrows Point, the education of children from low wage industrial families presented very different, but equally demanding problems (at least for those who felt obliged to take the education of these poor children seriously). In 1906 the Sparrows Point School had twenty-four different nationalities among its 800 students. As Cook told the school board in 1903, “It is impossible to secure the best results in the large schools near the city without adapting the county system in these localities to the needs and advanced supervisory methods of a city system.” The suburbanites generally recognized Cook for the great educational leader he was and were willing to pay to keep him, but others in the county thought that he and his fancy new ideas and administrative methods were far too expensive. In 1910 the board bought an automobile for Cook to use in his endless rounds of visits and meetings at the county’s many schools, but the action outraged a number of taxpayers. Frank Zouk, President of the Reisterstown Bank, said county residents took an extremely dim view of “their extravagance” such an automobile for the secretary of the school board represented. It was not only a waste of money, but set a bad example for the students “who should be taught economy.” Cook and the school board came under fire again in 1914 when it raised his salary from $3,500 to $5,000 in order to keep him being hired away by school systems quite willing to pay this amount for a good superintendent. The wife of a county farmer wrote to the Sun about this matter, saying that such a salary was an example of “the petty system of politics that is rampant in our county,” where politicians pay each other huge salaries at the taxpayers’ expense. She was bemused by the board’s “excuse” that “he was so valuable he could not be spared.” She could not believe that any school administrator was worth such a salary.
All honor to Mr. Cook as a modern educator! But our little country ‘schoolmarm’ on a $500 salary, in a one-room school…very often does better and more lasting work than the high salaried officials who impart dignity to our school system with their important manner and bearing …The cultivated suburbanites will raise their eyebrows in supercilious amazement at such ignorance. But let me assure you that many of those poorly equipped county children from the one-room schools will compare very favorably with the precious physically weak suburban product. In our mad race after higher education, sanitation and cultivated luxurious idleness we have sacrificed much of the virile brain force that made our Maryland men and women famous in the days of the old log schoolhouse…

The fact that Cook did earn ten times more than some of his starting teachers obviously gave pause to many county residents, particularly in the rural districts. Shortly after the salary flap, a $500,000 bond issue for school construction came up on referendum and was narrowly defeated (4,786 to 4,438) with the rural districts voting three or four to one against it. After the vote a “taxpayer” wrote that the defeat stemmed from “the almost wild extravagance in the name of education” for which Cook was chiefly responsible. His new high schools are so elaborate they “resemble colleges” and while some “would have us believe that there are few, indeed, so rare, talented and brilliant…[whose] genius and executive ability pass all understanding, scarcely a taxpayer in our section believes his service is worth $5,000 a year…We have been Cooked and Cocked until we are ‘well done’ with the Cook, for the cupboard is nearly bare now.” Much of the rural resentment, which found a focus in Cook’s salary, was really directed towards the large expenditures of funds on the upper grades and the high schools. The suburbanites, of course, were deeply interested in this “higher education.” The first true high school in the county, Franklin High School, was established at Reisterstown in 1896. The location was chosen because of its access to almost all the suburban areas, but it was still quite inconvenient for many students, so separate high schools were established at Towson (1901) and Catonsville (1903). By 1910 all three schools were operating efficiently in large, modern, expensive buildings and a high school course had been established at one of the schools in Highlandtown. The three middle-class suburban high school buildings were indeed excellent buildings. The new Catonsville High School, built in 1910, cost $55,000 and had a capacity for 600 students. Cook recruited Edward de Russy, a young man with a Bachelor of Arts degree from Manhattan College and a Master’s degree from Columbia Teachers College as the principal of this school in 1912. Whether the county’s suburban schools were producing idle and effete graduates, as the farmer’s wife had implied, cannot be known, but by 1917 their sports teams were thought to be among the best in the state, and at the state-wide track and field “Olympiad,” the Baltimore County team defeated the Baltimore City team 81 to 85 (third place went to Allegany County with 25 points). Sports is not a measure of academic quality, but the local papers during the decade from 1907-1917 indicate that the county schools held their own against the city’s three high schools in the quality of their
teachers, their curriculum and the numbers of graduates going on to some type of higher education. The total number of county high school graduates was still quite small compared to the city, and students could not take the variety of courses offered at City College High School or the Polytechnic Institute; but they could get a solid high school education from first-rate teachers. Having available a system of suburban grammar schools and high schools offering an education of roughly equal quality to that which city residents could obtain was a major step forward for the county, but the farmer’s rejection of the county’s first school bond issue cast a cloud over the suburbs which still lingered during the 1916-1918 annexation debate.

County Roads

The greatest improvement in the county in the 1890-1920 era was the upgrading of its roads and bridges. A technological revolution and the lavishing of gigantic sums of money on roads by the county and, after 1903, the state government, gave Baltimore County a system of improved roads and highways an earlier generation could not have even imagined. Unlike schools, good roads, and free ones, came to have equal appeal for both suburbanites and farmers. The payoff for improved education seemed distant in time and was difficult to perceive, while the reconstruction of a major county road brought instant and unquestionable improvement. In 1892 the county purchased its first stone crusher, placing it at a quarry adjacent to the McDonogh School station of the Northern Central Railroad so it could ship stone to any point in the county reached by a railroad. It also bought a steamroller.521 Six years later it purchased a much larger and more powerful crusher. The county was now able to crush its large deposits of trap rock, which was extremely hard, and once crushed, made a very long lasting roadbed.522 The whole technology of road building advanced rapidly. Steam shovels and rollers and, after 1908, motor-driven trucks, graders, and other machines replaced the labor of hundreds of horses and thousands of pick and shovel men who had made the construction and maintenance of good roads impossibly expensive. These new machines were also expensive, but with the realization that they could in fact make really good roads, taxpayers in the county were willing to spend more of their money on them. Even in the 1890s Baltimore County’s road program cost about $140,000 a year, four to five times more than any other in the state. Only Baltimore City spent more. 523 In 1914, $551,000 was spent on the county roads with $243,000 coming from the state of Maryland. The drive to establish a state presence in road building was led by men from Baltimore City and Baltimore County. These two local territories were the center of the state’s roads and turnpikes, and consequently over the next decades, they received the largest share of state highway money. The first good roads bill was sponsored by the league of American Wheelmen, which had a large Baltimore County membership and from 1904 onward the Maryland Automobile Club was a major force in helping to formulate the highway construction program. Its chief counsel and lobbyist was Osborn I. Yellott, a Towson attorney. In 1898, while the state highway program was
still just getting started, the Baltimore County commissioners took control of road building away from the local district commissioners and centralized it in Towson, establishing its own modern highway department in 1900. They hired Walter W. Crosby away from the Massachusetts Highway Commission to become its first chief engineer. Local improvement projects, particularly on the secondary roads, remained in the hands of the fifteen district supervisors. They also did the actual contracting (so they could reward political associates) but Crosby had overall planning authority and final approval of all projects. He was able to work reasonably well with the politicians, and, as an engineer with expert knowledge and a wide reputation, was able to prevent major mistakes and oversee construction to make sure the politicians’ friends gave the county good roads for the money they received. Under his administration roadwork became far more scientific and efficient. Crosby left in 1904 to become head of the Baltimore City park system, but soon moved on to become chief engineer for the state highway commissioner. His replacement in Baltimore County was Henry G. Shirley who proved an equally able engineer until he too was enticed away to replace Crosby in Annapolis. Shirley’s replacement in the 1912 was William Sucro, an M.I.T. graduate who kept up the standard set by Crosby and Shirley.

The county’s main roads (approximately 400 miles of them out of total of about 1,300 miles) were transformed into modern all-weather gravel highways, and from about 1910 onward were covered with a thin layer of asphalt to keep the auto dust down. Between 1900 and 1917 almost all of the county’s wooden bridges were replaced with concrete or steel structures. Some of them, like the Dickeyville Bridge and the Eastern Avenue Bridge over the Back River, were large and expensive structures. The $52,000 Back River Bridge (1912) was the largest ever built by the county. A large part of the county’s success stemmed from the state’s gradual takeover of the major old turnpikes and their transformation into modern free highways. Once the Maryland Highway Commission was established in 1903, various private groups attempted to force the turnpikes to sell out to the state of Maryland. However, the cost of rebuilding and maintaining the turnpike roads was huge. Only when Governor Austin Crothers made abolition of the turnpikes a state policy and got the legislature to vote the necessary funds, did the tollgates began to come down. Subsequently, the mixture of mud and rocks that passed for a roadbed was replaced with a modern macadam surface by the state highway commission operating with state revenues (mostly gathered from Baltimore City taxpayers and auto owners). The York, Liberty, and Harford turnpikes were purchased in 1910 and the Reisterstown Road in 1915. Baltimore County in the meanwhile had been buying (or was given) several of the smaller turnpikes. Finally in 1918 the county bought the little Western Run turnpike and the last tollgate in Baltimore County came down. The old turnpikes and wagon roads leading out from Baltimore served as the main grid for the state’s trunk line highway system laid out by Crosby and state highway officials in 1908. Since all eight of these roads passed through Baltimore County, it had by far the largest mileage of new state roads of any county in the state—over eighty miles. With the state taking over the main roads running out of Baltimore, county engineer Shirley, and Sucro after him, directed their
efforts at improving the more important cross roads to link up the semicircular band of towns and residential developments in the new belt. No “beltway” was actually planned, but the general concept was clearly embodied in the efforts to connect communities like Catonsville, Pikesville, Mount Washington, Towson, Gardenville, and Dundalk. Secondary roads were still a problem in 1917. A large number of them were still dirt and this was particularly aggravating to the suburbanites who paid most of the local road taxes. There was also growing criticism of the frankly political nature of the street and road contracting. The county highway engineer had direct control of the improvement of the major roads, but much of the money for the secondary roads and streets was still controlled by the district road supervisors. The Confederated Civic Association said that until the entire highway and street program of the county was put “onto a proper business basis,” the county’s streets and roads could not be brought to the same state of modern efficiency found in the city.526

Regardless of these continuing problems, it was clear by 1917 that the county was on the verge of overcoming the greatest single drawback to suburban living. With the trolley lines for daily commuting into the city and good roads on which to drive an automobile for shopping or pleasure, the isolation and inconvenience of suburban living was largely banished. It was still expensive. Operating an auto and paying a daily trolley fare was more of a transportation expense than most households could afford or wished to make, but by 1917 thousands of city residents could do it and it led thousands of others to think that at some point they could do it too.

Water

Amidst all the county’s successes, one area of failure loomed large by 1917. Water lines and sewers became the weakest spots in the county’s service system. The problem was a fairly new one for the county. Prior to the 1890s private wells and small water companies with deeper artesian wells proved adequate in supplying the new belt and the surrounding village with fresh potable water. In 1895 a private water and electric company was chartered to bring these utilities to Highlandtown and Canton from a dam across Herring run, and service was in place by 1898.527 Sewage was a larger problem, but the annexation of 1888 had removed the most serious drainage problems in the densely populated belt area, and complaints didn’t begin to pile up again until the mid-1890s. Canton, Peabody Heights, Towson, and even Catonsville experienced problems with sewage by the late 1890s. Only Roland Park had a sewer system. Many localities allowed the problem to become quite serious before seeking any remedial action. The increasing amount of sewage stemmed in part from the growing suburban population, but also from the installation of modern plumbing in the new suburban houses. The secretary of the state board of health said in 1897 that “since the introduction of so-called modern conveniences into suburban homes, the volume of sewerage to be disposed of has increased enormously beyond the growth of population.”528 The introduction of piped water into a number of villages and housing
developments just exacerbated the problem. Upon connection to the water system, many residents then connected their sewer pipe to their old well, turning it into a cesspool that drained into the watershed. In some suburban developments, such as Hamilton Park on the Philadelphia Road, residents drew their water from one well while draining their sink and toilets into another well on the same 35 x 150 foot lot. At Lutherville, Tuxedo Park, and Embla Park, the local natural springs and wells became contaminated with typhoid fever from such wells, and in 1897 the county commissioners passed an ordinance requiring all privy vaults and cesspools to be welling cemented so sewage could not leak through into the ground water. Compliance, however, was slow, and the pollution of wells remained a problem for years.

With the more shallow wells and springs becoming increasingly contaminated, communities sought to create water systems, but those served by the deeper artesian wells often had limited capacity. The self-evident solution was for the county and the city to jointly finance the expansion of the city water system on the Gunpowder River and develop together a metropolitan sewer system. The river ran through Baltimore County but the city owned the rights to its water. There were informal discussions between the two governments, but no agreement could be reached. Into the breach stepped the Catonsville Water Company, which in 1899 got its charter (and name) changed to the Baltimore County Water and Electric Company and set out to become the chief supplier of water to the suburbs. It purchased the Chesapeake Water Company, which supplied Highlandtown and Canton, the Towson Water Company, and several other suburban companies. It built a large modern water works on the Patapsco River at Avalon, just south of Catonsville. The Patapsco’s water quality was unsavory since all the little towns, villages and riverside mills flushed their wastes directly into the river; but a modern filtration plant was built to take care of the problem (at least to the satisfaction of the company’s directors). The filtered water was then to be pumped up to the Catonsville reservoir and from there re-pumped over to Arlington, Mount Washington, Towson, Lutherville, Govans, and even as far east as Hamilton near the Belair Road. Towson residents, enjoying fine tasting and healthy artesian water, resisted, saying the Patapsco was “a common drain.” T. Scott Offutt said it was “so foul one would scarcely care to have his dogs washed in it.” The water company, which owned the Towson wells, began to cut back on water service in the village, saying there was too much demand, but local residents claimed it was turning the well water off to force residents to accept piped water from the Patapsco. There may have been some truth to the charge, but with the growing population in the whole suburban area, the small artesian wells scattered throughout the area could not begin to supply all the new houses that wanted it. In 1908 the Baltimore County Water Company finally won its fight to deliver water to the suburbs, with the proviso that Towson could still use its artesian wells rather than the Patapsco water. After a year of watching the other suburban residents drink Patapsco water without any bad effects, and suffering from severe low pressure in their own taps, a group of Towson residents petitioned the county commissioners to rescind their order prohibiting the water company from supplying Towson.
from the Patapsco. Even with this change, Towson, Govans, and many other suburbs continued to experience low pressure and during the dry summers of 1910 and 1917, some serious loss of water service. For whatever reason, the Baltimore County Water Company could not meet the requirements of the suburbanites even though it charged more than twice the city rates for its water.532

While the private monopoly partially met the need for water for the suburbs, the sewer issue never came to a resolution during this period. For years the county possessed no legal authority to build sanitary sewers and refused all requests to undertake the responsibility. The Arlington section of the county in the Third District had very serious problems with several local builders suing each other to prevent one development from draining its private sewer pipes into streams that flowed into the neighboring properties. At Canton where stagnant pools of sewerage were a continual problem, the Canton Company even offered to pay part of the cost, but the commissioners did not want to get involved with what they knew would be an expensive project.533 In 1911 the situation had grown acute and the county medical association along with the Confederate Civic Associations pressed the commissioners to seek the authority and funds to build a sewer system. A local law was passed in Annapolis authorizing the county commissioners to create a suburban sewer system.534 The commissioners began their sewer program by agreeing to buy the Mount Washington sewer system and its treatment plant. W.W. Crosby, acting as an outside consultant, recommended the purchase as the foundation of a suburban-wide sanitation system. The Mount Washington sewerage works was privately built in 1911 and then purchased in 1912 by the Baltimore Suburban Sewerage Company, a subsidiary of the county water company (Albert H. Wehr was president of both companies). On Crosby’s recommendation the commissioners moved to buy the Mount Washington treatment plant for $600,000. The Confederated Civic Association and a number of people in both Towson and the suburbs became suspicious of the high price paid and the soundness of the whole idea. The fight led to the largest legal battle in the history of the county. For forty-five days every major figure connected with the county, the company, and the various local and state sanitary authorities testified. Dr. William H. Welch, the great Johns Hopkins public health specialist testified in his capacity as president of the state board of health. As a result, the purchase was declared illegal and the whole plan collapsed.535 The commissioners abandoned their original plan and sought to build their own system from the ground up. The next year they sought a $1,500,000 sewer bond issue to do the job. It was placed before the voters (along with the school bond issue) in May 1914. The sewer proposition did even less well than the schools even though J.F.C Talbott endorsed it. While the school loan lost by only 237 votes, the sewers lost by a vote of 6,477 to 2,337. Only the Third and Twelfth Districts (Arlington and Canton) favored it. In a number of the rural districts over 95 percent cast a vote against the loan.536 What exactly lay behind the whole sewerage fiasco remains a mystery, but most informed people believed the question became entangled in local politics and was compounded by the commissioners (and perhaps Crosby’s lack of knowledge in the admittedly
complex area of area public sanitation). Whatever the reason, it left most of the county’s suburbs without a critical utility.

On balance, the county’s failure to take more informed and aggressive action in the water and sewer areas was a serious blow to suburban development, but not a devastating one. Its performance in the other areas of public service was fairly good, but none of them, with the possible exception of the roads department, was yet up to the standard of Baltimore City. Between the political machinations of the Towson party leaders and the seemingly intransigent opposition of the upcountry farmers, Baltimore’s suburban leaders found it difficult to have very much confidence in the will or the ability of the county government to do very much better. Whether a majority of them would have been willing to voluntarily join the city and pay double the tax rate to get a better deal is an intriguing question, but the city leaders, who should have known, took no chances and sought to capture the new suburbs without a local referendum. They recognized that while the county’s services still left much to be desired, the tax advantage was very substantial. No leader on either side of the city line, of course, thought for a moment that the suburbs offered superior services. The county offered more trees, grass and air while the city offered more and better of everything else. For someone looking for the good life it was still a very difficult choice.
Bibliography


*American and Commercial Daily Advertiser [The American].*

*Annual Reports of the City Officers to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore*. Baltimore: City Hall, 1894.


*Baltimore Afro-American, The.*

*Baltimore City Code*. Baltimore: Department of Legislative Reference, 1909.

*Baltimore Sun, The.*


Brackett, Jeffrey R. *Notes on the Progress of the Colored People of Maryland Since the War: A Supplement to The Negro in Maryland: A Study of the Institution of Slavery*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1890.


Ditman, David B. “Conversion to Cable and Electric Power by the Street Railway Companies of Baltimore.” Student paper, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, undated.


*Evening Sun, The.*


Bibliography


Latrobe, John H.B. “Reminiscences of Baltimore, 1824.” Maryland Historical Magazine 1, no. 2 (June 1906): 113-133.


Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser

Maryland Gazette


*Morning Herald, The*.


Roland Park Company records, MS 504. Special Collections, The Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore, MD.


Rubinsky, Beth. “Restrictive Covenants Do Not Explain Jewish Migration into the Northwest Suburbs of Baltimore.” Student paper, University of Maryland Law School, 1986.


---------. “Residential Development on a Landed Estate: The Case of Baltimore’s Harlem.” *Maryland Historical Magazine* 77, no. 3 (Fall 1982): 266-278.


Endnotes

1 Due to filling along the shoreline over the past 275 years, the site today lies under the Transamerica
Tower, formerly known as the Legg-Mason building near the corner of Charles and Lombard streets,
approximately a thousand feet from the northwest corner of the Inner Harbor.
2 There is some confusion about the original spelling of the town’s name. The Act of the General Assembly
referred to the town as “Baltimore,” but the title page of the commissioner’s record book, spells it
“Baltemore.” By 1741 Dr. George Walker, the commissioner who made the entries in the book, switched to
the modern spelling. See Wilbur Coyle, ed., First Records of Baltimore Town (Baltimore: The Mayor and
City Council, 1905) frontispiece, 17.
3 Neal Brooks and Eric Rockel, A History of Baltimore County (Towson, Maryland: Friends of the Towson
Library, 1979), 10.
4 When Howard County was created out of the northwest section of Anne Arundel County in 1851,
Elkridge became part of the new county.
5 This phrase from the petition was repeated in the 1729 Act. See First Records of Baltimore Town, ix.
6 The drawing by John Moale Jr. (plus the embellished and annotated print made from it some years later)
can be correlated with a partial list of the town’s inhabitants in 1752 to provide a reasonably accurate visual
and demographic profile of the community. See “Residents of Baltimore Before 1776,” Maryland Historical
7 J. Hall Pleasants, ed., Archives of Maryland, Vol. 61, Proclamations and Acts of the General Assembly of
Maryland, 1766-1768 (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1944), 447. The act also established
inspections for hay, grain, flax seed, salt, staves and shingles and cord wood, although here the primary
object was uniform and honest weights and measures to avoid fraud.
(Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1925), 654.
Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by His Students (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 238.
12 Quoted in Tina Sheller, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town, 1765-1790” (PhD diss.,
University of Maryland College Park, 1990), 64.
130-133.
14 The figure is derived from Charles Steffen’s estimate that “on the eve of the Revolution about one
hundred men trading in the county, the vast majority of whom had settled in Baltimore Town and arrived
after 1760.” See Charles G. Steffen, From Gentlemen to Townsmen: The Gentry of Baltimore County,
Maryland, 1660-1776 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 147.
15 Most of the violence occurred during the revolutionary years, but it long predated this era. It is almost
impossible to document incidences of crude or lascivious behavior among the town’s polite gentlemen, but
the historian Charles Steffen uncovered a letter which casts a beam of light into this otherwise hidden
subject. When the Baltimore merchant Robert North died in 1749, he left his attractive, unmarried
daughter Ellen a substantial amount of property. Ellen, now doubly attractive, was pursued by two locally
wealthy and prominent young men, Charles Ridgely, Jr. and John Moale, Jr. In 1758 Ellen decided on
Moale and Ridgley (who was away at the time) received the news from his brother as follows:
“This day Mr. J. Moale is to be Married to Miss North. [H]appy for you that you did not engage with her
but Suppose you’d be Angry with yourself for not Plucking the Bud as without Doubt it was in your power.

324
I wish you had, as it might have saved Poore Johnny some trouble in entering.” Quoted in Steffen, From Gentlemen to Townsmen, 108.


17 Ibid., Vol. II, 486.

18 Ibid., Vol. II, 480.


21 Thomas Griffith, Annals of Baltimore (Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers, 1874), 73.


24 Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, April 22, 1783.

25 John Pendleton Kennedy, “Baltimore Long Ago,” in J. Thomas Scharf, The Chronicles of Baltimore (Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers, 1874), 231. Congress Hall was a large building that stood at Baltimore and Liberty streets where the Continental Congress met for a brief period during the winter of 1776-1777.

26 Dennis Rankin Clark, “Baltimore, 1729-1829: The Genesis of a Community” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1976), 95.


29 In 1791 the legislature transferred these functions to the Baltimore County government where they remained until transferred again in 1797 to Baltimore’s new municipal government.

30 Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, September 9, 1773.

31 Until 1837 Baltimore County included the eastern half of present day Carroll County.

32 In the year 2002 the general property tax accounted for 24% of Baltimore City’s income from all sources, local, state and federal. A property tax to provide revenue for the Special Commissioners to use for street paving began in 1783, but this does appear to have been envisioned as a temporary tax, whereas the 1784 tax was seen as permanent (even though it was temporarily transferred to the Baltimore County Court from 1793 to 1797). For the origins of the town’s property taxes see J. H. Hollander, The Financial History of Baltimore (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1899), 18-31, 40-44.


34 Wilbur F. Coyle, ed., First Records of Baltimore Town and Jones Town, 1729-1797 (Baltimore: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 1905), 34.


38 A section of this bulkhead was discovered in the 1990s while digging the foundation of The Gallery Shopping Plaza on the north side of Pratt Street. It is on display in the Gallery.


Maryland Gazette, October 17, 1765.

The trustees from Baltimore Town were William Lux, Charles Ridgely, John Moale, William Smith and Samuel Purviance. The Alms House was constructed on the site of the present Maryland state government complex at the intersection of Howard Street and Martin Luther King Boulevard.


Clark, “Baltimore, 1729-1829,” 156-57. The newspapers report no serious problem of homelessness during these economic crises; largely it appears because landlords seldom evict unemployed tenants who have fallen behind in their rent. The landlords undoubtedly understood the plight of normally responsible tenants, and there was little chance of renting the dwelling to another tenant in the midst of an economic crisis.


*Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser*, March 7, 1786 in Sheller, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 353. This entire discussion of the struggle over a municipal charter is drawn from Ms. Sheller’s excellent account.

*American and Commercial Daily Advertiser* [hereafter, The American], April 25, 1817.

In 1817 Henry Keerl and Sons, druggists at 321 W. Baltimore Street had 600 pounds of opium for sale. See *The American*, April 20, 1817.


*The American*, February 26, 1817.


*The American*, February 5, 1819.


Ibid., 92-93.


*The American*, July 15, 1815.


No citation found for Reverend Coker’s life.
Endnotes


68 The British seemed to have thought that the Baltimoreans were very unsportsmanlike in firing on Ross. In 1832, an English officer named Edward Coke visited Baltimore and went out to view the site of the Battle of North Point. Coming to the spot where Ross had been killed, he observed a stone marker praising the militia unit which had been responsible for the act. Coke thought the praise was quite inappropriate. He wrote that even the Americans agreed that the riflemen who shot the General had "fired deliberately from behind a tree" and that, in his view, such an act "was but a shade better than cold-blooded assassination." See Edward T. Coke, *A Subaltern's Furlough: Descriptive Scenes in Various Parts of the United States...and Lower Canada during the Summer and Autumn of 1832* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1833), 81. The two young militiamen credited for killing Ross were Daniel Wells and Henry McComas, but both were killed by the British in the skirmish following the initial attack on Ross, so it is impossible to verify if they were the ones who actually fired the fatal shots. Baltimoreans at the time believed they did and the two now lie buried under the Wells-McComas Monument in Ashland Square on Gay Street in East Baltimore.


72 *The American*, October 16, 1819.


74 Quoted in *The American*, June 8, 1819.


79 Some indication of the geographical distribution of Baltimore's business activities by the 1840s and 1850s can be gained by the range of its bank note exchanges. While notes were exchanged with almost every state in the union, the specific cities listed in *The American*'s financial column were: [Maryland] Annapolis, Salisbury, Easton, Frederick, Hagerstown, Williamsport, and Cumberland, [Virginia] Georgetown, Alexandria, Richmond, Petersburg, Norfolk, Winchester, Charleston, and Wheeling, [Pennsylvania] Philadelphia, Harrisburg, Columbia, Middletown, Reading, Lancaster, York, Gettysburg, Chambersburg, Carlisle, Waynesburg, Brownsville, and Pittsburgh, [New York] New York City, [South Carolina] Charleston, [Georgia] Savannah and August, [Louisiana] New Orleans.
It is not clear how Oelrich and Lurman were selected by the Barings, but the fact that Johann Baring, the founder of the firm, had immigrated to England from Bremen in the 18th century may have had something to do with it.

The American, July 7, 1830.


James Carroll’s son, James Jr., inherited Mount Clare in 1832 and continued his father’s efforts to develop the thousand-acre estate for commercial purposes. By 1848, he had sold off all but 364 acres around the mansion including lands which the B&O finally made valuable by the construction of their branch line to Locust Point and Camden Station. Three years later, in 1851, Carroll permanently moved up to Mount Vernon Place and rented the mansion to a George Sugdon who used it as a summer hotel. In 1890, the city of Baltimore bought the mansion and ultimately the 162 acres of land surrounding it. In 1917, the city turned the house over to the Colonial Dames of America who opened it as a museum. During the 1970s and 1980s, the mansion and its gardens were restored to their 18th century splendor and Mount Clare is today one of the few colonial-era houses still standing within the city limits of Baltimore.


A History and Description of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road with an Appendix and an Original Report of the Great Opening Celebration at Wheeling, Virginia, January, 1853 (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1853), 159. See also The American, January 13, 1853.

For a description of Bollman’s bridge building efforts at Mount Clare, see the Baltimore Sun, September 21, 1852.

One of the most unusual products of the Mount Clare shops during this building boom were several beautiful 80-seat omnibus-style rail cars, finished in “blue plush” which were designed to carry passengers between the PW&B’s President Street Station and the B&O’s Camden Station. Unfortunately, none have survived. See The American, January 6, 1857.

When the B&O finally built its line to New York in the 1880s, it crossed the northern suburbs almost exactly where Swann had wanted to build in the 1850s, but by this time the area had been heavily developed and the corporation was forced to put the tracks into a deep cut which still runs near 25th street.

The American, August 12, 1828.


Baltimore Sun, December 29, 1852.

A few hundred hogs were purchased by local residents who kept them (more or less) confined until the fall when they were slaughtered and smoked in backyard smokehouses. In the early years of the 20th century, old residents still recalled the delicious smell that arose each fall from dozens of these residential smokehouses.

Brown, The Old Bay Line, 1840-1940, 49.

The American, March 14, 1857.

Baltimore City Directory (Baltimore: John W. Woods, 1859).

Baltimore Sun, December 31, 1858

Baltimore Sun, December 1, 1848.


Baltimore Sun, August 12, 1859

104 Among the other reforms endorsed by this group were the elimination of imprisonment for debt, a more comprehensive and generous system of charities, and an end to slavery.
105 *The American*, January 11, 1825.
107 *The American*, February 12, 1825.
110 *Baltimore Sun*, March 7, 1849.
111 *Baltimore Sun*, March 26, 1850.
112 Baum, 24
119 *Baltimore Sun*, December 20, 1858.
120 Interview with Charles Clark in *Baltimore Sun*, January 10, 1915.
121 *Baltimore Sun*, April 21, 1840.
123 *Baltimore Sun*, October 18, 1858.
124 *Baltimore Sun*, September 20, 1859.
126 The police commissioner’s “General Rules and Regulations” are reprinted in *Baltimore Sun*, May 4, 1860.
127 *Baltimore Sun*, May 8, 1860.
128 *Baltimore Sun*, September 26, 1860.
Why so few families purchased the houses in which they lived is not clear, but there is no doubt that it remained quite rare, only about one in nine or ten Baltimoreans owning their own residence in 1860. There were, of course, no tax advantages for mortgage holders and no longer-term mortgages at all. Many who could have purchased their dwelling must have decided that it was more economical to rent. Also, in a city where most people needed to be within walking distance of the job, and changed jobs rather regularly, they changed residences surprisingly often. They may have found it more convenient to do this with rented dwellings rather than to buy and sell each time.


*Maryland Sun*, May 7, 1851.

*Maryland Sun*, October 28, 1859.


The *American*, June 11, 1863.

The *American*, August 9, 1849.


*Maryland Sun*, March 28, 1849.

The five houses of prostitution in the Calvert Street area and a census of their inmates is found in the manuscript census returns for 1860. The females include two sisters (ages twenty-one and seventeen) and what appears to be a mother and daughter (ages thirty-two and sixteen). See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *11th Ward, Census for Baltimore City, 1860*, Reel #463, 238-39, Microfilm Collection, National Archives, Washington.

On the character of East Baltimore Street during the 1840s, see the interview with James Anderson in the *Maryland Sun*, November 9, 1898.


*Maryland Sun*, January 9, 1860.

An exception to this bias was the sometimes extensive coverage that both the *Sun* and *American* gave to local black church activities. See for example, the coverage of the A.M.E. annual convention at Bethel Church in May 1859.


See Wilson’s obituary in the *Maryland Sun*, May 5, 1877.

The *American*, December 18, 1859.

*Maryland Sun*, December 14, 1859; *The American*, December 14, 1859.

At an “elegant reception” at William Prescott Smith’s home, Winans, Garrett, J.H. Latrobe attended along with General Lew Wallace, Commander of the Middle Department, and his staff of officers. Unfortunately, it was not recorded whether Winans and Wallace spoke. Two of Wallace’s predecessors had arrested Winans for his pro-Confederate activities, but each time the extremely wealthy and well-connected Winans was released. Wallace appears to have given up the chase by 1864. *The American*, December 12, 1864.

Mayor-elect Brown’s speech appears in *The Sun*, October 11, 1860; but see also *The American*, October 11, 1860. 


157 The American, November 2, 1864.


159 The American, February 2, 1864. The trade figures are from the extended discussion of Baltimore’s wartime trade in Richard R. Duncan, “The Social and Economic Impact of the Civil War on Maryland” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1963), 50-54, 70-78.

160 Jean Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 135-37. The entire set of questions is reprinted in Brugger, Maryland, 303. These questions had actually been developed in the spring of 1864 in Cecil County and were published in The American on April 4, 1864. See also Wagandt, The Mighty Revolution, 209-11.

161 The American, April 5, 1865.

162 The American, April 11, 1865.

163 The Sun, April 11, 1865.


166 The American, January 10, January 20, January 26, 1865.

167 The American, February 10, 1865.

168 This document has been digitized and is available on the Enoch Pratt Free Library Digital Maryland website: http://collections.digitalmaryland.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/mdmc.

169 Baltimore Sun, January 18, 1873, January 30, 1873, January 31, 1873.

170 Baltimore Sun, March 17, 1874 and March 14, 1881.

171 Baltimore Sun, November 3, 1902 and March 14, 1881.


173 Baltimore Sun, August 11, 1881.

174 Baltimore Sun, March 6, 1872.

175 Baltimore Sun, July 29, 1865 and August 16, 1866.

176 Baltimore Sun, June 1, 1881.

177 For examples see the Baltimore Sun, July 21, 1870, July 26, 1870, September 28, 1871, November 10, 1871, December 18, 1871, November 16, 1872, March 7, 1873, November 3, 1873, February 11, 1876, June 19, 1876, July 13, 1876, July 27, 1876.
In 1910 workmen digging a water line on Lombard and Bowley streets (now Hunter Street) discovered a large wooden ox yoke buried approximately eighteen feet under Lombard Street at what had been in the 1730s the original waterfront of Baltimore Town. The workmen had discovered two earlier streets as well. At five or six feet they reached an older Lombard Street which had been covered over and at fourteen feet struck the remains of a log road which crossed Lombard on its way down to Bowley’s wharf and called Franklin Lane in the eighteenth century. Four feet under this road was the ox yoke. See the Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1910.

Baltimore Sun, September 4, 1871.

Baltimore Sun, July 31, 1894.

Baltimore Sun, February 9, 1867 and April 1, 1876.


Baltimore Sun, October 28, 1868.

Baltimore Sun, July 13, 1878.

Baltimore Sun, August 17, 1871.

Baltimore Sun, June 17, 1867 and May 11, 1870.

Baltimore Sun, September 20, 1870, March 21, 1871, May 39, 1871.

Baltimore Sun, November 11, 1881.

Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1895.

Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1883.

Baltimore Sun, April 26, 1867, August 3, 1871, March 29, 1873, July 7, 1873, May 23, 1874, December 13, 1875, July 7, 1876; Baltimore Sun Supplement, April 13, 1887.

Baltimore Sun, May 2, 1876 and July 8, 1876.

Baltimore Sun, June 8, 1881, November 11, 1881, November 18, 1881.

Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1882, August 15, 1882, June 7, 1883, June 15, 1883.

Baltimore Sun, February 16, 1877 and November 14, 1878.

Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1878, April 10, 1879, August 20, 1879.

H.L. Mencken, Happy Days, 125.

Ibid., 70.

Baltimore Sun, March 4, 1879.

For a remarkably thorough and detailed description of the home construction financing of the Harlem Square area see Martha J. Vill, “Residential Development on a Landed Estate: The Case of Baltimore’s Harlem,” Maryland Historical Magazine 77, no. 3 (Fall 1982): 266-278.

Baltimore Sun, May 16, 1839.

Baltimore Sun, August 24, 1866, April 25, 1868, May 12, 1869, August 21, 1875; The American, April 23, 1874.

Baltimore Sun, November 12, 1866, September 21, 1870, June 17, 1873.

Mencken, Happy Days, 151.

Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1876.
213 Baltimore Sun, July 8, 1885.
215 The top three cities were New York, Philadelphia and Brooklyn.
216 The most recent general history of urban transportation from the omnibus to the motor vehicle is Clay McShane, Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the City (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). The major focus of this work is the period from 1900 to the 1920s.
217 Baltimore Sun, May 1, 1844.
218 Ibid.
219 The vote on Sunday operation of the cars was close, 10,915 in favor and 9,152 opposed. The major argument favoring the proposition was that the six day work week, then almost universal in the nation’s cities, only left Sundays for many families to escape the city heat and enjoy a suburban outing. See The American, April 29, 1867.
220 Baltimore Sun, December 2, 1889.
221 Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1882; The Sun Supplement, April 16, 1883. Statistics on the number of carriages entering Druid Hill Park can be found in the Park Commission’s annual reports.
222 The prototype for all modern safety bicycles was developed by John Kemp Starley at the Coventry Machinist Company in England between 1885 and 1889. He was the nephew of James Starley who had been the leading developer of the “Ordinary.” This type of bicycle began to be manufactured in the United States in 1878 by Albert A. Pope. When John Kemp Starley’s “safety” bicycle was developed it was quickly copied by Pope and other American manufacturers. The pneumatic bicycle tire was patented in 1888 by the Scotchman John Boyd Dunlop. It too was soon adopted by in the United States and in France where the Michelin brothers patented their own pneumatic bicycle tire with beaded edges. See Frederick Alderson, Bicycling: A History (New York: Preager Publishers, 1972), 38-42, 77-82.
223 Baltimore Sun, June 10, 1895.
224 Baltimore Sun, March 17, 1896.
225 Baltimore Sun, May 11, 1896
226 The American, May 5, 1895.
227 Baltimore Sun, November 12, 1897.
228 In 1908 the Baltimore City Council passed an ordinance allowing cyclists to ride on sidewalks in the outer districts of the city if the abutting street was “not reasonably ridable for such vehicles.” See Ordinance 139, Baltimore City Code (Baltimore: Department of Legislative Reference, 1909).
230 Baltimore Sun, March 8, 1900.
231 Baltimore Sun Supplement, October 8, 1889.
233 Baltimore Sun, September 3, 1892.
234 Mrs. Gilbert was also invited to ride on the first Red Line trolley car when the line was converted to electricity in 1898. See Baltimore Sun, August 31, 1898.
235 The American, April 3, 1893.
236 Baltimore Sun, September 21, 1891.
237 The American, April 8, 1894.

333
A general account of the conversion from horsecars to rapid transit can be found in Farrell, *Who Made All Our Street Cars Go?*, 59-90. I am also indebted to a fine paper by one of my students, David B. Ditman, “Conversion to Cable and Electric Power by the Street Railway Companies of Baltimore.”

Farrell, *Who Made All Our Street Cars Go?*, 59-105. See also the valuable article on the first fifty years of transit in Baltimore in *Baltimore Sun*, July 25, 1909. Details of the merger can be found in *Baltimore Sun*, January 20, 1899, February 1, 1899, February 3, 1899.

The *American*, November 5, 1897.

The *Morning Herald*, March 4, 1895.


The *American*, November 26, 1909.

The *American*, September 20, 1914 and October 11, 1914.

For example, see the advertisement for mowers offered for sale at Bolgiano’s Seed Company on Pratt Street in the *Baltimore Sun*, April 26, 1909. Bolgiano’s began as a supplier to farmers, but turned increasingly to supplying seed and tools for suburban lawns and gardens.

The *Baltimore Sun*, July 2, 1905 and July 25, 1909.


The entire letter is reprinted in Farrell, *Who Made All Our Street Cars Go?*, 71.


Citation not found.

The annual number of deaths from various types of accidents can be found in the vital statistics section of annual reports of Baltimore City Public Health Commissioners, in the *Annual Reports of the City Officers to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore* (hereafter cited as the *Annual Reports of the City Officers*). These reports are available at the Legislative Reference Department at City Hall, and in the Maryland Department of the Central branch of the Enoch Pratt Library.

The *Baltimore Sun*, October 15, 1894. The fender requirement can be found in City Ordinance 140, October 26, 1894.

The tally of trolley accidents is listed in *Baltimore Sun*, April 22, 1896. The *Baltimore Sun* editorial appeared on September 11, 1902.

By 1907 the news articles on trolley injuries and deaths seldom assigned any blame, but if they did it usually fell on the pedestrian for failing to look before crossing the trolley tracks.

The *Baltimore Sun*, November 18, 1915.

The editorial appeared in the *Baltimore Sun*, December 24, 1902; the response in *Baltimore Sun*, December 29, 1902.

The subway is discussed in *Baltimore Sun*, August 1, 1916; the tunnel in *Baltimore Sun*, December 19, 1911 and *The American*, December 20, 1911. For the bridge see *Baltimore Sun*, December 3, 1918.

*Baltimore Sun*, December 30, 1896.

*Baltimore Sun*, November 3, 1915.

There is a large literature on the development of the motor vehicle. See John B. Rae, *The American Automobile: A Brief History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); James J. Flink, *America Adopts*

262 Baltimore Sun, July 12, 1895, July 17, 1895, September 17, 1895.
263 Baltimore Sun, March 13, 1896.
264 It appears that Mr. Gill drove the first automobile in Baltimore, but others think Crouch was first. The question will probably never be answered. See the long article on this subject in the Baltimore Sun, May 2, 1909. The story of Crouch’s drive through Roland Park and Druid Hill Park is in the Baltimore Sun, April 15, 1899 and May 18, 1899. Crouch attempted to manufacture autos in Baltimore, but after a year the company went into receivership. See Baltimore Sun, May 30, 1899; Baltimore Sun, February 2, 1900.
266 The Records of the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration list 840 autos registered in Maryland in 1905, but the majority of these vehicles were actually owned by residents of the District of Columbia who, until 1909, were required to obtain a Maryland registration certificate in order to drive into Maryland.
267 The American, April 25, 1904.
268 Baltimore Sun, July 14, 1909; The American, September 16, 1914.
269 The mayor purchased a four passenger “Rambler.” See Baltimore Sun, April 6, 1906.
270 Baltimore Sun, November 15, 1913.
271 Second Annual Message to the Baltimore City Council (Baltimore: City Hall, 1909), 45.
272 The figures are estimates based on the total number of automobiles registered in Maryland which were kindly provided to the author by the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration’s Vehicle Services Division that has annual totals for all autos since 1900, all trucks since 1905 and all motorcycles since 1914. I have assumed that 75 percent of all autos were owned by residents of the Baltimore region during the 1900-1920 era. This is based on a list of all Marylanders holding a driver’s license in 1914. The list gives the name of the license holder, their place of residence, and the make of auto he or she owned. The list was published in The Sun of a number of weeks during 1914.
273 This figure is based on the 1914 driver’s license data, but see the articles on female auto owners in Baltimore Sun, May 31, 1914 and December 15, 1917.
274 Baltimore Afro-American, July 27, 1912. On the racial policies of the Maryland Automobile Club see Baltimore Sun, December 27, 1906.
275 The Baltimore Afro-American contains a number of notices of meetings and social events of the chauffeur associations.
276 The comment comes from C. E. Stonebraker, a longtime resident and well known businessman. See his letter in Baltimore Sun, February 15, 1914.
277 Baltimore Sun June 11, 1910.
278 The information on auto owners living in working class neighborhoods in 1914 was gleaned from the 1914 list of auto license holders.
279 Baltimore Sun, June 30, 1918.
280 In 1933 the Fox family began selling autos. They remain one of the largest auto dealers in the Baltimore region.
281 Baltimore Sun, April 7, 1906 and February 3, 1917.
282 Baltimore Sun, June 12, 1908.
283 Baltimore Sun, March 26, 1915.
284 Baltimore Sun, September 22, 1914.
When a building took fire, the Salvage Corps’ wagons raced to the scene to save as much of the building’s contents as possible before it burned or was ruined by water from Fire Department’s hoses.

The number of hacks and horse drawn cabs was computed from the “Receipts from General Licenses” contained in the annual reports of the Baltimore City Comptroller.


There is a full discussion of speed limit legislation in Maryland by Osborne Yellott, the Maryland Auto Club’s Chief Counsel in the Baltimore Sun, January 18, 1914.

Macadamized roads, developed by the Scottish engineer John MacAdam (1756-1836), consisted of creating a convex or “crowned” road surface to drain off water, and covering the dirt surface successive layers of small broken stones packed down as firmly as possible. See Roy Devereux, The Colossus of Roads: A Life of John Loudon McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), 47-65.

311 For a discussion of the paving on Franklin, Mulberry and Pleasant streets see Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1913. On Padgett see Baltimore Sun, March 29, 1910 and April 5, 1910. For the paving commission’s views see Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1913.
312 Baltimore Sun, January 6, 1910.
313 Baltimore Sun, November 11, 1915 and November 16, 1915.
315 The strategy of the county’s political leaders worked quite well. The majority of suburbanites seemed content to remain residents of the county, but in 1918 Baltimore City’s leaders convinced the Maryland General Assembly to annex almost all the county’s suburbs without a referendum to determine if the suburbanites wanted to be annexed. The annexation took effect January 1, 1919. See ibid., 120-123.
316 See, for example, Baltimore Sun, March 22, 1892.
317 These were the Philadelphia Turnpike, the Belair Turnpike, the Harford Turnpike, the York Turnpike, the Falls Turnpike, the Reisterstown Turnpike, the Liberty Turnpike, and the Frederick Turnpike (the last mentioned turnpike ran west to Cumberland, Maryland where it connected with the old National Road that crossed Ohio and Indiana, terminating at Vandalia, Illinois).
319 The $6,000 machine could produce approximately 175 perches of crushed stone per day. This was enough to cover half a mile of a twenty-foot wide road with a three inch layer of stone. See Baltimore Sun, August 23, 1892.
320 The American, January 24, 1898.
321 The early development of the state’s road system is presented briefly in The State Roads Commission of Maryland, A History of Road Building in Maryland (Baltimore: State Roads Commission of Maryland, 1958), 39-65.
322 Baltimore Sun, October 28, 1911.
323 Baltimore Sun, June 25, 1910.
324 Baltimore Sun, June 14, 1908 and June 25, 1910.
325 Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1916.
326 Baltimore Sun, August 12, 1906.
327 Baltimore Sun, April 28, 1909, July 14, 1909, November 19, 1909.
328 Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1906.
329 Baltimore Sun, November 12, 1906.
330 Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1911.
331 Baltimore Sun, May 13, 1911.
332 Baltimore Sun, July 15, 1916.
333 Baltimore Sun, December 6, 1907 and December 15, 1907.
334 Baltimore Sun, June 20, 1911, June 21, 1911, June 22, 1911.
335 Baltimore Sun, April 10, 1907.
336 The struggle between Officer Walker and motorists can be followed in Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1905, April 30, 1906, May 3, 1906, May 9, 1906, April 10, 1907, May 8, 1907, May 16, 1907.
337 Baltimore Sun, December 19, 1907.
338 Baltimore Sun, October 4, 1913 and October 12, 1913.
339 Baltimore Sun, January 18, 1914.
When J. Berry Mahool ran for mayor in 1911, his supporters used automobiles to drive voters to the polls that could not get to them easily on foot. See Baltimore Sun, April 5, 1911.

Baltimore Sun, November 15, 1914. In 1922 the city’s first traffic light was placed at the intersection of Charles Street and North Avenue. See The Evening Sun, September 14, 1946.

Baltimore Sun, November 15, 1914.

Baltimore Sun, September 28, 1917.

Baltimore Sun, February 29, 1918.

George Bagby, ed. The annotated code of the public civil laws of Maryland (Baltimore: King Bros, 1918): Ch. 85. For a brief explanation of the law see Baltimore Sun, April 5, 1918.

Baltimore Sun, June 9, 1918; Baltimore Sun, August 31, 1918.


Baltimore Sun, August 1, 1915 and September 11, 1916.

Baltimore Sun, August 3, 1916.

Baltimore Sun, January 17, 1916.

Baltimore Sun, November 20, 1875.

See Pratt’s interesting and amusing testimony before the Baltimore County commissioners in the Baltimore Sun, March 26, 1896.

Baltimore Sun, September 16, 1868.

Baltimore Sun, March 25, 1873.

Baltimore Sun, April 14, 1866, June 8, 1869, March 25, 1873, April 13, 1878.

Baltimore Sun, September 26, 1900.

The Baltimore Sun called Woodbrook “a model English estate.” See Baltimore Sun, May 31, 1903 and June 9, 1903.

Baltimore Sun, May 9, 1867 and July 3, 1867.


Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1893.

The American, December 23, 1894.


Neal Brooks and Eric Rockel, A History of Baltimore County (Towson, Maryland: Friends of the Towson Library, 1979), 195-196, 286-288, 297; Description of Mount Washington: Rural Retreat (Baltimore: John W. Woods, 1854); Baltimore Sun, November 19, 1905. On Lutherville, see the Baltimore Sun, July 21, 1893.

The American, June 3, 1899.


Baltimore Sun, September 9, 1868, February 5, 1869.


Baltimore Sun, July 10, 1891, September 21, 1900, March 6, 1901.
The Six Mile House was torn down in 1913 to make way for the construction of the State Normal School, now Towson State University, see Baltimore Sun, February 8, 1913.

Owens’ twenty-two room mansion, built in the 1850s survives today as an office building for the Baltimore County Board of Education, but the board has allowed the structure to deteriorate to the point where it may not be restorable. See the Baltimore Sun, January 31, 1896.

Brooks and Rockel, A History of Baltimore County, 288-297; Baltimore Sun, February 20, 1890, March 27, 1890, May 28, 1891.

The American, January 5, 1894; The American, February 2, 1894.

The American, January 14, 1894.

Baltimore Sun, February 10, 1896.


Baltimore Sun, October 5, 1870.

See her obituary in the Baltimore Sun, February 26, 1906.

Baltimore Sun, October, 6, 1918.

Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1907, January 29, 1916.

Baltimore Sun, July 20, 1908, July 28, 1908.

Baltimore Sun, October 15, 1918.


Ibid., 258-261; Baltimore Sun, December 4, 1915.

Baltimore Sun, August 6, 1895, August 14, 1897, August 17, 1897, December 22, 1897, December 2, 1911.

Baltimore Sun, June 1, 1866.

Baltimore Sun, April 27, 1871.


Baltimore Sun, July 5, 1883.

Baltimore Sun, January 11, 1887.

Baltimore Sun, August 25, 1876.

Baltimore Sun Supplement, October 25, 1884.

Deale, The History of the Baltimore County Police Department, 29-36; Baltimore Sun, June 1, 1888; Baltimore Sun, July 26, 1889.

Baltimore Sun, January 8, 1874, January 4, 1876, December 14, 1877, January 18, 1878, March 29, 1879.

Baltimore Sun, April 23, 1881, April 29, 1881.


Holloway stayed with the county department until 1885 when he resigned in protest over lack of sufficient funding, but the dispute may have been more purely political. See the Baltimore Sun, May 1, 1885.

See The American February 21, 1885. On the original controversy of 1881 see the Baltimore Sun, April 23, 1881, April 29, 1881, May 6, 1881, May 7, 1881, July 28, 1881, October 29, 1881, December 17, 1881, May 18, 1882, August 25, 1882, January 10, 1883, April 6, 1883.

Baltimore Sun, February 28, 1885.

Scharf, History of Baltimore City and County, 258-259.

Scharf, History of Baltimore City and County, 813.

Baltimore Sun, February 9, 1870.

Baltimore Sun, May 11, 1897.

Baltimore Sun, February 14, 1874.
Baltimore Sun, June 20, 1874 and August 17, 1892. On the schools in the 1870-1881 period, see the Baltimore Sun, April 20, 1871, September 5, 1873, January 31, 1874, February 14, 1874, March 16, 1874, June 20, 1874, February 21, 1881, August 29, 1881, December 3, 1881, September 2, 1882.

Baltimore Sun Supplement, January 15, 1890.


Towsontown Journal in the Baltimore Sun, December 9, 1867.

Baltimore Sun, February 8, 1868.

Baltimore Sun, March 9, 1874.

Baltimore Sun, March 9, 1874.

Baltimore Sun, September 16, 1876.

Baltimore Sun, January 25, 1878.

Baltimore Sun, September 29, 1885.

Baltimore Sun, March 11, 1887.

Baltimore Sun, July 31, 1888.

Baltimore Sun, May 30, 1887 and June 2, 1887.

Baltimore Sun, February 13, 1888.


Baltimore Sun Supplement, March 22, 1888; Baltimore Sun, March 23, 1888.


Baltimore Sun, March 26, 1890.

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, The Telephone in Maryland (Baltimore: Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland, 1974), 3-9; Baltimore Sun, March 7, 1899; Baltimore Sun Supplement, August 5, 1899; Baltimore Sun, March 29, 1910, April 6, 1913.

Baltimore Sun, November 6, 1915.

The American, April 6, 1895.

Baltimore Sun Supplement, June 6, 1890.

The American, December 4, 1895.

The 1st, 3rd, 9th, and 12th districts were valued at $50.9 million while the other eight districts were valued at $22.2 million. Figures from the Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1897.

Baltimore Sun, May 31, 1892, December 11, 1895.

Baltimore Sun, June 27, 1895, August 7, 1902, June 3, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, June 28, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, June 14, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1893.

When Carroll was forced to sell, the property ended up in the possession of the Guam Hutton’s who resold it to a development syndicate headed by Edwin Warfield, Summerfield Baldwin and Nelson Perin. Baltimore Sun, June 5, 1903.

Baltimore Sun, October 7, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, June 12, 1905 and July 2, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, October 7, 1905.
Endnotes

439 Baltimore Sun, June 28, 1895.
440 Baltimore Sun, June 24, 1884. Eventually in the 1890s the Elkridge Hunt Club purchased this parcel and a handful of others around it when they would from their old headquarters. This finally erased one of the last remains of Baltimore’s Civil War nastiness.
441 Baltimore Sun, January 20, 1890; The American, May 16, 1897.
443 Baltimore Sun, June 26, 1891.
445 Conklin remained interested in the Roland Park Company, but never played a major role in its development and appeared to prefer the city to suburban life. He lived the rest of his life in his town residence on Calvert near Eager where he died in 1915. See the Baltimore Sun, November 14, 1915.
446 In early 1891 Bouton helped Grasty sell some land the newspaperman owned in his native state of Virginia. Both Bouton and Grasty were also close friends of J.T. Harwood of the Kansas City law firm of Hardwood and Meredity, which did the legal work for Conklin-Jarvis. See Charles H. Grasty to E. H. Bouton, April 23, 1891, RPP file 21, box 22; J.T. Harwood to E.H. Bouton, June 10, 1893, July 8, 1893; file 10, box 33.
447 The American, June 26, 1891.
448 Chas. P. Marty to E.H. Bouton, July 10, 1891, RPP, file 21, box 22.
449 Waesche, Crowning the Gravelly Hill, 59; Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1904.
450 For a typical ad see the Baltimore Sun, May 23, 1893. On advertising the development, see R.H. Edmonds to E.H. Bouton, May 22, 1894, RPP, file 30, box 4.
451 Waesche, Crowning the Gravelly Hill, 45-47.
452 Waesche, Crowning the Gravelly Hill, 53-59.
453 Baltimore Sun, December 27, 1908.
455 Baltimore Sun, June 4, 1898.
456 Baltimore Sun, July 13, 1901.
457 Baltimore Sun, January 6, 1904.
458 Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1905.
459 Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1903.
460 On good looking women golfers see P.D. Keilholtz to E.H. Bouton, May 19, 1899, RPP, file 7, box 7; see also Stuart to Smith and Williamson, July 15, 1897, file 3, box 6 and “Baltimore Country Club: Statement for 1904,” file 14, box 22; Baltimore Sun, March 8, 1899; Social Register figures are from Waesche, Crowning the Gravelly Hill, 67-68.
461 C.M. Armstrong to E.H. Bouton, April 24, 1895, RPP file 18, box 4.
462 Baltimore Sun, December 27, 1894; Baltimore Sun, February 1, 1895; Baltimore Sun, November 5, 1905.
463 Michael R. Farrell, Who Made All Our Streetcars Go? The Story of Rail Transit in Baltimore (Baltimore: NRHS Publications, 1973), 86, 115, 117, 125; Baltimore Sun, January 12, 1895, February 1, 1895, October 9, 1908, October 18, 1915.
464 Baltimore Sun, March 7, 1907, March 8, 1907, January 12, 1911, August 12, 1911, November 20, 1911.
465 Baltimore Sun, July 19, 1914.
Ninety-three of them are shown in the map published by the Roland Park Company in the Baltimore Sun, January 24, 1915.

Brief histories of these suburbs were written by Emily E. Lantz and published in the Baltimore Sun, October 15, 1905, October 29, 1905, November 12, 1905, December 17, 1905.

The American, April 26, 1890; Baltimore Sun, February 8, 1891, May 10, 1892, May 11, 1892, July 9, 1896, April 14, 1898, April 15, 1900, March 10, 1904, March 17, 1905, March 18, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, February 4, 1903.

Baltimore Sun, July 20, 1903.


Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1911, June 23, 1912.

Baltimore Sun, June 23, 1910.

See the Baltimore American and Baltimore Sun, for countless depressing examples in the years from 1900 to 1917.

Baltimore Sun, January 4, 1895.

Baltimore Sun, April 22, 1907; Baltimore Sun, Afro American, November 30, 1895.

Baltimore Sun, June 19, 1901.

Baltimore Sun, May 12, 1894; American, May 6, 1894.

American May 13, 1894.

American May 26, 1897.

Baltimore Sun, November 12, 1906.

Baltimore Sun, October 27, 1900; Baltimore Sun, May 10, 1903, July 30, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1905.

Baltimore Sun, October 17, 1909.


Baltimore Sun, September 25, 1905; Baltimore Sun, July 28, 1910.

See “Picturesque Reisterstown” in The American, November 5, 1897.

Baltimore Sun, July 10, 1907.

Baltimore Sun, May 8, 1909.


Baltimore Sun Supplement, November 3, 1894; Baltimore Sun, January 14, 1906, April 8, 1906, January 4, 1907, February 9, 1910, July 17, 1910, February 26, 1912, April 9, 1916.

In 1910 Baltimore County had just over 122,000 residents of which about 90,000 lived in the suburban districts; that is the 1st, 3rd, 9th, 12th (which in 1910 was subdivided into the 14th and 15th districts), and 13th. The old 12th district running from the eastern city line out to Sparrows Point and Middle River, had over 45,000 people while the upscale western and northern suburbs held just about the same amount and another 10,000 lived in the 13th district southwest of the city.

Baltimore Sun, December 17, 1900.

Baltimore Sun, September 26, 1908, December 10, 1908, December 14, 1908.
County School Superintendent Charles B. Rogers estimated that the free textbook law had brought a substantial influx of new students into the schools at Highlandtown and Canton, but overall the increase was probably ten percent. *The American*, March 12, 1897.